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
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CAMPAIGN OF 1870–1871

THE

GERMAN ARTILLERY

IN THE BATTLES NEAR METZ

COMPILED FROM THE OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE ARTILLERY

BY

E. HOFFBAUER

CAPTAIN IN THE PRUSSIAN ARTILLERY, AND INSTRUCTOR IN THE ARTILLERY AND ENGINEER ACADEMY

TRANSLATED BY CAPTAIN HOLLIST, R.A.

DEPARTMENT OF ARTILLERY STUDIES

WITH MAPS AND PLANS

HENRY S. KING & CO.
65 CORNHILL & 12 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON
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
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of the approximate Positions of the Ist and IInd German
and of the French Armies on the 14th August 1870
shortly before the Commencement of the battle.



Henry S King & Co. 65 Cornhill, London.

THE GERMAN ARTILLERY

IN THE

BATTLES NEAR METZ.

FIRST PART.

I.

EVENTS FROM THE 4TH OF AUGUST TO THE BATTLE OF METZ ON THE 14TH.

THE affair of Weissenburg on the 4th of August was followed by the victorious battles of Wörth and Spicheren on the 6th. MacMahon's army was shattered at Wörth. Pressed by the Third German Army, under the command of H.R.H. the Crown Prince, its fragments hurried without halting to the Moselle; they dared not reassemble even behind the line of the Saar. After its defeat at Spicheren the army of Napoleon was compelled to retreat rapidly on Châlons. A portion of the 6th Corps, which should have arrived on that battle field by train, was turned back. More deliberate reflection resulted in the French Army of the Rhine retiring behind the Nied.

The Germans now determined to march with concentrated forces on the Seille and Moselle, for it was expected that, behind these rivers, the French would collect their armies for a decisive battle. To effect this it was necessary to make a complete wheel to the right, the First Army forming the pivot; consequently the Third Army would have to make very long marches, while those of the First Army would be short. So much the more necessary was it that the advance of the First Army should be

stayed,[1] because the Second required time to reach the line of the Sarre in its forward march; and the Third Army had to fear no danger and scarcely any effective resistance from the flying enemy, weaker in numbers as well as in *moral.*

The intention of the French to fight a battle with their forces concentrated behind the Nied was not realised. According to the journal of Lieut.-Col. Fay, the French head-quarters received on the 10th of August information generally correct as to the strength and plans of the three German armies. That the plan was abandoned must be attributed to this information, and not alone to the weak points presented by the position on the Nied, counterbalanced though they were by some advantages.

It was determined then to retire to the camp at Metz, which, on the advance of the German armies towards Paris, would serve as a base for flank operations. Consequently the French army, on the 11th of August, took up the following positions in front of Forts Queuleu and St. Julien:—

The left wing of the 4th Corps rested on the Moselle, the right on the ravine of Vallières—astride the road to St. Barbe: the 3rd Corps in the centre stretched from that point to Grigy, astride the Saarbrück road, and in front of the village of Borny: the 2nd Corps in front of Queuleu, on the high ground above the village of Peltre, from the Strasburg road to the front of Magny sur Seille. Lapasset's brigade occupied the château and the approaches to Mercy le Haut, where the engineers had intrenched the ground to strengthen this important point. The 6th Corps, arriving gradually from Châlons, encamped partly on the right bank of the Moselle near Montigny, and partly on the high ground near Woippy. The Guard was in reserve to the left of Borny; the 3rd Division of the Cavalry Reserve, which had reached Metz on the 9th of August, encamped at Montigny. The 1st Division of the Cavalry Reserve, with three regiments of the Chasseurs d'Afrique as well as the supply parks of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Corps, were on the island of Chambière.

The line of French outposts, which was actually maintained

[1] The prosecution of the forward movement on the part of the First Army alone, after the battle of Spicheren, would have exposed it to the numerically superior forces of the adversary, and also to the danger of being beaten when isolated.

up to the commencement of the battle of the 14th of August, ran (looking from the French position) forward from Magny by Peltre, Jury, Ars-Laquenexy, Château d'Aubigny, Montigny, Montoy, Noisseville, Servigny and Poix, as far as the Moselle. All these places were occupied by French troops. The rain, which had fallen heavily on the previous night and on the morning of the 11th, had seriously inconvenienced the troops. Marshal MacMahon reached the Moselle on the 11th of August, and on the 14th the 5th Corps (de Failly) was at Lamarche, the remainder of his army being at Neufchâteau.

Meanwhile the German armies had resumed offensive operations. The 12th of August brought them to the German Nied and south of that river and a great part of the cavalry further to the west. Smaller detachments of cavalry succeeded in destroying the railroad at Nancy and Maxville. A similar enterprise at Pont à Mousson failed on the first attempt, but telegraphic communication between Metz and Nancy by Thionville was interrupted on the 11th. The Third Army reached the obstacle of the Saar on the 12th, and a portion of the cavalry and the left wing followed the track of MacMahon's left wing beyond it.

The German First and Second Armies found the French Nied, and the Third Army the Saar, unoccupied by the enemy.

Extensive camps, which were seen in front of the forts of Metz on the right bank of the Moselle, left no doubt of the presence of considerable bodies of troops there. The French army did not appear as yet to have relinquished all idea of offensive action, reinforcements having been continually brought up by the Châlons railway. Obviously MacMahon could endeavour, at least with a part of his army, to effect a junction with the Emperor Napoleon on the left bank of the Moselle.

Under these circumstances the Germans decided on a rapid and decisive course of action. To force the camp of Metz, in order to obtain a decisive result, was out of the question; the only course to be pursued was to outflank the enemy, preventing at the same time any forward movement on his part. A passage of the Moselle to the north of Metz, which appears to have been greatly feared at that time by the French, could only serve a secondary object, as the destruction of the railway to Thionville,

or as a demonstration. The following considerations pointed to a passage of the Moselle south of Metz, and especially at Pont à Mousson:—

The general direction of the roads;

The direction of the railway from Metz to Châlons;

The intention of penetrating between the armies of Metz and of MacMahon;

The desire of preserving communication with the Third Army, whose general direction was prescribed by its pursuit of Marshal MacMahon.

The task of preventing any forward movement on the part of the enemy in front of Metz fell naturally to the First Army; that of outflanking him on the south, to the Second Army. A strong pressure on MacMahon's left wing would eventually be effected to check his movements in a northerly direction, but it was also certain that the enemy would not wait inactive for the completion of the turning movement, as soon as he became aware of it.

The French army could avoid being surrounded either by a retreat on Verdun, or by an offensive movement in a southerly direction on either side of the Moselle. A retreat on Verdun would give up a large extent of country without a battle, but on the other hand would bring about a junction with MacMahon, with the troops at Châlons, and with those on the march to that place. If commenced at the right moment such a movement could scarcely be interrupted. In both cases a possibility of success was opened to the inferior numbers of the French by assuming the offensive at the moment when the German armies stood astride the Moselle and Seille. The configuration of the ground on the right bank of the Moselle was more favourable to an offensive movement than that on the left bank, but the French army would there be exposed to an attack by superior forces. On the left bank neither the form of the ground nor the direction of the roads favoured such a movement, but it possessed these advantages—a safe retreat behind the Meuse in the event of failure, and a nearer approach to the direct railway communication between Metz and Châlons and to MacMahon's army. In either case it was important to assume

the offensive at the right moment, for which purpose it would be necessary to occupy the principal passages of the Moselle by detachments of all arms. Offensive operations on the left bank seemed under existing conditions to offer the best chance of success, but an immediate evacuation of the right bank of the river was necessary in order to reach the plateau of Gravelotte.

The Germans were however compelled to maintain an offensive attitude on the right bank, the French army being yet on that side of the river. Consequently it was incumbent on the German army to select points of passage over the Moselle beyond the reach of the nearest fort, and instantly seize Pont à Mousson the most important of them ; to prosecute the flank march with the Second Army without delay, and in such a way as to preserve its communication with the First Army so that it should be ready in conjunction with that army to meet any offensive movement on the right bank of the Moselle ; to reach the Moselle with an extended front at several points of passage simultaneously ; and to conceal the whole movement as much as possible, which it would be able to do by means of its strong body of cavalry.

Let us now glance at the German operations previous to the battle of the 14th of August. The First Army arrived on the 13th on the French Nied, which was crossed by the advanced parties of the advanced guard.

Head-quarters of the Army at Varize.

On the 13th and until the commencement of the battle, the line of the Prussian outposts ran along the front of the villages Orny, Laquenexy, Colligny, by the 'Maison isolée' and Retonsay to St. Barbe. The army was disposed as follows :—

IST ARMY CORPS.

Head-quarters at Courcelles-Chaussy.

1ST INFANTRY DIVISION (Lieut.-General von Bentheim) : main body and corps artillery at Courcelles-Chaussy ;—advanced guard (Major-General Freiherr von Falkenstein) : 2nd Infantry brigade, 1st Rifle battalion, 1st Dragoons, 1st field division (Major Munk) at Pont à Chaussy ; main body of the outposts

(Colonel von Busse), with the 1st Light field battery, at the Tuileries de Landremont.[1]

2ND INFANTRY DIVISION (Major-General von Pritzelwitz): main body, to which were attached the 5th and 6th Heavy batteries of the 3rd field division (Major Müller), at Landonvillers;—advanced guard (Major-General von Memerty): 44th regiment of infantry, two squadrons of the 10th Dragoons, 5th and 6th Light batteries of the 2nd field division, in front of Les Étangs.

VIITH ARMY CORPS.

Head-quarters at Pange.

ADVANCED GUARD (Major-General Baron von der Goltz): 26th Infantry brigade, 7th Rifle battalion, 8th Hussars, 5th and 6th Light batteries of the 3rd field division at Laquenexy.

13TH INFANTRY DIVISION (Lieut.-General von Glümer), to which were attached the 5th and 6th Heavy batteries of the 3rd field division (Major Wilhelmi), at Pange.

14TH INFANTRY DIVISION (Lieut.-General von Kamecke) at Domangeville.

CORPS ARTILLERY at Bazancourt.

3RD CAVALRY DIVISION (Lieut.-General Count von der Groeben), to which the 1st Horse Artillery battery of the 7th Westphalian field artillery regiment was attached, at Bry, patrolling beyond St. Barbe.

1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (Lieut.-General von Hartmann), to which was attached the 1st Horse Artillery battery of the 1st East Prussian field artillery regiment, at Pontoy, with patrols towards Frontigny and Orny. On the left of the 1st Cavalry Division at Orny lay the foremost troops[2] of the advanced guard of the 18th Infantry Division (Colonel von Brandenstein): two battalions of the 36th regiment of infantry, two squadrons of the 6th Dragoons, the 2nd Light battery of the 1st field

[1] Throughout this work the larger unit of troops is written with a capital initial,—Division. A division of artillery consisted of four batteries,—two Heavy (6 pr.) and two Light (4 pr.).—TRANS.

[2] These troops arrived on the evening of the 14th, and are consequently included in the detail of the army.

division of the 9th field artillery regiment. The main body of this Division was at Buchy. These positions were held by the First Army until the battle on the 14th.

The Second Army occupied the following positions on the 14th :—The IIIrd Army Corps, Chéminot—Vigny ; the 6th Cavalry Division pushed forward towards Metz, supported by the IIIrd Army Corps ;

The IXth Army Corps at Buchy ;

„ XIIth „ „ Solgne ;

„ Xth „ „ Pont à Mousson,

with its advanced guard pushed forward beyond the river ;

The 5th Cavalry Division at Thiaucourt and towards the road Metz—Verdun ;

The Guard Corps—head-quarters at Sivry, main body at Arreye, advanced guard at Thionville, cavalry further forward ;[1]

The IVth Army Corps at Manhoué, advanced guard at Armancourt ;

The IInd Army Corps at Faulquemont ;

Head-quarters of the army at Pont à Mouss n.

The Third Army stood on the 14th with the IInd Bavarian Army Corps at Mojenvic ;

The 4th Cavalry Division being advanced in the direction of Nancy ;

The Vth Prussian Army Corps at Einville, supported by the Wurtemberg Division ;

The XIth Prussian Army Corps at Luneville ;

„ VIth „ „ { 12th Infantry Division at Dieuze ;
{ 11th „ „ „ Hening ;

„ Ist Bavarian Army Corps at Bourdonnay.

The execution of the plans above detailed is seen in these operations :—

1. The flank march by the Second Army was in progress and in part completed. Three army corps (the IIIrd, IXth, and XIIth) and the 6th Cavalry Division stood in the 1st line facing Metz, ready to make head against offensive operations in a southerly direction. The remainder of the Second Army had ap-

[1] The leading troops of the advanced guard reached Bernecourt, Flixy, and Thiaucourt.

proached the Moselle by rapid marches in rear of that position, and the most important passage of the Moselle, Pont à Mousson, was already occupied.

2. The First Army, in its position on and beyond the French Nied, was in contact with the enemy; and being in communication with the Second Army, was so situated that it could co-operate with it, should the enemy assume the offensive.

3. The Third Army was pursuing vigorously with its left wing. Its right was held back, was in communication with the Second Army, and in position to support it, should Bazaine press it back by an offensive thrust on the right bank of the Moselle.

With regard to the part played by the cavalry in masking these movements the following words dictated, and possibly written, by Napoleon may be cited.[1] 'The Prussians concealed their movements so successfully behind the formidable veil of cavalry which they threw before them in all directions, that the position of their main body was never really known.' The French Commander in Chief is moreover censured, apparently with justice, for never having endeavoured to penetrate this veil. It is true detachments up to the strength of single squadrons were habitually sent out for reconnoitring purposes; but they had little chance of obtaining their object in face of the masses of cavalry employed by the Germans for objects of security and reconnaissance. There is no mention whatever of the French having employed whole cavalry divisions either of the reserve or army corps for reconnoitring in force. The destruction of the railways and telegraphs on the left bank of the Moselle above Metz was a warning to the French headquarters to look seriously at their own position.

The council of war assembled on the 12th decided for retreat on Châlons, which received the sanction of the Emperor. According to Fay's account, the want of sufficient supplies and ammunition appears conclusively to have determined him to give up the project of remaining with the army in the camp at Metz. On the same day Napoleon yielded to the pressure of public opinion and laid the command in the hands of Marshal Bazaine.

[1] *Campagne de 1870: des Causes qui ont amené la Capitulation de Sédan. Par un officier attaché à l'État Major-Général.* Bruxelles: S. Rozez.

The 13th ought to have given the French army a greater insight into the existing state of German operations. Communication between Metz and Paris by Nancy was interrupted, Pont à Mousson in German hands, the transport of troops from the camps at Châlons discontinued; slight collisions had taken place between the outposts at Château d'Aubigny and in the forests near Mercy le Haut. On the approach of the Germans the inhabitants flocked out of the villages, hurrying with bag and baggage towards Metz and causing great confusion there. With regard to the garrison of Metz, it was decided that the Division Laveaucoupet of the 2nd Corps should form the nucleus, and to it were to be joined four battalions, the national guard, sendentary guards, and men unable to march, formed into several detachments.

On taking over the command, Marshal Bazaine, in accordance with the decision of the council of war, received orders to cross the Moselle forthwith, in order to lead his troops towards the plains of Champagne.

Since the loss of the pontoon train at Forbach the means of throwing bridges over the Moselle were scanty, and had to be supplemented by trestle bridges. The sudden rise of water in that river and the Seille during the night between the 12th and 13th had, however, partially destroyed some of the trestle bridges which had been commenced and sunk the shore-ends of others. Consequently the commanding engineer of the army considered it impossible to commence the passage of the river before the morning of the 14th.

Marshal Bazaine, according to his own account, represented to the Emperor Napoleon the danger of the movement across the river. He proved that, owing to the propinquity and watchfulness of the enemy, it might be the cause of bringing on a battle under conditions unfavourable to the French army; that it was preferable either to await an attack in the selected position near Metz, or to assume the offensive on the right bank of the Moselle at the moment the enemy was executing his flank march. In the event of success, he intended to march with the Army of the Rhine to Frouard, and take up a position on the plateau of Haye, betweer

Nancy and Toul, which would command the eastern railway. To this Napoleon replied, on the 13th, by forwarding a despatch from the Empress, which confirmed a rumour already brought to his notice that the march of German troops towards Nancy was merely a demonstration in that quarter. It spoke also of the intention of Prince Frederick Charles to unite with General von Steinmetz and to pass the Moselle below Metz in the neighbourhood of Thionville, in order to march round the Army of the Rhine in that direction; and it inferred that the junction with the Crown Prince would consequently be effected near Verdun. On the ground of this report, which bore on its face the stamp of improbability, the Emperor again urged on the immediate passage of the army to the left bank, and Bazaine considered it his duty to execute this renewed order with the least possible delay.

II.

BATTLE OF METZ (COURCELLES—BORNY) ON THE 14TH OF AUGUST, 1870.

1. *The movements of the French Army of the Rhine on the 14th up to the commencement of the battle.*

IT is remarkable that the night of the 13th of August passed away without any of the numerous trains being passed over the river by means of the two available stone bridges and the railway bridge.

The orders published on the evening of the 13th were still in force. 'The army will be ready to march at 5 A.M. to-morrow. Every man is to carry provisions for three days, and the Intendant-General is to take as many rations as possible, &c.' An order was indeed issued from head-quarters limiting the officers' baggage to the utmost, but probably was not obeyed very strictly, for Colonel Fay makes this a subject of reproach against Marshal Bazaine; and, indeed, according to French accounts the Army of the Rhine resembled that of Darius in the amount of its baggage.

The passage of the river was not commenced until early on the 14th; no wonder, then, that at four in the afternoon three army corps were still on the right bank. On this subject Bazaine says in his official report: 'The movement of the troops should have been from both wings, and so the semicircle which they formed in front of Queuleu and St. Julien would have been gradually diminished till they came under the protection of the guns of Fort Belle Croix. The instructions on this head were not adhered to, and the consequent delays brought on the battle of Borny at a much greater distance from the line of ramparts than would otherwise have been the case.'

2. *Remarks on the field of battle.*

(1) The battle field lay between two concentric arcs of circles having Metz as a centre. The smaller arc extended from Fort Queuleu by Borny to Fort St. Julien; the larger by Jury, Ogy, and St. Barbe to Vremy. Radii passing through the southernmost point of St. Julien and the northernmost point of Queuleu formed the boundaries of the field on the north and south respectively.

(2) The main position, occupied by the French at the beginning of the battle, extended from Grigy by Grange aux Bois to Colombey, and thence west of the defile of La Planchette—Lauvallier by the wood of Mey to the chapel of La Salette on the high road from Metz to Bouzonville. The position was supported by the fortress of Metz, whose proximity allowed its guns to take part in the battle. The works on this side were; —the strong permanent work of St. Julien, with its outworks almost complete; Fort Queuleu, as yet unfinished, whose armament, according to French accounts, was not ready on the day of the battle; and the fort of Belle Croix, to a certain extent serving as a curtain to the other forts. The newly constructed lines near Les Bordes were also adapted for the reception of guns. St. Julien and Queuleu were of the utmost importance, as they supported the flanks of the position.

(3) The ground generally is undulating, hilly, and cut up by ravines; more open towards the north and east, but close towards the south. The plateau of St. Barbe sends out two considerable spurs; one beyond the eastern boundary of the battle field and running parallel with it to a point south-east of Colligny, the other towards Fort St. Julien. The western slope of the first spur, with which we are most concerned, is richly furrowed by the hollows formed by numerous streams converging in the general direction of the roads and lanes to Metz. Between these hollows the slope stretches out in long, narrow, and gentle spurs falling away by steep inclines into the valley Ars-Laquenexy—Colombey—Lauvallier, as well as into those parts of the neighbouring defiles which are nearest to the main valley, the opposite side of which also bears a similar character. It is impos-

sible for troops in close formation to cross the main valley anywhere, on account of the vineyards covering the sides of the hollows, and of the dense plantations of trees and hedges running along the banks of the streams; and the lateral defiles, for similar reasons, can only be traversed in their upper parts, and even then the roads must be followed. Cavalry and artillery are limited to the roads everywhere. The thick plantations which extend throughout the valley from Ars-Laquenexy to the north of Colombey and the great number of small woods prevent artillery acting with efficiency. Moreover it follows from the peculiar formation of the western slope that there are many positions astride the high roads and lanes fronting the west, where small detachments of troops can make a prolonged resistance to superior numbers.

The other spur, bold and strongly marked, slopes away gently from the plateau of St. Barbe to Fort St. Julien, has an extensive command towards the west and south, and is the key of the position. It folds round the valley of La Planchette—Lauvallier, and would therefore take in flank any attack made from the east in that direction. Close to its crest extends the wood of Mey, which was not only of considerable importance from its position, but possessed a great power of defence, being thickly grown and artificially strengthened. On the north and south this ridge has the appearance of a wall, and limits the view in those directions. The northern slope of the spur to the east of Villers l'Orme is unbroken, and is passable for all arms, though difficult in some places. The western side is broken up into long ridges and hollows, and is easier of access. The southern slope, gentle in the high ground, becomes steeper towards the lower, declining abruptly into the valley of Vallières—Noisseville. In consequence of this sharp descent, and of the existing vineyards, troops in close formation, marching either up or down the hill, are confined to the roads.

The configuration of the valley of Nouilly resembles that of Lauvallier—Colombey. Of more importance is the ridge, which rises in gentle gradations from Ars-Laquenexy, and, curving slightly to the west, extends to the north of Fort Queuleu. The slope towards the stream of the Chenau is gentle, that on the south and west more steep; but the movements of troops are

there less hampered than among the vineyards which cover the ground in front. The higher ground towards the west and south, between Basse Bevoye and Mercy le Haut, commanded and outflanked the French right wing, and this could not be effectually prevented by Fort Queuleu, which is situated on a lower level, and was still unfinished on the day of the battle. An attacking force would gain a decisive advantage by the occupation of this ground, inasmuch as its configuration admits of the employment of all arms.

The main position of the French army was a range of hills in the shape of a horse-shoe, lying eastwards from Les Bordes between the valley Colombey—Lauvalliers—Vallières and the stream of the Chenau; it had a good command of the ground towards the east, but was itself commanded from the south and north. The position slopes gently towards the exterior of the circle, and then, by falling sharply towards the valley, increases the difficulties of that obstacle. There, on its southern and steeper side, is the wood of Borny, thick with brushwood and divided into two portions. The eastern portion, the scene of a protracted struggle, is remarkable for its dense underwood, want of paths, and its artificial defences. The other was of importance on account of the adjoining fir wood north-west of Colombey, which formed a more remote although valuable support to the position. On the inner side also the ridge falls away with an easy slope, forming a gully, which affords sheltered positions without impeding the manœuvres of troops. The villages mentioned in the following account have massive stone houses with tiled roofs, lying close to each other and surrounded with orchards and gardens. The *enceintes* are enclosed by walls and hedges. The isolated homesteads also bear the same character. The natural convergence of the many roads and paths towards Metz from the east is favourable to the concentration of advancing troops; but, on the other hand, it facilitates the judiciously timed employment of reserves by the defender from his concentrated position. The roads were generally firm and good, but away from them the ground was heavy for guns, for the persistent rain of the previous days had softened the clayey soil; and especially was this the case on the slopes near Nouilly, Noisseville, Montoy, La Planchette, and on the west of Coincy, &c.

The terrain on the whole offered more facilities for defence than for attack, and had been carefully strengthened by numerous intrenchments, abattis, shelter trenches, and batteries. Under these circumstances artillery and infantry could act on the defensive with advantage, though but slight opportunity was presented for the effective employment of cavalry on either side.

Let us now close the consideration of the field of battle with a review of the French position.

Advantages: (1) A very formidable obstacle covering the greater part of the position;

(2) Extensive command of the ground towards the east, where it was not intercepted by the village gardens and overgrown hollows;

(3) Excellent sheltered positions for infantry and artillery;

(4) Numerous points of support in woods, homesteads, &c.;

(5) The possibility of keeping reserves and other troops under cover until wanted;

(6) The power of advancing for offensive action from the flanks of the position with a broad front;

(7) Safe retreat on the fortress in the vicinity;

(8) Co-operation of the guns of the fortress, more particularly in support of the flanks.

Disadvantages: (1) The position being severed by the defile of Vallières;

(2) The possibility of concealed attacks being made against the right wing;

(3) The wings resting on no good positions, the right being completely exposed.

We arrive therefore at the conclusion that the flanks were the weak points of the French position, more particularly the right flank. It was extremely difficult to form any correct idea of the position or to observe the effect of our fire owing to the smoke, which lay thick, and to the fact that the sun shone on the backs of the enemy and full in the faces of our troops. As it sank towards the horizon these difficulties were proportionally increased.

3. *The attack by the advanced guard of the* VIIth *Army Corps—Arrival of part of the* 1st *Army Corps in the line of battle—Dispositions of the French at the beginning of the battle—Further reinforcements to the* 1st *Army Corps and to the* 13*th Division.*

Towards 2.30 in the afternoon unanimous reports from the cavalry patrols and outposts reached the advanced guard of the VIIth Army Corps that the enemy was retiring from his camps before Metz. General von der Goltz, who had received unofficial information of the passage of a part of the Second Army over the Moselle at Pont à Mousson in the morning, looked on the enemy's retreat as a consequence of that movement. A successful attempt to delay the enemy on the right bank would disconcert his plans, and operate most injuriously on the passage of the Army of the Rhine to the other banks. Thereupon General von der Goltz decided to move forward with his advanced guard, feel the enemy, and, if possible, compel him again to bring his whole army into line. The commanders of the troops on the flanks and rear—1st Army Corps, head-quarters and both divisions of the VIIth—were made acquainted with this decision and their eventual support requested.

General von der Goltz at once attacked (3.30 P.M.), for there was no time to lose. The answers of the officers commanding the troops came in during the engagement, promising their co-operation. General von Manteuffel was close to the field of battle, having ridden to the outposts at 1.30 P.M., and was there informed that the camps beyond Servigny and Borny were broken up, and that that near Metz had become smaller. He distinctly observed a considerable movement in the French camp, and strong columns were seen on the march. Having watched them for some time, he concluded from the direction of their line of march and from the general strategic state of affairs, that the French intended to throw themselves either on the VIIth Army Corps or on the Second Army, which they knew to be in the act of crossing the Moselle.[1] The general commanding

[1] The First Army had received orders to attack the enemy if he advanced towards the south against the flank of the Second Army.

consequently sent off his adjutants to put the troops on the alert, so that they might be ready for immediate disposal. After 4 P.M. General von Manteuffel heard guns in a southerly direction, and the gradual increase of the firing told him that a warm engagement was going on in that quarter. Presently an adjutant from General von der Goltz brought the news, already mentioned, and the Ist Army Corps was ordered to push forward rapidly by the two roads on which it was echeloned.

All this was reported to the Commander in Chief of the army, and the general in command immediately issued orders for the troops to attack vigorously and drive back the enemy, but not to allow themselves to be drawn under the fire of the guns of the fortress.

To return to the attack of General von der Goltz: The column was preceded by an advanced guard under Colonel von Delitz (1st and 2nd battalions of the 15th regiment, 6th Light field battery, and one squadron of the 8th Hussars) in the direction of Colombey, west of Marsilly, and was covered by the 7th Rifle battalion marching by Ars-Laquenexy. The main body, under Colonel von Barby (Fusilier battalion of the 15th regiment, the 55th regiment, and 5th Light field battery), was directed on Marsilly, with its right flank covered by three squadrons of Hussars between Marsilly and Ogy.

It was not intended to advance beyond Colombey at present. The Hussars on the right flank soon had a slight skirmish with the enemy's dragoons. On the repulse of the latter, the 5th Light field battery (Captain Schreiber) was advanced to the west of Marsilly, but as soon as it opened fire, the enemy, who showed himself near Château d'Aubigny, withdrew.[1] Our infantry deploying meanwhile, moved on in pursuit, so that the 6th Light battery under Captain Gasch, which had taken up a position near Schreiber's battery, had no longer an object for its fire. Some riflemen had also met with advanced parties of the enemy's infantry near Ars-Laquenexy and pushed them back. Advancing further, the right wing of the infantry came under a heavy artillery fire in the defile of Coincy, which was opened on

[1] It was evident that the enemy's advanced parties, who alone had been visible up to this time, were yielding easily to the determined attack of the advanced guard of the VIIth Army Corps.

it by the enemy. As the infantry advanced, so did the batteries. Leaving its second position south of Coincy, Schreiber's battery took up another to the south-west of that village, where Schreiber had a horse killed under him. Gasch, under orders from General von der Goltz, moved his battery into its second position north of Château d'Aubigny, and after firing for a short time against some infantry in a thinly planted wood from 1,400 to 1,600 paces distant, it and Schreiber's battery engaged some guns which appeared at a range of 1,800 to 2,400 paces. The enemy brought up more and more artillery into position, so that the batteries were overwhelmed with shell and shrapnel, and were at the same time exposed to the fire of musketry. Gasch's battery, however, alone suffered, Second Lieutenant Dieterici being severely wounded; and as the French guns had now got the range and were making their more powerful and accurate fire felt, the battery was obliged to change its position, and retiring, placed itself on Schreiber's left. The commander of the 3rd field division (Major Wilhelmi) on the staff of Lieut.-General von Glümer, soon afterwards arrived on the battle field and took command of the two batteries.

Beyond Colombey the attack made by von der Goltz was brought to a stand-still by the superior strength of the enemy, but not before it had attained its object. The zeal of some of the infantry had carried them close to the small pine wood north-west of Colombey; but there the brigade found it hard to keep its ground, for the French continued to deploy heavier masses and lead them to the attack. Intrenchments and shelter trenches, together with the form of the ground, afforded a protection to their infantry, while abattis barred the way to the Prussians, now exposed to a deadly fire of small arms added to that of large and continually increasing numbers of guns and mitrailleurs.

While further reinforcements from the VIIth Army Corps marched to the immediate support of von der Goltz's brigade, the 1st Army Corps became actively engaged on its right flank. The 1st Light field battery of the 1st East Prussian field artillery regiment (Captain Hoffbauer) was permitted by the commander of the advanced parties of the 1st Division to move forward to the piquets of the outposts, which were then on the

march. When near the 'Maison isolée' on the Saarbrück high road, it received orders from the general in command to come into action on the right flank of von der Goltz's brigade; and a squadron of the 1st Dragoons was told off as its escort. A smart trot soon brought the battery (4.45 P.M.) to its first position near Colombey, which it took up with the sanction of the commander of its division (Major Munk), who joined it at that moment. Lieut.-General von Glümer, coming up at the same time, wished the battery to be placed on the Saarbrück high road, but this could not be immediately done, because the defile of La Planchette had not yet been reconnoitred. Major Munk then left the battery to order the other batteries of the division to the front. Only a few rounds had been fired at the enemy's infantry seen on the western border of the heights, when the infantry of the right wing of von der Goltz's brigade rushed forward close to the small pine wood immediately on the north-west of Colombey, and masked the battery, which ceased firing. In the distance the 1st Dragoons and the 1st field division were now seen approaching by the Saarbrück road, and Prussian infantry was advancing in the defile Coincy—La Planchette. At that moment the enemy attacked the troops occupying the pine wood, and surrounded them with superior numbers. Under these circumstances Hoffbauer's battery (5 P.M.) moved to its second position on the Saarbrück road, and opened fire with shell at 900–1,000 paces with the object of extricating the infantry. A gun, capsized in crossing the Coincy defile, soon came up into line. The enemy's columns suddenly disappeared, and their place was taken by long lines of skirmishers, one behind the other; mitrailleurs and guns also opened fire. For a few minutes the battery was exposed to a heavy fire from skirmishers in the vineyards of La Planchette adjoining the defile of Montoy, but opening fire with case at 400 paces, it cleared the ground. The losses of the battery were considerable. The battery commander was severely wounded when taking up the position; two officers, Ganda and Ottzenn, were afterwards slightly wounded; all the officers' horses except one were killed or wounded.[1]

At this moment riflemen and infantry from the advanced

[1] The captain's second horse, which had remained with the second line of waggons, was severely wounded later in the day under Lieut. Krause.

guard of the 1st Division advanced through the defile of Montoy, and strong reinforcements of artillery reached that part of the battle field (5.15 to 5.30 P.M.) The three remaining batteries of the 1st field division led by their divisional commander, Major Munk, advanced at a trot and came into action under a heavy fire of infantry, artillery, and mitrailleurs; the 1st and 2nd Heavy batteries (Captains von Horn and von Selle) south of the high road, on the left front of the 1st Light battery,[1] which afterwards moved up into line; the 2nd Light battery, Captain Puppel, on the left flank of the heavy batteries, and somewhat retired owing to the configuration of the ground. Major Wilhelmi placed the 6th Heavy battery of the 7th Westphalian field artillery regiment, Captain von Gostkowski, in a good position, with its right flank resting on Montoy, and supported by a squadron of the 1st Dragoons. Mention will be made below of the 5th Heavy battery, which was brought into action on another part of the field at the same time.

From the very beginning of the action all these batteries between the defiles of Montoy and Coincy sustained heavy losses, almost entirely from the fire of infantry and mitrailleurs. Major Munk and Captain Puppel were so severely wounded that they had to give up their commands respectively to Captain von Horn and First Lieutenant Hardt. Lieutenants Hoffman and Korsch were also wounded. First Lieutenant Stein and Second Lieutenant Herford of von Horn's battery, as well as the commander and Lieutenants Rettberg and Hauszmann of von Gostkowski's battery, had horses killed under them. The objects

[1] In accordance with the desire expressed in a high quarter, some remarks are here made about the fire of this battery. It opened fire at 800 paces. Nothing could be seen except the smoke of concealed skirmishers and the flash of guns. It was extremely difficult to observe the burst of the 4-pr. shell, in consequence of the position of the sun and the brisk fire of the enemy, so that it was not until several shots had been fired that it became evident that the elevation was too low. It was therefore altered for 900, and afterwards for 1,000 paces, and at both ranges hits appeared to be made. The correction was made by altering the tangent scale marked with paces, with which the batteries had been provided shortly before the beginning of the campaign, so that it was unnecessary to use the deflection-scale. Twice after opening fire the battery had seen the enemy—once when the skirmishers were driven up the slope in their rear by case, and afterwards when towards evening the enemy's artillery executed a flank march on the opposite ridge. Then the guns and waggons showed out in dark outlines against the bright sky.

aimed at by the batteries were nearly the same. The enemy's artillery as well as infantry was shelled with great success at ranges of from 800 to 1,000 paces by the nearer batteries, and from 1,400 to 1,600 paces by the more distant batteries. The batteries on the left wing mostly directed their fire on the pine wood north-west of Colombey, where the infantry of the 13th Division was hotly engaged. When the battle commenced, the 1st battalion of the 44th regiment had moved forward to the front line of the outposts for the purpose of relieving the two squadrons of the 10th Dragoons attached to the advanced guard of the 2nd Division, which were greatly fatigued. This was consequently the first battalion of the 1st Army Corps that appeared on the field of battle. The batteries of the advanced guard, escorted by two squadrons of the 10th Dragoons, had, however, preceded it. The 5th Light field battery (Schweickart) and the 6th Light (Dolmann) had taken up a position west of the line Montoy —Noisseville (5–5.15 P.M.), the former north and the latter south of the Saarbrück high road. A heavy fire from guns and mitrailleurs under cover was directed on both batteries, without causing them much loss, and they succeeded in materially harassing some columns of infantry on the march from 2,500 to 3,000 paces distant.

Meanwhile the 1st battalion of the 44th regiment had come up, and was directed to march through Noisseville and round the north of that village to Nouilly. The attack was supported by the fire of the batteries, and, in spite of heavy losses, the battalion drove the enemy back into the position of Mey.

'At the beginning of the battle,' says the French official account, 'there were on the right bank only Grenier's Division, forming the rear guard of the 4th Corps (General Ladmirault), the 3rd Corps, and the Guard, which were to have been the last to march.' General Decaen had previously directed his corps to retire in echelons. This order was about to be put in execution, when the piquets of Montaudon's and Castagny's Divisions were so hotly attacked as to betoken the 'prelude of a serious engagement.' As soon as Marshal Bazaine was informed of this, he ordered the 3rd Corps to resist the attack.

The French army then occupied the following positions :—

3rd CORPS (Decaen).

The 1st Division (Montaudon) had its right wing resting on the Strasburg road in front of Grigy, its left on the wood of Borny, which it occupied in force.

The 2nd Division (Castagny) occupied the plateau, which lies to the north of Ars-Laquenexy and La Grange aux Bois, and extends as far as the valley near the Château d'Aubigny.

The 3rd Division (Metman) had its right wing behind Colombey and its left on the Saarlouis road.

The 4th Division (Aymard) extended thence to the defile of Vallières.

4th CORPS (Ladmirault).

The 2nd Division (Grenier) extended from Mey to the little chapel of La Salette.[1]

The Guard was in reserve in front of the road Borny—Vantoux; Brincourt's brigade occupied the hill of Fort Queuleu with the divisional batteries, for the support of the right flank of General Decaen's Division.[2]

The French account states:—'The whole of these divisions were formed in two lines, the first deployed and the second in columns of divisions. From the energy displayed by the enemy opposed to Castagny's and Metman's Divisions in maintaining a very brisk fire, there can be no doubt that it was his intention to pierce the centre of the 3rd Corps and seize the Saarlouis road, which he considered to be our line of retreat. The

[1] According to other French statements, the brigade (Bellecourt) on the left flank of the 2nd Division (Grenier) of the 4th Corps was posted in front of the wood of Mey on the heights commanding the valley of Nouilly.

[2] French sources give but few details of this battle. The following information about the French artillery has been discovered:—

1. Batteries of mitrailleurs were posted opposite the wood of Colombey.

2. The 4th Corps (Ladmirault) had posted batteries at an early hour so as to sweep the defile of Nouilly and the ground near Servigny.

It is further stated that 'Ladmirault's mitrailleurs directed an uninterrupted fire against the enemy's infantry, which was pressing on in thick masses in the valley of Nouilly.'

To this the writer can add from personal observation that a mitrailleur battery to the north-west of La Planchette kept up a heavy fire on the ground in its front, and especially on the defile of Montoy. The peculiar shrill noise of those machines and the ricochet of the bullets, resembling that of case, left no doubt of the fact.

battle had hardly commenced at this point when another attack was directed at the same time against Grenier's Division of the 4th Corps.' Whilst the 1st Army Corps attacked vigorously on the right wing of von der Goltz's brigade, troops of the VIIth Army Corps also marched up to its immediate support.

The remainder of Glümer's Division, the 25th infantry brigade, came up by Colligny on the right of von der Goltz's brigade, to support it. Orders were then given to the two heavy batteries to move rapidly to the front. As we already know, Major Wilhelmi placed the 6th Heavy battery (von Gostkowski) close to Montoy. The 5th Heavy battery (Captain Schnackenberg) received orders about 5.15 P.M. to support the infantry on the heights of Colombey, and marched under a heavy fire of infantry to a position near the farm to the north-east of Colombey. The fire of common and shrapnel shell from the enemy was soon added to that of small arms. The pine wood north-west of Colombey was shelled at a range of 1,000 paces for ten minutes, and then the battery had suffered so severely that 'the service of the guns could no longer be properly executed.'[1] It consequently retired. In this position Captain Schnackenberg and First Lieutenant Baehr were severely, and Second Lieutenant Borggreve slightly, wounded.[2] The guns could only be withdrawn by the aid of the infantry and with the greatest difficulty; and the battery, commanded by Second Lieutenant Rühle von Lilienstern, was afterwards ordered to come into action on the left of Schreiber's battery.

4. *Affairs of the advanced guard of the 2nd Division of Infantry near Mey, of the 4th Regiment, and of the advanced parties of the 1st Division of Infantry near Lauvallier and La Planchette—The enemy's left wing is extended—The two heavy batteries of the 2nd Division of Infantry and the battery of the 3rd Division of Cavalry come into action—Arrival of the 25th Brigade of Infantry on the left flank near Colombey.*

Meanwhile the advanced guard of the 2nd Division, consisting of the two other battalions of the 44th regiment, ap-

[1] Account of the 5th Heavy field battery.

[2] Lieuts. Baehr and Borggreve afterwards died of wounds received in this action.

peared on the field of battle. With their assistance, in spite of a heavy fire of mitrailleurs and of musketry supported by that of artillery, possession was gained and retained of the heights of Mey and of the wood near it. The main body of the 2nd Division had also arrived so near that its van formed by the 4th regiment could be employed, and it therefore marched forward at once to the left of the Saarlouis road. When General von Memerty became aware that the right flank of the 44th regiment was threatened, he ordered the fusilier battalion to march round Noisseville towards the north to support it.

The other two battalions placed themselves across the high road fronting Lauvallier, under a very heavy fire of artillery, mitrailleurs, and infantry. The battle progressed but slowly. But presently the 44th regiment fell in with some troops of the 1st Division, which proved to be the advanced parties of the division, consisting of the 43rd regiment and half a battalion of rifles. Colonel von Busse had led them through the defile of Montoy and to the north of it; and they now came into the line of battle near La Planchette and Lauvallier.

A deadly contest ensued for half an hour, which resulted in the Prussian infantry obtaining a firm grasp of the defile of Lauvallier. About this time (towards 6 P.M.) the enemy's left wing was extended. The commander of the 3rd field division, Major Müller, who had come up during the action, led Schweickart's battery (5th Light) into a position north-east of Noisseville. Hostile infantry columns were indeed visible from that spot, but were too distant to be reached with effect. The battery therefore directed its fire with apparently good results against the enemy's mitrailleurs at 1,800 paces, which disappeared after a few rounds.

Soon afterwards the 1st Horse Artillery battery (Schrader) of the 7th field artillery regiment came up, and placed itself in the right rear of Schweickart's battery. When the alarm was sounded at 5 P.M., this battery, with the 3rd Cavalry Division, broke up from its bivouac at Bry, and marched by St. Barbe to the assistance of the 1st Army Corps, which was already engaged. It cannonaded the enemy's guns of the left wing at 2,300 paces apparently with success, but soon left the position in consequence of an order from the 3rd Cavalry Division, which wished to move further to the north.

Nearly simultaneous with the arrival of this battery on the field was that of the two field batteries of the 3rd field division of the 1st regiment (a little before 6 P.M.). They had marched with the main body of the Division as far as Les Étangs at a walk, and then received orders to follow the advanced guard on the high road at a trot. Major Müller posted the 5th Heavy battery, Captain Grasz, on Schweickart's right, while for the present he kept back the 6th Heavy battery, Captain Hellwig. Hostile infantry columns were shelled at 2,500 paces, apparently with success, as was shown by their seeking cover in the inequalities of the ground.

'About 5.15 P.M. the van[1] of the 25th brigade reached the field of battle, followed by the main body at 6 P.M. It was ordered to attack the pine wood north-west of Colombey, the light batteries of the 3rd field division preparing the way by a vigorous fire.[2] Two battalions in close order were left west of Coincy. Then the contest progressed slowly; the brigade forming the advanced guard maintained its position in Colombey with difficulty, and even the 25th brigade (Major-General von Osten-Sacken) gained ground by slow degrees. About 6 P.M. the fight became general, and the 13th Division, bringing up the two battalions, which had been left behind, was hardly able to resist the offensive thrust of its adversary.'

5. *The corps artillery of both army corps comes into line—Arrival of the advanced guard of the* 1*st Infantry Division—Storming of the heights beyond the defile of Lauvallier, La Planchette—Attack of the heights of Mey through the defile of Lauvallier—The artillery of the* 1*st Infantry Division crosses the defile of La Planchette—The French left wing is reinforced and extended—Capture of the wood of Borny by the* 27*th Brigade of Infantry and of the pine wood near Colombey by the* 25*th Brigade of Infantry—Arrival of the troops of the* 18*th Infantry and of the* 1*st Cavalry Division on the left wing.*

Shortly after 6 P.M. the corps artillery of the 1st Army Corps, under Colonel Yungé, arrived on the battle field. The alarm

[1] It seems as if ground had been gained by a charge of infantry.
[2] From the account of the VIIth Army Corps.

having been sounded at 5 P.M., it had been informed by Lieut.-General von Bentheim that three 'column-roads' were available for its use, so as to enable it to reach the fight as soon as possible. Colonel Yungé made use of two roads; that south of the high road for the two light batteries of the 2nd field division, and the high road itself for the remainder of the corps artillery. He led the way along the high road with the horse artillery division (Major Gerhards) at a trot; close in rear followed the two heavy batteries of the 2nd field division under Lieut.-Colonel Gregorovius. In accordance with an order of the commander of the artillery of the 1st Army Corps, Major-General von Bergmann, Colonel Yungé placed the horse artillery division north-west of Montoy, on the left flank of Dolmann's battery, with the 2nd Horse Artillery battery, Captain Cruse, on the right, and the 3rd, Captain Schmidtke, on the left. They opened fire about 6.15 P.M. at 1,800–2,100 paces on the enemy's infantry and artillery in the direction of Vallières and Bellecroix apparently with good effect.

The 2nd field division was unable, from want of space, to take up a position south of the road for the purpose of enfilading the enemy according to its orders. There was only room for one battery on the left flank of the 1st field division, and the 3rd Heavy battery, Captain Westphal, was directed to occupy it, finding itself therefore on the left of von Selle, but somewhat too low down. Presently, however, von Selle moving to the front, Westphal was able to occupy the better position thus vacated, and directed his fire on the pine wood north-west of Colombey. Lieut.-Colonel Gregorovius led the 4th Heavy battery, Captain Iwentz, through the defile of Montoy, and, shortly after the arrival of the horse artillery batteries, placed it on a height in advance of their line. Two guns had stuck at the foot of the steep, clayey slope, but were brought up later into position. Hostile infantry was driven from the opposite ridge north of the Saarlouis road by common shell at a range of 1,400 paces, and both infantry and artillery were fired at apparently with similar success at from 2,000 to 2,300 paces. The enemy's artillery responded warmly with common shell and shrapnel, but without effect.

Meanwhile the corps artillery of the VIIth Army Corps came

on the field (6.30 P.M.). Colonel von Helden-Sarnowski had heard the sound of guns in front, and having turned out the corps artillery, marched with it from the distant bivouac at Bazoncourt to join the 14th Division at Domangeville, where it received orders to advance. With the horse artillery division (under Lieut.-Colonel von Coester) at the head, and the 2nd field division (under Major Matthiasz) close in rear, it reached the field of battle at a smart trot by way of Villers-Laquenexy at 6.30 P.M. Colonel von Helden-Sarnowski rode to the front to obtain information as to the state of the battle and to receive further orders. In accordance with the orders of the general commanding, he directed the 2nd field division to take up a position in support of the advanced troops. Major Matthiasz placed the two light batteries in front of Coincy, and the two heavy just to the north of Château d'Aubigny. The 4th Heavy battery (Captain Lemmer) fired a single shot at the enemy's artillery, but then ceased firing, having discovered that the range was too great, and that no nearer position was available. The horse artillery division in the next place took up a position on the right flank of the 3rd field division, but was unable to effect any greater results, inasmuch as the infantry which had gone on in front intercepted the line of fire. It therefore drew off to the right, and its further movements in that quarter will be given below.

The infantry of the main body of the advanced guard of the 1st Division, under Colonel von Legat, came up at the same time with the corps artillery of the 1st Army Corps, and immediately followed the 'advanced parties' on the Saarbrück high road. Lieut.-General von Bentheim, not considering the connection with the 2nd Division secure, caused the 3rd regiment to move to the right on Lauvallier. The infantry at that place and at La Planchette was now again formed for the assault of the heights beyond the defile.

All the batteries in position between the north side of Montoy and the defile of Coincy prepared the attack by a vigorous fire. As soon as the desired effect had been produced and a cavalry attack, made from the heights and driven home, had been repulsed, a determined onset of infantry and rifles drove the enemy from the further side of the valley, beyond the forking of the Saarbrück and Saarlouis roads. Most of the infantry then turned

to the right in the defile of Lauvallier and advanced against the heights of Nouilly and Mey—which had already once been taken[1]—stormed them, and definitely held them. The gallant Captain von Horn, who was afterwards killed in battle near Noisseville, then rode forwards across the defile of La Planchette to the line of skirmishers, 'in order to get information about the ground beyond it, and to be able to form an opinion whether the possession of the border of the valley on that side was so secured that artillery might be taken across in safety. As far as could be observed in the twilight now commencing, the French had retired from the edge of the hills about 1,000–1,200 paces, into a previously intrenched position, and thence opened a violent fire of infantry, mitrailleurs, and artillery. Their aim was in the highest degree faulty, yet the tempest of bullets occasioned continual casualties in the deep, hollow road.

'Close to the road were some companies of the 1st battalion of rifles, some battalions of the 15th and 55th regiments of infantry, and, more to the right, the 43rd regiment. The infantry began to complain of want of ammunition.'[2]

To give a longer respite to the infantry and a fresh impulse to the battle, Captain von Horn decided on taking his batteries over the defile in echelons. His own battery, 1st Heavy, led by First Lieut. Stein, crossed first at 7 P.M., and was followed by Hoffbauer's battery, under Lieutenant Krause,[3] in consequence of its commander being too severely wounded to mount a second horse. The 2nd Light field battery, under First Lieutenant Hardt (for Puppel), and the 2nd Heavy, under von Selle, came next. The latter alone suffered much loss in passing the defile. Two guns had their poles broken, and were consequently delayed in coming up into line. The batteries were placed astride the Saarbrück road

[1] General von Memerty, as related above, had captured the heights at an earlier period; but on the arrival of very superior reinforcements to the enemy had temporarily given them up, having no supports at hand to reckon on. When the 44th regiment again advanced at a later period, it found the 3rd regiment in its former position.

[2] From Captain von Horn's account.

[3] Lieutenant Krause had his second horse killed under him on this occasion; Lieutenant Ganda remained with the battery until the end of the battle, in spite of his painful wound—a shot through the upper part of his thigh—and then went into hospital. Lieutenant Oettzenn remained with the battery.

300 paces in rear of the foremost skirmishers, and shelled the enemy's infantry and artillery with evidently good effect at ranges of between 900 and 1,300 paces. The 2nd Light battery with the 3rd company of the 1st battalion of rifles repulsed a cavalry attack. The batteries suffered from musketry fire only, the enemy's artillery always firing their shrapnel too high.

During this period the adversary's left wing had been perceptibly reinforced and extended. The French official account states on this point: 'General Ladmirault, who was present at the passage of the 1st and 3rd Divisions (4th Army Corps) over the Moselle, was informed of the attacks directed against General Grenier, and immediately ordered those divisions to return to the heights, and the reserve artillery to follow them. Cissey's Division, which was then descending the hills to the bridge of boats communicating with the island of Chambière, laid aside its knapsacks, clambered up the slopes of St. Julien at the double, and relieved Grenier's Division, which moved off towards the right and somewhat to the rear towards the defile of Vantoux. On this the 20th battalion of rifles threw itself with great gallantry into the little wood of Mey, which the enemy's skirmishers had begun to occupy,[1] and took possession of it. Then the 3rd Division (Lorencez) moved into line farther to the left.' It must doubtless have been this division which reinforced and lengthened the left flank of the enemy's position so considerably.

To return to the left wing of the Germans: Here the 14th Division, Lieut.-General von Kamecke, had come up. The 28th brigade, General von Woyna, forming the van, was directed against the enemy's right flank near Colombey, while the 27th brigade, General von Zastrow, moved to the heights east of Colombey in reserve. The 28th brigade advanced through the defile south of Colombey against the wood of Borny, while the 1st Light battery, Captain Schweder, attached to the brigade, prepared the attack from a position south of the mill of Colombey, directing its shell apparently with good effect against the skirts of the wood, 900 paces distant. The brigade meanwhile, in co-operation with the advanced guard of the

[1] As has been already mentioned in a former note, General Memerty evacuated this ground, without any assault being made on the enemy.

VIIth Army Corps, pressed on without halting; and the enemy retired, leaving the wood in its possession.

Major Freiherr von Eynatten could not carry out his intention of bringing the three remaining batteries of the 1st field division into action, owing to the rapid progress of the infantry fight in the intersected and close country, and, moreover, because darkness soon put an end to the battle.

The 25th brigade, von den Osten-Sacken, after a severe struggle and repeated assaults, succeeded in getting possession of the little wood north of Colombey at 7.15 P.M., which had been obstinately defended by the enemy though exposed for a long time to the fire of the batteries of the 1st and VIIth Army Corps.

The sound of guns from the battle field had reached the 18th Division; and its commander, General von Wrangel, having ridden out to the outposts to reconnoitre, ordered the Division to get under arms at 5.15 P.M., and march to the front. Our interest is confined to the movements of the van, which, led by Colonel von Brandenstein, marched off on the high road to Metz with its cavalry in front, and the batteries in rear of the leading battalion. The infantry occupied Château Mercy le Haut; and the 2nd Light battery of the 9th field artillery regiment (Captain Freiherr von Eynatten), receiving orders from Colonel von Brandenstein, trotted to the front about 7.30 P.M., and took up a position under the direction of its divisional commander, Major von Gayl, on the high road at the point where the lane branches off to Mercy le Haut. Shortly afterwards the 1st Horse Artillery battery of the 1st field artillery regiment, Captain Preinitzer, placed itself on the left of Eynatten. It had started with the 1st Cavalry Division from Pontoy in the direction of Mercy le Haut, and then advanced under escort of two squadrons of the 3rd Cuirassiers with orders to come into action against the enemy's right flank. The two batteries fired on dense columns of infantry at ranges of from 1,100 to 1,200 paces with such good effect that they withdrew.[1] The guns of Montaudon's Division near Grigy replied, but were forced to leave the field.

[1] It is scarcely necessary to mention that infantry contributed their share to this result.

The battle now became general. From Fort Queuleu the heavy guns of the place and the field guns of the division of Voltigeurs of the Guard opened fire with common shell and shrapnel, but with little success, while the shrill rattle of mitrailleurs was also heard, though its effect was not traced. In the meantime von Eynatten's battery continued to fire from its old position, and Preinitzer's battery, escorted by cavalry, pursued the retiring enemy, throwing shell into his rear and flanks. The last object aimed at by the battery was hostile artillery in and near Fort Queuleu, at a range of 1,800 paces.

After eight o'clock, when night was coming on, the 2nd Heavy field battery, Captain Kindler, of the 9th field artillery regiment, arrived on the field. It had started from Buchy with the main body of the 18th Division, and was then led to the front by General von Wrangel. Major von Gayl placed it on the right of Preinitzer's battery, and it was able for a short time to take part in the fight with the enemy's artillery, till night put an end to the duel of the guns.[1] The enemy under cover of the darkness threw out skirmishers, who approached to within 600 paces of the most advanced batteries; but being driven back by our infantry, who had followed the guns, they joined the general retreat of the French. The divisional commanders ordered the troops on that part of the field of battle back to their original bivouacs about 9.30 P.M.

6. *Movements of the* I*st Army Corps consequent on the extension of the French left wing—Repulse of that wing—The left wing of the* I*st Army Corps and the* VII*th Army Corps hold the captured positions—Close of the battle.*

The result of the battle on the left flank of the Ist Army Corps was decidedly victorious, but on the centre and right it was doubtful. The enemy constantly extended his left wing more and more, and under these circumstances, the corps was threatened with danger, either in the event of the enemy succeeding in turning its right wing or driving back the centre by

[1] The battery took the range from Preinitzer's battery, and aimed at the flash of the enemy's guns.

an attack with superior forces. The whole of the artillery was in line, except two batteries of the corps artillery and one of the 3rd field division; but of the infantry only the 2nd and 3rd brigades and the 1st battalion of rifles had been engaged up to that time.

Under these circumstances the general in command issued the following orders:—

1. Major-General von Memerty will maintain the position of Noisseville and the valley near it under all circumstances.

2. The corps artillery will be drawn more to the centre of the Noisseville position.

3. The 1st infantry brigade will march to the Brasserie de Noisseville.

4. The 4th brigade, leaving two battalions in reserve, will advance round the north of Noisseville against the enemy's left flank.

Major-General von Bergmann issued corresponding orders:—

The 1st field division is to remain on the left flank and form the pivot.

The corps artillery will place itself between Noisseville and the Saarlouis high road, and direct its fire as much as possible on the enemy's left wing.

The 3rd field division is to move against the left flank of the enemy near Poix and Servigny, and press forward energetically.

The four batteries, skilfully led by Captain von Horn, remained in the captured position on the left flank with praiseworthy self-devotion under a tremendous fire of common and shrapnel shell, mitrailleurs, and small arms. Von Gostkowski's battery had followed them to the further side of the bridge of La Planchette, but was unable to come into action owing to the approach of darkness.

The corps artillery meanwhile obeyed its orders (7.30 P.M.). The two light batteries of the 2nd field division, which had been delayed by the difficulties of the ground, were at last also brought into action, but did not contribute to the result, as it was already dark.[1] On the extreme right flank, about 200

[1] They ceased firing after the first round.

paces west of Noisseville, stood the 2nd Horse Artillery battery (Cruse). It was joined by the following batteries drawn up, as far as the configuration of the ground permitted, in a large arc:— The 3rd Horse Artillery battery (Schmidtke), the 6th Light (Dolmann), the 4th Light (Schmidt), the 3rd Heavy (Westphal), the 3rd Light (Roehl); their left flank resting on the Saarlouis road.[1] The 1st field division, in action to the west of the defile of La Planchette, might be considered as in prolongation of this line of artillery. The corps artillery had, during its movements and in its position, to sustain a heavy, but fortunately not very effective, fire from the enemy's guns, among which those of the forts could not be mistaken. Its target was the artillery and infantry of the left wing, which were constantly increasing in numbers, and the practice was excellent.

To return again to the 3rd field division: The Fusilier battalion of the 4th regiment had, in prosecution of its orders, moved on Servigny and occupied that village as well as Poix. Major Müller considered therefore that he could now move his batteries to the right with safety. They moved off in succession between 7.30 and 8 P.M. Hellwig's and Schweickart's batteries were posted between Poix and Servigny, Grasz's to the left of the latter village, and Schrader's horse artillery battery of the 3rd Cavalry Division on their right, but somewhat further back. All these batteries were fired upon vigorously, but without much effect, by a number of the enemy's guns, mostly placed behind intrenchments between the roads to Bouzonville and Vremy, and also by several mitrailleurs as well as by the guns of the forts. The more advanced of the batteries fired on the enemy's artillery, mitrailleurs, and infantry under cover at a range of from 1,800 to 2,000 paces; those less advanced at a range of from 2,700 to 3,500 paces.

The 4th brigade had now reached the field of battle, and drew up on the left of the Saarlouis high road. General von Pritzelwitz retaining the two fusilier battalions in reserve, sent the remaining four battalions round Noisseville to Nouilly and Mey (8 P.M.) To support this movement to the front,

[1] The 4th Heavy battery, Captain Iwentz, also moved to this position by order of Lieut.-Col. Gregorovius, but did not come into action as it was too dark.

Major Gerhards advanced with his horse artillery batteries from Noisseville to Nouilly, and posted them on both flanks of the horse artillery division of the 7th field artillery regiment, consisting of von Hahn's and Hasse's batteries. This division, under Lieut.-Colonel von Coester, though eager to take part in the battle, had been unable to do so on the ground occupied by the VIIth Army Corps for reasons already given. With the sanction of Colonel von Helden-Sarnowski, it had in consequence moved off to the right, and, in spite of considerable obstacles, taken up a position to the north and north-west of Flanville. This position was, however, abandoned, after a few shots at hostile artillery on the road Metz—Bouzonville, in order to get nearer the enemy and thus support the infantry attack more effectually. The division then opened fire on the enemy's artillery at 1,800 paces apparently with good results. A hostile battery, appearing on the right flank at a distance of about 1,100 paces, was obliged to give way before the shells of Hasse's guns. Lieutenant Selhausen, adjutant of the division, had a horse killed under him, and Major Gerhards' endeavour to take part with the horse artillery division of the 1st regiment in the struggle was frustrated by the darkness, which caused a cessation of the fire. Major Müller and his batteries fared no better. He advanced from Servigny on the approach of the 4th brigade, but darkness prevented any further action on his part. The appearance of that brigade caused the enemy, already shaken by artillery, to retire after a short exchange of infantry fire (8.15 P.M.).

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finished at 8.15 P.M. Five perfectly fresh regiments were still at the disposal of the general commanding.[1]

His Excellency General von Steinmetz, on his arrival on the battle field, ordered General von Manteuffel to take his corps back to its original position after collecting the wounded. About 10 o'clock the troops began their march, the bands playing *Heil dir im Siegerkranz.*

With the commencement of night the firing on the battle field of the VIIth Army Corps also died away, the corps remaining on the field in occupation of the captured position, the enemy keeping his ground on the opposite ridges.

French writers are generally of opinion that their army had committed an error in accepting battle, but was justified in claiming the victory. They appeal to the fact that the army passed a part of the night of the 14th-15th in its old bivouac, that it was able to make its retreat at its own time and unmolested; that, on the other hand, the Prussian army had retired at all points, and that the French army generally had been pervaded by a consciousness of victory.

Some of these statements are false; the remainder prove nothing. The Prussian army had obtained its object on the evening of the battle. A pursuit was therefore unnecessary, and moveover it presented no prospect of obtaining trophies, &c., while there would be the risk of incurring useless losses from the works of the fortress. The positions represented on the plan of the battle-field prove that the French army was in fact pressed back at all points, and at all events considerably so in the centre. Even if the French were able to keep their original bivouacs in that quarter, nothing is proved by this; for they would probably have ordered their bivouacs, as is the practice of other armies—in rear of the position where they are about to fight.

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menced its retreat not from compulsion, but by orders from its commanding officer after more than an hour's rest.

With respect to the 'consciousness of victory,' if it really existed in the hostile army, it is only necessary to call to mind that it is no rare phenomenon for Frenchmen to yield to *illusions.*

The assertion of the French that they had fought against a superior force is equally false. The 'Spectateur militaire' gives the strength of the French as follows:—

	Men	Batteries[1]
3rd Corps	48,360	20
4th ,,	35,063	15
In addition, Brincourt's brigade, with the artillery of the Voltigeur division	4,500 to 4,800	3
Total in round numbers	88,000	38

Including 8 batteries of mitrailleurs.

The whole of the troops were fresh, and had suffered neither from battle nor hardships; and, as a further addition to their strength, the fact is notorious that the French were supported by the garrison guns of their outworks.

The Prussian force is estimated as follows:—

	Men	Batteries
1st Army Corps (infantry, cavalry, artillery, and pioneers)	29,700	14
VIIth Army Corps (infantry, cavalry, artillery, and pioneers)	29,700	14
Van of the 18th Infantry Division	2,450	2
1st and 3rd Cavalry Divisions	6,300	2
Total	68,150	32

From this must be deducted the losses on the march, and especially those in the previous battle of Spicheren, in which the 14th Division had been chiefly engaged. The numbers, therefore, did not exceed from 62,000 to 64,000 men, with 32 batteries. With respect to the latter, we know, that a considerable part of them could not be employed on account of the peculiar configuration of the ground.

[1] The batteries according to Fay.

The French losses amounted to:—

	Officers		Men	
	Killed and Wounded	Missing	Killed and Wounded	Missing
3rd Corps	145	1	2,702	428
4th Corps	54	—	706	161
Total . .	199	1	3,408	589

Marshal Bazaine himself received a severe contusion. Amongst the wounded are reckoned Generals Decaen (commander of the 3rd Corps, who died afterwards of his wounds), Castagny, De Clérembault, and Duplessis.

The German losses were:— [1]

	Officers		Men	
	Killed and Wounded	Missing	Killed and Wounded	Missing
1st Army Corps . . .	90	—	2,824	168
VIIth ,, ,, . . .	84	—	1,864	92
1st Cavalry Division . .	—	—	1	—
36th Infantry Regiment . .	—	—	32	—
Total . .	174	—	4,721	260

[1] These numbers originate from the Royal Statistical Bureau, and the following remarks are appended:—

1. *Portépéefähnrichs* and others doing duty as officers are not included under the head of officers.

2. Men who fell into the hands of the enemy when dead or wounded are not reckoned among the 'missing.'

With respect to the Prussian infantry, the heaviest losses occurred in

The 2nd and 3rd brigades of the 1st Army Corps, the former suffering most;

The 25th and 26th brigades of the VIIth Army Corps, the former of which suffered most.

The 2nd infantry brigade incurred the heaviest casualties, the 43rd regiment alone losing 22 officers and 723 men killed and wounded.

The 1st battalion of rifles lost 9 officers and 284 men, killed and wounded.

3. The special losses of the artillery are given in the Appendix.

On the French side Aymard's and Castagny's Divisions in the French centre suffered most.

The ammunition columns remained behind the Nied during the battle.

The supply of the troops with ammunition was carried out on the following day by ammunition columns previously indicated.

OBSERVATIONS.

a. *On the French Army.*

As soon as the retreat on Châlons was determined on, the French army had all the less reason for committing themselves to a battle on the 14th on the *right* bank of the Moselle, inasmuch as a great part of it had reached the other bank even before the commencement of the fight, and the news which was brought to Metz of the progress of the turning movement on the part of the Second Army permitted no postponement of the French operations.

To avoid an engagement was no longer in the power of the French Commander in Chief, but it was possible for him so to manœuvre as to gain time for the retreat by an affair of the rear guard. He might in the first place have averted for a time the fall of the defensible semicircular ridge of heights on the west of the defile of Colombey and Lauvallier into the hands of the enemy. If the French statements are true that the armament of the fortress, and more particularly of the advanced works of St. Julien, Les Bordes and Queuleu, were still insufficient,[1] no other

[1] That the armament of these advanced works was still very much behindhand at the time of the battle is, in the first place, proved unanimously by all the French military writers, and further by the later observations of the German troops in front of Metz. For example, the Prussian batteries which on the 17th fired from a position near Mercy le Haut on Fort Queuleu as a demonstration, saw a great number of artificers and labourers employed on that work.

It is a fact that many Frenchmen believed that it was actually the intention to storm the works, the state of which could not be known by the Germans. At a later period also, it is clearly proved from the transactions of the council of war of the French Army of the Rhine (compare Bazaine) that the French had no great confidence in this fortress.

The following letter, published by Marshal Bazaine and addressed to him by the

course remained but a direct defence of that ridge by an occupation in force. It should have been held till the Guard had effected its retreat.

To render this feasible it was also requisite to hold for some time the ridge in front of Metz, as far to the left as the chapel of La Salette, so as to prevent the advance of the enemy on that most important point.

The second line to be defended ran from this chapel by the wood of Mey, thence along the left edge of the defile Lauvallier —Colombey, where it took an oblique turn to the right and rear, along the eastern and southern borders of the two copses which together form the wood of Borny, till it struck the stream of La Chenau. Fort Queuleu could be held by a special detachment, as indeed was the case. The 3rd Corps and Grenier's Division of the 4th, which were still at hand in the neighbourhood of the position at the commencement of the battle, sufficed for the occupation of this ground. To facilitate the operation of putting an end to the battle, the cavalry of the Guard, the 3rd and 4th Corps, with a part of the artillery, could take up positions in rear, under cover and ready prepared. A second position for a rear guard existed, provided Queuleu still held out, between Borny, the intrenchment near Les Bordes, and Fort St. Julien, under cover of which, and with the most strenuous co-operation of the garrison guns already mounted, the retreat could be carried out. The impression cannot be avoided that at the commencement of the battle the French head-quarters were not clearly acquainted with the position of affairs.

We find the French army in such a situation as to warrrant the conclusion that it was surprised. The right wing of the 3rd Corps was totally unsupported, and, as the course of the fight has shown, it gave way at the first onset of the van of the 18th

Emperor Napoleon, proves that the Emperor himself shared this view of the forts previous to the battle of the 14th :—

'Metz, 12 août.

'Plus je pense à la position qu'occupe l'armée, plus je la trouve critique ; car si une partie était forcée, et qu'on se retirât en désordre, les forts n'empêcheraient pas la plus épouvantable confusion. Voyez ce qu'il-y-a à faire, et si nous ne sommes pas attaqués demain, prenez une résolution. Croyez à mon amitié.

(Signé) NAPOLÉON.'

Infantry Division. Marshal Bazaine's official report informs us that the instructions issued by him were not respected ; that accordingly the troops forming a semicircle in front of Forts St. Julien and Queuleu were compelled to converge to the rear, in correspondence with the retrograde movements of the two wings. It appears that this error might easily have been rectified, for the right wing was first attacked at 7 o'clock in the evening.

b. *On the Prussian Army in general.*

The narrative has explained the motives which determined the advanced guard of the VIIth Army Corps to attack the enemy near Colombey. The writer does not command sufficient information from all sources to justify satisfactorily that resolution, and the task is left to more competent pens at a future opportunity. For us some remarks on the execution and formation of the attack will suffice for the better comprehension of the mode in which the German artillery was handled, this being the subject of the following section.

The advanced guard had regarded Colombey as its first object, and the attack itself, executed with resolution and on a comparatively broad front, took the enemy completely by surprise. The selected line of advance offered the great advantage that it led direct to a position naturally defensive, in front of which lay Colombey, like a bridge head. This was of the greatest importance, since, in consequence of the considerably superior forces of the enemy, the advanced guard of the VIIth Army Corps must have been prepared, after the first shock, to be thrown on the defensive.

It was therefore unavailing to advance merely as far as Colombey, for it was imperative to get a firm footing ***beyond*** it, and so obtain a close grip of the main body of the enemy. The repulse of his outposts would be useless ; for then there would be the danger that he would prosecute his retreat under cover of a small rear guard.

The comparatively broad front with which the advanced guard attacked, was necessary here for the purpose of leading the enemy to believe that he was opposed to more considerable numbers than were actually present. This induced him the

more readily again to form front with the main body of his army, and to make greater preliminary preparations for the counter-attack, thereby incurring a loss of time. This broad front was, moreover, for a time a security against being outflanked or surrounded by the enemy, which was especially to be feared, in consequence of his great numerical superiority, though unquestionably the danger of being broken through was augmented by such a formation.

It was obvious that the seizure of Colombey from an enemy so superior in strength could only succeed by a rapid, sudden, and resolute attack. Its confidence, moreover, must strengthen the French in the belief that they had to deal with more considerable hostile forces. The daring attack undertaken by the advanced guard of the VIIth Army Corps necessitated *prompt* support, if it were not to be exposed to great risks.

Thus the prompt support, afforded by the 1st Army Corps, was of great advantage, and the narrative has shown what favourable circumstances concurred to enable speedy action to follow the immediate promise of support. We gather from the official report of Marshal Bazaine that to the rapid and resolute onset of a part of the 1st Army Corps must be attributed the cause of the 4th Corps (Ladmirault) again forming front for the fight. The anxiety of the VIIth Army Corps, and of all the other troops engaged, to reach the field of battle with the utmost rapidity, and to march in the direction of the firing, as soon as they understood the state of affairs, was everywhere remarkable.

For example, both divisions of cavalry with their batteries and the van of the 18th Division, as also a battalion of its main body, were successful in taking part in the fight on the wings at the right moment.

The battle bore the character of being unpremeditated. The whole attack resolved itself naturally into a series of deployments from the centre to the right and left. Each Division as it came up was obliged to get the touch of that preceding it, and the front opposed to the enemy was for a long time necessarily limited. It was therefore always exposed to the danger of being outflanked and surrounded. The troops in front were gradually freed from this danger by the arrival of the Divisions from the rear.

Even after the entire 13th Division, the half of the 2nd, and the 3rd brigades, together with the greater part of the artillery, were engaged, the state of affairs remained unfavourable for the Prussians, as for a long time the 13th was opposed by three Divisions of the 3rd French Corps, and the brigade and a half by Aymard's Division of that corps and the whole of the French 4th Corps. The casualties incurred by these troops in from four to four hours and a half prove the obstinacy of the fight at that time.

The situation of the 1st Army Corps was for a time peculiarly critical. The enemy had constantly made use of his superiority in numbers to prolong his left wing, and threatened to overlap our flanks. To prevent this, the troops of this corps already engaged saw themselves compelled to defend a front of more than 3,500 paces, extending from La Planchette to beyond Poix, thereby affording the enemy better opportunity of penetrating the line. We know how the tactics of the commander combined with the gallantry of the troops warded off this danger.

The battle could be conclusively decided only on the flanks. Therefore it was important to repel the overlapping movements of the enemy and attack him at his weaker points.

The reinforcements from the 1st Army Corps enabled us to storm the heights of Mey and Nouilly simultaneously, as well as to prolong the right flank of the attack. The arrival of the 14th Division and of the van of the 18th with a battery of the 1st Cavalry Division rendered it possible, with the co-operation of the troops engaged (who had just succeeded in the capture of the pine wood north-west of Colombey), to storm the wood of Borny and lengthen the left wing of the attack. These were the decisive moments on both flanks. The enemy recognised them as his weak points, and retired from them with but slight resistance, as is proved by his loss.

The importance of this hardly won victory cannot be estimated by its trophies, for the vicinity of the fortress secured the enemy from pursuit. Its principal value lay in the strategic result. The French army had lost time for its retreat; Prince Frederick Charles had gained it for his turning movement.[1]

[1] Marshal Bazaine says:—

'En retardant notre mouvement les Allemands avaient obtenu le résultat qu'ils cherchaient: ils gagnaient le jour que nous perdions. . . .' We learn from the same

c. *On the special employment of the German artillery.*

The arrival in line of the Prussian artillery has the appearance of being improvised, as was the case with the whole battle. The attack so boldly undertaken demanded *prompt* assistance. The artillery was the arm which, by virtue of its mobility, was best adapted to the peculiar formation of this field of battle. We see it therefore eagerly pressing on from all points, in order to come into action in the shortest possible time. Its occasional separation from the bodies of troops to which it was attached by the order of battle was unavoidable, yet its efforts to rejoin them afterwards were undoubted.

In the first stage—the opening of the battle—the greater part of the artillery was employed. We see the whole of the batteries of the 1st Army Corps in action a considerable time before the 1st and 4th brigades came into line. In the VIIth Army Corps, the corps artillery arrived shortly after the main body of the 13th Division, notwithstanding the length of the march. Everywhere, as far as circumstances permitted, the artillery supported the infantry throughout the battle, and prepared the way to a decisive result.

Two considerations operated against the principle of bringing into action the largest possible mass of artillery—the improvised nature of the battle and the form of ground of a part of the field of battle. They both tended to bring about the employment of smaller masses of guns and even of single batteries.

The remarks on the configuration of the ground and the narrative of the battle will have sufficed to prove that the former was decidedly unfavourable to the employment of artillery on the battle field of the VIIth Army Corps. For instance, before entering on a decisive movement, to which the 13th Division by itself was unequal, it was necessary to repulse the enemy's attacks near Colombey. However desirable it was at that moment that artillery should take up a position on the left edge of the defile, it was unfortunately no less impossible, in consequence of

sources that the 2nd, 6th, and Guard Corps reached their appointed positions near Gravelotte on the 15th. The 3rd and 4th Corps were only able to complete their passage in the course of the morning of the 15th. The 4th Corps was not concentrated on the left bank of the Moselle till noon. Mention will be made in the second part of this treatise of the circumstances which gave rise to other momentous delays.

the immediate vicinity of shelter trenches and small woods, strongly occupied by the enemy. This has been shown in the attempt to place the 5th Heavy battery of the 7th regiment of field artillery immediately to the north-east of Colombey. To maintain possession of the left edge of the defile was the difficult task of our gallant infantry, able in all cases to procure more effectual cover from the form of the ground.

In the *detaining* combat at this point there was at first but one position available for artillery on the right of the defile where it could come into action. But we know that it was forced by the course of the fight, the form of the ground, and the want of light soon to take up positions in reserve, however great might be the desire of its leaders to employ their arm to a greater extent. This explains why a great number of the batteries of the VIIth Army Corps took no share in the battle, and why some of them came on the battle field of the 1st Army Corps. There the configuration of the ground was less difficult, and we see the artillery generally employed in greater masses against distinct objects under the same commander.

Pre-eminently conspicuous is the conduct of the artillery mass represented by five batteries (one belonging to the VIIth Army Corps) between the defiles of Coincy and Montoy opposite that of La Planchette, and later on beyond it. It had materially contributed to support the right wing of von der Goltz's brigade, and afterwards that of the 13th Division, and also to facilitate the march of the 1st Division by diverting the enemy's fire from it; to prepare the way for the capture of the pine wood north-west of Colombey, and for the assault of the slopes by a portion of the infantry of the advanced guard of the 1st Division, and of the 13th; and finally to support those troops in the possession of the conquered slopes by taking up a position beyond the defile of La Planchette.

The artillery mass is also remarkable, which was formed of the corps artillery of the 1st Army Corps and a battery of the 3rd field division, and joined in the last position by two horse artillery batteries of the VIIth Army Corps. While from the centre of the corps, it prepared the assault of infantry against the heights west of Lauvallier, with the greater part of the batteries;—from its second position, further to the right, it

materially assisted, by its concentrated fire, with the co-operation of the three batteries of the 3rd field division, to prevent the attempt to overlap our flank, which meanwhile had become more pronounced and menacing. To the shattering of the enemy's left wing by the fire of this artillery mass, it must be mainly attributed that only a light pressure was needed to induce the infantry to retire.

There remains to be noted the withdrawal from its first position of the whole corps artillery and of the 3rd field division to the right flank during the battle, for the purpose of taking up their last position. This flank movement was for the most part made under the fire of the enemy's guns without any great loss. This goes to prove that there is no difficulty in taking guns already in action out of the line of battle and employing them in another part of the battle field, and that flank marches, not as a rule undertaken by artillery under fire, can be safely executed in case of necessity. These reflections only add strength to the principle of employing a greater part of the artillery at the outset, and lead to the conviction that it is less necessary to *keep artillery in reserve* than infantry and cavalry.

The batteries came into action at very different ranges, varying from 800 paces—which were reduced by the offensive thrusts of the enemy to 400 and 500 paces—up to considerably more than 2,000 paces; and however strange such a variety of range may appear, it was nevertheless the necessary result of existing circumstances.

At the shortest ranges we find the artillery near Colombey, and astride the Saarbrück high road opposite the defile of La Planchette, and later on beyond that defile, as at that point it was necessary to support the advanced guard of the VIIth Army Corps, which was hardly pressed, especially on its right flank. This was a decisive moment, and consequently the consideration of the effect of the fire outweighed that of seeking cover for the guns. That the batteries were exposed, is proved by the list of casualties, which speaks for itself; bearing in mind that the really combatant part of a field battery numbers 4 officers, 62 men, 48 horses, and that of a horse artillery battery 4 officers, 74 men, 96 horses, and that these losses were incurred within the space of a few hours.

A near approach at that point was possible, as the artillery was in close connection with its own infantry; and it was all the more demanded because the light was so extremely unfavourable for observing the effect of the shots, and also that, owing to the intersected and very close nature of the ground, the troops engaged were liable to be annoyed by fragments of shells from their own guns.


Greater ranges are found at the commencement of the battle on the right wing, where it was required merely to keep the enemy at bay; here the artillery could maintain no connection with its own infantry, which from its more defective mobility was still on the march in rear, and it found moreover a target in the dense columns of the the 4th French Corps marching up. But when it was desired to create a *decisive* effect on both wings, the batteries showed their eagerness to prepare the attack of the infantry by taking up positions closer to the enemy. The approach of night prevented the further advance of the artillery on the right wing.

There also remains to be noticed the effective fire of case on the part of a battery in self-defence at a short range against skirmishers under slight cover.

The narrative of the battle and our own observations point to the conclusion, that on this day the Prussian artillery vied with its sister arm the infantry in fortitude and gallantry, and in devotion to King and Fatherland. At any rate it materially contributed on the 14th of August, 1870, to entwine a fresh leaf of laurel in the rich crown of victory of the German armies.

POSITION

of the I^st and II^nd German and French armies at Metz on the evening of the 15^th August and in the night between the 15^th and 16^th August 1870.



the other Germans.

2. The Roman figures are the numbers of the Corps.

Arabic " " " " " " Divisions

3. Ly. Von Lynckers Detachment

G.D. Brigade of Dragoons of the Guard.

5.C.D. The V^th Cavalry Division was divided between Suzemont, Puxieux and Xonville

C.A.X. Corps Artillery, 10^th Army Corps, with the exception of 2 H.A. Batteries, which were at Thiaucourt.

SECOND PART.

I.

A GLANCE AT EVENTS FROM THE BATTLE OF BORNY ON THE 14TH OF AUGUST, 1870, TO THE BATTLE OF MARS LA TOUR ON THE 16TH OF AUGUST, 1870.

1. *French operations after the battle of the 14th of August.*

AFTER the battle of the 14th of August Marshal Bazaine ordered the interrupted retreat on Châlons to be resumed. Under existing circumstances it was imperative that this should be executed by the French with the greatest possible rapidity, and as a preliminary operation it was necessary to concentrate the Army of the Rhine on the high ground forming the left bank of the Moselle —the plateau between St. Privat and Gravelotte. This could be reached by four roads, not counting the indifferent by-roads : —

1. The high road from Metz to Gravelotte ;
2. The by-road from Ban St. Martin by Lessy, Châtel St. Germain and Leipsic, to Chantrenne ;
3. The metalled road by Lorry to Amanvillers ;
4. The high road by Woippy to St. Privat.

Although these roads ascend the left side of the valley by steep gradations, still it was to be presumed that as no part of the troops would have to march more than eleven miles, the whole would be in position on the 15th.

Everything depended on attaining the Orne, the Yron, or the Longeau, without delay. Arriving there before the enemy, the Army of the Rhine would intercept the Germans, and the ma

difficulties of the retreat would be overcome. In addition to several by-roads there were available three high roads: that by Mars la Tour to Fresne, and those by Conflans and Briey to Étain. There was all the more reason to expect that the river would be reached on the 16th, if no collision with the enemy occurred, as the march for that day was far inferior in difficulty to that of the 15th, as regarded both the length and character of the roads.

The flank march of the Second German Army had been carried so far, that it was not to be expected that the retreat could be prosecuted on the 16th without fighting, and of this the French possessed reliable information. Thence arose the necessity of covering the march by a strong flanking detachment on the most southern road, which would become the rear guard after the army had passed the rivers.

Let us now glance at the marches actually executed by the French Army of the Rhine. According to Marshal Bazaine's dispositions, the following movements were to be made on the 15th :—

The 4th Corps to Doncourt;

The 3rd Corps to the line Vernéville—St. Marcel, with observation of the Bois Doseuillons;

The 2nd Corps to prosecute its march to Mars la Tour as soon as the van of the 6th became visible;

The 6th Corps to march to its position at Rezonville and Vionville;

A Division of Voltigeurs and two batteries to take up a position at Point du Jour, for the purpose of covering the retreat in case of necessity;

The remainder of the Guard to form up at Gravelotte, leaving a regiment at Longeville, till the whole of the army had defiled;

De Forton's Cavalry Division to march to Tronville and protect the army on the left flank and towards the front along the road to St. Mihiel;

Du Barail's Cavalry Division to perform a similar duty on the Verdun road by Jarny.

These dispositions, however, were not strictly carried out, and the two most southern roads to Verdun alone were made

use of. Marshal Bazaine alleged as his motives for not using the road to Briey :—

The difficult nature of the ground at Briey itself ;

Intelligence of the presence of a hostile corps of cavalry of 20,000 men at that town, confirming the rumour that Prince Frederick Charles and General von Steinmetz were making a flank march below Metz ;

The idea that the Army of the Rhine would be better concentrated (*plus compacte*) on the two southern roads for the purpose of forming front in any direction in which the enemy might appear.

It is obvious that the latter idea is incorrect, if it is considered what would be the situation of the whole Army of the Rhine when marching with its trains on two roads only, and that moreover the road does not fork before it reaches Gravelotte.

It is also remarkable that the arrangements of the march were made dependent on a mere rumour, the improbability of which is obvious, as shown in the first part of this treatise. There is no notice in the French works of any measures being taken for discovering the grounds of the rumour.

2. *Reconnoitring combats on the 15th of August.*

On the 15th the Germans made reconnaissances on both banks of the Moselle, and H.M. King William visited the field of battle of the 14th. These reconnaissances led to several engagements during the morning of the 15th, and an account must be given of the part taken in them by the German artillery.

(1) The 13th brigade of the 5th Cavalry Division, under Major-General von Redern, at Beney (2¼ miles west of Thiaucourt) had received orders to advance towards the high road from Metz to Verdun with the 2nd Horse Artillery battery (Captain Schirmer) of the 10th Hanoverian field artillery regiment. It started at 3.30 A.M., and on arriving at Sponville came upon hostile cavalry. The battery, according to its own report, fired six shells at a considerable range from a position to the north of that place at the enemy, who was retiring rapidly. Escorted by a squadron of Hussars, it then moved to a position about 1,800 paces south of Mars la Tour, in order to fire into

the defiles south-west of the village, which were filled with cavalry, but here the enemy also retired immediately.

General von Redern had fallen in with de Forton's Reserve Cavalry Division. As related in the French accounts, the 2nd Corps (Frossard) had received orders, in consequence of delays experienced by the other army corps, to halt at Rezonville, where also the 6th Corps (Canrobert) was to remain. Consequently at this moment the 2nd Corps was encamped to the south of the high road from Rezonville to Vionville, and Valabrègue's Cavalry Division near the latter spot. A smart fire ensued between the two batteries of de Forton's Division, posted in front of Mars la Tour, and Schirmer's battery, which lasted for an hour; the latter battery losing two men severely and one slightly wounded in addition to eleven horses, of which six were killed; the five wounded horses had also to be shot.[1] After the battle, de Forton's brigade (according to V. D.) retired on Vionville; it was unsuccessful in obtaining intelligence about the German troops on the left bank of the Moselle, and General de Forton reported erroneously that the cavalry had been supported in the affair by German infantry. But the 5th Cavalry Division had ascertained that there was opposite to it at Rezonville an encampment of infantry, estimated at 20,000 men, in addition to a strong force of hostile cavalry.

(2) The 6th Cavalry Division, under the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, reconnoitred on the right bank of the Moselle on the morning of the 15th; the right and left divisions of the 2nd Horse Artillery battery (Captain Wittstock) of the 3rd Brandenburg field artillery regiment, attached to it, taking part in the subsequent combats.

The right division, under First Lieutenant von Gizycki, starting from Verny at 5.30 A.M., joined Colonel Count Groeben's detachment, consisting of the 3rd Lancers and a squadron of the 6th Cuirassiers, at Pournoy le Chétif. This force reconnoitring between the Seille and Moselle, ascertained that the right bank of the latter river was unoccupied by the enemy, who had abandoned several intrenchments during the

[1] The account given by the battery states that after the firing 'it limbered up, and retired about 1,000 paces. After obtaining men, horses, and ammunition from the first line of wagons it again advanced, but found the enemy's position evacuated.'

night. But the position of a French camp below Moulins les Metz was discovered by signals made by the enemy, although Fort St. Quentin was hidden by the thick mist, which rose from the Moselle valley. The guns were directed to open fire on the camp at a range of 2,300 paces from a position at Bradin farm, 100 paces from the railway embankment. The account given by the artillery engaged is, that after the first shells struck the camp the whole of the troops in it were on the alert, and taking to flight ran wildly into the adjoining woods for protection. The guns in consequence frequently altered their range, which varied from 2,200 to 2,800 paces, and continued to fire until the whole camp was abandoned. They expended 48 shells in all.

'Fort St. Quentin fired three rounds and then ceased firing, probably because it could not see in consequence of the mist. Thereupon the detachment returned to Verny, the cavalry remaining some time longer in observation. No losses were sustained by the division.'

This affair is mentioned in French accounts. V. D. states:—'Towards 8 A.M. a German battery, having advanced as far as Frescaty farm, threw some shells into the large body of troops on the road between Longeville and Moulins. Fort St. Quentin soon compelled it to retire, but in consequence of this bold step the Emperor decided on removing to Lessy.' According to another French account the first German shell, which fell into the camp, burst among three French officers, who were quietly breakfasting, and killed two of them, severely wounding the third.'

The left division of the battery, under Second Lieutenant Hederich, was attached to Major von Heszberg's detachment, consisting of a squadron of the 15th Lancers and two squadrons of the 6th Cuirassiers. The column broke up from Verny at 5.30 A.M., and the Lancers, forming the van and followed by the two guns, advanced along the road by Pouilly to Metz. On arriving at the point where the railway crosses the road, part of the cavalry was left behind to observe the road to Metz. The account given by the artillery further states: 'The division turned out of the road to the left and advanced at a trot in the direction of Montigny. As the station there was occupied and trains were leaving with troops and forage, Lieutenant Heder'

received orders to open fire on them. In consequence of the conformation of the ground it was necessary to approach to within 800 paces, and after a few rounds a building forming part of the station appeared to be on fire. On this the enemy advanced, lining the hedges and buildings with skirmishers, and opened a brisk fire on the battery.

'The guns consequently retired 500 paces, in pursuance of orders, and shelled with apparently good results the buildings from which the enemy was firing on the advanced cavalry posts. Having attained its object, the reconnoitring detachment withdrew along the left bank of the Seille to Marly, and then rejoined the main body of the division. Meanwhile Fort St. Quentin had commenced a heavy and somewhat damaging fire. The battery expended 24 shells in all, and lost a horse in its first position.'

Lieut.-Colonel Fay gives this affair but a brief notice and states: 'Fort St. Quentin threw a few shells against the enemy, who had placed his field guns in front of Montigny, and in the midst of the firing an explosion was heard, which announced the destruction of the railway bridge at Longeville, ordered by the Commander in Chief.' We cannot but agree with the complaint made by that officer against the French for not having thought of destroying that at Ars also some days previously instead of leaving it for the use of the Germans.

3. *Position of the French Army on the evening of the 15th of August and Bazaine's dispositions previous to the battle.*

Bazaine's army did not reach its projected destination on the 15th, which is accounted for on the following grounds:—[1]

The fatigue of the troops engaged in the battle of the preceding day; the length of the columns of march, which were enormously increased by the number of the trains and of military as well as of private carriages; the circumstance that only the two southern roads from Metz to Verdun were used; the delay of some hours occasioned by the 3rd and 4th Corps making up their complement of ammunition at Metz, and the confusion which occurred, especially during the march.

[1] Marshal Bazaine's statement shews that in consequence of the battle on the 14th, the 4th Corps (Ladmirault) could not move towards the bridges over the Moselle before 1 A.M on the 16th, and that it was not brought together till 1 P.M.

The French army, according to the accounts given by Fay and V. D., occupied the following positions on the evening of the 15th :—

Du Barail's Division at Jarny ;

De Forton's Division at Vionville ;

The 2nd Corps (Frossard) in front of Rezonville and to the left of the road Metz—Mars la Tour—Verdun ;

The 6th Corps (Canrobert) at Rezonville, level with the 2nd Corps, but to the right of the road ;

The Guard at Gravelotte ;

The reserve artillery of the army between Gravelotte and Rezonville ;

The 4th Corps had remained between Devant les Ponts near Metz and Woippy, the 3rd Division being encamped by itself at Lessy ;

The 3rd Corps, contrary to its orders, was in front of the 4th Corps, with its 1st Division at St. Marcel ; the 2nd and 4th Divisions reached that place during the night, the 3rd, under Metman, remaining on the Moselle. The Cavalry Division, under Clérembault, lay close to the gates of the city.[1]

Marshal Bazaine arrived at Gravelotte, and the Emperor Napoleon left the army at 6 A.M. on the 16th for Châlons by way of Verdun, escorted as far as the latter town by Marguerite's brigade, consisting of the 1st and 3rd regiments of the Chasseurs d'Afrique. On the evening of the 15th the Marshal had issued orders that the army should get under arms at 4.30 A.M. the following morning, stating his opinion that the 2nd and 6th Corps would come into collision on that day with part of the enemy's force, the strength of which was conjectured to be 30,000 men. Further delays in the march of the corps in rear decided the Marshal on the 16th to postpone the movement till noon, so that the 3rd and 4th might come into line with the remainder of the army. Moreover, he wrote significantly as follows to Marshal Lebœuf, who on the preceding day had taken over the command of the 3rd Corps, Decaen being wounded : 'At your request I postpone the march of the army till noon this day. Order the Divisions in rear to concentrate

[1] Marshal Bazaine so far differs from this account that he places two Divisions only of the 3rd Corps on the line St. Marcel—Vernéville.

without delay. There is no enemy on your right flank. From Gorze alone is danger to be expected; reconnoitre therefore on your left flank, so that in the event of a battle taking place to-day the 3rd Corps may march up into second line in rear of the 2nd and 6th Corps.'

4. *Position of the First and Second German Armies on the night of the 15th of August, and their movements previous to the battle.*

To return to the German armies: In the course of the 15th it appeared no longer probable that the enemy would assume the offensive, and it was concluded that he had commenced the retreat from Metz with the whole of his troops. There was much to warrant this conclusion, viz.:—

The fact that the French had deployed only two army corps in the battle of the 14th; the circumstance that during the night of the 14th a continued noise of marching columns and moving carriages along the high road to Verdun had been heard by the outposts of the Second Army advanced towards Metz, and that the patrols in front had everywhere been fired on; and, lastly, the results of reconnaissances made during the morning of the 15th.

Drawing their conclusions from these events, it was but natural that the Germans should consider the hostile masses seen between Mars la Tour and Rezonville on the 15th as a flanking detachment covering the French armies then supposed to be in full retreat on the northern roads from Metz towards the west; for such gigantic delays as occurred in the projected retreat of the Army of the Rhine on Verdun could not possibly have been anticipated.

Everything depended on vigorously attacking the enemy at once, so as to arrest the flank march of the bulk of his force, if practicable; and the Royal head-quarters gave orders to this effect. It was also of importance so to order the marches and positions of the troops as to render it impossible for a sortie from Metz either to endanger the passages of the Moselle or to menace the communications, and more especially the rail-road from Courcelles sur Nied to Faulquemont. As it was impossible for the Germans to know the position of the bulk of

the French army, the march towards the road Metz—Verdun would have at first the character of a reconnaissance in force, and must therefore be made with a comparatively broad front, extending so far to the west as to insure their falling in with the Army of the Rhine, which was now supposed to have already advanced further. The marches generally were arranged with a view to attaining this object. The greater part of the First and Second Armies started on the 15th of August, and the positions reached on the evening of that day or during the night were as follows:—

The Royal head-quarters, Herny.

The head-quarters of the First Army, Bazoncourt.

Ist Army Corps, Courcelles-Chaussy.

VIIIth Army Corps, Pange and the Courcelles station.

VIIIth Army Corps, Orny (Gneisenau's brigade, to which the 6th Light battery was attached, being on detachment).

1st Cavalry Division, Verny.

3rd Cavalry Division, Avancy.

The head-quarters of the Second Army, Pont à Mousson.

5th Cavalry Division, Xonville, Puxieux, and Suzemont near Hannonville.

Xth Army Corps, 19th Infantry Division with two horse artillery batteries of the corps artillery, Thiaucourt. A detachment under Colonel von Lyncker—consisting of the 2nd and Fusilier battalions of the 78th regiment, the 1st and 3rd squadrons of the 9th Dragoons, and the 1st Light battery—was pushed forward in the morning towards Metz as far as Novéant, as a precautionary measure. The 20th Infantry Division and corps artillery, exclusive of the horse artillery, Pont à Mousson.

IIIrd Army Corps, 5th Infantry Division, Novéant; having crossed the standing bridge. The 6th Infantry Division and corps artillery echeloned from Arnaville to Vandières, the former having made use of a bridge thrown over the river at Champey, and the latter that of Pont à Mousson.[1]

Guard Corps, Thionville on the left bank of the Moselle. The brigade of Dragoon Guards under Count Brandenburg II., with the 1st Horse Artillery battery, Thiaucourt.

[1] These troops did not reach their quarters till after midnight.

6th Cavalry Division, between the Moselle and the Seille, near Sillegny.

IXth Army Corps, Verny—Silly.

XIIth Army Corps, Noménу.

IVth Army Corps, opposite to Marbache on the right bank of the Moselle, with its reconnoitrers beyond the river.

IInd Army Corps, Hans sur Nied.

The Third Army had already reached Nancy with its advanced parties.

The following were the destinations for the 16th of August :—

The Royal head-quarters to Pont à Mousson.

The head-quarters of the First Army, to Coin sur Seille two and a quarter miles from Verny.

Ist Army Corps, to the Courcelles station.[1]

VIIth Army Corps, to Pommerieux.

VIIIth Army Corps, exclusive of the 31st Infantry brigade, under von Gneisenau,[2] to Lorry and Arry.

1st Cavalry Division, to remain at first in its present position, and then to move to Fey between the Moselle and the Seille, two and a quarter miles east of Corny.

3rd Cavalry Division, between Courcelles and Mécleuves.

According to the orders of the Second Army issued at 7 P.M. on the 15th from Pont à Mousson, the IIIrd Army Corps and the 6th Cavalry Division were to reach the road Metz—Verdun at Mars la Tour and Vionville on the 16th, marching by way of Novéant sur Moselle and Gorze.

The following dispositions were also ordered :—[3]

'The Xth Army Corps and the 5th Cavalry Division will continue their march along the road towards Verdun as far as St. Hilaire and Maizeray.

'The XIIth Army Corps will march from Noménу to Pont à Mousson, with its advanced guard to Regnéville en Haye.

[1] The 1st Army Corps was also to follow the First Army over the Moselle as soon as it was relieved by the army corps of General von Kummer, which was concentrating at Saarlouis.

[2] The 31st infantry brigade, reinforced by a squadron of the 9th Hussars, the 6th Light field battery of the 8th regiment, and a company of the 8th Pioneer battalion, was detached in the direction of Thionville.

[3] Official account of the Second Army on the battle of Vionville.

'The Guard Corps, to Vernecourt, with its advanced guard at Rambucourt.

'The IVth Army Corps, to Les Saizerais and Marbache, with its advanced guard at Jaillon on the road to Toul.

'The IXth Army Corps, to Sillegny, so as to follow the IIIrd Army Corps over the Moselle and by Gorze on the 17th.

'The IInd Army Corps will march with its van as far as Buchy, and will begin to cross the Moselle at Pont à Mousson on the 17th.

'The head-quarters of the army will remain at Pont à Mousson.'

When the orders of the Royal head-quarters, dated at Herny, 6.30 P.M., August the 15th, were received, stating that two army corps of the First Army were to take up a position on the line Arry—Pommerieux on the 16th, 'the IXth Army Corps (Second Army) was directed to continue its march on the 16th close up to the Moselle, and to cross the river immediately in rear of the IIIrd Army Corps by the bridges constructed by that corps, while part of the IXth Army Corps was to follow the IIIrd towards Mars la Tour on the 16th and 17th.'

The orders for the further advance, issued by Lieut.-General von Alvensleben II. on the evening of the 15th, directed the 6th Infantry Division to march at 5 A.M. by Onville on Mars la Tour, followed by the corps artillery; the 6th Cavalry Division was to complete its passage of the Moselle by the bridges at Novéant at 5.30 A.M., and march thence by Gorze on Vionville, followed by the 5th Division.

The 5th Cavalry Division, under General von Rheinhaben, reinforced by the two horse artillery batteries of the corps artillery of the Xth Army Corps, received orders early on the 16th from General von Voigts-Rhetz to advance and reconnoitre in force in the direction of Vionville.[1] Lehmann's brigade—consisting of the 1st battalion of the 78th regiment, 2nd and 4th squadrons of the 9th Dragoons, and 1st Heavy battery of the 10th regiment of artillery—was ordered to march to Chambley, where it would be joined by von Lyncker's detachment, and the entire force was to operate under the com-

[1] According to an extract from the report of the Xth Army Corps on the battle of Vionville.

mand of Colonel Lehmann in support of the 5th Cavalry Division. According to the reports of the Xth Army Corps, 'St. Hilaire was named as the destination of General von Schwartzkoppen with the remainder of the 19th Division and the brigade of Dragoons of the Guard. The 20th Infantry Division, with the corps artillery, was to march to the north of Thiaucourt.'

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The ground generally is undulating, hilly, and much intersected by ravines containing water; but it is for the most part open, the southern, north-eastern, and south-eastern margins alone being covered with wood. That part of the field of battle lying to the north of the high road from Metz to Verdun is cut in two by the copses of Tronville. As regards the elevation of the ground, the battle field is divided by nature into two portions. The plateau of Vionville forms the principal portion, extending on the north to the defile at the old Roman road and on the east to the ravine of Rezonville. A broad ridge nearly in the form of a right angle lies in front of the northern and eastern edge of this plateau, its most commanding point being at Villers aux Bois. It is bounded on the east by the ravine of la Jurée, beyond which is the northern part of the Bois des Ognons.

As a rule the ground slopes from east to west. A broad ridge forms the most commanding part of the plateau of Vionville on its eastern margin, running from the defile at the old Roman road nearly to the Bois de St. Arnould, where, after sending out a spur in its original direction, it turns at right angles to the south-west for a distance of from 1,200 to 1,500 paces, and finally resumes its original line of direction towards Gorze. During the whole of the battle it was an object of eager contention. The southernmost of the three parts into which nature has divided this ridge culminates at a point at the north-western angle of the Bois de Vionville (marked 326), and this is the most commanding ground on the whole field of battle. The northernmost is highest near the old Roman road and to the south of Rezonville at the hill marked 311: the centre and more level portion is in the form of a long, low saddle uniting the other two features, and was frequently traversed in vain by both antagonists in their endeavours to make themselves masters of the whole ridge.

The French position was materially strengthened by the woods covering the gentle slope to the north and north-west of the ridge, which would take in flank any aggressive movements directed from the copses of Tronville or from Vionville against its northern side. The plateau is bounded on the east by the defile of Rezonville. The northern part of the latter between the old Roman road and Rezonville can be traversed by all arms,

though not entirely without difficulty. But to the south of that village it is so steep and narrow that infantry in loose order alone can pass through the Bois de St. Arnould. As the stream running through it is but shallow, the defile formed the line of march which would be naturally taken by a force advancing from Gorze to attack or turn the French left wing. These operations were greatly facilitated by the vicinity of the Bois de Vionville and St. Arnould. The Bois des Ognons lying further to the east was as dangerous for the Prussian right wing as for the French left, so long at least as it remained unoccupied by that wing. The character of those forests is generally the same; being full of well-grown timber or dense underwood, they can only be traversed with the greatest difficulty except by the roads; and their edges can be easily defended. The western slope of this ridge is thickly intersected by numerous defiles, of which the most important are those of Vionville and Flavigny: they can be traversed by all arms, though not always without difficulty. Long spurs stretch out between them with regular and gentle slopes as far as the line Vionville—Anconville. The capabilities of defence are increased by the inequalities of the ground, and also by patches of wood lying near the high road from Metz to Verdun and to the south of it, the principal being the Tank wood between Flavigny and Vionville.

Beyond the above-mentioned line the ridges again rise to the hill immediately to the west of Vionville and the cemetery south of that village, while an extensive terrace is formed further to the south. This hill (297) commands the ground on the east to a distance of 2,000 paces, and that on the south-east and north to a still greater distance. The situation of the village is so low that one can see over it from the hill. The hill of the cemetery is nearly on the same level with the hill of Tronville to the west of it, and divided from it by a defile passable, though with difficulty, for all arms. The latter hill commands the ground towards the north and west for a considerable distance. From the heights of Vionville and Tronville long spurs with gentle slopes radiate north and south of the high road in the direction of Mars la Tour. One of them extends beyond that village and trends away with a gradual fall towards the north on the right bank of the Yron. The hollows and defiles thus formed afford an

the defiles south-west of the village, which were filled with cavalry, but here the enemy also retired immediately.

General von Redern had fallen in with de Forton's Reserve Cavalry Division. As related in the French accounts, the 2nd Corps (Frossard) had received orders, in consequence of delays experienced by the other army corps, to halt at Rezonville, where also the 6th Corps (Canrobert) was to remain. Consequently at this moment the 2nd Corps was encamped to the south of the high road from Rezonville to Vionville, and Valabrègue's Cavalry Division near the latter spot. A smart fire ensued between the two batteries of de Forton's Division, posted in front of Mars la Tour, and Schirmer's battery, which lasted for an hour; the latter battery losing two men severely and one slightly wounded in addition to eleven horses, of which six were killed; the five wounded horses had also to be shot.[1] After the battle, de Forton's brigade (according to V. D.) retired on Vionville; it was unsuccessful in obtaining intelligence about the German troops on the left bank of the Moselle, and General de Forton reported erroneously that the cavalry had been supported in the affair by German infantry. But the 5th Cavalry Division had ascertained that there was opposite to it at Rezonville an encampment of infantry, estimated at 20,000 men, in addition to a strong force of hostile cavalry.

(2) The 6th Cavalry Division, under the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, reconnoitred on the right bank of the Moselle on the morning of the 15th; the right and left divisions of the 2nd Horse Artillery battery (Captain Wittstock) of the 3rd Brandenburg field artillery regiment, attached to it, taking part in the subsequent combats.

The right division, under First Lieutenant von Gizycki, starting from Verny at 5.30 A.M., joined Colonel Count Groeben's detachment, consisting of the 3rd Lancers and a squadron of the 6th Cuirassiers, at Pournoy le Chétif. This force reconnoitring between the Seille and Moselle, ascertained that the right bank of the latter river was unoccupied by the enemy, who had abandoned several intrenchments during the

[1] The account given by the battery states that after the firing 'it limbered up, and retired about 1,000 paces. After obtaining men, horses, and ammunition from the first line of wagons it again advanced, but found the enemy's position evacuated.'

night. But the position of a French camp below Moulins les Metz was discovered by signals made by the enemy, although Fort St. Quentin was hidden by the thick mist, which rose from the Moselle valley. The guns were directed to open fire on the camp at a range of 2,300 paces from a position at Bradin farm, 100 paces from the railway embankment. The account given by the artillery engaged is, that after the first shells struck the camp the whole of the troops in it were on the alert, and taking to flight ran wildly into the adjoining woods for protection. The guns in consequence frequently altered their range, which varied from 2,200 to 2,800 paces, and continued to fire until the whole camp was abandoned. They expended 48 shells in all.

'Fort St. Quentin fired three rounds and then ceased firing, probably because it could not see in consequence of the mist. Thereupon the detachment returned to Verny, the cavalry remaining some time longer in observation. No losses were sustained by the division.'

This affair is mentioned in French accounts. V. D. states:—'Towards 8 A.M. a German battery, having advanced as far as Frescaty farm, threw some shells into the large body of troops on the road between Longeville and Moulins. Fort St. Quentin soon compelled it to retire, but in consequence of this bold step the Emperor decided on removing to Lessy.' According to another French account the first German shell, which fell into the camp, burst among three French officers, who were quietly breakfasting, and killed two of them, severely wounding the third.'

The left division of the battery, under Second Lieutenant Hederich, was attached to Major von Heszberg's detachment, consisting of a squadron of the 15th Lancers and two squadrons of the 6th Cuirassiers. The column broke up from Verny at 5.30 A.M., and the Lancers, forming the van and followed by the two guns, advanced along the road by Pouilly to Metz. On arriving at the point where the railway crosses the road, part of the cavalry was left behind to observe the road to Metz. The account given by the artillery further states: 'The division turned out of the road to the left and advanced at a trot in the direction of Montigny. As the station there was occupied and trains were leaving with troops and forage, Lieutenant Hederich

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near the Bois de Vionville (326), except where cover is afforded by hollows and woods; and command of ground in front from the hill of Vionville up to the range of field artillery.

5. The favourable and covered positions afforded by this command and by transverse hollows, for infantry and artillery.

6. The possibility of assuming the offensive on a broad front from the greater part of the position.

7. Abundant opportunities for the employment of cavalry.

8. The re-entering angle formed by the right wing outflanking hostile offensive movements made from Rezonville towards the south or south-west.

9. The position intercepting the shortest line of retreat on Verdun, the object at which the enemy was aiming.

The disadvantages of the position were the following :—

1. Its intersection by the ravines of la Jurée, Rezonville, Flavigny, and Vionville.

2. The command of the extreme right wing afforded by the hill marked 308.

3. The difficulty which would be experienced by the extended left wing (excluding its most distant portion to the west of Mars la Tour) in making any offensive movement across the defile between Greyère and the copses of Tronville, behind which the enemy could obtain cover in a commanding position.

4. The existence in rear of the centre and right wing of an obstacle not easily traversed, viz. the edge of the plateau and the defile.

5. The extent of the position (three miles) being out of proportion to the available number of troops, which consisted at the commencement of the battle of but one strong corps, including von Lyncker's detachment.

6. The danger of both wings being turned and outflanked, the right through the Bois des Ognons and the left from the commanding ridge at Bruville.

7. The direction of the line of retreat being oblique to the right wing, a danger which was, however, counterbalanced to a certain extent by the reinforcements expected at that point.

The German position possessed several weak points from a strategical point of view, the principal being the flanks.

ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE.

1. *Surprise of the 2nd French Corps and Cavalry Reserve in bivouac at Vionville and Rezonville by the 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions—The artillery of the 6th Infantry Division comes into action—Marshal Bazaine's dispositions—Repulse of the German cavalry.*

THE official account of the Second Army states that the morning of the 16th was very warm and the march of the troops through the narrow valleys and up the steep ascents to the plateau fatiguing.

The movements of the IIIrd Army Corps will first be traced. Some advanced patrols of Dragoons reported at about 8 A.M. 'that the enemy's outposts were visible at Tronville and Vionville, and that extensive encampments were seen in their rear near those villages. The general in command, von Alvensleben, who was riding with von Buddenbrock's 6th Division, ordered it to march as far as the plateau, and there await the arrival of the 6th Cavalry Division in a covered position in rear of the heights of Buxières. Reconnoitring the ground from those[1] heights, he perceived several hostile camps at Vionville, clearly indicating the presence of a considerable force. The general determined to attack without delay, as this was necessary in order to detain the enemy.

General von Rheinhaben reported that he was advancing with the 5th Cavalry Division towards Vionville, and would place himself at the disposal of the IIIrd Army Corps. He also undertook to inform the Xth Army Corps of what had taken place. The Division had broken up from its bivouacs at Xonville and Suzemont at 8.30 A.M., von Redern's brigade of Hussars march-

[1] According to Captain Helmuth's Lecture.

ing in front, with four horse artillery batteries under Major Körber. The 2nd Horse Artillery battery of the 10th regiment was attached to the advanced guard, while the others followed with the main body. The first lines of wagons remained with the batteries, the second being united under the command of First Lieutenant Macard. The Division had also been joined by a squadron of the 2nd Dragoons of the Guard, which had served as escort to the two horse artillery batteries of the corps artillery on their march from Thiaucourt to Xonville; as well as by Colonel Freiherr von der Becke, commanding the artillery of the Xth Army Corps, and by Lieutenant-Colonel von Caprivi, Chief of the General Staff. When the advanced guard reached Tronville the skirmishers of the IIIrd Army Corps were seen in the direction of Vionville and Tronville, and also a detachment of French cavalry on the march. The 2nd Horse Artillery battery, Captain Schirmer, immediately opened fire from a position near Tronville (2. r. X.), and its very first shell struck the object. The hostile cavalry retired and unmasked some guns, which had taken up a position on the hill to the west of Vionville. These were shelled at a range of 1,500 paces with good results. But meanwhile Major Körber had brought up the batteries of the main body, which, in their eagerness to get possession of the all-important hill of Vionville without further delay, came into action in echelon, left in front, to the left of Schirmer's battery. They stood in the following order:—The 1st and 3rd Horse Artillery, 10th regiment, Captains Frisch and Saalmüller, and the 1st Horse Artillery, 4th regiment, Captain Bode, (1. r. X, 3. r. X., 1. r. IV.) The fire of these batteries at a range of about 1,500 paces compelled the enemy to retire; and to increase the panic, which seized the enemy, Major Körber immediately advanced boldly from the left wing to the hill of Vionville, while the other batteries, remaining a little longer in action, were ordered to direct their fire on the village, sheltered in the hollow. From the hill the enemy's troops of all arms were seen retiring on Rezonville, and were effectually shelled at distances varying from 1,500 to 2,000 paces by Bode's battery (1. r. IV.), posted between the two roads from Mars la Tour and Tronville to Vionville, and by Saalmüller's and Frisch's (3. r. and 1. r. X.), which stood on Bode's right.

The 6th Infantry Division, under von Buddenbrock, had meanwhile received orders to continue its march in the direction of Mars la Tour, and the general, von Alvensleben, directed General von Bülow (almost simultaneously with the orders issued to the two Divisions of cavalry), to bring forward his divisional artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel Beck, escorted by two squadrons of the 2nd Dragoons, with the object of attacking the enemy's camp. The corps artillery was also ordered to the front as rapidly as possible. In spite of the great distance it had to march the divisional artillery came up in time to assist in the attack made by the cavalry. The 6th Light field battery of the advanced guard, Captain Schlicht, as well as the 5th Light field battery, Captain Müller I. (6. and 5. l. III.), trotting at the head of the division of artillery, came into action close to Schirmer's battery near Tronville, immediately after the three horse artillery batteries moved from the position. After firing a few rounds at 2,000 paces at a French battery, these batteries continued their advance; von Schirmer's[1] and von Schlicht's batteries coming into action on the hill of the churchyard to the south of Vionville (2. r. X. and 6. l. III.), where they fired on the enemy's infantry at Flavigny at 1,600 paces and obliged it to retire; and Müller's battery (5. l. III.) further to the left. Further reference will have immediately to be made to this battery.

Simultaneously with the above, the 6th Cavalry Division under the Duke of Mecklenburg, was ordered by General von Alvensleben to ascend the plateau from Gorze.[2] Von Rauch's brigade, advancing directly from Gorze on Flavigny, was prevented from reaching the edge of the plateau by infantry fire from the Bois de Vionville, but Grüter's brigade, taking a more circuitous route from Gorze through the Bois de Gaumont, was more fortunate. The 2nd Horse Artillery battery of the 3rd regiment, Captain Wittstock (2. r. III.), attached to the latter brigade, came into action for the first time after a trot of two miles through the difficult defile of Tantelainville; but one

[1] The battery does not consider this position to be strictly correct, but from the statements of the batteries in the vicinity the writer considers himself justified in maintaining his opinion until he receives more reliable information.

[2] From the *résumé* of Major von Scherff's Lecture.

of its guns was left behind and only rejoined the battery at a later hour. This battery, opening fire about the same time as the batteries of the 5th Cavalry Division, shelled a large mass of hostile artillery to the east of Vionville, 2,000 paces distant, with good results. The two heavy batteries under Lieutenant-Colonel Beck were also brought into line to the south-west of Flavigny; the first to arrive being the 6th, under Captain Meinecke (6. s. III.), which was followed by the 5th, under Captain Eunicke (5. s. III.) During their advance and while coming into action, they were exposed to shrapnel from guns at Vionville and Flavigny, to which they replied with apparently good results at a range of 2,000 paces. Meinecke's battery had previously taken a temporary position more to the front, but this is not shown on the plan of the battle.

Let us now follow the French accounts of this prelude to the battle. At 8 A.M. the reconnoitring parties returned to the French camp at Vionville and Rezonville and reported that there were no strong bodies of the enemy in the neighbourhood, but that single troopers showed themselves and exchanged shots with de Forton's vedettes. The 2nd Corps, Frossard, was advised early in the morning of the march of a Prussian advanced guard through Gorze, 'which appeared to be taking a line of march parallel to our own.' The general, however, considered that he had already taken sufficient precautions for the safety of his flanks, while de Forton's Division guarded his front. Part of the latter was watering its horses in the direction of the enemy, when, according to the French accounts, Murat's brigade of Dragoons, carelessly encamped at Vionville, was surprised by the German shells.[1] It is also stated that the Prussian batteries 'threw their shells into the camp of de Forton's Division and as far as the cavalry of the 2nd Corps in rear of it.' Some shells also fell into the infantry camp. Great confusion ensued, for it happened that the baggage of de Forton's Division had just arrived, blocking the narrow street of Vionville and the high road. Panic-stricken, the civilian drivers turned their wagons and horses

[1] Marshal Bazaine's work, *L'Armée du Rhin*, which has recently appeared, contains a statement vindicating General de Forton and denying that he was surprised.

to the right about. Murat's dragoons, with some of their horses unsaddled, followed them. All fled to the rear in confusion.

General de Forton endeavoured to rally his dragoons on the brigade of Cuirassiers; but as his artillery, which had taken up its position to the west of Vionville, was obliged to give way, they withdrew along the north side of the road in the direction of Rezonville to the right flank of the 6th Corps. Valabrègue's cavalry division of the 2nd Corps joined in this retreat.

The French infantry, unaffected by the panic of the cavalry, soon formed up and moved forward to drive the foe from the edge of the plateau. The 2nd Corps, Frossard, fronted in two directions:—the 2nd Division (Bataille) and the 2nd brigade of the 1st Division (Vergé) towards the south-west with its right flank resting on the road to Verdun; the 1st brigade of the 1st Division (Vergé) and Lapasset's brigade towards the south, watching the forests of Vionville, St. Arnould, and les Ognons, and particularly the ravines running from Gorze to Rezonville. The batteries of the reserve artillery were ready for employment according to circumstances. The 6th Corps, Marshal Canrobert, gradually took up a position to the right rear of the 2nd Corps. The space between the road to Verdun and the old Roman road was occupied by the 3rd Division, Lafont de Villers; the 2nd Division, Bisson, consisting of but one regiment; and the artillery of Tixier's Division. The 1st Division, Levassor-Sorval, formed up to the east of Rezonville, facing the south, to support Lapasset's brigade. Soon afterwards the Imperial Guard, Bourbaki, was placed by Marshal Bazaine in reserve near Gravelotte in the following positions:—The Voltigeur Division at Malmaison and the Grenadier Division at the 'Post' at Gravelotte, to secure the retreat on Metz; the Zouaves of the Guard only and part of the artillery on and near the road to Verdun, to watch the ravine of la Jurée. The 3rd Corps, now under the command of Marshal Lebœuf,[1] was ordered to wheel to the left from the line Vernéville—St. Marcel, so as to take the enemy in flank. The 4th Corps, Ladmirault, was at the commencement

[1] According to Marshal Bazaine's account, this general—to avoid crowding on the roads, which were few and narrow—had on his own responsibility and contrary to orders selected the more circuitous route by St. Marie aux Chênes.

of the battle only in the act of climbing the heights from Woippy in the valley of the Moselle, with the intention of marching on Doncourt. Marshal Bazaine trusted that it would march towards the sound of the guns and support the movements of the 3rd Corps.

To return to the Germans. The hostile infantry, supported by artillery, was pressing forward along the whole front and gaining ground especially on the German left. At that moment the batteries of the 6th Infantry Division received orders to retire on their Division, which was marching up from Buxières to Tronville, and maintain a closer connection with it.

Despite the vigorous and well-directed fire of the horse artillery batteries at Vionville, they were unable to prevent that village being re-occupied by swarms of skirmishers. According to General Freiherr von der Becke, commanding the 10th artillery brigade, they were at that time escorted by two squadrons of Dragoons of the 5th Cavalry Division, their own infantry not having yet come up.[1] 'When the French re-captured Vionville and their skirmishers pressed on beyond the village, the situation of the batteries—and more especially that of the 1st and 3rd Horse Artillery batteries of the 10th regiment fronting Vionville—became critical.' Colonel Becke, with the sanction of the General of the Staff, Lieut.-Colonel von Caprivi, directed both batteries to retire and await the arrival of the German infantry. But the movement was not executed without a considerable loss of men and horses, and Lieutenant Blanck of the 3rd Horse Artillery battery had a horse shot under him.

Bode's battery (1. r. IV.), posted on the hill between the two high roads, was fortunately well under cover and could not be reached from the outskirts of Vionville; but on the other hand its guns could not see that place, and consequently could not hit it. Major Körber remained with the battery, which stoutly maintained its important position. At that moment Müller's battery (5. l. III), advancing from its first position, moved up

[1] Von Redern's brigade of Hussars had advanced as far as the ravine between Tronville and Vionville, the main body of the 5th Cavalry Division being in rear in the direction of Tronville. The brigade of Hussars was brought forward to the attack at a later hour by Lieut.-Colonel von Caprivi.

close to the village of Vionville, and came into action under a heavy fire, several horses being either killed or wounded. Swarms of skirmishers again rushed out from Vionville and the moment became critical. The battery had recourse to case and succeeded in driving the enemy back into the village, but as the close and biting musketry fire continued to make many casualties, it retired some 300 or 400 paces and took up a fresh position.

Understanding that the retrograde movement was general, the batteries on the hill of the cemetery, south of Vionville, also retired, having sustained a considerable loss from the fire of mitrailleurs and musketry. A gun of von Schlicht's lost so many horses that it was temporarily left behind. The spare horses, which were brought up, were also killed, but the gun was at length brought off, though not without further loss, by the detachment under Lieutenant Maas, which had remained with it. In that position Captain von Schlicht had a horse killed under him. The hostile attack was pressed with such vigour that the whole line of artillery stretching from the heights south of Flavigny to the hill of Vionville was on the point of giving way. This was noticed by General von Bülow, who had meanwhile ridden some hundred paces to the rear to give orders to the corps artillery then coming up. In pursuance of the orders received from General von Alvensleben, he immediately directed the batteries to halt and unlimber, with the exception of the 5th Heavy field battery, Eunicke, which came into action on the left of the 1st Horse Artillery battery of the 4th regiment (Bode, I. r. IV.) near Vionville, as ordered by the 6th Infantry Division.[1] This was reported to the general in command and approved by him.

The 6th Cavalry Division with its battery (Wittstock, 2. r. III.) was driven back to the wood of Gaumont and the ravine of Anconville.'[2] As soon as the enemy's skirmishers succeeded in approaching to within from 1,200 to 1,400 paces the guns were gradually withdrawn for cover behind the hill, though not

[1] The 5th Heavy battery, Meinecke, and the 5th Light, Müller I., did not come up until a later hour, when the corps artillery was able to come into action in the centre of the position, as described below.

[2] *Résumé* of Major von Scherff in the *Militair-Wochenblatt.*

without considerable loss. They then limbered up and retired with their brigade (Grüter's) into the defile, there to await further orders.

2. *Advance of the 5th and 6th Infantry Divisions and retreat of the 2nd French Corps to Rezonville.*

'The infantry divisions of the IIIrd Army Corps, intended to cut off the retreat from Metz on the west,'[1] arrived in time, and Lieut.-General von Stülpnagel, on hearing that the enemy was at Vionville, determined to attack forthwith.[2] The 1st Light battery, Captain Stöphasius, of the 1st field division of the 3rd regiment was attached to the advanced guard of the 5th Infantry Division. The remaining three batteries followed the leading battalions of the main body under their divisional commander, Major Gallus. The enemy had just commenced to occupy the Bois de Vionville and St. Arnould when the advanced guard under General von Döring ascended the plateau from Gorze; and the 2nd and Fusilier battalions of the Body Guard Grenadiers were directed on Rezonville by the Côte Mousa. 'The 1st and 2nd battalions of the 48th regiment advanced along the hollow road from Gorze to Flavigny, while the 3rd Rifle battalion followed the Musketeer battalion of the 48th, and attacked the enemy in the forest on the right of the road.'[3]

After a severe and bloody contest the infantry succeeded in pushing forward victoriously towards the heights and forest of Vionville, thereby clearing the way for the artillery, which gradually came to the front. The enemy brought up considerable reinforcements, which pressed our gallant infantry severely. At this critical moment Captain Stöphasius brought his battery into position on a hill previously reconnoitred by him and General von Döring. His left flank was protected by the Fusilier battalion of the 48th regiment, but the battery was overwhelmed by the enemy's bullets before it came into action. First Lieutenant Puscher and Second Lieutenant Flöthe were severely wounded and three guns temporarily disabled. But

[1] *Résumé* of Major von Scherff.
[2] Lecture by Captain Helmuth.
[3] *Résumé* of Major von Scherff's Lecture.

recognizing the importance of the situation, Captain Stöphasius, as well as the infantry, resolutely maintained his ground. The three uninjured guns opened fire at a range of from 800 to 1,000 paces with such effect that the dense swarms of hostile skirmishers were crushed and obliged to retire.

The 1st Heavy and 2nd Light batteries (1. s. III. and 2. l. III.), Captains Nöldecke and Vollbrecht, soon came into action on the right of the 1st Light battery under their divisional commander, Major Gallus, and their fire was equally effective. Their losses, however, were heavy. Lieutenant Schröder of the 2nd Light battery was severely wounded, and Lieutenant Brehmer was also hit, but was able to remain with his battery. Captain Knobbe soon followed with the 2nd Heavy battery (2. s. III.) His orders obliged him at first to remain in rear in reserve, to avoid blocking up the road; but concluding from the heavy firing that the situation of affairs was serious, he advanced immediately and brought his battery, considerably weakened, into action on the left flank of the division. Two horses were killed under him. 'A superior force of the enemy meanwhile attacked the 48th Fusiliers in flank and drove back the three companies of the left wing; the leading battalion of the 10th brigade (1st battalion, 52nd regiment) advanced at a double to support it, and repulsed the French to a short distance only, when it was itself brought to a standstill by superior numbers. Major-General von Döring fell mortally wounded, and the enemy was not definitely driven off until the arrival of the Fusilier and 2nd battalions of the 52nd regiment, followed by the 2nd and Fusilier battalions of the 12th regiment, which had approached during the fight.'[1] The artillery of course contributed materially in bringing about this result.

It was now 11 o'clock. Major-General von Schwerin posted his troops at the crossing of the roads Buxières—Rezonville and Gorze—Flavigny, the two battalions on his left flank (the 2nd battalion of the 52nd regiment and the Fusilier battalion of the 12th) pursuing the enemy towards the north. On the right flank the infantry, after an obstinate struggle, succeeded in reaching the northern edge of the Bois de Vionville, and

[1] *Résumé* of Major von Scherff.

established itself there. The 48th regiment and the Rifle battalion had been reinforced by the 2nd and Fusilier battalions of the 78th regiment, which had moved up into the intervals between the batteries, under Colonel Lyncker, he having placed himself under the orders of Lieut.-Gen. von Stülpnagel while on the march from Novéant to Chambley. The two battalions of the Body Guard regiment on the right of the line had advanced to the margin of the wood of St. Arnould, and held their position against Lapasset's brigade, which was greatly superior in numbers. In the centre the 1st field division of the 3rd regiment, having moved up between the 9th and 10th Infantry brigades, had gradually wheeled to the right with them, and had made some progress. Major Gallus, wishing to follow the enemy's movement and to rest his right flank on the infantry in the Bois de Vionville, ordered the division to advance, bringing its left shoulder forward and extending its right flank. Knobbe's battery (2. s. III.), which was at some distance on the left of the line, at once moved along the rear of the other batteries, this movement being concealed by the conformation of the ground, and then advanced under a heavy musketry fire for a short distance along the western edge of the Bois de Vionville. This battery formed the pivot of the wheel, the other batteries alligning themselves on it. At this moment the 1st Light battery of the 10th regiment (1. l. X.), under Captain Knauer, attached to Lyncker's detachment, came into action on the left flank of the division and took an active part in the fight. When the enemy retreated further, the wheel was continued, so that at length the line fronted nearly due east.

The ground was extremely favourable to our fire, which was at first directed against the enemy's infantry at a range of from 1,600 to 1,800 paces, and the effect was apparently excellent, since the hostile skirmishers and their supports withdrew in two directions. After this the batteries fired alternately at artillery, mitrailleurs, and infantry, according to circumstances, the ranges being generally between 1,600 and 3,000 paces. Some batteries on the old Roman road at more than 4,000 paces were also fired at, but this distance was exceptional, though even then the effect was evidently good.

The hostile infantry repeatedly endeavoured to advance over the hill to the north of Rezonville (311), but were exposed to such an accurate and destructive fire from the German guns, which were served with the greatest coolness, that they were always obliged to retire. The French batteries were frequently shelled with such effect that they were unable to come into action.

Owing to the necessity of maintaining a rapid fire the ammunition was soon expended. The command of the ammunition wagons and the general supervision in rear had indeed been entrusted to an officer, but nevertheless it was only with considerable difficulty that a few ammunition wagons were brought up from Gorze. This was principally owing to the march being through the ravines of Gorze, the delays caused by the steepness of the road, and the circumstance that the ground in rear of the batteries was exposed to the enemy's shells.

The losses sustained by the batteries during the above movement and also when in action were very considerable. The French fire, though occasionally brisk, was not at first very effective; the shrapnel went over our heads, bursting in the air, generally at a height of 100 feet, and the greater part of the common shell burst short. Most of our losses were caused by musketry. Major Gallus was struck three times by the enemy's bullets, and soon afterwards died of his wounds, but did not give over the command of the division to Captain Stöphasius until after the third wound, by which time it was evident that the enemy could not silence the German guns. The following officers fell:—Captain Vollbrecht, who was succeeded in the command of the 2nd Light battery by First Lieutenant Woppisch; First Lieutenant von Heydenreich, and Second Lieutenant Borchert. Lieutenant and Adjutant Steinlein of the 3rd brigade of artillery was also severely wounded, while carrying an order from General von Bülow to Major Gallus. The loss of horses was very great; Captain Stöphasius lost two, while Captain Knauer, Lieutenant and Adjutant Krulle, and Lieutenant Haas each had a horse killed under him. There were only three riding-horses left in the 1st Light battery, so that the officers, with the exception of the captain, were obliged to be carried on the limbers. During the pauses in the action, which lasted from

half an hour to one hour at a time, losses were made good and the supply of ammunition replenished.

While these events were taking place on the right wing of the Prussians, the left wing and centre had made some progress, which afforded material support to the 5th Division. 'The 6th Division (von Buddenbrock), led by General von Alvensleben, had reached Tronville, where soon after 10 A.M. the 11th brigade deployed on the south side of the village and the 12th on the north side, facing the east. The 35th Fusiliers of the 11th brigade, Major-General von Rothmaler, advanced against Flavigny and Vionville, and the 64th regiment of the 12th brigade along the high road against the latter village.'[1] On the approach of the infantry, the two horse artillery batteries under Saalmüller and Frisch (3. and 1. r. X.), which were then retiring, wheeled about and advanced with the supports of the skirmishers of the leading battalions in the direction of Vionville and Flavigny, as desired by Colonel von Becke. Frisch's battery (1. r. X.) rejoined Bode's battery (1. r. IV.), and fired with good effect at columns of infantry advancing along the high road towards Vionville. Saalmüller's battery (3. r. X.) was equally successful from a position in the cemetery south of Vionville, where it had been sent by von der Becke, and it also shelled Vionville. The losses of the batteries, both while advancing and in action, were considerable, and were mostly due to the close musketry fire from Vionville. In Frisch's battery Lieutenant Bluhm was severely wounded and had a horse killed under him, while Lieutenant Rückheim was slightly wounded, but able to remain with the battery. The effect of the artillery fire at Vionville was excellent, and it completely stopped the advance of the enemy's columns.

'Vionville, attacked on the north, west, and south, was carried about 11 A.M., Colonel von Bismarck being wounded in the assault. But the enemy obstinately retained possession of the heights on the east of Vionville, as well as of Flavigny and the little wood between it and the high road. The Fusilier and 1st battalion of the 20th regiment attacked on the southern side of Vionville; more to the left, meanwhile the 24th regiment,

[1] *Résumé* of Major von Scherff's Lecture.

covering the left flank, had advanced from the 2nd line of the 12th brigade into the copses of Tronville.'[1]

To return to the artillery. Meinecke's battery (6. s. III.) had kept up its fire from the position to the south-west of Flavigny, unconnected with any other troops except a squadron of Hussars, probably of the 16th regiment, which happened to be near its right flank. It succeeded in driving back some hostile columns of infantry at a range of 1,800 paces, which were in the act of descending the opposite hills. Heavy losses were occasioned by the French musketry and mitrailleurs, as well as by the artillery, which was much more numerous. Second Lieutenant Rohde was severely wounded.

To support his left wing General von Buddenbrock again ordered his batteries, which had been detached to the right, to move up to Vionville, now in the hands of the Germans. Being relieved by the corps artillery (as described below), Lieut.-Colonel Beck brought them into line on the left of Major Körber's artillery. Meinecke's battery (6. s. III.) placed itself between Bode's battery[2] (I. r. IV.) and Eunicke's (5. s. III.), Müller's battery (5. l. III.) being on the left of the latter. The latter soon afterwards advanced a few hundred paces, so that its left flank rested on the wood occupied by the 24th regiment. Meanwhile the 1st Heavy battery of the 10th regiment, Captain Kleine (I. s. X.), had placed itself under the orders of Major Körber. It had marched to Chambley with Colonel Lyncker's detachment, to which it had been attached, and was now permitted to advance at a trot, without waiting for the infantry, in order to take part in the fight at Vionville. It came up immediately after the capture of that village, and took up a position between Bode's and Frisch's batteries.[3] This

[1] From the *résumé* of Major von Scherff's Lecture.

[2] Meinecke's battery retired at a walk from the position it had hitherto held, rapidly refitted, and then made a long flank march to its fresh position. A gun was overturned in passing a ditch, but was soon brought up by *Portépéefähnrich* Kühling, and came into action on the left flank of Eunicke's battery, as there was not sufficient space between that and Bode's battery for the whole of Meinecke's.

[3] General Freiherr von der Becke states that the horse artillery batteries under Major Körber were separated the whole day from the 5th Cavalry Division, to which they belonged, by their advance from Tronville to Vionville. An orderly officer of the Division arrived in the afternoon to recall the batteries, but this was not permitted by the officer commanding the artillery, who pointed out the necessity of their holding the position they occupied.

artillery mass of seven batteries directed its fire on various objects as circumstances dictated. In the first place, by cannonading the hostile artillery masses and batteries at a range of from 1,800 to 2,000 paces, it prepared the way for the successful infantry attack against the wood between Flavigny and the high road. After this the ranges were occasionally increased to 3,600 paces, at which distance good results were obtained against infantry, artillery, and mitrailleurs. The enemy's columns were unable to gain ground; his guns and mitrailleurs being temporarily silenced, were compelled to retire and his ammunition wagons blown up. Later in the day bodies of troops advancing to the attack from Rezonville in a south-westerly direction were also effectively enfiladed.

But the position of the batteries at Vionville had already become critical; the losses were great, caused not only by mitrailleurs and musketry but also by the enemy's guns, which were continually increasing in number. Second Lieutenant Oemler of Bode's battery had his right arm broken by a piece of shell, and First Lieutenant Freiherr von Türcke was killed by another. The horses of Captain Müller and of Lieutenant and Divisional Adjutant Cordemann, of the 3rd field artillery regiment, were killed by the same shell and fell on their riders. Major Körber and Captain Bode also had horses killed under them.[1] In several instances it was necessary to exchange gun with wagon limbers, to replace parts of carriages that had been shot away, and make good other defects under fire. The supply of ammunition ran short, and some batteries were obliged to remain inactive for a considerable period.[2]

The fighting round Vionville was still going on when the horse artillery division of the corps artillery of the IIIrd Army Corps came into action. On its march a little before arriving at Onville

[1] In the report by Meinecke's battery attention is called to the fact that its right division sustained extraordinary losses at the cross roads near a poplar, which the enemy served as a mark.

[2] Meinecke's battery expended the ammunition in its limbers, in the first line of wagons, and in an ammunition wagon belonging to another battery. Its second line of wagons did not at first come up, having been kept back by a battery of the corps artillery to which it supplied ammunition. The battery therefore, reserving five common shell per gun for emergencies, ceased firing until the arrival of its second line of wagons, which came up after an hour.

it had received orders from General von Bülow to advance at a trot in the direction of Mars la Tour. The horse artillery division, under Major Lenz, at the head of the column, moved off immediately at a trot, and the 2nd field division, under Captain Stumpf, was ordered to follow, mounting its men before starting. The first row of wagons of the ammunition columns, in rear, was directed to march to the Barraques de St. Marie, where it was to remain for the present. It was evident that the field division with its men mounted would not arrive on the field of battle till half an hour after the horse artillery, as the distance was more than four miles and the road bad. General von Bülow directed Colonel von Dresky to move his guns to the hill south-west of Flavigny (271) and come into action. Von Schlicht's battery (6. l. III.) joined the horse artillery division. From the moment of passing the defile which runs from Flavigny towards the south-west the 1st Horse Artillery battery suffered severely from hostile infantry behind a hedge 1,500 paces distant. Soon after the batteries had taken up their position Wittstock's battery (2. r. III.) came into action on their right flank, having advanced from a position on the right rear, where it had for some time effectively enfiladed at a range of 1,800 paces some French infantry engaged with the 5th Infantry Division under von Stülpnagel.

The four batteries thus united under the command of Colonel von Dresky were the 2nd Horse Artillery battery, Captain Wittstock (2. r. III.), the 3rd Horse Artillery battery, Captain Rödenbeck (3. r. III.), the 1st Horse Artillery battery, Captain Scheringer (1. r. III.), and the 6th Light battery, Captain von Schlicht (6. l. III.): their fire was directed at the enemy's infantry and artillery at a range of 1,800 paces, apparently with the best possible effect. They were, however, exposed to musketry fire from the left front, which occasioned many casualties. Captain Rödenbeck was so severely wounded that he died a few days after, the command of his battery devolving on Lieutenant Meyer. Lieutenants Gerber and Wolter were also severely wounded, one of them being hit before the guns unlimbered.

The deficiency of artillery in the centre of the army corps arising from the 3rd field division being engaged in another direction, could fortunately be provided for with very little delay by the 2nd field division of the corps artillery. This had reached

the vicinity of Tronville under the command of Captain Stumpf after a forced march, and was ordered to the front by General von Bülow. The 3rd Heavy battery, Captain Vosz (3. s. III.), was the first to arrive and came into action on the left flank of the batteries united under the command of Colonel von Dresky, which had experienced great difficulty in maintaining their position against the more numerous artillery of the enemy. The 3rd Light battery, First Lieutenant von Pressentin (3. l. III.), was placed to the south-west of Vionville, the 4th Light, Captain Müller II. (4. l. III.), and the 4th Heavy, Captain Fromme (4. s. III.), on the south side of the cemetery of Vionville. This occurred at 11.45 A.M.

Thus reinforced, Colonel von Dresky was able to advance the five batteries under his immediate command to a more favourable position 500 paces nearer the enemy, which afforded a better command of the ground in front in the direction of Flavigny. There, as well as on the hill of the cemetery, they were overwhelmed by a storm of bullets at a range of from 1,200 to 1,600 paces, and sustained heavy losses. Major, Körber and Lieutenant Gerricke, who were with Saalmüller's battery at the cemetery, had horses killed under them. Captain von Schlicht received so severe a contusion that he was insensible for half an hour, First Lieutenant Bodenstein commanding the 6th Light battery during the interval.

It was now of the utmost importance to take Flavigny and the Tank wood. By order of General von Bülow and of Colonel Freiherr von der Becke, the greater part of the batteries at Vionville and to the south of the village directed their fire at those points and at artillery placed on either side of the road for their defence, at a range of from 1,200 to 2,000 paces, with such success that the wood was carried by the Prussian infantry, and Flavigny itself was soon in flames. Two dense columns of infantry, issuing suddenly from the farm buildings to the north-east and south-east, were shelled by the whole of the batteries at a range of 1,500 or 1,600 paces, and retreated on Rezonville, leaving the ground literally covered with corpses; while strong French columns, which advanced from the hill to re-occupy the village, met the same fate.[1] It is reported by the artillery

[1] On the day after the battle an extraordinary number of French corpses and a

that the occupation of Flavigny was then effected by the infantry without much fighting, although the conflict up to that time had been most bloody. This occurred shortly after noon, and that part of Frossard's Corps which faced the south-west, consisting of Bataille's Division and the 2nd brigade of Vergé's Division, was in full retreat.

It is interesting to compare the French accounts of the events above narrated. General Frossard, commanding the 2nd Corps, states: 'Two simultaneous and clearly defined attacks were made against the 2nd Corps: one on its left flank through the Bois de Vionville and de St. Arnould; the other on its right flank in front of Vionville.' The first was met by Lapasset's brigade and Vergé's 1st brigade; the second by Vergé's 2nd brigade and Bataille's Division. Along the whole of the enemy's front numerous heavy batteries, to which our artillery found great difficulty in replying, covered us with shell. On the extreme left flank two 4-pr. batteries were sent forward from the reserve to support General Lapasset's battery; but owing to their inferior calibre and the losses they sustained were compelled to retire immediately. They had however assisted the left wing in stopping the advance of the German columns. The fire of Vergé's artillery, combined with that of the infantry, broke the force of the attack, but the superiority of the Prussian guns was everywhere conspicuous. Such was equally the case on our right flank, where several batteries which had reinforced Bataille's Division were unable to gain any advantage. In spite of our inferiority in this duel of artillery, the Prussian infantry was checked at every point.

. . . . . .

'The enemy, having brought up more artillery on his left, contented himself with redoubling his fire on the 6th Corps; which was replied to by the French guns.

. . . . . .

'The hostile cannonade continued to become more intense: we were harassed by guns of very heavy calibre, posted on the commanding heights of Tronville. As the divisional artillery

large herd of cattle, which had fled from the farms, lay on the ground in and about Flavigny, torn and mangled by shells.

was overmatched, General Frossard ordered the 12-pr. batteries of the reserve to advance under the command of Colonel Baudouin. The contest was then principally confined to artillery. Several officers of the French artillery fell, and General Frossard had a horse killed under him.'

Marshal Bazaine having made the above dispositions, joined the 2nd Corps on the field of battle, arriving about the time that Vionville was taken, and found the corps very hotly engaged in a combat of artillery. The Marshal states that the 6th Corps, under Canrobert, had checked the advance of the enemy who now confined himself to keeping up a brisk fire from his batteries.[1] He goes on to say: 'It was clear that the enemy would direct his principal attack against our left wing, taking advantage of the woods to screen his advance, and that he would endeavour to cut off our retreat to Metz.' Marshal Bazaine decided therefore to remain with the left wing of the 2nd Corps, and ordered up batteries from the general reserve of the army to support it, while to support the right wing until the arrival of the 3rd Corps under Lebœuf, de Forton's Reserve Cavalry Division took up a position behind it on the old Roman road, with its rear against the wood of Villers aux Bois. To judge from the French accounts, and especially that of General Frossard, the right wing (1st brigade) of Bataille's Division was the first to give way under 'the converging fire' of the Prussian artillery. It was followed by the 2nd brigade of Vergé's

[1] Lieut.-Colonel de Montluisant, commander of the artillery of Tixier's Division of the 6th Corps, states that, in consequence of the superiority of the Prussian artillery fire, he placed the guns in echelon with intervals of 33 yards and changed their positions every half-hour, either to the front or rear. His four batteries were on the right wing, and the position of the battery on the right flank at the old Roman road was so advanced that it could take in flank all troops marching forward beyond the line Vionville—Flavigny. These batteries were frequently taken to the rear to make good their damages.

The yielding nature of the ground was advantageous to the French. Montluisant says: 'Heureusement les terres étaient meubles; les obus s'enfonçaient et nous couvraient d'une mitraille très-pressée et peu meurtrière. . . Si le combat avait eu lieu sur un terrain ferme, nous aurions été écrasés.'

Before long the two batteries of de Forton's Cavalry Division came into action near these batteries, and later on the two 12-pr. batteries (9th and 10th) from the general reserve, which had been attached to Bisson's Division. They were posted at first to the east of Rezonville; and afterwards took up a position on the western side of that village, from which they were compelled to withdraw about 300 mètres by the Prussian fire.

Division and, after General Bataille had been wounded, by the 2nd brigade of its own division. The 1st brigade of Vergé's Division held out for some time longer until it too was obliged to retire in consequence of its right wing being turned, so that Lapasset's brigade alone stood its ground on the southern front of the position. According to Frossard Vergé's 2nd brigade suffered greatly from the fire of a strong Prussian battery.

3. *Advance of French cavalry at Flavigny to support the 2nd Corps—It is repulsed and pursued by the German cavalry—Advance of Prussian Artillery in the Centre—The troops engaged on both sides.*

At Frossard's request Marshal Bazaine ordered the cavalry at hand to advance and cover the retreat of the 2nd Corps. The 3rd Lancers of Lapasset's brigade rode resolutely forward followed by the Cuirassiers of the Guard on its right. Exposed to the fire of the German guns on the hill of the cemetery, the French cavalry came upon the companies of the 10th and 11th brigades,[1] which had advanced as far as the east of Flavigny. The charge was checked by the steady fire of the Prussian infantry, which the 17th Brunswick Hussars and the 11th Westphalian Hussars advanced from behind Flavigny to support, the former charging the remnant of the French Cuirassiers and the latter that of the French infantry.[2] A battery of the Guard, having come up during the fight, was captured by the German cavalry, and Marshal Bazaine, who had joined it, was for some minutes in the greatest danger. But the fire of Picard's Grenadier Division of the Guard, which had been brought up to support the 2nd Corps and lined the ditches of the high road, and Valabrègue's Cavalry Division of the 2nd Corps advancing to extricate the Marshal, forced our Hussars to retire, although unable to recapture the lost battery. The German cavalry was supported by the 6th Cavalry Division, which had been sent forward by General von Alvensleben in pursuit of the enemy, but now came on the advancing French Grenadiers. Exposed

[1] *Résumé* of Major von Scherff's Lecture.

[2] According to Captain Helmuth, the squadron of Dragoons of the Guard also took part in this affair.

to a heavy musketry and artillery fire from covered positions, it rapidly sustained heavy losses and Major-General von Rauch was wounded, but no opportunity of attacking the enemy was found. The left wing, composed of the 3rd and 15th Lancers, alone crossed swords with the remainder of Valabrègue's cavalry, and, after driving it off the ground, retired slowly to the rear of Flavigny.[1]

The occupation of Flavigny by the Prussian infantry and the advance of the cavalry afforded the desired opportunity for the artillery of the centre to advance. Schirmer's battery (2. r. X.), which by this time had made good its losses previously sustained, trotted to the front and took up a position to the east of Flavigny, by order of Colonel Freiherr von der Becke. It was soon followed, between 12.30 P.M. and 1 P.M., by Colonel von Dresky, who brought up his five batteries in echelons from the right. Major Lenz, with the horse artillery division, led the way to the hill occupied by Schwerin's brigade, and the other batteries were alligned with it, leaving an interval of from 150 to 200 paces on their right. The order of the batteries from left to right was as follows:—Vosz's (3. s. III.), von Schlicht's (6. l. III.), Wittstock's (2. r. III.), Rödenbeck's (3. r. III.), and Scheringer's (1. r. III.)

The batteries on the hill of the cemetery were also moved forward. Colonel von der Becke ordered Saalmüller's battery (3. r. X.) to advance at a trot to a position to the north of Flavigny. It was followed by Müller's battery (4. l. III.) and afterwards by Fromme's (4. s. III.), which were directed to advance by General von Bülow. All the batteries of the centre fired on the enemy's infantry at ranges of from 1,500 to 2,400 paces, and by their accurate fire always repulsed the attacks, which were often made in close masses. Although the positions of the batteries were not always favourable, being comparatively low, yet they had this advantage in the case of a hostile attack, that the French columns were always obliged to pass conspicuous features of the ground, the ranges of which could be accurately estimated by trial shots. It was observed that three shells striking consecutively in most cases caused the hostile columns to retire and

[1] *Résumé* of Major von Scherff's Lecture.

drag their skirmishers with them. As soon as the infantry was out of sight, his artillery and mitrailleurs on the ridge extending from the Roman road to the south of Rezonville were fired at, the ranges generally varying from 1,800 to 2,500 paces. That the effect of the fire against artillery was also good, was concluded from the frequency with which the hostile batteries changed their positions and the total disappearance of some of them.

From want of nearer objects, the artillery posted at the wood near the Roman road was occasionally fired on with apparently good results at a range of 3,000 paces, and by some batteries at a range of 4,000 paces. For a short time French cavalry also formed a favourable object. As Saalmüller's battery (3. r. X.) appeared to be very much exposed to the enemy's skirmishers, Colonel von der Becke ordered it to retire 200 paces to another position close to the high road from Vionville to Rezonville. Schirmer's battery (2. r. X.) also moved from its position south of Flavigny to another on the north of the high road, for the purpose of taking in flank a battery which had harassed it considerably by direct fire. The losses sustained by the artillery in the centre at this time from artillery, mitrailleurs, and the fire of skirmishers at long ranges, often extending to 1,800 paces, were very serious.

As soon as the infantry at Flavigny was disengaged by the cavalry, the portion of von Schwerin's brigade which had already reached that place (2nd bat., 52nd reg., and Fus. bat., 12th reg.) continued its offensive movement as far as the high road far to the east of Vionville; but being there opposed by a fresh and superior force of French infantry, was obliged to retire with considerable loss. The 52nd found support in Flavigny and the 12th reformed in rear of the artillery line.[1] At 12.30 P.M. the 24th regiment was at last able to advance from the copses of Tronville against the heights to the east of them, which had for a long time been raked by the guns at Vionville. It was impossible to attack earlier, because the 2nd battalion, detached for the security of the left flank to the northern margin of the copses, had not till then been able to penetrate the thick

[1] On the authority of Captain Helmuth: so also what follows.

underwood. Incurring many casualties from artillery, mitrailleurs, and musketry from covered positions, this gallant body of infantry crossed the long narrow ridge and the ravine beyond, where it held its ground in spite of a biting fire on its flank from Tixier's Division in the wood beyond the Roman road.

The IIIrd Army Corps was now master of the important position which intersects the shortest road from Metz to Verdun, and this it was necessary for Marshal Bazaine to force if he desired to carry out his original plan of retiring on Châlons. It was the object of the Prussians to hold this position, which extends for three miles from the Bois de St. Arnould to the copses of Tronville. Now therefore commences the second period of the battle.

The opposing forces up to this time had been as follows:—On the French side: de Forton's Reserve Cavalry Division, the 2nd and 6th Corps, and the greater number of the batteries of the Army Artillery Reserve (26 batteries exclusive of the latter).

On the German side: the 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions, the 3rd Corps, von Lyncker's detachment, and a battery of Lehmann's detachment (21 batteries, of which 7 were heavy).

'The whole of the artillery and nearly the whole of the infantry was engaged in the first line. The second was formed by the cavalry consisting, of the 2nd and 12th Dragoons (belonging to the divisions), to each of which was attached half of the 9th Dragoons from the 37th brigade; Mecklenburg's Division in the wood of Gaumont; Redern's brigade of Hussars at Flavigny, and the other two brigades of the 5th Cavalry Division at Tronville.'[1] Towards noon Colonel Lehmann arrived at the latter village from Thiaucourt with three battalions and a half,—the remainder of the 37th brigade; his 1st Heavy battery had already joined Major Körber's division.

4. *Movements of the Xth Army Corps—Attack of the French Guard and 6th Corps—Charge of 12th cavalry brigade and advance of infantry from Vionville.*

General von Voigts-Rhetz, commanding the Xth Army Corps, was desirous of reaching St. Hilaire, and after detaching the 37th

[1] From the *résumé* of Major von Scherff's Lecture.

brigade had marched in the morning with the remainder of von Schwartzkoppen's Division, consisting of the 38th brigade, two batteries and the brigade of Dragoons of the Guard attached to it, from Thiaucourt towards the high road Metz—Verdun. But in consequence of reports received from von Rheinhaben's Cavalry Division, he took the direction of Xonville before the battle commenced, to afford timely support to the advanced detachments. Even when the guns were heard, the troops, judging from recent events and reports that had been received, were far from believing in the possibility of an immediate encounter with the whole French army, which was supposed to be in full retreat towards the Meuse,[1] and consequently some of the battalions continued at first to march in their original direction. But when the firing increased, indicating unmistakably the commencement of a serious engagement, orders were immediately issued to the whole of the columns on the march to take the direction of the field of battle. The nearest detachments under von Lyncker and Lehmann had already marched in that direction on hearing the guns.

We have already spoken of the arrival of von Lyncker's detachment on the field of battle, and we also know that Colonel Lehmann's detachment, exclusive of the battery already in action, had arrived at Tronville, and had placed itself at the disposal of the officer commanding the IIIrd Army Corps. This detachment was at first to remain in reserve until it 'received certain information of the arrival of Kraatz-Koschlau's Division. The 2nd battalion of the 91st regiment alone took part in the advance on Vionville, and assisted the 24th and 35th regiments in a smart engagement with a considerably superior force of skirmishers to the north and north-west of that place.'[2]

'The 20th Division, under General von Kraatz-Koschlau, and the corps artillery of the Xth Army Corps, which had been on the march from Pont à Mousson to Thiaucourt and Beney since 4.30 A.M., received orders near Thiaucourt at 11.30 A.M. to take the shortest route to the field of battle. The half of von Schwartzkoppen's Division, with the Dragoons of the Guard, was still on the march to St. Hilaire; but receiving reports

[1] From the *résumé* of Major von Scherff's Lecture.
[2] According to Captain Helmuth's Lecture.

that continued firing was heard in the east, Count Brandenburg, after a short halt, marched towards it. Before, however, Von Wedell's brigade had formed up General von Schwartzkoppen received orders from General von Voigts-Rhetz soon after twelve o'clock to march to the battle field.'[1] Before the Xth Army Corps could support the IIIrd, now very hardly pressed, the greater part of it had to make a march of from 18 to 26 miles on a hot and sultry day.

Let us now turn to the French accounts of the period of the battle just commencing. Marshal Bazaine reports that after the cavalry action, in which he and his staff were surrounded, there was some hesitation in the Prussian lines. 'This,' continues the Marshal, 'allowed me to bring forward Picard's Division of the Grenadier Guards, which advanced under the personal command of General Bourbaki to relieve Bataille's and Vergé's Divisions,' while a brigade of Levassor-Sorval's Division of the 6th Corps was directed by Marshal Canrobert to move to the heights on the left opposite Vionville. Deligny's Division of the Voltigeurs of the Guard received orders at the same time to march to the Bois des Ognons, occupying it with its battalion of Chasseurs, and to watch the outlets of the wood by which the Prussians might possibly reach the plateau of Gravelotte.

The French writers differ in their accounts of the action which ensued. It is however certain that — the Prussians having halted between 1 and 2 P.M. after fully attaining the object of their attack—a general offensive movement was made between 1.45 and 3.30 P.M. by the whole of the French troops on the western front of the position.[2] Bazaine's official account omits all mention of this. Fay speaks of some advantages which the 6th Corps, Canrobert, had gained on its right wing. Canrobert states that an offensive movement was made along the whole line from Marcel to Rezonville about 2 P.M. after the cannonade on the right flank began to slacken, which led to

[1] From Major von Scherff's statement.

[2] Having regard to the attainment of the object and the danger in which the left flank would be placed by the prosecution of the attack, General von Bülow expressly and repeatedly forbad his batteries to advance, when he was obliged to leave the artillery position about 4 P.M., on being sent for by the general in command.

the inference that the enemy was discontinuing the attack. Frossard speaks even of a recapture and obstinate defence of Flavigny, and of a futile attempt made by the French to retake Vionville. That Flavigny was certainly not recaptured at this time, is proved by the fact that Müller's and Fromme's batteries (4. l. and 4. s. III.), together with the infantry, never left the ground immediately to the north of that hamlet until the end of the battle.[1]

The advance of the enemy's left wing was soon checked. Exposed in front to a heavy and accurate fire from the German artillery and attacked in flank by the 3rd Rifle battalion, the 48th and 78th regiments, which rushed out of the northern edge of the Bois de St. Arnould and de Vionville, it was unable to get beyond the hill marked 311.[2] In spite of repeated and energetic attempts to attack, the French were always repulsed with terrible loss. The enemy's centre was more successful in its advance against Vionville, but, in spite of its numerical superiority, was repulsed by the accurate fire of the German guns and of the infantry defending Vionville. The 64th, the 35th, and the 20th regiments, with two companies of the 91st, charged the enemy and forced him to retire with great loss. This gave fresh confidence to von Stülpnagel's Division, von Lyncker's detachment, and the troops at Vionville.

The position of the 24th regiment on the extreme left wing had become desperate. It had till then resolutely held its ground against a superior force, its losses increasing every moment, and its ammunition being nearly expended. In consequence of a report that some hostile columns advancing along the road Metz—Doncourt—Conflans had countermarched and were in the act of ascending to the plateau south of Bruville, the 2nd battalion of the 20th regiment, the last battalion of the reserve, had been sent to its support by General von Buddenbrock. General von Lehmann was indeed marching from Tronville through the forests to the north of that village to reinforce the

[1] In justice to the endeavour which Frossard has generally made to give correct information in his account, it must be remarked that isolated bodies of Prussian infantry had succeeded in penetrating into the farm buildings of Flavigny, and that these possibly were driven back.

[2] According to he account of Captain Helmuth.

left wing, but some time would necessarily elapse before his arrival.

In the interval it was possible for the enemy to annihilate the left wing by his artillery mass on the plateau of the old Roman road combined with the turning movement of his infantry. Prompt support was therefore necessary, and this could be given by cavalry only. Consequently General von Alvensleben, fully recognizing the demand he was making on the courage and devotion of the cavalry, ordered the 12th brigade, under General von Bredow, consisting of the 7th Cuirassiers and 16th Lancers, to charge the enemy's guns. The Chief of the General Staff Colonel von Voigts-Rhetz, undertook to explain the necessity for this important order.

This celebrated cavalry charge took place at 1.45 P.M. The batteries of Vionville, under Major Körber and Lieutenant-Colonel Beck, prepared it, concentrating their fire on the point of attack, after which they protected the right flank of the cavalry. 'General von Bredow advanced with three squadrons of the 7th Cuirassiers and three of the 16th Lancers up the gentle slope north of Vionville, where he deployed to the right under a tremendous fire. The brigade then charged and rode down all the troops of Canrobert's Corps between the Roman road, the high road, and Rezonville.'[1] The charge was finally checked by a flank attack made by de Forton's Cavalry Division and by the fire of the hostile infantry, which had rallied. But the object was attained; the required time was gained and the left wing of the infantry disengaged.[2]

Even the French accounts recognise the gallantry with which the Prussian cavalry pushed home its charge. As soon as the hostile attack on Vionville was checked, the confidence of our infantry rose to such a pitch that it was determined to assume

[1] From the *résumé* of Major von Scherff's Lecture.

[2] That the French were unable to carry out their offensive movements at later periods, and that the Prussian artillery contributed in effecting this result, is shown in the *Guerre de* 1870, by V. D——, *officier d'état-major*, published in the *Spectateur militaire* of 1871, vol. xxiii. page 236. The following statement is made:—'A Rezonville les 5e et 6e divisions de cavalerie prussienne ont pu masquer pendant une heure l'épuisement de leur 3e corps par des charges réitérées. Mais ce n'est pas leur action qui a empêché nos mouvements offensifs. Ceux-ci n'ont pas eu lieu, parce que nos chefs n'y ont pas songé, que l'artillerie ennemie nous maintenait, et que nos propres pertes nous faisaient attendre avec impatience l'arrivée des renforts.'

the offensive. Fresh columns of attack were formed under Colonel von Rothmaler, the original formations having become dislocated during the contest. The 20th, 24th, 35th, and 64th regiments advanced against the heights at Rezonville and succeeded, though with a heavy loss, in driving some of the batteries temporarily from their position and in capturing a gun. But at length the infantry was exhausted and was obliged slowly to retire before the superior forces opposed to it.[1] Meanwhile the 64th regiment was drawn up in reserve behind Vionville, ready to resist an attack which was momentarily expected from the north.[2]

This retrograde movement had of course its effect on the position of the batteries east of Vionville. The fact of the 35th regiment having lost ground to some extent to the north of Flavigny decided Captain Müller II. to withdraw his battery (4. l. III.), which was suffering severely, about 200 paces, so as to bring it in line with the skirmishers. Schirmer's and Saalmüller's horse artillery batteries (2. and 3. r. X.) received a heavy fire from skirmishers in front and on the left flank, which occasioned considerable loss. There was no infantry at hand to support them, and Colonel Freiherr von der Becke, who was near the batteries, ordered them to retire behind Vionville. After making good its losses Schirmer's battery returned into the line of battle, as related further on. Saalmüller's battery (3. r. X.) made a flank march at a gallop round the southern side of Vionville, and although exposed to a sharp fire, sustained but trifling loss: one of its guns was however disabled for a short time. The battery then took up a position to the north-west of Vionville between Beck's batteries. The adjutant of the 10th artillery brigade, First Lieutenant Looff, had a horse killed under him to the east of Vionville when near Colonel Freiherr von der Becke, who though covered with earth by bursting shells, escaped unwounded.

[1] From Captain Helmuth's Lecture.
[2] From Major von Scherff's Lecture.

5. *Extension of the French right wing by the 3rd Corps and Grenier's Division of the 4th Corps—Artillery combat at Vionville.*

Somewhat before 2.30 P.M. Lehmann's detachment reached the edge of the copses of Tronville opposite the enemy and came under a heavy fire. The range was so great that the battalions immediately pushed forward swarms of skirmishers from the margin of the wood against the strongly occupied heights in order to make their fire felt. The two battalions of the 91st regiment occupied the eastern skirts of the wood and the 1st battalion of the 78th the northern. The 1st Horse Artillery battery of the Guard, Captain von der Planitz, had also come into action somewhat earlier on the extreme left flank. Marching with the brigade of Dragoons of the Guard, it had preceded von Wedell's brigade to Mars la Tour, and arrived there about 1 P.M. After the field of battle had been reconnoitred, permission was given to the battery (1. r. G.) to take up a position on the hill south-south-east of Bruville, to enfilade the enemy's line at St. Marcel, covered by von Barby's cavalry brigade, which had advanced to observe the enemy. The battery drew on itself the fire of several hostile batteries, including a battery of mitrailleurs, without incurring much loss, and it repulsed some French infantry, which advanced from the forest to the south of St. Marcel against the copses of Tronville.

The enemy now threw out skirmishers from Marcel against the cavalry and the battery. At first the cavalry repulsed them. Presently however they began to gain ground. The battery now moved close to the old Roman road, and threw a few shells at a long range against the enemy's right flank, which was barely visible. It then withdrew and rejoined the brigade of Dragoons of the Guard at Mars la Tour.

The following account is given by Marshal Bazaine of this period of the battle: 'It was now 2 P.M. The enemy was completely repulsed on our right flank. In the centre he was checked by the 6th Corps and the Grenadiers of the Guard, and on the left flank he had not as yet assumed the initiative, as I had expected, for which nevertheless he had made preparations. His artillery fire was almost silenced, but it was

evident that he was making dispositions for a fresh effort. The 3rd Corps, under Marshal Lebœuf, had been impatiently expected and now made its appearance. Wheeling to the left on St. Marcel as a pivot, it moved up into the line of battle.

Marshal Bazaine, now at ease about his right wing, ordered Lebœuf to hold his position to the last with Nayral's Division, to open communication with the 6th Corps by means of Aymard's Division, and to move Montaudon's Division to Gravelotte, where it was to guard the outlet of the road from Ars sur Moselle. The Divisions of the 2nd Corps which had reformed were ordered to march in the same direction by Marshal Bazaine, who also placed mitrailleurs and 12-pr. batteries at the openings from the ravine to overwhelm the enemy's masses as soon as they became visible. 'I knew,' says Marshal Bazaine, 'that reinforcements had passed Ars and Novéant, and therefore paid especial attention to the probability of an attack being directed against our left flank. My line had been nearly parallel to the ravine of Rezonville at the beginning of the battle, but towards 3 P.M. became almost perpendicular to it, extending from the Bois des Ognons to St. Marcel and Bruville. At this moment the 4th Corps began to arrive in line of battle.'

Grenier's Division was the first to arrive, led by General Ladmirault in person. Cissey's Division followed in the right rear, and further to the right Clérembault's and Legrand's Cavalry Divisions of the 3rd and 4th Corps. The latter was joined by the 2nd brigade of the Cavalry Division of the Guard under de France. General Ladmirault outflanked the left wing of the 64th regiment and of Lehmann's detachment, which were attacked in front and on the right flank by the two Divisions of the 3rd French Corps. A brave resistance was made by the Prussian infantry, but at last the turning movements on both flanks made by a superior force compelled the left wing, fighting on the north side of the road Mars la Tour—Vionville, to give way. The 24th regiment retired with the last round in its rifles, and at the same time the 20th and Lehmann's three battalions were slowly pushed back. The only part of the copses of Tronville still in German possession was that nearest to the high road.

As the enemy continued to press his attack against the left

wing, Captain Stumpf, at the request of Colonel von Rothmaler, ordered the 3rd Light battery of the 3rd regiment of artillery, First Lieutenant von Pressentin, to support the infantry north of Vionville. Even in its march through the village the battery sustained heavy losses, and Second Lieutenant Nicolai had a horse killed under him. It however boldly advanced to a position (3. l. III.) on the hill immediately to the north of Vionville, on the slopes of which a small force of our infantry still remained to meet the attack of the formidable hostile force, which continued to advance. Within a few hundred paces of the enemy's skirmishers the guns were brought into action, and opened fire on the storming columns at a range of 800 paces with great effect. But in a few moments considerable losses were sustained. First Lieutenant von Pressentin and Lieutenant Ahrens had their horses killed under them, the latter receiving a severe contusion, which, however, did not oblige him to leave the battery. Another officer commanding a division of the battery was also disabled.

It was impossible to withstand the overwhelming numbers of the enemy, and the small body of infantry as well as the battery were obliged to retire. One of the guns was reduced to two tired horses which were unable to drag it through the heavy ground. The limber was abandoned with the object of saving the gun. Harnessing the horses one in front of the other, Lieutenant Nicolai with the assistance of two volunteers from the gun detachment and two drivers succeeded in carrying off the gun. It was afterwards provided with a wagon limber and returned into line. The five other guns retired under a tremendous fire from artillery and skirmishers, but came into action at every 150 paces, and checked the pursuit. The battery, much weakened, at length came into position between Kleine's and Bode's batteries to the west of Vionville, where it again took part in the action.

As the configuration of the ground made it impossible to come into action nearer the enemy, the batteries under Lieut.-Col. Beck and Major Körber had kept up a deliberate fire at a range of from 2,000 to 3,000 paces on the hostile artillery, which had increased in number and fired with great rapidity. Soon after 2 P.M. the left flank was enfiladed by a French battery,

which, however, was driven off by the 5th Light battery, commanded by Müller I. (5. l. III.). The Prussian artillery line retained its position, but at length, when our infantry had been compelled to evacuate the northern portion of the copses of Tronville and the enemy's skirmishers had begun to pour their fire on its left flank, Lieut.-Colonel Beck withdrew gradually from the position, which had then become untenable. Saalmüller's battery (3. r. X.) followed the movement. Meinecke's battery (6. s. III.) kept its position till the last, and with the remaining batteries under Major Körber maintained so effective a fire on the enemy's artillery that some of his ammunition wagons were blown up, and batteries both of guns and mitrailleurs, which had advanced to about 2,000 paces, quickly retired. To obtain cover from the threatened attack in flank, Meinecke's battery wheeled to the left and retired behind the low road embankment, where it took up a position with its front towards the north.

Shortly before the arrival of von Pressentin's battery on the west of Vionville, Lieut.-Colonel Beck withdrew his three batteries to the hill south-west of that village for the purpose of repairing damages and replenishing his supply of ammunition, and the division remained there ready to take part in the action when required. Saalmüller's battery also made good its losses.[1]

The situation of Major Körber's batteries, which remained in action at Vionville, where Colonel Freiherr von der Becke was also present, had meanwhile become very critical, the enemy's superior force continuing to outflank the Prussian left wing. Three French batteries came into action on the ridge to the south of Bruville (257), and enfiladed our artillery through the openings which separate the copse close to the high road from the central copse. But the batteries still maintained their position, the two on the left wing wheeling back so that the position assumed the form of an acute angle. A steady fire was kept up on the new as well as on the old antagonist. First Lieutenant von Pressentin was so severely wounded previous to taking up this new position that he was obliged to give up the command of the 3rd Light field battery to Second Lieutenant Ahrens. The hostile batteries exposed to the fire of this battery

[1] Some of the other batteries at Vionville were also occasionally obliged to retire during the action to make good their losses, but soon returned into the line of battle.

(3. l. III.) and of Bode's (1. r. IV.) at a range of from 2,500 to 3,000 paces very soon retired.[1]

Scarcely were the batteries at Vionville free from this peril when they encountered a fresh and greater danger. The enemy now endeavoured to advance in dense swarms of skirmishers from the central copse against the batteries and the southern copse. The position, described as forming an acute angle, became a line, so that the four batteries, joined by a fifth under Schirmer (2. r. X.), which had come up after obtaining fresh supplies, again fronted towards the north. Somewhat covered by the embankment of the high road, they shelled the hostile infantry at a range of from 900 to 1,000 paces and drove it back into the wood. The French batteries, according to Montluisant's statement, were withdrawn to make good their losses as soon as our batteries ceased to fire on them.

6. *Arrival of the Corps Artillery and of the 20th Infantry Division on the field of battle—Attack of Wedell's Brigade —Charge of Barby's and Bredow's Brigades of Cavalry —Artillery combat at Vionville—Orders by the German Commander in Chief.*

The position of the Germans had become very critical, especially on the left wing, which was being gradually outflanked and forced back by the superior numbers of the enemy. The right wing still held its ground, but there also the hostile attacks were repeated more frequently and in greater force, as want of ammunition obliged the Prussian artillery to fire slowly, and some of the batteries to cease firing entirely. The arrival of considerable reinforcements from the Xth Army Corps on the field of battle at this time was consequently very opportune. The 20th Infantry Division had reached Thiaucourt at 11 A.M., and soon after its arrival First Lieutenant von Podbielski brought an order from the corps head-quarters to proceed at once to the field of battle. In the order of march the 3rd Light and 3rd Heavy batteries, under Major Krause, followed the leading battalion of the 39th brigade of infantry, while in rear of

[1] In consequence of the fire opened on them by some batteries of the corps artillery of the Xth Army Corps and of the 20th Division at Mars la Tour.

that brigade marched the corps artillery under Colonel Baron von der Goltz. The 40th infantry brigade came next, with the 4th Heavy and 4th Light batteries marching in rear of its leading battalion.

Colonel von der Goltz received permission to move forward with his two light batteries at a trot, escorted by the 16th Dragoons. But when the batteries arrived at the head of the 39th infantry brigade, they found that the cavalry was employed in another direction. They however continued their march to Tronville without escort, in consequence of the news from the field of battle repeatedly urging the necessity of immediate support. Tronville was reached immediately after the evacuation of its two northern copses. At the request of Lieut.-Colonel von Caprivi, Chief of the General Staff, Baron von der Goltz took up a position to the west of the village, so as to bring a heavy fire on the southernmost portions of the copses. From this point shells were thrown on the enemy as he advanced to the attack at a range of 2,500 paces, while masses of cavalry and artillery were fired on at 2,800 paces. Three or four hostile batteries replied, but without success. The attack was repulsed. In this position the 5th Light field battery (5. l. x.), Captain Berendt, was on the right flank, and the 6th Light (6. l. x.), Captain Richard, on the left. Colonel von der Goltz now advanced to the high road to get a shorter range, and the French batteries, distant from 1,500 to 1,800 paces, retired;[1] not however before they had occasioned great loss, which in the case of Berendt's battery was due to the hostile mitrailleurs. Lieutenant Schellhaas was killed. Two guns were rendered temporarily useless by want of gunners, and three guns lost so many horses that they could not be moved.

The van of the 20th Division, von Kraatz-Koschlau, reached Tronville at 3.30 P.M. The 1st and 2nd battalions of the 56th regiment, the Fusilier battalion of the 79th, the 3rd, Light and 3rd Heavy batteries (Captains Burbach and Heyn) led by Major Krause, as well as the 5th and 6th Heavy batteries (Captains von Scheven and Reinsdorff) of the corps artillery, under Lieut.-Colonel Cotta, had already been sent forward from

[1] These French batteries were evidently those which had fired on Major Körber's through the opening between the copses.

Buxières through the Bois de Gaumont and by Sauley Farm to support the 5th Infantry Division, under Stülpnagel.[1] The remainder of the Division, consisting of eight battalions and two batteries, was led by General von Voigts-Rhetz from Tronville against the copses with the object of occupying them before the enemy could do so, or, if necessary, of recapturing them.

The batteries which had remained with the Division, the 4th Heavy (Brunswick) and the 4th Light, Major Ribbentrop and Captain Mittelstädt (4. s. and 4. l. x.), trotted to a position south of the high road from Mars la Tour to Vionville. They fired on the enemy's artillery at a range of from 2,200 to 2,500 paces, and for a short time also infantry columns retreating to the heights. The effect was apparently good. Lieutenant Bachmann of the 4th Light battery was wounded and had a horse killed under him.

Meanwhile the infantry of the Division came up. In the *résumé* of Major von Scherff's Lecture it is stated that 'Major-General von Woyna immediately advanced with the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 79th regiment by Tronville against the copses, the southern of which was still held by our troops. The enemy retired of his own accord before these fresh reinforcements towards the north, evacuating what little ground he had gained in the copses. The two battalions of the 79th wheeled outwards to the right and left towards the eastern and western edges of the wood, and into the interval General von Kraatz brought up the 17th regiment at a double, which worked its way northwards through the thick underwood. The reserve of the 20th Division—two battalions of the 92nd regiment, the 10th Rifle battalion, and the Fusilier battalion of the 56th regiment, which had at first been in the rear—took up a position in the south-western angle of the copses.'

Covered by the infantry Ribbentrop's and Mittelstädt's batteries advanced along the western edge of the wood against the opposite ridges, and coming into action fired with good results on the enemy's infantry at a range of 1,500 paces, and afterwards at from 2,200 to 3,000 paces. But being exposed to the fire of some infantry under cover in the skirts of the

[1] According to Major von Scherff.

wood, at a short range of 800 paces only, considerable losses were sustained, and Lieutenant Pfafferott had a horse killed under him.

It was 4.30 P.M. when the contest was thus renewed on this flank by the decisive counter-attack of half of Schwartzkoppen's Division, which had been brought up from the west to Mars la Tour. Its march had been accelerated as much as possible in consequence of demands for support, which grew more and more urgent. 'Nothing but the most determined energy and the employment (as is well known) of the very last reserves promised to restore the balance in this ardent struggle. But the favourable circumstance that von Wedell's brigade was actually on the march against the enemy's right wing, posted at the north-west angle of the copses of Thionville (as known from personal observation), while the 20th Division was advancing to attack in front, afforded reasonable grounds for the hope that a decisive success would be achieved.

'On arriving at Mars la Tour towards 4.45 P.M., Lieut.-General von Schwartzkoppen deployed the five battalions of the brigade (16th regiment, 1st and Fusilier battalions of the 57th regiment) in one line, and ordered them to advance against the conspicuous clump of wood to the north-east.'[1] To prepare this attack Lieut.-Colonel Schaumann brought up his batteries to the east of Mars la Tour, the 2nd Light, Captain von Baumbach (2. l. X.), being on the right, and the 2nd Heavy, Captain Lancelle (2. s. X.), on the left. The French infantry was shelled at 1,500 paces and retired, after which the guns were turned on the artillery and mitrailleurs at 2,000 paces, apparently with equally good results. The enemy answered with common shell and shrapnel without occasioning much loss, but the former, passing over the German batteries, set fire to the wood in rear of them. First Lieutenant Keutner had a horse killed under him in this position. Colonel von der Goltz had previously endeavoured with his two batteries to pursue the retiring hostile artillery to the next ridge beyond the high road, but had been prevented by a brisk fire from skirmishers. The attempt was now renewed, and although heavy losses were occasioned by

[1] From the *résumé* of Major von Scherff's Lecture.

the enemy's guns and mitrailleurs, which were in greater force, they reached the ridge (257) with Richard's battery (6. l. x.) in front. Berendt's battery soon followed, having been obliged to halt for a short time under cover of the embankment of the high road to repair damages. At first the batteries came into action in front of the 57th regiment and directed their fire on columns of French infantry and artillery at a range of from 1,000 to 1,200 paces with good success.

Of the batteries under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Schaumann, Lancelle's (2. s. x.) succeeded in reaching the same ridge and took up a position somewhat to the west of the corps artillery and close to the road to Bruville. The battery then at a range of more than 700 paces shelled the enemy's columns, which had advanced as described in the following extract: 'The assailants were overwhelmed by a grazing fire of musketry and mitrailleurs. The two pioneer companies of the Division having joined the right wing of the two battalions of the 57th regiment, the troops advanced in twenty-two company-columns, which quickly dissolved into a single line of skirmishers, for the ground to be traversed was perfectly open for a distance of from 1,000 to 1,500 paces. Alternately throwing themselves on the ground and running forward short distances, the troops advanced, and at the foot of the hostile position came unexpectedly to a ravine fifty feet deep, the sides of which were abrupt and broken. This was crossed and the stormers emerged from it at various points, 30, 40, and 50 paces from the French lines. Chassepot and needle-gun were pitted against each other at these fearfully short distances.

'But Cissey's Division now moved up at a double to support Grenier's. Twenty-six French battalions were opposed to five Prussian. This unequal contest was maintained on the hill for several minutes and then the Germans began to fall back slowly. The fire during the retreat was so destructive that the brigade was nearly annihilated. Out of 95 officers and 4,500 men, 65 officers and 2,600 men, including only 350 men taken prisoners, were sacrificed in this attack, which had thus miscarried instead of being decisive. The 4th French Corps however estimates its loss on this day at 200 officers and 2,300 men. The remnant of Wedell's brigade retreating in confusion on Mars la Tour and

Tronville was pursued by the French army, which began to cross the ravine.' [1]

A gallant stand was made by the Prussian batteries on the ridge (257) to cover the retreat of the infantry, although the enemy's skirmishers approached to within 400 paces. The losses increased considerably. All the commanders of batteries, Captains Richard, Berendt, and Lancelle, had horses killed under them. Baron von der Goltz's horse was struck down by five bullets. Among others Captain Lenz, of the 'Intendance,' on the staff of that officer, who had requested to be employed under fire, was severely wounded. The detachments and teams suffered so severely that the guns could scarcely be served or moved, the horses in the teams being in some cases reduced to two.[2] These losses however were not in vain. The infantry, so terribly cut up, was partially extricated and saved from complete annihilation. It was however only with the greatest difficulty that the batteries could be withdrawn. On the approach of hostile skirmishers to within a few hundred paces, Lancelle's battery (2. s. X.), fired a few rounds at the close columns, which were following immediately in rear of them, and then retired slowly in column of route along the high road, which descends rapidly to Mars la Tour. It then came into action on the left of Baumbach's battery (2. l. X.), which was drawn up to the south-east of that village ready to give support. Colonel von der Goltz also retired slowly in echelon, Richard's battery in the first instance taking up a position in support on the high road not far from that previously occupied. But Berendt's battery did not follow until the rear of the retreating infantry had come up to it. As the hostile infantry pressed eagerly in pursuit the 57th regiment and some of the Prussian batteries were now exposed to the greatest danger, from which they were

[1] From the *résumé* of Major von Scherff's Lecture.

[2] A gun of Berendt's battery had to be sent to the rear, being disabled by an accident. No. 2 while in the act of closing the breech fell wounded without completing the operation. Under the impression, however, that this was done, No. 1 fired. The flame burst from the breech, wounding severely the commander of the gun, No. 1 and No. 3, and the shell was so crushed that it jammed at the beginning of the rifling. Under the pressure of circumstances, the commander of the division gave the order to load, and No. 5 in his haste entered another shell into the bore, which completely stopped up the gun, rendering it temporarily useless.

saved by the devotion and valour of the cavalry. The following account is given by Major von Scherff:—

'At the commencement of Wedell's attack General von Voigts-Rhetz, meeting General von Schwartzkoppen immediately to the east of Mars la Tour, sent orders to General von Rheinhaben and Count Brandenburg, whose brigades were drawn up between Tronville and Mars la Tour, to advance and support the infantry. The 1st Dragoons of the Guard rode forward in threes between Mars la Tour and the copses of Tronville, taking the hedges and ditches in their stride. Charging the 13th regiment of Grenier's Division, the dragoons rolled it up in confusion round its eagles and extricated the 57th regiment and Berendt's battery, though at a heavy sacrifice. With equal gallantry the escort of the corps artillery, consisting of two squadrons of the 4th Cuirassiers, disengaged Lancelle's battery. Ribbentrop's and Mittelstädt's batteries (4. l. and 4. s. x.) were also obliged to take up positions to the south of the high road. The six batteries of the 10th regiment, thus posted, facilitated the retreat of the 38th infantry brigade, which reassembled at Tronville. Their fire was directed on hostile infantry at from 1,600 to 1,800 paces, and on artillery at from 1,800 to 2,200 paces, with such success that the pursuit was abandoned. Towards the end of the fight observation was rendered difficult and in some cases impossible by the smoke of the guns, which clung to the ground.'

From this description of the battle, we cannot but agree with Major von Scherff, 'that the cavalry a second time gallantly came to the rescue of the infantry in a dangerous crisis.' We must remark moreover that the artillery had also to thank it to a certain extent for its safety. But we ought also to claim for the latter, that by its exemplary conduct it afforded fresh and firm support to the German left wing, and thus saved both the other arms of the service.

The Horse Artillery battery of the Guard, Captain von der Planitz (1. r. G.), had advanced to a position north-west of Mars la Tour to support the attack of von Wedell's brigade. A large body of hostile cavalry showed itself at Greyère, and retired after a few rounds from the battery, which then galloped to a position close to the high road to Jarny, escorted by the 4th squadron of the 2nd

Dragoons of the Guard. The infantry and cavalry of the enemy's right wing were successfully shelled at a range of 1,800 paces. Skirmishers were then thrown out towards the battery, while simultaneously an attack was made by Chasseurs d'Afrique against its left flank. The battery appeared to be lost, but with the true spirit of comrades in arms the squadron of Dragoons at once charged the superior hostile force and extricated the battery. The squadron was now severely pressed, but the 13th Dragoons hastening to its assistance drove the Chasseurs back. The German cavalry was however recalled after a short charge, because in the background a strong force of French cavalry was crossing the ravine which runs from east to west towards Jarny. The battery withdrew to Mars la Tour.

'General Ladmirault was anxious that the numerous cavalry assembled on the right flank in the plains between Greyère and Ville sur Yron should complete the advantage gained by the infantry.'[1] At first the 2nd regiment of Chasseurs d'Afrique, de France's cavalry brigade of the Guard, and Legrand's Division of cavalry moved forward to the attack. On the Prussian side there advanced to meet them von Barby's brigade of cavalry, the 1st and 2nd squadrons of the 2nd Dragoons of the Guard, the 13th and 16th Dragoons and the 10th Hussars. The collision of these masses was almost simultaneous along the whole line. 'Twenty-two squadrons were opposed to twenty-four in this hand to hand struggle of more than 5,000 troopers, the greatest cavalry action of the war. The French line gave way and retired on Clérembault's Division of cavalry, which was advancing from Bruville with three regiments of Chasseurs and two of Dragoons towards the vast cloud of dust seen in the direction of the plain. In their retreat the Hussars, leaving their generals Montaigu and Legrand on the field, threw the leading brigade under Bruchard into confusion, and the Chasseurs were borne back in the general retrograde movement over the gully, which General Clérembault with his two regiments of Dragoons did not venture to cross. Infantry and artillery brought up from all quarters formed a barrier to the Prussian cavalry and saved the French right wing from a total rout. The recall was there-

[1] From Major von Scherff's Lecture.

fore sounded, and the regiments retired slowly to the west of Mars la Tour, followed cautiously by a single regiment of French Dragoons. There the cavalry was ordered to cover the left flank of the defensive position, which General von Voigts-Rhetz had meanwhile taken up. This position was indicated by the heights of Tronville, and extended from the copses of that name as far as the road from Mars la Tour to Buxières. The first line of troops was formed of the 20th Division, the six batteries of the 10th regiment mentioned above, with a few other batteries, among which was Schirmer's (2. r. X.). In the second line were portions of the 37th and 38th brigades, which had been assembled. It was now past 7 P.M., and the enemy showed no desire to renew the attack.'[1]

The following is the French official account of the conclusion of this action :—'General Ladmirault considered the position of Vionville too strong for his two Divisions to make themselves masters of it, and was therefore obliged to content himself with preventing the enemy from advancing beyond the ground already won.' Ladmirault's Corps assembled on the ridge to the east of Greyère and bivouacked. The 3rd Division, under Lorencez, had not come up soon enough to take part in the battle.

As soon as the 20th Division, commanded by von Kraatz-Koschlau, was established in the copses of Tronville, the batteries under Major Körber (with which, as we already know, Colonel Freiherr von der Becke had been for some time present) again moved forward across the high road to the west of Vionville. The batteries stood in the following order from right to left: Frisch's battery (1. r. X.), Schirmer's (2. r. X.), Kleine's (1. s. X.), Bode's (1. r. IV.), Ahrens's [previously Pressentin's] (3. l. III.). A tremendous fire was immediately opened on them by the numerous French batteries on the old Roman road, to which they responded, the range being between 3,000 and 3,500 paces. It was impossible to support the fire, as the hostile artillery, besides being more numerous, was under cover and had got the range of the embankment of the high road. After sustaining heavy losses the German batteries were obliged to withdraw behind the embankment, where they resumed firing.

[1] From Major von Scherff's Lecture.

A limber of Kleine's battery was so shattered that the gun had to be carried off by means of a swingletree, and another gun was temporarily disabled by a shell jamming. Lieutenant von Neumann and Captain Bode had horses killed under them.

Having repulsed the attack of von Wedell's brigade, the enemy reinforced his artillery opposite our position at Vionville to such an extent that it appeared as if he wished to bring his whole strength to bear on that point. Fully aware of its importance as regarded the result of the battle, our artillery continued the contest with great steadiness, undaunted by its own heavy casualties and the enemy's great superiority. Some of the batteries were obliged occasionally to withdraw for the purpose of making good their losses. Vosz's battery (3. s. III.) had been engaged since 7 P.M., having been ordered up from its position at Flavigny by Prince Frederick Charles.

Schirmer's battery (2. r. X.) in pursuance of orders took up a position to the west of Tronville, and exchanged shots with the French artillery to the south of Bruville at very long ranges.[1] Kleine's battery (1. s. X.) returned to Lehmann's detachment about 6.30 P.M., when the enemy's fire had ceased, and about 9 P.M. Vosz's battery (3. s. III.), Bode's (1. r. IV.), and Frisch's (1. r. X.) withdrew from the position.

At 7.30 P.M. an attempt was made by some columns of French cavalry to advance from the woods south of St. Marcel, but these batteries opening fire on them at a range of 3,000 paces they rapidly withdrew. Major Körber bivouacked at Tronville.

It was past-noon before Prince Frederick Charles at Pont à Mousson was informed of the very serious nature of the engagement, and he reached the field of battle at 3.45 P.M., after a rapid ride of an hour and a quarter.[2] Satisfied of the safety of the right wing after receiving an assurance from General von Stülpnagel that he would hold the position to the last man, the Prince arrived at Flavigny towards 5 P.M., at the moment

[1] According to the statement of Colonel Freiherr von der Becke, Schirmer's battery was moved too soon from the position at Vionville to Tronville, and was then ordered to take up this position without his knowledge by Major von Seebeck, First Officer on the General Staff of the Xth Army Corps.

[2] From the *résumé* of Major von Scherff's Lecture.

when the arrival of the Xth Army Corps in the line of battle gave hopes of achieving a decisive success. His orders pointed to an energetic attack against the enemy's right wing and centre along the gully of St. Marcel; but the 38th brigade was crushed before the 20th Division could engage, and the attack was then no longer possible.

7. *Arrival of reinforcements to von Stülpnagel's Division from the Xth Army Corp.—Repulse of partial attacks made by Prussian infantry against Rezonville—The artillery of the 16th Division comes into action—Marshal Bazaine's measures for the security of his left wing—Great artillery combat on the Prussian centre and right wing.*

The troops ordered up from the Xth Army Corps to support von Stülpnagel's Division had meanwhile reached their destination, the batteries owing to their great mobility being the first to arrive. They moved up into the intervals in the great artillery line between Flavigny and the Bois de Vionville, their arrival being all the more opportune since, as above related, some of the batteries had exhausted their ammunition.[1] They were now able to obtain a fresh supply. Towards 3 P.M. Major Krause took up a position between Wittstock's and Scheringer's batteries, Burbach's battery (3. l. X.) being on the right and Heyn's (3. s. X.) on the left. Lieut.-Colonel Cotta placed Reinsdorff's battery (6. s. X.) on the right of Knobbe's near the Bois de Vionville, while von Scheven brought up his battery (5. s. X.) on the left near Haase's (previously commanded by Stöphasius). This battery had made an attempt to advance to the right near the edge of the wood, but had been prevented by a well-directed fire from skirmishers under cover.

As soon as the reinforcements of infantry came up, the 48th regiment was sent into the Bois de Vionville and the 56th to the left flank of von Stülpnagel's Division. Soon after this an attack was made against Rezonville, the key of the French posi-

[1] Knauer's battery (I. l. X.) had expended the whole of its ammunition before 3 P.M. Its endeavours, made by order of Colonel von Lyncker, to find an ammunition-column, were unsuccessful, so that it was no longer able to take part in the battle. An ammunition-column belonging to the IIIrd Army Corps arrived at a later hour, as related below.

tion simultaneously, by the 78th, 79th, and 48th regiments, which advanced independently from the Bois de Vionville, as well as by the two battalions of the 56th from the artillery position on the plateau. The gallantry and devotion of the German troops were, however, baffled by the energetic resistance and numerical superiority of the enemy. The 56th regiment was the last to retire after fighting for two hours; while the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 12th regiment sent for to its assistance by General von Schwerin and supported by the fire of artillery, were compelled to return to their original position towards 6 P.M.

Later in the day, about 5 P.M., an offensive movement was made by the German infantry from the Bois de St. Arnould, not so much with the object of obtaining any direct advantage as of preventing the enemy from assuming the offensive. The half of the 16th Division commanded by Lieut.-General von Barnekow had reached its destination, Arry sur Moselle, at 1 P.M. On hearing the guns and receiving tidings that the IIIrd Corps was seriously engaged, it again started after a short halt with the sanction of General von Goeben, and, crossing the Moselle by the suspension bridge at Novéant, marched on Gorze, arriving there at 4 P.M.[2] At the suggestion of General von Goeben the Division was joined by the 11th Regiment of the Xth Corps, under Colonel von Schöning. A direct attack on Rezonville was considered most advisable, and consequently the 32nd infantry brigade, Colonel von Rex, and the 11th regiment were ordered to march on the Bois de St. Arnould. The commander of the divisional artillery (3rd field division of the 8th regiment), Lieut.-Colonel Hildebrandt, received orders to march through Gorze and come into action to the north-west of that village. He arrived at the very moment the Prussian infantry commenced to advance against Rezonville.

The 5th Heavy and 5th Light field batteries (5. s. and 5. l. VIII.), Captains Jacobi and Hammer, which were the first to come up, were placed on the road from Chambley to Rezonville

[1] From Captain Helmuth's account.

[2] The 31st Brigade of Infantry, General Count Gneisenau, with the 6th Light battery of the 8th regiment, was still detached to Thionville. Compare the account given above.

between the battalions of the 56th regiment, and supported them effectually by firing on hostile artillery to the north of the road from Vionville to Rezonville at a range of from 2,500 to 3,000 paces, and afterwards on infantry at 1,600 paces. The 6th Heavy battery, Captain Mende, in position near the Bois de Vionville, was equally successful at a range of 2,400 paces against French artillery on the road near Rezonville, as well as against mitrailleurs and columns of infantry. When the 56th afterwards retired, Lieut.-Colonel Hildebrandt withdrew Hammer's and Jacobi's batteries, which had sustained considerable loss from the heavy fire in flank and front, to the main artillery position, where they again took an active part in the engagement. Von Scheven's battery (5. s. x.), had apparently produced but little effect on the enemy's infantry between Rezonville and the Bois des Ognons, owing to the cover afforded by the ground. Previous to the appearance of the artillery of the 16th Division on the battle field, the battery had taken up a position further to the north and opened fire on hostile artillery to the west of Rezonville, which it silenced. Having obtained a fresh supply of ammunition, it also followed the 56th regiment to support its attack, but was too late, the regiment having commenced its retrograde movement. It therefore now again came into action between the batteries of the 8th regiment in the main artillery station.

Before commencing the account of the artillery contest, reference must be made to the movements of von Rex's brigade and the 11th regiment, which we left on the march to the Bois de St. Arnould. Notwithstanding its terrible losses, the Prussian infantry succeeded in retaining possession of the northern skirts of the wood until the arrival of these reinforcements which occurred about 5 P.M. After detaching the 2nd battalion of the 72nd regiment to the Bois des Ognons to support the right flank, the three regiments (72nd, 40th, and 11th), without receiving any direct support from artillery, made three successive and determined charges against the French infantry, artillery, and mitrailleurs occupying the height (308).[1] 'All three charges

[1] Indirect support had been afforded by the batteries, which swept the whole of the ground between Rezonville and the Bois des Ognons from their position on the hill near the Bois des Ognons.

were pushed well home to the village of Rezonville itself, but the troops in each instance were driven back towards the margin of the wood by the strong French reserves, which were in great force.'

Rendered more and more anxious about his left wing by these as well as by the earlier attacks of the German infantry against Rezonville, Marshal Bazaine had ordered Montaudon's Division (which had been directed to march to the ravine of Ars from Villers aux Bois) to move up to the western side of the ravine of la Jurée with the Grenadiers and Chasseurs à pied of the Guard towards the hill (308) ; while a battery of mitrailleurs was placed on the other side to enfilade the ravine. The remainder of the Voltigeurs of the Guard, under General Deligny, had also been engaged at a later hour. It is therefore not surprising that all the attacks of the German infantry against a force so superior in number were finally unsuccessful. In addition General Bourbaki now brought up 54 guns of the reserve artillery into position at Rezonville.

Meanwhile the long line of artillery, extending in a flat concave arc from the Bois de Vionville by Flavigny nearly as far as the high road, continued their fire under the general direction of General von Bülow. Some further changes now took place in this line. Knobbe's battery (2. s. III.) on the right flank was withdrawn from the line for some time to make good its losses, just when the welcome reinforcement consisting of the batteries of the 16th Division made its appearance on the field of battle.[1] This was rendered necessary not only by the tremendous losses the battery had sustained, but also by the fouling of the guns in consequence of the continued firing during the hot and dry weather. Captain Knobbe, who had been wounded, soon rejoined his battery and brought it again into line to the north of the Bois de Vionville, soon after which he was obliged to give up the command owing to his wound. The battery now had no officer fit for duty.

Large masses of French artillery appearing to the west of Rezonville, Captain Stöphasius ordered the 1st Light battery, commanded by Second Lieutenant Haase, (*for* Stöphasius 1. l. III.) to make a half-wheel to the left to oppose them. Nöldecke's

[1] For a short time this battery occupied the place in the main artillery position afterwards filled by Jacobi's battery (5. s. VIII.)

battery (1. s. III.), and Knobbe's (2. s. III.) also,—after the return of the latter into line,—were placed on its left flank, while Woppisch's battery (originally Vollbrecht's) was entrusted with the duty of opposing any advance made by infantry over the hill (311).

Saalmüller's battery (3. r. X.), having made good its losses in the defile to the south-west of Vionville, was moving to the south of that village, in order to resume its place in the line of battle, when Prince Frederick Charles ordered it to come into action to the south of Flavigny.[1] It was obliged to advance at a walk, having lost a great number of draught horses.

It has been already mentioned that Colonel von Dresky had by the Prince's order detached Vosz's battery (3. s. III.) to support the artillery at Vionville; but previous to this, nineteen batteries were concentrated between the Bois de Vionville and the high road under one commander.[2] The German fire was directed at various objects according to circumstances, but was always concentrated on the French infantry directly it showed itself. In the attacks made by the latter, sometimes supported by cavalry, the columns were shelled at ranges varying from over 4,000 paces to 800, and were always prevented from advancing nearer.[3] The effect was also observed to be good at the longer ranges. On the occasion of the infantry attacks from the Bois de Vionville against Rezonville, the batteries in position to the north of Flavigny were able to enfilade

[1] It had been unable to retain its connection with the other horse artillery batteries of its division.

[2] These batteries stood in the following order from right to left:—Reinsdorff (6. s. X.);—Woppisch, *vice* Vollbrecht (2. l. III.);—Haase, *vice* Stöphasius (1. l. III.);—Nöldecke (1. s. III.);—Knobbe (2. s. III.);—Mende (6. s. VIII.);—von Scheven (5. s. X.);—Hammer (5. l. VIII.);—Jacobi (5. s. VIII.);—Franck, *vice* Rödenbeck (3. r. III.);—Scheringer (1. r. III.);—Heyn (3. s. X.);—Burbach (3. l. X.);—Wittstock (2. r. III.);—von Schlicht (6. l. III.);—Vosz (3. s. III.);—Saalmüller (3. r. X.);—Müller II. (4. l. III.);—Fromme (4. s. III.);—Total, 114 guns.

[3] General von Bülow states that from the time of the capture of the farm of Flavigny up to that of posting the outposts in the evening, there was not a single infantry soldier within reach of the artillery in the centre, or, in other words, from the position of the right wing of the corps artillery on the hill (326) as far as that of the 4th Heavy battery near the high road; the farm of Flavigny alone being occupied by two companies. The artillery was consequently obliged to defend itself against the attack of the enemy's skirmishers, which was done with perfect success.

the hostile columns and take them obliquely. Finally, when in spite of this the Prussian infantry was obliged to retire, pursuit was prevented by a concentrated fire from the whole artillery position, which played on the flanks as well as the front of the enemy. These infantry attacks became more frequent and more formidable during the long pauses in the firing occasioned by the pressing want of ammunition. When the Prussian regiments charged out of the Bois de St. Arnould, although without artillery support towards their front, their own batteries having been detached to the left, the great artillery line was able to supply the want, and amply support them. Thus, for example, the dense hostile masses moving between Rezonville and the Bois des Ognons were taken in flank, apparently with good results, by Mende's and von Scheven's batteries (6. s. VIII. and 5. s. X.), at a range of 2500 paces.

Equally successful was the fire directed on the hostile artillery and mitrailleurs, a great mass of which, having taken up a position near Rezonville at 5 P.M., was cannonaded at a range of from 2,400 to 3,000 paces, and some artillery to the north of the high road near the forest at distances varying from 3,000 paces to far over 4,000 paces. That the effect was good is inferred from the frequent changes of position made by the French batteries, and especially by the mitrailleurs. Several batteries, debouching from Rezonville, were unable to come into action in consequence of the concentrated cross-fire. The batteries of the right wing by a flanking or oblique fire repeatedly prevented the enemy placing his artillery opposite the left wing, and similar service was rendered to the right wing by the German left.

The artillery contest became remarkably keen when the reserve artillery advanced with the French infantry at Rezonville between 6.30 and 7 P.M. The German guns, firing with great accuracy and steadiness at a range of from 2,400 to 3,000 paces, soon reduced the French to silence.[1] In consequence of the

[1] The ordinary procedure was sufficient for trial shots, but the constant motion of the objects aimed at necessitated the frequent use of the deflection scale. The observation of the shots was often rendered difficult by the enemy's position being under cover and by the smoke of the guns, which lay thick on that part of the field of battle. This was particularly favourable to the enemy's fire. Burbach's battery (3. l. X.) proved the correctness of its aim by striking one of the houses in Rezonville, when firing at some artillery, which was standing near that village and was barely visible.

want of ammunition, occasioned by the length and severity of the battle, the arrival of the 3rd artillery ammunition-column of the 3rd regiment, brought up by Captain Bartels to the batteries on the right flank, was very opportune, as in accordance with orders not only ammunition but also horses were obtained by the batteries which required them.

The losses sustained by our artillery at this period of the battle from the enemy's guns, mitrailleurs, and musketry were very considerable. Some of the batteries were much harassed at a range of from 3,800 to 4,000 paces by the enfilade fire of French artillery, which was posted between the high road from Rezonville to Vionville and the Roman road. Towards evening the heavy fire of artillery from Rezonville occasioned fewer casualties, but French infantry was repeatedly observed running from that place along the high road; and after firing some volleys at more than 1,600 paces against the batteries at Flavigny with very little effect, it again disappeared.

A great number of casualties had previously occurred among the officers, and the following were wounded in the course of the afternoon in this position:—In the batteries of the 3rd regiment, Captain Knobbe slightly, who nevertheless was able, as previously stated, to command his battery for some time longer; Second Lieutenants Weyer and Krüger severely, and Second Lieutenants Ahlers and Haase slightly. Second Lieutenant and Adjutant von Massalski, of the horse artillery division, was also slightly wounded when close to his commanding officer, having previously had a horse killed under him. In the batteries of the 10th regiment Captains Saalmüller and Burbach were struck, but remained with their batteries, and Second Lieutenant Grumbkow was severely wounded. In the batteries of the 8th regiment Captain Hammer and Lieutenant von Metzen, who afterwards died, were severely wounded. First Lieutenant Gillmeister succeeded the former in the command of the 5th Light battery. Several officers also had horses killed or wounded in this position, among whom were Lieut.-Colonel Hildebrandt and his adjutant, Lieutenant Schulz, of the 8th regiment; Second Lieutenant Schede, of the 10th regiment; Major Lentz and Captain Scheringer, of the 3rd regiment, the latter losing two horses. Captain Wittstock's horse was severely wounded.

Even at an early hour the casualties in the detachments were so numerous that drivers, and not unfrequently officers also, were obliged to work the guns, some of which had temporarily to cease firing for want of gunners. Most of the teams were reduced to two horses.[1]

8. *Arrival of reinforcements from the Hessian Division—Last general attack on the German right wing and centre—Line of the German outposts—Losses—Supply of ammunition.*

At 12.30 P.M., after the first reports had been received at Pont à Mousson from the IIIrd Army Corps, H.R.H. the Commander in Chief saw General von Manstein and having explained the state of affairs, directed him to cover the right flank of that corps and support it vigorously. The 49th brigade of infantry and the 1st Reiter regiment of the 25th Hessian Division, then on the march from Cherizey, accordingly crossed the Moselle at Novéant at 4 P.M. under Lieutenant-General Prince Louis of Hesse, commanding the Division, and marched towards Gorze. The 1st and 2nd Heavy batteries, as well as the 1st Light battery of this Division, bivouacking at Bezon, were turned out at the same time, and under the command of Captain Reh overtook a portion of the column, when they continued the march in rear of the 1st regiment of infantry. The remainder of the Division followed at a later hour.

Lieutenant-Colonel Stumpf, commanding the Hessian artillery, led the 2nd Heavy and 1st Light batteries (2. s. and 1. l. IX. H.), Captains Hoffmann and Frank, from Gorze to von Stülpnagel's Division. They marched at a smart trot, which they kept up nearly the whole distance, along the western skirts of the Bois des Prêtres and of the Bois de Vionville through the artillery of the IIIrd Army Corps and came into action in the first instance to the north of the Bois de Vionville. From that

[1] A French shell passed through a limber of the 2nd Horse Artillery battery of the 3rd regiment, and another burst under a limber of the same battery, but no explosion was caused in either case. Instances of gallantry among the men were very numerous in this battle. It was not an uncommon thing for them to undertake dangerous duties voluntarily and for non-commissioned officers to repair their damaged material regardless of a heavy fire of artillery and musketry.

spot they shelled columns of French infantry moving between Rezonville and the Bois des Ognons.

The 49th infantry brigade meanwhile was ordered to advance through the Bois des Chevaux and the Bois des Ognons, followed by the 1st Heavy battery. General von Manstein and Lieutenant-General Prince Louis of Hesse joined this detachment. It must have been about 7 P.M. or 7.30 P.M. when 'the firing was renewed with great vigour along the edge of the forest of St. Arnould. The 2nd battalion of the 72nd regiment, which had been detached to cover the flank of von Rex's brigade during its advance through the forest, had worked its way as far as the northern skirts, somewhat beyond that part of the forest already in our possession, and its appearance was the signal for a fresh general attempt against the heights of Rezonville.

'The Commander in Chief concluded from the renewal of the firing that the van of the IXth Army Corps, brought up by his orders, was now engaged. Anxious to convert the desultory fight into a decisive victory, he issued orders for a general attack, which was now all the more expedient, as the increasing feebleness of the enemy's assaults against the right wing indicated his exhaustion. The French had by this time given way to some extent, and darkness was coming on, it being 7.30 P.M.

'The 49th infantry brigade of the 25th Division, under the command of Major-General von Wittich, came into the line of battle on the extreme right flank at the Bois des Ognons. Only four battalions strong, it pressed forward with fixed bayonets through the dense brushwood of the forest, driving back the Chasseurs of the Guard, but was nevertheless unable to achieve any decisive success. The firing in the forest continued long after dark, until at last, towards 10 P.M., General von Manstein gave orders to break off the battle. The Hessians bivouacked in the Bois des Ognons under arms.' [1]

Encouraged by the presence of its commanding officer, General von Alvensleben II., the wearied infantry again advanced; the 64th, 24th, 91st, 35th, and 20th Regiments continuing to march along the high road east of Vionville, while General von Kraatz-Koschlau led two battalions of the 20th Division to the

[1] Major von Scherff's Lecture.

front. The German infantry supported by the brigade of Hussars under the command of Colonel von Schmidt (in the absence of Major-General von Rauch, wounded), soon came into collision with the enemy. The ground having first been reconnoitred by infantry in consequence of the darkness, the cavalry charged some hostile masses (93rd regiment) and rode close up to the village, but was even then unable to achieve any success of importance. This was followed gradually by a general retrograde movement up the hill to the original position. Colonel von Schmidt was wounded. The batteries under Müller II. and Fromme (4. l. and 4. s. III.) tried to advance on the left of the cavalry from their position north of Flavigny, but were received by so sharp a fire from infantry lying under cover along the high road that they were obliged to come into action and open fire upon it. As soon as it was dark Colonel von Dresky moved the batteries nearer to Flavigny, where they bivouacked, ready however to turn out during the night.

In consequence of this attack Marshal Bazaine ordered Montaudon's Division to reinforce the 3rd Corps and de Forton's Cavalry Division, which had been withdrawn, to return into its original position at Villers aux Bois.

The order to resume offensive operations against Rezonville was executed by the batteries under Colonel von Dresky in the position south of Flavigny, with the utmost vigour and rapidity, which their extraordinary losses of men and horses permitted.

These were Frank's (3. r. III.), previously commanded by Rödenbeck; Scheringer's (1. r. III.); Heyn's (3. s. X.); Burbach's (3. l. X.); Wittstock's (2. r. III.); and Schlicht's (6. l. III.) They had only a few rounds left, and in the increasing darkness it was no longer possible to distinguish troops at a hundred paces. Nevertheless the batteries advanced with resolution. Some infantry discovered on the hill (308) was reported to be Prussian. Frank's battery (3. r. III.) on the right flank rashly wheeled to the left with the intention of firing into some skirmishers at Rezonville at a range of 1,000 paces, and suddenly received a smart fire at 800 paces in flank from the supposed Prussian infantry, which proved to be French. Near this battery was Scheringer's (1. r. III.), which was also severely handled, Captain Scheringer being severely and Lieutenant Müller

slightly wounded, while the loss of men and horses was very considerable. The batteries extricated themselves by shell, and were withdrawn to a short distance by Major Lenz. They then loaded with case and awaited the course of events.

Burbach's and Heyn's batteries (3. l. and 3. s. x.) were equally unfortunate. They had only just opened fire on the outskirts of the village of Rezonville, when they received a volley from skirmishers concealed in the ditches of the high road and in some small bushes close at hand. The loss was heavy, Lieutenants Bulius and Stolterforth being wounded. Major Krause was also obliged to remove his batteries to another position some hundred paces in rear, where they resumed firing.

The position of Wittstock's and von Schlicht's batteries (2. r. and 6. l. III.), was still more critical. On receiving information from an officer, which proved to be erroneous, that the heights to the south of the high road near Rezonville were in possession of the Prussians, Captain von Schlicht rode forward in the twilight to select a position. He observed some troops, and when within 150 paces of them recognised them as Grenadiers of the French Guard, who opened a heavy fire on him. Although his horse fell with him, he succeeded by a miracle in reaching his battery, which was following him at a distance of 200 paces. First Lieutenant Bodenstein meanwhile had sufficient presence of mind to halt and load with case, seven rounds of which, with from twelve to fifteen shells, sufficed to clear the ground. The battery then retired at a walk with the gunners dismounted. Great trouble was experienced in limbering up, in consequence of the exhaustion of the men and the steepness of the ground, the captain of the battery himself lending a hand. At this moment 'Portepeefähnrich' Lessing was killed. After retiring some hundred paces the battery again came into action, and opened fire at a range of 600 paces, to support Wittstock's battery (2. r. III.) which had advanced on its right. That battery was also exposed to a heavy fire from infantry lining the high road; but extricating itself by six rounds of case, it retired into the line of the other batteries. Colonel von Dresky resolutely held this position until he received orders to return to the position near Flavigny and bivouac. Saalmüller's battery (3. r. x.), which had followed Colonel von Dresky's batteries on

the left flank, was prevented from coming into action by the approach of darkness. It bivouacked at Flavigny, as well as Pressentin's battery (3. l. III.), now commanded by Ahrens.[1]

About the same time that Colonel von Dresky moved to the front, Lieutenant-Colonel Stumpf also advanced on his right with the Hessian batteries, Hoffmann and Frank (2. s. and 1. l. IX. H.). Hostile infantry was fired on at 800 paces apparently with good results, but the batteries were exposed to a troublesome musketry fire in front and in flank. The position however was maintained until after dark, when an order arrived from Prince Frederick Charles for the batteries to rejoin von Stülpnagel's Division and bivouac.

The rapid and almost uninterrupted fire, which some of the batteries maintained for nine or ten hours, had fatigued the very reduced detachments in the highest degree, rendering some of the men almost blind and deaf. Most of the guns were very foul, and several instances of jamming had occurred in consequence.

When the advance of the artillery on the right flank took place, Grüter's brigade of Mecklenburg's Cavalry Division also rode forward, and, directed only by the flash from the rifles, charged the French infantry in and near Rezonville. Major-General von Grüter, second brigadier of the Division, was wounded. It was however impossible to make any progress in the dark against the concentrated hostile force, and the recall was sounded.

About 9 P.M. the fighting ceased in every part of the field of battle. The *résumé* of Major von Scherff's lecture concludes with these words :—'The Prussian outposts were posted after dark in an arc extending from the Bois des Ognons along the northern skirts of the forests of St. Arnould and Vionville, across the well contested plateau of Rezonville, passing by the east of Flavigny and Vionville to the copses of Tronville, whence it was prolonged by the cavalry of the line, as soon as the moon rose, across the blood-stained field of Mars la Tour to the

[1] When Colonel von Dresky advanced against Vionville, the 3rd field division of the 3rd regiment (Lieut-Colonel Beck) also moved forward to the edge of the plateau from its position south-west of Vionville, but it was prevented by the darkness from taking any further part in the battle. Lieut.-Colonel Stumpf states that his batteries came into action somewhat before Colonel von Dresky's.

stream of the Yron. During the night the enemy evacuated the position still in his possession, and abandoning the march to the west, withdrew nearer to Metz.'

The losses of this day, on which about 138,000 French with 476 guns, were engaged against a German force not exceeding 67,000 men, with 222 guns, were in round numbers as follows:—

'*Germans.*

	Officers	Men
IIIrd Army Corps	307	6,300
Xth ,, ,,	169	5,100
6th Cavalry Division	17	250
5th ,, ,,	59	950
One-half of the 16th Division, including the 11th Regiment	87	2,200
Hessians	1	120
Dragoons of the Guard	20	250
Total	660	15,170

'*French.*

	Officers	Men
2nd Corps (Frossard)	201	5,085
6th ,, (Canrobert)	171	5,457
3rd ,, (Lebœuf)	98	748
4th ,, (Ladmirault)	200	2,258
The Guard	113	2,010
Reserve Cavalry	70	465
,, Artillery	6	105
Total	859	16,128[1]

Details of the losses sustained by the German artillery in *personnel* and *matériel* are given in the appendix. French writers dwell much on those of their own artillery. The only details to be found on this point are given in the works of de Montluisant and Frossard, but they will serve the purpose of comparison with the Prussian losses. Up to 12 o'clock the four batteries under Lieutenant-Colonel de Montluisant, commanding

[1] The most recent accounts given by Marshal Bazaine differ somewhat from this, giving the total French loss at 16,954 men killed, wounded, and missing, and 831 officers, including six generals (Legrand, Brayer, and Marguenat killed; Bataille, Letellier-Valagé wounded; and de Montaigu missing).

the artillery of Tixier's Division, had 40 men and 50 horses killed and wounded, including Captain Abord. One of these batteries had indeed only four guns when it reached Gravelotte. A battery of de Forton's Cavalry Division lost one man killed, twelve wounded, and one missing, while the other battery lost one man killed and nine wounded. Frossard states that the total loss in his six reserve batteries was: officers, three killed and seven wounded;[1] men, four killed, sixty wounded, and six missing.

The supply of ammunition.

The first line of wagons of the IIIrd Army Corps consisted of the 1st infantry, and of the 2nd and 3rd artillery ammunition-columns. It started early on the 16th of August from its bivouac at Vandières, and joined the field hospitals of the corps artillery. Captain Burchard, commanding the division of columns, reached the field of battle early with the object of obtaining orders, and in obedience to those received from Colonel von Dresky, commanding the corps artillery, parked his wagons at the Baraques de St. Marie, and issued ammunition to the battery wagons. But very soon the demand from all parts of the field of battle became so urgent that Captain Burchard considered it necessary to advance his wagons to it.

Captain Bartels trotted with the wagons of the 3rd artillery ammunition-column to within 600 paces of the batteries of the 1st field division of the 3rd regiment at the Bois de Vionville, and was soon afterwards ordered by the commander of that division to move up close to it, the Horse Artillery division of the 10th regiment at Vionville being supplied from the spare gun carriages of the column. But this supply only lasted a short time, and then the 2nd artillery ammunition-column, under Captain Reinsdorff, was brought up to the batteries of the two corps. Captain Hundrich also brought the 1st infantry ammunition-column to the front at a trot, as the infantry was beginning to run short of ammunition; this was not done without some loss from the enemy's fire.

[1] It appears from a nominal list given in another place that of these ten officers, two wounded and one killed belonged to the 1st division, two killed to the 2nd division, one killed and five wounded to the reserve.

Under the pressure of circumstances a regular issue was out of the question, the losses of men and horses having been so considerable that the batteries were no longer in a position to send their wagons for the ammunition, but in most cases the wagons of the columns were brought up to the limbers of the guns in action, and the ammunition was issued direct. That the columns did their duty well under fire is proved by the losses incurred in many instances.[1] The empty wagons were generally sent to the rear with the wheelers only, the other horses and men being taken to fill up the casualties in the batteries. Having given over the whole of their ammunition, the artillery ammunition-columns of the first line of wagons started on the return journey to Vandières on the same day, but, in consequence of the deficiency of horses, did not arrive there till late at night on the 16th, quite exhausted after their long marches on bad roads in a hilly country.

The 2nd line of wagons was also ordered to the front as soon as the battle commenced. Having bivouacked at Pagny, it marched by Pont à Mousson and Onville to the Baraques de St. Marie, a distance of 27 miles, arriving there between 8 P.M. and 11 P.M. During the night of the 16th and on the following day the batteries of the 3rd regiment replenished their supply of ammunition from the three artillery ammunition-columns of the 2nd line. One hundred and seventy-one horses were also given over by the columns to replace casualties in the batteries, their places being filled up by requisitions in the neighbourhood. The artillery ammunition-columns of both lines having united at Vandières, were ordered to Herny to obtain supplies from the reserve ammunition-park, which had arrived there, and, as a temporary measure, a first line of wagons for the IIIrd Army Corps was made up of an artillery ammunition-column of the 9th regiment and of one of the 2nd regiment.

The 1st line of wagons of the division of columns of the Xth Army Corps, which was parked at Atton on the right bank of the Moselle on the 15th of August, was to have followed close in rear of the corps artillery and of the 20th Infantry Division on the 16th. At the beginning of the battle the commander of the

[1] *Vide* Appendix.

artillery ordered it up, but its march was delayed in consequence of its being directed to make way for the xth Army Corps and its trains, which had overtaken it, and afterwards for the head-quarters. The columns then advanced at a trot to make up for the delay, but the road was still blocked by troops marching to the front, and an accident in one of the teams necessitated a further halt at Pont à Mousson. It was late at night when the 1st artillery ammunition-column reached Charey beyond Thiaucourt where, being wholly unacquainted with the field of battle, it was parked till break of day.[1] It then marched to Tronville, arriving there early in the morning of the 17th, and was subsequently joined by the 2nd column. Ammunition was issued at that place, but the supply contained in the two columns was wholly insufficient. Two full columns were consequently ordered to the front from the 2nd line of wagons, and arrived at Tronville early on the 18th, while the empty columns returned to Pont à Mousson on the 17th for a fresh supply. These columns also furnished horses and men to the batteries.

The two lines of columns of the IIIrd and of the Xth Army Corps were unable to supply all the batteries, so that it was necessary to have recourse to the columns of other corps, as for instance those of the Guard and IXth Army Corps. Captain von Lüttwitz states that of the three artillery ammunition-columns belonging to the latter corps, one and a quarter only had its full complement of ammunition on the 18th of August.[2]

[1] A non-commissioned officer, sent from the field of battle to meet the column, did not return, having lost his way in the darkness.

[2] General Freiherr von der Becke remarks that several of the 2nd lines of wagons belonging to batteries willingly supplied ammunition to the 3rd regiment, either by order or of their own accord.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. *The French.*

THE object of the Army of the Rhine was to retreat from Metz on Verdun. The fact that this could not be carried out on the 16th without fighting—nor indeed without a serious engagement—was apparent to Marshal Bazaine, as is evident from the orders issued by him on the 15th and on the morning of the 16th. The head-quarters already began to entertain doubts as to the success of this retreat, on becoming acquainted with the delays in the march of the army and with the exaggerated reports made by de Forton's Reserve Cavalry Division of the skirmish on the 15th. If once it gave up its connection with Metz, and was unsuccessful in effecting its proposed retreat, the Army of the Rhine ran the risk of being driven back towards the north, and in consequence of the limited extent of country in its rear, of being thrown with insufficient supplies of ammunition and provisions against neutral territory, and annihilated. The original plan of basing the operations on Metz, which had many supporters, again claimed consideration.

The dispositions of the Army of the Rhine for the retreat on Verdun and the measures taken to secure the march were inadequate, and to this alone is to be attributed the fact that the army was surprised and obliged at the beginning of the battle to fight in a position not conducive to the object in view. General Frossard states that the 2nd Corps received early intelligence that a Prussian advanced guard was marching through Gorze on a line parallel to that taken by the French, and it appears that this was also known at head-quarters. The question arises,—ought the 2nd Corps, after receiving this intelligence, to have remained inactive in its bivouac at Rezonville? The answer is decidedly in the negative; it was imperative at all events to dispute with the German army the possession of the plateau of

Vionville. The obvious course to have pursued was to have marched immediately to the southern edge of the plateau, which was abrupt and difficult of access (*vide* the description of the battle field), occupying the Bois des Prêtres, de Vionville, and de St. Arnould, and to have halted in this strong defensive position. Then immediately on requests for support reaching head-quarters and the neighbouring corps, the 6th Corps and de Forton's Cavalry Division could have quickly extended the right flank by taking possession of the important heights of Tronville. More considerable reinforcements would have been able to reach the battle field after a short time; the Imperial Guard from Gravelotte, the reserve artillery of the army from its bivouac between that place and Rezonville, and three Divisions (according to Bazaine two only) of the 3rd Corps from their camps between Vernéville and St. Marcel. Even if it had been necessary to preserve the connection with Metz for some time longer, in order to cover the advance of the troops and trains still in rear, by posting a strong detachment of the Guard in the Bois des Ognons and des Chevaux to watch the defiles of Ars sur Moselle and Gorze, the whole of the remaining troops could have been brought up to support the 2nd and 6th Corps.

Everything depended on the right wing boldly assuming the offensive with the least possible delay, and the conformation of the ground was singularly favourable to such a line of action. The left wing, the pivot of this great wheel to the left, scarcely needing any support in consequence of the strength of its position, every man was available for reinforcing the right wing, the conformation of the ground being such that it could advance towards Buxières with a broad front.

A glance at the relative positions of the opposing forces on the night of the 15th of August, as shown on the map, proves that this great wheel to the left would have succeeded. At the commencement of the battle the French army could reckon on an overpowering superiority of force. But its head-quarter staff might have known this had it calculated the possible marches of the Germans on the basis of the information it had received. Nor ought the erroneous and unjustifiable report of General de Forton, that he had encountered hostile infantry on the occasion of the reconnaissance on the 15th, to have materially altered

this view of the case, as the troops he met with could have been nothing more than reconnoitring parties of German infantry. Even on the assumption that the Germans would attain a numerical superiority towards the end of the day, which was very improbable, the French would nevertheless have gained the advantage of being more advanced than they on the contested road passing through Verdun to Châlons.

It must be acknowledged that the 2nd Corps speedily recovered from the effects of its first surprise, and by vigorous offensive operations strove to make up for the neglect hinted at above. But these were unsuccessful, and in making them it came into a position, the front of which was completely turned away from the new line of retreat without being in any way favourable to the old one. The disadvantages of the tactical conditions have been already referred to in the description and criticisms on the field of battle, and it would be unjust to make the 2nd Corps (Frossard), which fought with great gallantry, solely responsible for its want of success. We know moreover what difficulty was experienced in forcing its left flank and bringing the turning movement to a successful issue.

That the extreme right wing was forced with such comparative ease and rapidity, must be ascribed to the 6th Corps. It was imperative that that corps as well as the 2nd Corps should vigorously assume the offensive at all costs, by at once occupying the copses of Tronville and the commanding heights of Vionville. In his observations on the 16th of August Lieut.-Colonel Fay states that Tixier's Division of that corps was kept at a distance from the scene of action to lend support to the 3rd Corps under Marshal Lebœuf. It was however clearly of much greater importance to retain connection with the 2nd Corps on the left flank than to support the other corps on the right flank. It is also stated that the 3rd Corps could not come into line till late, but no reason is given why the three Divisions, which arrived between Vernéville and St. Marcel at 10 P.M. on the 15th of August, did not march at once towards the sound of the guns, Marshal Lebœuf being fully assured that no attack on the part of the enemy was to be expected on his right flank. How different would have been the result of the battle, had these

troops been employed at its commencement to outflank the German left wing![1]

It was doubtless necessary for the Commander in Chief to bring forward his cavalry, at the request of General Frossard, to support the 2nd Corps in its retreat. Time was actually gained by the movement, and well employed in moving up the Grenadiers of the Guard into line on the left flank of the 6th Corps. It is not clear from the French accounts whether the whole of the reserve artillery of the army in the vicinity came into action at this time, as required by the state of affairs.

It is remarkable that an entire Division, the Voltigeurs of the Guard, remained for a long time in the Bois des Ognons for the sole purpose of watching the ravine from Gorze and Ars sur Moselle. As there was no enemy in that quarter, this object could have been attained by pushing weak detachments well to the front. The remainder of the Division should have been led through the Bois des Ognons to outflank the German right wing in the Bois de St. Arnould. The detention of this entire Division for a merely defensive purpose appears all the more extraordinary, as the 2nd Corps, having rallied, was afterwards available for employment at that point.

The result of the battle was greatly influenced by the Commander in Chief taking up his position, not on the right wing where a decisive result was to be attained by turning and outflanking the enemy, but on the left wing, which covered the communication with Metz. His presence at this point indicated a doubt as to the success of the retreat on Verdun, and also an anxiety to retain his connection with Metz. His intention to do this and at the same time to open a new communication with Châlons by Verdun naturally stamped Bazaine's dispositions as half-measures. The German attacks on his left flank under his own eye, impressed him more forcibly than the events reported to be taking place on his right flank. Previous to his arrival on the battle field the idea of breaking out in the direction of Châlons prevailed, as testified by the dispositions of the Com-

[1] Is it possible that Marshal Lebœuf executed the order conveyed to him shortly afterwards, to move upon the right of the 6th Corps and attack the enemy in flank, at so late an hour as 2 P.M., in order to concentrate his whole corps 'and keep up the connection with the 4th Corps on the right'?

mander in Chief. The 3rd and 4th Corps were therefore ordered to outflank the German left wing, and the Imperial Guard was placed astride the high road at Gravelotte. After his arrival on the left of the position he witnessed the check received by the 2nd Corps generally and especially the vigorous attack made against its left flank. The result was the movement of the whole of the Guard Corps to the left flank and the Bois des Ognons.

The 3rd Corps (Lebœuf) was barely in the act of marching up into line on the right flank and preparing with Grenier's Division of the 4th Corps to dislodge the German left flank from its position in the copses of Tronville, when—in consequence of reports that a strong hostile force (parts of the 16th and 25th Divisions) from Ars had marched into the line of battle, and that the right flank of the Germans had been reinforced by the Xth Army Corps—it received the momentous order to defend its position to the last with Nayral's Division, keeping up its communication with the 4th Corps (Ladmirault) by Aymard's Division, and to send Montaudon's Division to the left flank of the French position near the Bois des Ognons, where it remained for the present, though not required. A further movement of troops, to and fro, between Rezonville and the Bois des Ognons and de St. Arnould was occasioned by the hostile reinforcements engaging the French left wing and by the last general attack made by the Germans.

Had Marshal Bazaine taken up his position on the right flank, his dispositions would have assumed a very different character; for he would at once have been convinced that the chances of forcing the enemy's left flank were greatly in his favour, and this would have relieved him from all anxiety about his own left flank; for a tactical victory on his right would compensate for the strategically bad position of his left flank. The Marshal would certainly have directed all his disposable troops at a very early hour against the German left wing, then in a critical situation. These troops, consisting of the right wing of the 6th Corps and those Divisions of the 3rd Corps which had reached the ground, would then not have been employed simply on the defensive when they had the opportunity of deciding the day by a vigorous attack—i.e. at the moment when the Germans were obliged to evacuate the copses of Tronville and afterwards

when von Wedell's brigade was annihilated. In that case Montaudon's Division would not have made its long and circuitous march from Villers aux Bois to the Bois des Ognons, returning at last to the 3rd Corps, but would have been actively employed on the right flank. It is however easy to understand that the 4th Corps (Ladmirault's) found itself too weak—after the check of the cavalry, which ought to have completed the victory of the infantry—to force the position of Vionville (Tronville) in the evening without assistance. We observe consequently that through want of a clear appreciation of the state of affairs two objects were aimed at which produced half-measures, and the result was that the main object was missed in spite of a large numerical superiority.[1]

2. *The Germans.*

1. The Object of the Germans was to strike as severe a blow as possible on the French Army of the Rhine, which had been considerably delayed in its retreat on Verdun by the battle of the 14th of August. It was not at first expected that they would be in time to prevent the whole of that army from prosecuting its march, for it was believed that its main body had made greater progress along the more northern of the roads leading from Metz towards the west than was really the case. Before the battle commenced, however, the IIIrd Army Corps was fully aware that considerably superior forces were encamped in the vicinity of Vionville and Rezonville, but, notwithstanding this, it was decided to attack them with the object of cutting them off from Verdun, as otherwise the greater part would reach that place. This important result, as is generally the case in war, was not to be achieved without running a great risk of heavy losses, and possibly of the destruction of the IIIrd Army Corps; but it was obvious that a resolute attack by that corps, immediately supported by the 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions, would force on a battle, which would last for several hours before this

[1] Major von Scherff calls attention to the frequent changes in the positions of the French artillery as very characteristic, stating that 'fresh batteries constantly came into action at various points, and after firing a few rounds against the Prussians disappeared and were succeeded by others in different positions.' Such a proceeding was only rendered possible by the great numerical superiority of the French artillery.

could be effected by the enemy. The time thus lost for the march of the Army of the Rhine would be gained for the advance of the Second German Army. The participation of the Xth Army Corps in the battle at the right moment could be reckoned on with certainty, and probably also the timely arrival of reinforcements from the other corps in the neighbourhood. The bold course was determined on, which alone promised success.

2. Let us now turn to the execution of the attack. The object was to intercept the French army on the shortest road from Metz to Verdun, covering at the same time the retreat on Gorze and Pont à Mousson. It was foreseen that the IIIrd Army Corps would soon be thrown on the defensive, and would for a long time be mainly dependent on its own strength, supported by the 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions. It was therefore necessary to gain a position in which both these conditions would be fulfilled. The best was that formed by the copses of Tronville, the commanding hill near Vionville, Flavigny, the hill marked (326), and the forests of Vionville and St. Arnould ;—but it could only be seized by surprise.

The account of the battle shows that the attack was carried out in the most brilliant manner in accordance with these views. The IIIrd Army Corps deployed for the attack from the order of march by the simplest manœuvres. The 5th Division, marching by the most direct road towards the enemy, covered the line of retreat, while the 6th Division was ordered to cut the road from Metz to Verdun, but was obliged to execute a flank march from Buxières in the direction of Tronville before the commencement of the attack. The corps artillery, ordered to move rapidly to the front before the beginning of the battle, connected and supported both operations. This movement was masked by the configuration of the ground and by the 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions. Owing to this and the bold advance of the cavalry with its artillery the attack had the character of a surprise, and time was gained for the infantry divisions and corps artillery to reach the field of battle. They were in time to occupy the hill of Vionville, and that to the south-west of Flavigny, which had been won, and were fully aware of the necessity of making every effort to gain the other decisive points

above mentioned.[1] We have seen that the pursuit of the 2nd French Corps by Redern's brigade of Hussars and by the 6th Cavalry Division was checked by fresh bodies of the enemy's troops. The strength of the IIIrd Army Crops was quite insufficient to prosecute the offensive movement with success, but nevertheless it gained possession of the contested position a little before 1.30 P.M.

This closed the first period of the battle. If the Army of the Rhine still desired to make good its retreat on Verdun, it was necessary first of all to carry this position. 'From that time the maintenance of the position by the Prussians would be tantamount to a victory.'[2]

3. This was no easy task. The description of the ground and the account of the battle have shown that the IIIrd Army Corps, in striving for the great object it had in view, was obliged to occupy a position of very great extent (three miles) as compared with its own strength, although too limited as regarded the large force deployed by the enemy. It therefore incurred the danger of being forced, or outflanked and surrounded. A victory over the right wing of the German army would threaten its retreat and its communications with the bulk of the armies, while a defeat of the left wing would lay open to the French the road to Verdun.

The situation of that corps therefore soon became very critical. Being at first reinforced by von Lyncker's detachment alone, with the battery of Lehmann's detachment, it was able only by employing the whole of its strength,—even to the last battalion of the reserve,—to parry the great blow dealt by the united mass formed of the 6th Corps, the Grenadiers of the Guard, Lapasset's brigade, the reserve artillery of the army, and apparently of the artillery of the 2nd Corps also. The left wing was in the greatest danger, as the advance of the hostile masses threatened more and more to outflank it. We know the difficulty experienced by the 12th cavalry brigade in warding off that danger; a task attended with the prospect of annihilation. The object, however, was of the highest importance, and its

[1] It has not been considered necessary to call special attention to the fact that von Lyncker's detachment afterwards took part in these affairs.

[2] Captain Helmuth.

attainment will ever be reckoned among the most brilliant exploits of cavalry.

4. The support given by the Xth Army Corps was substantial, and, considering the circumstances, prompt. That this was not wholly given till late in the afternoon is accounted for by the long marches of from twenty-two to twenty-six miles made in sultry weather.

As soon as it became evident from the great increase of the firing that the matter in hand was not a slight skirmish (which there was reason to expect near Vionville), but a serious engagement, orders were issued for all the columns on the march to move as rapidly as possible towards the field of battle; while Divisions not immediately under the eye of the Commander in Chief abandoned as a matter of course their special routes, which had been dictated without reference to the battle, not then contemplated; and, obedient to the well-known maxim, hurried by the shortest roads to the field of battle, directed by the sound of the guns. For instance, at the very commencement of the affair we find von Lyncker's detachment, which was in the vicinity, on the march to Chambley, placing itself at the disposal of the 5th Infantry Division, and receiving orders from it. In the same way Lehmann's detachment took the initiative, and starting from Chambley, to which place it had been sent to support the 5th Cavalry Division while reconnoitring, marched in the direction of the sound of the guns, placing itself at the disposal of the general commanding the IIIrd Army Corps, who afterwards employed it at a critical moment to reinforce the hard pressed left wing of the 6th Division, in and near the copses of Tronville.

There were two circumstances which rendered the concentrated employment of the Xth Army Corps impossible—the configuration of the ground, and the dispositions for the march of the Second Army and Xth Army Corps. These had for good reasons given the Xth Corps a more westerly direction and a comparatively broad front, so that much time would have been required to concentrate the various scattered columns previous to their employment in the attack. But the pressure of circumstances demanded that the IIIrd Army Corps should be supported as soon as possible, and consequently the detachments were sent

into action in succession as they came up. Reinforcements were required at every point of the thinly occupied and yet too cramped position, and it appeared as necessary to strengthen the front as to extend the wings.

Simultaneously with the turning attack made by the French right wing reinforced (two Divisions of the 3rd Corps and one of the 4th), which necessitated the obstinate defence of the northern copses of Tronville, great pressure was also brought to bear against the German right wing; this was consequently reinforced by a portion of the corps artillery, which had come up very opportunely, and by the 20th Division of Infantry.

Von Wedell's brigade of the 19th Infantry Division, having meanwhile arrived at Mars la Tour, was now employed in the natural course of events in that quarter. We have learnt the reasons which justified the attack of the brigade and the unforeseen circumstances to which its disaster is to be attributed. Here again the German cavalry (1st Dragoons of the Guard and 4th Cuirassiers) was at hand at the right moment, and by a heroic charge against the pursuing French infantry supported the retreat of the brigade and artillery. Similar devotion was displayed at the same time by the escort of the 1st Horse Artillery battery of the Guard to the north of Mars la Tour, consisting of a squadron of the 2nd regiment of Dragoons of the Guard, which in its turn had to be extricated from the enemy's hands.

The gallant charge made by Barby's brigade, although numerically inferior, thwarted Ladmirault's intention of securing the victory of his infantry by means of the large force of cavalry on his right flank on the plain between Greyère and Ville sur Yron.

5. No sooner were the higher authorities convinced that a battle was inevitable than,—in accordance with the recognised maxim that to ensure victory numbers can never be too great, nor the chances too favourable,—we find them directing all the troops to the battle field, which could reach it in time. This being general wherever the sound of the guns was heard, a part of the 16th Division (three batteries and the 1st brigade, under von Rex), a part of the 25th Division (1st brigade, under von Wittick, and three batteries), and one regiment of the 18th

Division reached the battle field late in the afternoon and during the evening. As the day was drawing to a close, the troops marched by the shortest road towards the German right wing. The account shows how the intention of the Commander in Chief, after the arrival of the Xth Army Corps, to make a vigorous attack against the enemy's right wing and centre, failed in any decisive result. We know, moreover, that even at the end of the day, when a portion of the IXth Army Corps appeared on the field of battle, efforts were made to render the victory decisive, and that, after the bloody and severe struggle of ten hours, the remaining troops were assembled for this purpose. The attack, however, was brought to an end by darkness, after some ground had been gained.

6. The offensive operations of the German troops, frequently undertaken without orders from higher authorities, were too partial to gain any lasting success, but were nevertheless not without their effect on the result of the battle. They invigorated the German defence ; they gradually deprived the enemy of all desire to assume the offensive ; and they succeeded in the main object of increasing Marshal Bazaine's anxiety about his left wing and his communications with Metz, causing him thereby to divert to that flank troops which ought properly to have been employed for the really important object on his right flank. The German left flank was thus indirectly relieved.

The importance of this severely contested victory cannot be estimated by the number of trophies actually captured but by the great strategic result attained. In spite of their great numerical inferiority the Germans succeeded in arresting the march of the French army towards Châlons for a whole day. The shortest and most southern line from Metz to that place was in their possession, while their flank was close to the second main line. The enemy could only gain those roads for his retreat by a fresh battle, but the Germans had gained a day to bring up their reinforcements, and the chances were therefore in their favour that a new struggle would add another victory to their standards.

3. *The German artillery.*

The battles of the 14th and 16th of August resembled each other in their improvised character, and consequently the movements of the artillery on the first as well as on the second day were of the same nature.

1. The object in the first place was to throw the enemy into confusion by a surprise near Vionville and Rezonville, and thus gain time for the infantry yet on the march. We have seen that the horse artillery batteries of the 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions performed this duty in a most brilliant manner. The batteries of the 6th Infantry Division, sent forward to support them, also succeeded in taking part in the first action.

2. To the configuration of the ground and to the improvised character of the battle is to be ascribed the fact that the artillery on several occasions became separated from the Divisions to which it belonged. From the very commencement of the daring attack by which the horse artillery surprised the enemy, up to the end of the battle, the positions taken up by the artillery were so advanced as to expose it constantly to imminent peril and necessitate assistance from the other arms. The configuration of the greater part of the field of battle was suitable for artillery; it was only on the wooded ground, as the Bois des Ognons and similar localities, that it found no opportunity of coming into action until the outskirts on the further sides of the forests were reached. The artillery was consequently sent to the front, as its greater mobility enabled it to come into action before the other troops. For the same reason it was detached also to other points apart from the infantry or cavalry, to which it belonged.

The deficiency of ammunition, experienced in the afternoon more particularly on the right of the position, owing to the length of this severe and doubtful struggle, had its influence in checking the detaching of the batteries in this way. The slowness of their fire and the actual silence of some of them encouraged the enemy to make more frequent and vigorous attacks upon Rezonville against the decisive point, the hill (326), while at the same time the Bois de St. Arnould was less threatened

than before. The batteries at this point were consequently reinforced by batteries of the corps artillery of the Xth Army Corps, of the 20th, 16th, and 25th Infantry Divisions, the number of guns being thus not only increased, but several of those previously in the position being enabled to re-open fire, having obtained a fresh supply of ammunition. It is obvious therefore that the bloody attacks made afterwards by the infantry from the Bois de St. Arnould received no *direct* support from artillery.[1]

3. A large force of artillery was employed to open the battle, in accordance with its special province. Mention has already been made of the artillery of the 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions. As soon as it was resolved to attack the enemy, orders were sent to the corps artillery of the IIIrd Army Corps, which was marching in its rear, to advance at a trot. The horse artillery division at the head of the column succeeded in coming into action while the infantry was still fighting round Vionville. The field division in its rear did not come up till half an hour afterwards, which is only to be attributed to its inferior mobility and the badness of the roads. Under the circumstances the corps artillery, reinforced by a battery of the 6th Infantry Division and by another of the 6th Cavalry Division, served to connect the attacks of the two infantry divisions, and supported them materially. Even before the infantry of the left wing succeeded in penetrating the copses of Tronville and reaching the enemy, the whole of the artillery of the IIIrd Army Corps, of the 5th and of the 6th Cavalry Divisions, as well as that of von Lyncker's and Lehmann's detachments, was in action, making a total of 21 batteries, or 126 guns.

We observe that in the isolated attack of the Xth Army Corps on the left flank the same principle was adhered to, although it was owing to the necessity of previously detaching the greater number of the batteries to other threatened points of the field of battle, that artillery was not employed there in greater numbers. The light batteries of the corps artillery and the four batteries of the 20th Infantry Division reached the hills

[1] The account of the battle shows that the attacks of the Prussian infantry were indirectly supported by some batteries on the right flank of the main artillery position, which opened fire on the flank of hostile columns moving between the Bois des Ognons, de St. Arnould, and Rezonville.

of Tronville (at that time of such great importance) before the infantry belonging to them, and quickly checked Grenier's Division on the French right flank, which was in the act of outflanking the German position. They then advanced with the 20th Division, forcing the enemy to retire to the heights south of Bruville.

Of the troops that arrived at St. Hilaire the 1st Horse Artillery battery of the Guard, with the brigade of Dragoons of the Guard, marched to Mars la Tour, and took an active part in the battle at the time of the charge of von Barby's brigade, checking the advance of the French right wing. This was an advantage of considerable importance, as the execution of the French movement threatening to turn our left flank was delayed for some time. Before von Wedell commenced his attack, these batteries and the 2nd Light and Heavy batteries of the 19th Division opened fire at Mars la Tour.

4. The German artillery played as important a part in the progress of the battle and in bringing it to a decisive conclusion as it had done at its commencement. The principle of massing artillery was carried out to a great extent. At the beginning of the battle small masses, each under one command, were scattered over a large extent of ground :— On the right wing the four batteries of the 5th Infantry Division, reinforced soon afterwards by the battery of von Lyncker's detachment :—Four batteries in the centre, the Horse Artillery division of the corps artillery of the IIIrd Army Corps, the battery of the 6th Cavalry Division and one of the 6th Infantry Division. These were joined soon afterwards by three batteries of the corps artillery, thus extending the left flank as far as the cemetery of Vionville :—Four batteries of the 5th Cavalry Division were placed at first on the left flank at Tronville. This number was gradually increased to eight, consisting of three of those batteries, three of the 6th Division, one of Lehmann's detachment, and one of the corps artillery of the IIIrd Army Corps ; the position then extended from the cemetery of Vionville to the copses of Tronville.

We have already noticed the manner in which the artillery mass at Tronville surprised the enemy. General Frossard in his work bears witness to the great effect produced by it, when his corps (the 2nd), supported soon afterwards by the 6th Corps and

the reserve artillery of the army, was to be driven back, and some extracts from his work are given above. The capture and maintenance of Vionville by the German infantry was indirectly supported by the artillery mass of the left wing,[1] which fired on the French columns advancing in support and drew upon itself the fire of the enemy's artillery. The artillery mass of the right wing gave the most effectual support to the infantry in taking and holding the important height (326) and afterwards in driving back the right wing of Vergé's Division by enfilade fire. The concentrated and heavy fire from the artillery mass in the centre and from batteries of the left wing played a decisive part in the capture of the Tank wood and of the hamlet of Flavigny, and especially in dislodging the whole of Bataille's Division, while the enfilade fire of the artillery on the right and centre had a most important effect in routing the left wing of Vergé's Division. Frossard states that his corps retired in consequence of the converging fire of the Prussian artillery.

After the retreat of the 2nd Corps these masses of artillery distributed on a broad arc were brought together in the main artillery position, extending from the Bois de Vionville by Flavigny to the copses of Tronville. The desire of taking up as good positions as possible and of presenting small objects to the enemy's fire led to the artillery being employed by batteries all along the front, the more so that, as it was a question of defending the position, there was no fear of the batteries being masked too early by infantry advancing in front of them. The intervals left in this way were occupied, as might be expected, by the batteries of the Xth and VIIIth Army Corps (16th Division) coming up as reinforcements. It is obvious that owing to these and other circumstances mentioned in (2) and (3) the connection between the regiments of artillery, and generally even the detachments, was broken, although this does not appear to have had any injurious effect on the battle.

We are justified in regarding this position between the copses of Tronville and the Bois de Vionville as that of a great artillery mass. The artillery commanders were, as stated in the narrative, actuated by similar motives, and in this case unity of action

[1] And directly by two batteries.

was facilitated, as they were, as far as practicable, the channel of communication between the higher commanding officers and the artillery. The various portions of the great artillery mass did not limit their attention to self-defence and the enemy immediately in their front, but the prevailing idea was that of affording reciprocal support and of concentrating a cross fire on the most important objects;—an employment of artillery rendered more easy by the long ranges of rifled guns. Thus the right flank supported the left in repelling the enemy's attacks along the road to Verdun, and in replying to the formidable force of artillery well posted on the French right flank; and similarly the left flank supported the right in opposing the enemy's offensive movements near Rezonville towards the south-west, as well as the French batteries in position near that village and to the south of it. In this way only was it possible to obtain an effective oblique and enfilade fire.

As soon as the hostile columns advanced to the assault, the artillery concentrated its fire exclusively on them, regardless of the enemy's guns, and to this is to be mainly attributed the fact that several vigorous attacks, made with great gallantry, were repulsed by the accurate fire of the German artillery.

The left wing was refused, as the ground in front offered no suitable position for artillery, and a very advanced position would have allowed the right wing of the enemy, then seeking to turn our flank, to enfilade the line of guns. The attempt to keep some of the batteries with the infantry astride the high road from Vionville to Rezonville beyond the road from Flavigny to St. Marcel (2. r. and 3. r. X.), and afterwards to place a battery (3. l. III.) to the north of Vionville, failed, mainly owing to the effective and flanking fire of some hostile infantry under cover. It became necessary to withdraw all these batteries to the main artillery position of the left wing. The batteries (4. s. and 4. l. III.) were able to keep the position to the north of Flavigny, as they were defiladed by gently rising ground on their left flank, which had not fallen into the enemy's hands owing to the fire kept up by infantry at and in front of Vionville as well as by artillery to the west of that village.

It may be interesting here briefly to recapitulate the various changes in the main artillery position which were necessitated

during the battle either by the movements of the enemy or by the prosecution of the German plans. As a matter of course those on the left flank were the most frequent, that being the one most menaced.

a. Owing to the left wing being enfiladed by the French artillery firing through the northernmost opening in the copses of Tronville, the battery on the left flank (5. l. III.) was repeatedly obliged to change front to the left, in order to fire with greater effect;

b. The evacuation of the two most northern of the copses of Tronville by the German infantry necessitated the withdrawal of the extreme left flank, which rested on them, in rear of the high road from Vionville;

c. To avoid the flanking fire through the southern opening in the copses without losing the important hill of Vionville, and at the same time to answer the French fire, as well as to engage the guns to the north-west of Rezonville, four batteries took up an angular position *dos-à-dos*, two on either side of the angle;[1]

d. Owing to the necessity of firing on the French skirmishers as they advanced to the attack from the centre copse soon after the disappearance of the enfilading batteries, the angular position became a line, the batteries wheeling to the left and right up to the high road;

e. The desire of resuming the original position, with the left flank resting on the copses of Tronville, at the time that they were again occupied by the German infantry, was the occasion of a general advance of the batteries across the high road, while they at the same time wheeled to the right;

f. The impossibility of keeping its position under the greatly superior fire of the French artillery, which had now got the range of the road-embankment, obliged the left wing to wheel left about and retire behind it, where it remained till the end of the battle.

The batteries on the right flank of the great position ad-

[1] It appears almost as if the guns in this position were protected by the situation of Vionville as well as by the embankment of the high road from the superior force of French artillery on the old Roman road. Although the enemy knew the approximate position from the rising smoke, it must have been very difficult to get the range, as it was impossible for him to observe when the shells burst short in the space between Vionville and the German guns, and on this the accuracy of his aim depended.

vanced under a heavy fire, bringing their right shoulder forward, to avoid the oblique and enfilade fire of the French artillery at Rezonville, and at the same time to reply to it more effectually. The last change of position was the advance of the six batteries of the centre in the evening, which were joined by two of the Hessian batteries.

5. The ranges at which the guns fired varied greatly, being generally between 800 paces and considerably more than 4,000 paces. Some of the attacks made by the enemy necessitated the use of case shot at ranges of between 300 and 400 paces.[1] However remarkable these differences may appear, they were here also the natural consequence of the peculiar circumstances. After the commencement of the battle the batteries in the main artillery position fired at the longest ranges. The Germans had, as we know, to play a waiting game and to defend their position, in which the artillery had selected the most suitable points. When not engaged in offensive movements the French army maintained a defensive attitude along the ridge of heights to the west of Rezonville. The positions occupied by the contending forces diverged from south to north, the shortest interval between the southern flanks being about 1,500 paces, while that between the northern flanks was from 2,000 to 3,000 paces. Thus if the wings of the German army wished to afford a reciprocal defence, they could not avoid having to fire at ranges beyond 4,000 paces.

It has been asserted by several bodies of troops that enfilade and oblique fire of this kind was very effective, although at long ranges. On our side its peculiarly good effect in one instance against hostile artillery as well as against hostile columns was observed. On the other hand the effect also of the French artillery posted to the north of the high road as far as the old Roman road was felt by several batteries in the centre of our position. This occurred when the left flank of the German artillery position was prevented from keeping the hostile guns sufficiently in check. Hence the rule that in a great line of battle no part of the artillery may cease firing, merely on account of the great range, but must keep the enemy's artillery in

[1] The battery 2. s. x. also fired at a range of 700 paces when opposing an offensive movement made by the French.

check by a deliberate fire, so as to prevent it from enfilading and taking obliquely other parts of the position.

In most of the other cases the ranges in the earlier positions were between 1,500 and 2,000 paces, and when this was exceeded owing to errors in estimating the distance, the batteries as a rule moved nearer to the enemy as soon as practicable.

The shortest ranges employed for offensive purposes were between 800 and 1,200 paces. These occurred in the following instances :—

a. With the artillery of the 5th Division, when the decisive point, the hill (326) on the plateau of Vionville, was carried :—

b. When the batteries of the Xth Army Corps advanced to the hill (257), to prepare the attack of von Wedell's brigade. The fire of the 1st Horse Artillery battery of the Guard was very effective, as its position to the north-west of Mars la Tour enabled it to take the enemy obliquely at a range of 1,600 paces, and there was no danger of its being masked by the movements of its own troops. The fire of the enemy's skirmishers at 800 paces from parts of the copses of Tronville, which had not yet fallen into the hands of the Prussians, prevented the batteries of the 20th Division at that time from getting closer to the enemy than 1,500 paces :—

c. When the artillery supported the general offensive movement made by the infantry and cavalry in the centre and on the right wing, at the commencement of darkness. We know that, owing to the darkness, mistakes, and other causes, some of the batteries were obliged to use case shot in self-defence [1] :—

d. When the battery (3. l. III.) to the north of Vionville attempted, in obedience to orders, to check the overpowering force of the enemy, which was driving back our own infantry.

Although the attack mentioned in (*a*) was, after a sharp and heroic struggle, completely successful, and the artillery referred to in (*c*) did not retire, even after its great losses, further than appeared absolutely necessary, the attacks mentioned in (*b*) and (*d*) were less fortunate. These batteries, however, supported the other arms with the devotion to be expected from comrades

[1] The account shows that the two batteries to the north of Flavigny were prevented from taking part in this attack by the fire of some skirmishers under cover on the high road.

in arms, and quitted the field together, although the enemy had approached to within 300 or 400 paces. When the heroic charge of cavalry at Mars la Tour disengaged our infantry, the remnant was supported by the artillery of the Xth Army Corps, mentioned in (*b*), which maintained such a steady and deliberate fire that the enemy was unable to continue his offensive operations in that quarter.

As regards the defensive conduct of the Germans, the artillery at the commencement of the battle held the ground at Vionville, which had been gained by surprise, until it was threatened with annihilation, when it allowed the assailants to advance to within range of case shot. But even in the main position the firing was not limited to long ranges. The repeated and vigorous attacks made by the enemy with great gallantry, and in large masses, were by no means always checked at the longest ranges only, but generally at moderate ranges of between 1,200 and 1,800 paces. At some points they were not stopped by the cautious and well delivered fire of the line of batteries until within from 800 to 900 paces. The advance of French skirmishers, completely covered by the copses of Tronville, was arrested by common shell at ranges of from 900 to 1,000 paces. All these instances of short ranges occurred at decisive moments, when attention had to be paid to the effect of the fire without regard to cover.

6. That this was the case is strikingly proved by the numbers in the list of wounded, which speak for themselves, if it is borne in mind that the combatant part of a field battery, exclusive of the lines of wagons, amounts to four officers, sixty-two men, and forty-eight horses; and of a horse artillery battery, to four officers, seventy-four men, and ninety-six horses.[1]

Some of the batteries lost all their officers; others all, or nearly all, their horses; while a few lost nearly three-fourths of their men. It is obvious, therefore, that many guns were obliged to cease firing until men could be brought up from the lines of

[1] Including the lines of wagons, which were in rear and as much as possible under cover, the strength of the batteries was as follows :—

	Officers	Men	Horses
Horse artillery battery	4	150	207
Light field battery	4	145	124
Heavy field battery	4	151	126

wagons. Thus towards evening the very weakened batteries of the 5th Infantry Division were no longer able to move, in consequence of the difficulty of bringing up the lines of wagons, which had been left at Gorze; and, moreover, the division was prevented from taking part in the last attack in the evening by want of ammunition.

It is remarkable that the damage to material, as shown in the appendix, even in the batteries which suffered most from the enemy's artillery, was extremely slight. Hence the opinion is justified that less attention should be paid to disabling guns than to disabling men and horses.

7. The batteries when in close connection with their own infantry, as in the case of the three batteries of the 10th regiment on the hill (257), fired common shell against hostile skirmishers within range of case shot, with good effect; while others, being separated from their own infantry, were obliged to defend themselves with case shot, and were successful in every instance. This occurred to the 5th Light battery of the 3rd regiment at Vionville, to the 6th Light and to the 2nd Horse Artillery battery of the same regiment in the evening south-west of Rezonville. Evidently in such critical moments presence of mind was of the highest importance.

8. Flank movements and 'diagonal' marches under fire were not of rare occurrence in this battle also. Examples are seen in the withdrawal of artillery of the 6th Infantry Division from the centre to the left wing, in the flank march of the 2nd and 3rd Horse Artillery batteries of the 10th regiment, and in the diagonal march of the horse artillery division of the corps artillery of the IIIrd Army Corps from its second position up the hill on the right to the main artillery position. All these movements were made without any excessive loss, and we can only repeat what we have already called attention to in our remarks on the battle of the 16th: 'It is clear that it is not difficult as a rule to withdraw guns actually under fire from the line of battle and employ them in another part of the field, and that flank and diagonal marches, though not willingly made by artillery under fire, can always be executed in case of necessity. These considerations only strengthen the principle of employing a greater part of the artillery from the commencement and lead to the con-

viction that it is less necessary to keep back reserves of artillery than of infantry and cavalry.'

9. Finally, the battle shows the difficulty of executing flank attacks in a bad light, as in twilight, and more especially for artillery. For if it so acts as to create a decisive effect, it will probably fire into the troops on its own side; and if this is avoided, it may very easily fail in attaining the desired object. Its action cannot be rendered to any extent definite and effective without danger to the troops of the same army, except by maintaining most carefully the connection between the different detachments by experienced officers, who can point out to the artillery ordered to the front the objects for its fire and the ground occupied by the troops on both sides; because the commander of the artillery, suddenly ordered to the front, and being urged to bring his guns into action with the greatest expedition, cannot in such cases make himself sufficiently acquainted with the ground.

10. The account of the battle also teaches that, owing to the great expenditure of ammunition, the first line of wagons of the ammunition-columns should follow the troops as closely as possible, if not prevented by extraordinary circumstances; and, moreover, that the number of the artillery ammunition-columns should as a rule be increased, and especially in that line. This change has already been decided on.[1] The severe losses sustained by the batteries were made good from the ammunition-columns, decidedly a proper arrangement under the circumstances. But it is a question whether this supply (especially as regards horses) should not for the future be provided by a different organisation, as, for instance, from horse-depôts. By depriving the columns of so many horses, there is always a risk of rendering them temporarily incapable of marching, and of thus making the supply of ammunition a matter of uncertainty.

[1] The disadvantages of the second line of wagons being too far in rear was felt in some instances.

CONCLUSION.

SCARCELY any German battle surpasses that of Mars la Tour and Vionville in general tactics, in the skill of the commanders, or in the zeal and devotion of the troops of all arms. The moment was the most critical one during the first period of the campaign of 1870, and the German Artillery may proudly boast that it materially assisted in bringing that crisis to a successful conclusion.

THIRD PART.

I.

A SHORT GLANCE AT EVENTS FROM THE BATTLE OF VIONVILLE OR MARS LA TOUR ON THE 16TH OF AUGUST, 1870, TO THE BATTLE OF GRAVELOTTE ON THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870.

1. *French plans after the battle of the 16th.*

AFTER the battle of Mars la Tour and Vionville there were two courses open to the French—either to carry out the present intention of marching on Verdun, or to resume the original plan and base their operations temporarily on Metz. The first was the most desirable, but the shortest road was in possession of the Germans and the French could not make use of it without continuing the battle. They had, however, the alternative of a flank march by the more northern road through Conflans or by another passing through Briey, still further to the north and more circuitous. But even this line of march was full of peril, and did not evade a serious battle. The earlier the march or battle was commenced, and the larger the force brought into the field, the greater was the chance of success; for every delay was a gain to the Germans, to whom fresh reinforcements were every moment arriving. Hence the advisability of employing all the available troops from the garrison to co-operate with the army in the field by making demonstrations. A large German force would thus be detained on the right bank of the Moselle by French movements threatening the communications, and notably the line of railway from Metz to Faulquemont, which

became longer and consequently more susceptible to danger as the advance round Metz was developed.

With regard to the operations actually executed by the French on the 17th of August, Lieut.-Colonel Fay writes:—'After the success we had gained on that day everyone was expecting to receive the dispositions for prosecuting our (French) march into the interior, when the order to retreat was received during the night from head-quarters. The army was directed to take up the strong position of Amanvillers, which extended from Rozérieulles to that place. The 6th Corps alone was to remain in front of Vernéville.' Metman's Division of the 3rd Corps was to occupy the position of Gravelotte and cover the retrograde movement. These orders were carried out in the course of the 17th.

Marshal Bazaine gives the following explanations of the motives which decided him to abandon his intended march on Verdun and again to draw nearer to Metz:—(1) The tactical conditions were so unfavourable as to render the prosecution of the march impossible. An attempt to regain possession of the southern road or to make use of the neighbouring road by Conflans would, he considered, have brought on a battle with forces considerably superior to those he had encountered on the 16th. He was debarred from using the road through Briey by the difficulties of the terrain in the vicinity of that town, as well as by the consideration that the French would then have had their rear exposed to the enemy.[1] (2) The want of provisions, which had not been evenly distributed, owing to the pressure of events on the preceding days; for the convoys, limited to the single road from Metz to Gravelotte, were unable to reach all the corps on the 16th. (3) The pressing want of ammunition, especially for the artillery. This is explained by the great expenditure during the battle by the 2nd and 6th Corps and by the artillery reserve of the army, as also by the absence of the park of the artillery ammunition reserve, which had remained in rear at Toul. Moreover, it was impossible to issue ammunition to the army during the night between the 16th and 17th of August, owing to the extent of the line of battle and to

[1] With reference to this road, compare Part II.

the confusion into which the Divisions had been thrown by their contest of twelve hours' duration. 4. By offering battle to the Germans in the position of Rozérieulles and Amanvillers, which was considered impregnable and was moreover to be carefully intrenched, the Marshal expected that the Germans would be so weakened as to permit him to advance without further opposition. His intention was consequently to march on the 19th or 20th in the direction of Briey, having previously issued supplies to his troops, and from that point to gain the Meuse.

It would lead us too far from our subject to discuss all that has been urged by French writers against the validity of the above motives, and we prefer to turn our attention to the measures taken by the Germans.

2. *German Movements after the battle of the 16th of August, and the events of the 17th.*

The movements of the Germans were influenced by the considerations which follow from those already mentioned in the prefatory remarks:—(1) The necessity of bringing up as rapidly as possible all disposable troops to the battle field of the 16th. They would then be in a position again to accept battle on the same ground under more favourable conditions, or to prevent the march of the enemy and bring events to a decisive issue by taking advantage of the opportunities afforded by the flank march. (2) The necessity of leaving detachments in rear to protect the communications and more particularly the line of railway, Metz—Faulquemont. These troops, however, could at the same time make demonstrations against Metz, and so prevent the enemy from withdrawing any considerable force from the garrison for operations on the left bank of the Moselle. These objects would be simultaneously attained by making attacks on the south-east of Metz, in the general direction of Fort Queuleu.

Let us now trace the movements actually executed by the Germans, commencing with those on the left bank of the Moselle. All the troops, which had fought on the 16th or had reached the battle field on that day, bivouacked on the ground they occupied. Orders were issued by the Royal head-quarters and by the head-quarters of both armies on the evening of the

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16th or very early on the 17th, that strong reinforcements were to be pushed forward from every possible quarter, so as to reach the battle field at daybreak.[1] The orders of the Royal head-quarters to the First and Second Armies clearly showed that it was intended to force the enemy from Paris and Châlons towards the north.

With reference to the execution of the necessary marches, it is obvious that the IXth Army Corps (18th Division and corps artillery), encamped at Arnaville and Onville, as well as the available corps (VIIth and VIIIth)[2] of the First Army, which lay between the Seille and Moselle almost equally advanced with it, could reach the battle field much sooner than the more distant corps of the Second Army. Having started at an early hour, the van of the IXth Army Corps reached the battle field at 6 A.M., followed soon afterwards by the VIIth and VIIIth Army Corps, which had crossed the Moselle by all the available bridges, some of which had to be repaired by the pioneers for that purpose. The VIIIth Army Corps marched from Arry to Rezonville, leaving Gorze on the left, while the VIIth, from Corny, reached Gravelotte by Ars and the lateral valley of the Moselle.

The battle of the 16th having proved that the whole of the French army had moved to the left bank of the Moselle, the 1st and 3rd Divisions of Cavalry were sufficient to veil and cover the marches towards Metz on the right bank of the Moselle. The 1st was soon afterwards moved up to the VIIth Army Corps near the Moselle, leaving, however, detachments to watch Metz till the arrival of the 3rd Cavalry Division at Augny on the 17th.

The only troops of the Second Army available for battle on the 17th were the XIIth Army Corps, which was 15 miles distant with its advanced guard at Regnéville en Haye and main body at Pont à Mousson, and the Guard Corps, which was 20 miles distant with its advanced guard at Ramboucourt and main body at Bernécourt. Leaving its bivouacs at 2 A.M., the XIIth Army Corps arrived on the field of battle soon after noon, and the Guard Corps—thanks to its having concentrated its troops in

[1] General von Goeben, without waiting for orders, had caused the VIIIth Army Corps to get under arms and march towards the field of battle.

[2] Omitting of course the portions of these corps that had reached the field of battle on the 16th.

front at Flixey and Richecourt on receiving news of the battle of the 16th [1]—marched up on the left of the XIIth Army Corps a little after 3 P.M. The brigade of Lancers of the Guard had been detached towards the Meuse by orders from head-quarters. On the other hand it was impossible for the IInd Army Corps at and in rear of Buchy, and the IVth Army Corps, which was at le Saizerais and Marbache with its advanced guard at Gaillon, to reach the battle field on that day, and consequently the IVth Army Corps received orders from the Second Army at noon on the 16th to march in the direction of Sanzey and Boucy, with a view to operations against Toul, while the IInd Army Corps was to move on Pont à Mousson.

H.R.H. the Commander in Chief of the Second Army arrived on the field of battle at 4 A.M. on the 17th. The enemy gave many indications of his presence, and threw forward a line of skirmishers beyond Rezonville towards the front of the Germans. All dispositions had been made for the renewal of the battle, and the troops had formed up, but it was soon discovered that the French, covered by their skirmishers, had broken up their camp, and were for the most part retiring on Gravelotte.

On the arrival of the King on the field of battle soon after 6 A.M. patrols were pushed forward, who ascertained that the enemy had retired. As he neither attacked nor advanced towards the south-west, the Germans had no interest in forcing on a battle on the 17th, for every moment brought them fresh reinforcements, and rest was necessary for those troops which had undergone the fatigue and heat of the previous day's fighting. But caution was necessary, for the enemy was still in possession of Rezonville and Gravelotte. Sufficient time to cook could indeed be given to the troops actually present, but it was necessary to continue the concentration of the remainder, and further orders were issued to them from the field of battle. According to the Second Army, the rear guard of the enemy had at noon taken up a position to the west of Gravelotte, and some of his corps were subsequently seen on the plateau of Leipsic and Moscou. Clouds of dust and weak detachments on the march were observed in the direction of Conflans, while troops appeared

[1] Prince August von Wurtemberg had received this news from the 23rd Division, under Prince George of Saxony.

also to be moving in the direction of Vernéville.[1] Everythin indicated that no attack was to be expected on the 17th.

The only fighting that occurred on the left bank of th Moselle on the 17th was a skirmish between the French and th advanced guard of the VIIth Army Corps, of which the followin account is given by Major von Schell:—'South of the mouth (the defile leading to Gravelotte, von Woyna's brigade came upo hostile advanced parties of the guards and infantry of the lin and, by order of the Commander in Chief of the First Armj drove them by a light musketry fire as far as the skirts of th wood opposite Gravelotte, penetrating at the same time on th east side of the defile to the northern edge of the Bois de Vaux The detachments of the enemy which barred the defile dis appeared towards 2 P.M. in the direction of Gravelotte. As th orders issued by the Royal head-quarters did not permit a pur suit, outposts were placed along the borders of the wood and o the plateau to the south of Gravelotte.

'At that time, 2 P.M., General von Steinmetz rode up to th plateau with his staff for the purpose of reconnoitring the enemy' position. Columns were seen marching along the high road i an easterly direction towards Point du Jour; and the heights t the east of Gravelotte, as well as the ridge running from Poin du Jour by the Moscou Farm to Leipsic, were evidently occupie in force, apparently by the 1st and 2nd Corps, large camps alsc being visible. Batteries and shelter trenches were also observed At 2.30 P.M. the enemy's infantry began to advance against the Bois de Vaux from the direction of Point du Jour, and the fire from the batteries of mitrailleurs placed there reached the woods, as well as the height where General von Steinmetz was standing, without doing any harm, although the bullets struck the ground close to the officers of his Staff. The enemy retired soon afterwards.'[2]

Having received information from the Royal head-quarters that the general attack was postponed till the next day, General

[1] According to the lecture given by Captain von Helmuth, the 11th Hussars, having reconnoitred in the direction of Jarny during the morning, reported that strong columns were on the march towards the north-east.

[2] *The Operations of the First Army under General von Steinmetz*, by A. von Schell. H. S. King & Co.

von Steinmetz removed his head-quarters to Ars sur Moselle and at 4 P.M. ordered the VIIth Army Corps to halt.

We must now relate the events that occurred on the 17th of August on the right bank of the Moselle. We know that the 1st Army Corps had remained on that bank to watch Metz as well as to cover the German communication, more especially the railway and the important depôt the Courcelles station. General Manteuffel had received direct orders from the Royal head-quarters to retire on Rémilly in the very improbable event of the French army attacking the 1st Army Corps during the next few days with superior forces. In order to divert the enemy's attention from the left bank of the Moselle, General von Steinmetz had at 9.30 A.M. directed the 1st Army Corps to make a demonstration towards Metz[1] and accordingly General Freiherr von Manteuffel issued the following order :—'By order of the general commanding, the corps will make a demonstration towards Metz to prevent the garrison detaching troops to Marshal Bazaine's army, which is at present engaged with portions of the First and Second Armies on the left bank of the Moselle.[2] The 1st Division will take up a position at Laquenexy ; the 2nd will move up at 2 P.M., march to Pouilly, and push its advanced guard to Thiébault.[3] The corps artillery will be posted at the point where the high road to Strasburg crosses the railroad. The 1st Division must be under arms at 3 A.M. As a serious engagement is to be avoided, the demonstration will be limited to a bombardment of the south-western side of Metz and of the forts in the vicinity. Further dispositions will be made known. After 3 P.M. I shall be to the east of Pouilly.

'VON MANTEUFFEL.'

To carry out the above order Major-General von Bergmann, commanding the artillery, assembled the commanding officers at Laquenexy, and having informed them of the general state of affairs and the object of the ensuing operations, gave them the following verbal orders :—'The whole of the artillery

[1] *The Operations of the First Army, &c.*, by Major von Schell.
[2] *Vide* plan of the battle field of the 14th.
[3] About 1,800 paces west of Pouilly.

of the 1st Army Corps will take up a position 5,000 paces from the fortress, so as to embrace the front opposite Queuleu, viz. the 1st field division west of Ars-Laquenexy and south of the road leading from that place to Grigy; the corps artillery between Château Mercy le Haut and Bevoye farm; the 3rd field division west of the Strasburg road on the ridges running in a south-westerly direction from Peltré to Marly. The 1st field division will cannonade Fort Queuleu: the light batteries of the other divisions will direct their fire on the same point, the heavy batteries against the south side of Metz.

'To reduce the casualties to a minimum, the guns will be intrenched with considerable intervals between them, for which purpose a pioneer company will be attached: the fire is to be deliberate and steady, and no useless expenditure of ammunition permitted.'

The ground having been reconnoitred by General von Bergmann, the artillery took up the following positions:—The 1st field division, under Captain von Horn, west of the pond of Ars-Laquenexy in the direction of Mercy le Haut; the corps artillery under Colonel Jungé, with its right wing, the horse artillery division, Major Gerhards, between that village and the Strasburg road; and further along the ridge on the left of the 1st division, the 2nd division under Lieut.-Colonel Gregorovius; —the 3rd division, commanded by Major Müller, on the ridges which run along the right bank of the Ruisseau de St. Pierre to Marly sur Seille. The wagons remained under cover in rear of the ridges, and some of the batteries were in pits constructed by the pioneers, while infantry were posted in support under cover in rear of and on the flanks of the artillery position.

Fire was opened at 5 P.M. Fort Queuleu was cannonaded by the 1st division at a range of from 3,000 to 4,000 paces, by the corps artillery at 4,000 paces, and by the 3rd division at 5,000. At the same time the corps artillery and the 3rd field division fired on the suburbs of Metz from distances of 5,000 and 6,000 paces with long pauses between the rounds.

Fort Queuleu replied to the fire with mortar shell, common shell, and shrapnel from a considerable number of pieces of ordnance. The shells fell generally in rear of the Prussian batteries, causing some damage to the wagons. It was, however, difficult to observe the effect of our own fire; although some damage was observed

in the ramparts of Fort Queuleu, and the suburbs of the town were on fire in several places. The report despatched by General Freiherr von Manteuffel from Thiébault to the Commander in Chief of the First Army, after mentioning the fire in the suburbs, goes on to state :—'Dust was seen at 5.30 P.M. rising from the street, which leads from Metz on the left bank of the Moselle, and appeared to be made by returning columns. As our object was attained as far as possible, orders were given at 6.15 P.M. to cease firing, and the corps returned to its bivouacs at Laquenexy and Courcelles station.'

A letter, written by Marshal Bazaine to the Emperor Napoleon on the 17th of August, proves distinctly that the object of the demonstration was fully attained. It states :—'It is reported that the King of Prussia is at Pange or Château d'Aubigny with an army of 100,000 men, and also that a large force was seen on the Verdun road and at Mont sous les Côtes.... An air of probability is given to this report of the King's arrival by the fact that at this very moment that I have the honour of writing to your Majesty the Prussians are making a serious attack on Fort Queuleu ; it is reported that they have thrown up batteries at Magny, Mercy le Haut, and in the Bois de Pouilly ; the firing is now very brisk. . . .'

The detail of expenditure of ammunition and the losses of the German artillery on this day are given in the appendix.

The First and Second Armies occupied the following positions near Metz from the evening of the 17th until the beginning of the battle on the 18th :—[1]

FIRST ARMY.

Head-quarters, Ars sur Moselle.

1st Army Corps, Courcelles station.

VIIth Army Corps, in the valley between Ars sur Moselle and Gravelotte ; the 26th brigade at Ars under the immediate orders of the Commander in Chief, protecting the right flank on the side of Metz.

VIIIth Army Corps at Gorze.

1st Cavalry Division at Corny.

3rd „ „ Augny, between the Seille and Moselle.

[1] *Vide* sketch of position of the armies on the 17th.

SECOND ARMY.

Head-quarters, Buxières.

IXth Army Corps, west of the Bois de Vionville and sout of the road Gorze—Vionville.

Guard Corps, between Mars la Tour and Hannonville a Passage.[1]

XIIth Army Corps, on the right of the Guard Corps betwe Mars la Tour and Puxieux.

Forming the second line in rear were

The IIIrd Army Corps on the right } on the battle field of the 16t
The Xth „ „ on the left }

The 5th Cavalry Division at Tronville.

6th „ „ south of Flavigny.

The outposts of the First Army (exclusive of the 1st Arm Corps), which had got the touch of the enemy, extended fro Magny-sur-Scille, by Vaux, through the Bois de Vaux (th northern angle of which was held by the enemy), and the skirted the northern edge of the Bois des Ognons, where the joined those of the Second Army. The line of the latter ra from this point, in rear of Rezonville, to the Copses of Tror ville and thence to the Yron. The XIIth Corps, which furnishe the outposts on the left wing, watched the road through Hanor ville to Verdun.

[1] Captain Helmuth states that at 3 P.M. on the 17th, when the Guard Corps ha settled itself in its bivouacs, after a very fatiguing march, it received a second ord to bivouac at Puxieux, in rear of the bivouacs of the Saxons. This order had cross a despatch reporting the position of the bivouac. Prince August von Wurtembe considered himself authorised by the circumstances to leave his troops in the bivou already formed. This formed the subject of a verbal order by the Commander i Chief on the morning of the 18th, but the arrangements remained unaltered.

'The XIIth Army Corps, which, according to the second order, would be on th left flank, was entrusted with the duty of securing the road to Verdun on that flan by cavalry; but this had already been done by the Crown Prince of Saxony. Durin the fight he had ordered his Division of cavalry to occupy the road to the east of Ma la Tour early in the morning; and if it met no enemy there, to push forward to th road on the north leading to Étain. It reached that road at a point seven miles ea of Jarny, and held it till the 18th. The Division reported to the corps head-quarte at noon on the 17th that it had reached the road without coming into contact with th enemy. This report, however, was forwarded no farther; but a copy of the cor order, assigning this duty to the cavalry, was despatched to the Commander in Chie

II.

THE BATTLE OF GRAVELOTTE OR ST. PRIVAT ON THE 18th OF AUGUST, 1873.

Description of the field of battle.

TWO nearly parallel ridges run from the valley of the Moselle above Metz, and from the northern side of the Bois des Ognons between the ravines of Châtel St. Germain, the Mance, and la Jurée in a north-westerly direction to the Bois de la Cusse. At this point they are joined by a low saddle, and again separated further on by the defile extending from Habonville to Auboué. The western ridge maintains its original direction to the Orne, while the eastern trends away from it in an easy curve towards St. Privat and Roncourt on the east. These two ridges with the defiles between and beyond them, and the westernmost portion of the plateau of Plappeville, defined by a straight line drawn from Bronvaux to Montigny la Grange, formed the battle field of the 18th. Fort St. Quentin and the right bank of the Moselle opposite St. Ruffine must not however be passed over, inasmuch as French artillery from the former, and portions of the 1st German Corps from the latter, took part in the contest which extended in this direction during the afternoon. The field of battle may be regarded as a plateau, very undulating and much intersected by defiles, hollows, and copses, especially in the southern part.

The French position is indicated by the eastern ridge running from St. Ruffine or Jussy by Rozérieulles—Point du Jour—St. Privat la Montagne to Roncourt, with the northernmost part of the Bois de Vaux, the quarries at Point du Jour, the Bois de Genivaux and Champenois as outpost positions. At the close of the battle the right wing of the French when retiring found positions of support and for its rear guard along the line Montigny

la Grange—Quarries of Amanvillers—Bronvaux, astride
roads to Woippy and Plappeville.

The line on which the German armies first deployed previ
to the decisive advance of the left wing runs from the valley
the Moselle along the northern edge of the Bois de Vaux,
intersecting its northernmost part, and after crossing the de
of la Mance, some 1,000 paces to the south of Gravelotte, follo
the western ridge as far as the Bois de la Cusse. Beyond t
the left of the German army was formed in two echelons,
position of the foremost being indicated by a line drawn fr
the north-west angle of this wood to St. Ail, and the second
the northern portion of the western main ridge with the de
in front (north-east of Batilly). After the capture of Marie a
Chênes the second echelon came up into line with the first, a
extended to the north beyond that village and along the rid
on which it is situated.[1] The extremity of the left wing, exten
ing still further, was constantly advancing.

The eastern ridge, forming the French position, rises fr
the valley of Moselle at Ars by a steep slope covered with vin
up which infantry alone can clamber singly. The upp
portion, with part of the crest, is covered by the Bois
Vaux, which consists of lofty trees and thick underwoo
through which troops can pass only in loose formations, exce
on the roads. The ground to the west is commanded by t
ridge, which extends by St. Privat la Montagne to Roncou
assuming more or less the character of a plateau. Omittin
slight differences in altitude, formed by the alternations of fl
knolls and their connecting saddles, the southern portion of t
ridge, as far as to the north of Leipsic, is on the same lev
Thence to St. Privat the ground is gently undulating, the hollo
being from 50 to 72 feet deep. There the ridge culminate
forming the most commanding point of the right wing, an
then bends back in a large arc past Roncourt to the quarries an
wood of Jaumont.

The configuration of the western slope varies. Towards th
south as far as Moscou the gradations are generally more marke
so as to present a wall-like appearance towards the west. Conve

[1] The first position taken up by the artillery of IXth Army Corps was in front
the line here traced.

in form, the upper and less wooded slopes can be swept by musketry fire from the summit of the ridge; but the lower slopes, precipitous and thickly wooded, fall away to the defile of la Mance, the western side of which bears the same character. Notwithstanding the dryness of the soil, the defile, from 60 to 80 paces in breadth, can only be crossed by infantry in open formations, and that with difficulty. This is the case as far to the north as Chantrenne.

The slopes of the centre portion of the ridge as far as the commencement of the commanding height of St. Privat are more gradual. The hollows and undulations become less marked, and, where covered with wood, are advantageous for skirmishers, who are still further favoured by numerous hedges and ditches. The stream of la Mance near Vernéville resembles the latter in character, and as its banks are thickly wooded, it cannot be crossed without considerable difficulty.

The Bois de Genivaux, on both sides of this gully, consisting of young trees and thick underwood, cannot easily be traversed. This also applies to the copse south of la Folie. Both were intrenched; the eastern part of the Bois de Genivaux by stone parapets and shelter trenches; the south-western edge of the copse of la Folie by a deep ditch and parapet, from which two or more lines of men could fire, one above the other.

The Bois de la Cusse, which covers the western slope more to the north, but which was not occupied by the French, is cut up into a number of small pieces by broad clearings covered with thick underwood, amongst which are scattered oaks not more than a foot and a half thick in the stem. Consequently the protection afforded by the wood was slight, and all the more precarious as the French could fire into it from the commanding heights opposite.

The northern extremity of the ridge at St. Privat and Roncourt falls away gently to the north and west, having the appearance of a large glacis. But it is to be observed that the upper part of the slope on the west side is somewhat steeper, and a dead angle is formed about 800 or 900 paces from St. Privat, from which the western outskirts of the village cannot be seen, nor can they be seen into from it. The ground is quite open for a distance of 3,000 paces on either side of the road to

St. Marie; a few shallow gullies, the furrows running at right angles to the road, and the potatoes growing on some of the fields, alone afforded indifferent cover to attacking troops. On the other hand the effect of the enemy's fire was increased by the hardness of the ground, which caused the bullets to ricochet.

The western slope is bounded by the deep hollow formed by the meadow ground between Habonville and Auboué, so steep that artillery could not cross it without difficulty, and was obliged to unlimber in the lower portion. Less difficulty in this respect was presented by the higher part of the open defile, which extends northwards from St. Marie and sends out shallow gullies towards the position occupied by the French right flank; the lower and northern part is again more difficult and intersects the bushy copses between Auboué and Montois. These copses as well as those to the south of Montois, the two defiles already mentioned with the low and gentle ridge between them, the gullies running from the eastern of the defiles, the folds of the ground on the northern slope, and lastly the valley of the Orne, afforded numerous covered positions, and concealed the movements of troops advancing to turn the French right flank. Numerous hedges and ditches between Roncourt and the woods to the west of it provided suitable cover for skirmishers.

The steep declivity and the ravines immediately in rear of the French position were covered with nearly pathless wood, so that troops in close formation were limited to the roads. The French rear guard positions on the western margin of the Bois de Fêves and de Saulny were somewhat more elevated than the right of the main position; these woods were impassable for troops in close formation except by the roads. Fort St. Quentin had an extensive command of the ground in its front, especially on the left flank of the French position, which was within effective range of its guns, but woods concealed the right wing both from that fort and also from Fort Plappeville. Marshal Bazaine posted himself at the latter fort, which was in telegraphic communication with an observatory on the lofty tower of the cathedral at Metz.

The general character of the western ridge is similar to that of the eastern, and was favourable to the deployment of the

German armies. Although everywhere lower than the enemy's position, the higher parts, when not too much wooded, afforded good positions for artillery, often covered from the enemy's fire and commanding the ground for distances varying between 1,600 and 3,000 paces. But the woods covering the defile of la Mance occasionally prevented the enemy's position being seen, more particularly so from the side of the ravine facing the enemy. Thus there was no position for artillery immediately to the north of the northern edge of the Bois des Ognons, and the same held good at Malmaison.

The woods and villages on the sides of the ridges, as well as the defiles, gave the assailants every facility of keeping troops under cover until required ; while on the other hand they were exposed to the view of the enemy while moving from south to north beyond the limits of the battle field and while marching up into these positions. This was especially the case with regard to the turning movement, as already mentioned. The advance to the field of battle was moreover rendered more difficult by the deep valleys running at right angles to the general direction of the movements, particularly to the north of Mars la Tour and to the south of the road between Rezonville and Gravelotte, so that troops in close formation and artillery were obliged to keep the roads entirely.

The high roads are excellent. That from Gravelotte to St. Hubert passes through a deep cutting to the east of the village, and then crosses the ravine of la Mance by an embankment and bridge of masonry, beyond which it is cut out of the slope of the hill, so that it has an embankment on the north side and a ravine on the south. This high road, regarded by the French as a main line of communication with Metz, runs into the valley of the Moselle obliquely to the position occupied by their left wing. The road, leading from the mills in the ravine of la Mance (south-east of Gravelotte) to the plateau, is not passable for artillery, and that from the Bois de la Cusse to Amanvillers is through a cutting and partially lined with low hedges.

The railway between Habonville and Amanvillers, not completed at the time of the battle, runs partly through a deep cutting and partly along a high embankment, and is therefore a

serious obstacle to troops. There are only two points, as shown on the plan of the battle, at which it can be conveniently crossed; by the easternmost of these the road passes from Amanvillers to St. Marie aux Chênes, and its position is marked by a house of yellow sandstone occupied by a railway guard. The cutting to the east of this afforded excellent cover for the French infantry and formed a species of sally-port. The villages and farms which stud the field of battle, being as a rule massively built, are well adapted for defence, and it is necessary to make a few remarks on those which played a conspicuous part in the French position. The principal points of *appui* on the left flank were the farms of Point du Jour, Moscou, and Leipsic, strongly built of stone, and in consequence of their commanding positions infantry could sweep the gentle slopes in front with a grazing fire. La Folie and Montigny la Grange afforded similar advantages in the centre.

St. Hubert, l'Envie, and Champenois, surrounded with massive walls, formed the outposts of these portions of the position. The wall of the garden on the east side of St. Hubert is only as high as the knee; the west front, which was that attacked, is quite enclosed and contains the two stables, while the house in the courtyard is shut in on the north side by a lofty wall; while its power of defence is still further enhanced by the deep stone-quarries to the west, affording excellent cover, and which infantry can only climb up singly and with great difficulty. The village of Amanvillers lies on the eastern slopes of the French position, and its banks and ditches afforded good cover for the enemy's skirmishers. It was of importance as a rallying point. St. Privat la Montagne, which commanded everything on the right flank of the French position, is surrounded by a high and nearly continuous wall. On the northern and western sides, at distances of 200 and 400 paces, are walled enclosures as high as the knee, constructed without mortar, in several rows. From these terraces as well as from the loop-holed walls of the houses, a concentrated fire could be brought to bear on attacking troops. St. Marie aux Chênes and Roncourt are also surrounded by gardens enclosed by walls and hedges. All the villages and farms with the exception of St.

Marie aux Chênes were artificially strengthened, the approaches barricaded and walls loopholed.

The defensive power of the position was also increased by earthworks, gunpits, and shelter trenches, in several lines, one above the other, on the ridge as well as on the sides of the hills occupied by the left wing and centre; also by the large quarries to the south of Point du Jour, singularly well adapted for skirmishers.[1] The hollow way running along the slope west of Moscou from the Bois de Genivaux to the high road was of great importance, and being converted into a shelter trench, formed a strong position for the French infantry.

The defensive works were strongest on the left wing, but were formidable in the centre also. That the 6th Corps was but slightly intrenched is to be attributed to the fact of its late arrival in position and its having no engineer park. The assertion made by the French that that corps was not intrenched at all is surprising, and contradicted by Marshal Bazaine's orders and by the accounts given by German troops; but at any rate the preparations for defence made by the 6th Corps were considerably inferior to those made by the 2nd and 3rd Corps.

The terrain was generally more favourable to the defenders than to the assailants, and was particularly adapted to defence by artillery and infantry, affording, however, little opportunity for the effective action of the cavalry of either side. Very fortunately for the assailants, their right flank, which was obliged by the plan of battle to act at first on the defensive, derived the greatest advantage from the form of the ground; although on the other hand this rendered it more difficult for them to assume the offensive, when required to do so at the close of the battle. Movements of artillery off the roads were impeded by the clayey nature of the soil.

We conclude the description of the field of battle with a criticism on the French position. It possessed the following advantages:—

(1) An excellent obstacle in front of the left wing and centre.

[1] It must be observed that the Carrières de Jaumont, described by the fancy of French newsmongers as the grave of masses of Germans, are situated on the eastern edge of the forest of the same name, eastward of Roncourt.

(2) Command of the ground towards the west, where unintercepted by woods, villages, and other objects.

(3) Good covered position for artillery and infantry.

(4) Numerous points of *appui* and advanced posts, afforded by copses, villages, and homesteads.

(5) Lines of intrenchment, generally well adapted to the objects in view, especially on the left flank and centre.

(6) The possibility of keeping all the troops, as well as the reserve, under cover till wanted.

(7) The possibility of assuming the offensive with a broad front from the right, that being the flank from which the French intended eventually to break out.

(8) Co-operation of the guns of Fort St. Quentin in support of the left wing.

(9) Facilities for the retreat of the right wing to the fortress in the vicinity, for which the forest in rear with its heights afforded, as a rule, good positions for supports and rear guards.

The position, however, possessed the following disadvantages:—

(1) The possibility of troops approaching it undiscovered; (*a*) against the left wing, until within moderate shell range, through the Bois de Vaux (which, however, owing to want of roads, was passable for infantry only, and that with difficulty); and also through the vineyards extending towards St. Ruffine, until close to that place; (*b*) against the centre through the Bois de Genivaux, after its capture, until within short rifle range of the copses of la Folie, and through the Bois de la Cusse at a range of 900 paces to the hill west of Amanvillers—disadvantages which were, however, counterbalanced by the enfilade fire of all arms which the French could bring to bear on the skirts of the woods nearest to them; (*c*) against the right wing and flank at Roncourt, through the valley of the Orne, the hollows and folds of the ground, and the copses, until within from 700 to 1,000 paces.

(2) The exposed position of the right flank at Roncourt and absence of any extensive intrenchments on that part of the French position.

(3) The fact that the lateral movements of the reserves in rear of the position were impeded by the woods and valleys.

(4) Difficulty of retreat for the left wing and centre, since the defile of Châtel St. Germain lay in rear, and the main line of communication with Metz ran obliquely to the left wing and partially along the valley of the Moselle, where it was commanded by the German guns across the river. This strategic disadvantage, which would only be felt after the position had been forced in this direction, was compensated to a great extent by the tactical strength of this part of the position, due to the situation of Fort St. Quentin.

In conclusion, the relatively weak point of the strong position occupied by the French was the extreme right flank at Roncourt, against which, moreover, strategical considerations required that the Germans should direct their main attack.

The weather was very fine and clear throughout the battle. In the early morning it was cool, though it became very warm later in the day. It was frequently difficult to see the enemy, owing mainly to his excellent artificial and natural cover, as well as to the smoke, which became thicker as the battle went on, and was driven by a slight wind somewhat towards the attacking force.

ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE.

1. *Position of the French army.*

THE greater part of the French army retained its position the 17th up to the commencement of the battle of the 18th; the 6th Corps was withdrawn into line with the other troops, the representation by Marshal Canrobert that it was very m exposed at Vernéville. He had ordered the position to be m carefully intrenched.

The following is the order of battle of the French ar according to the accounts given by all French writers. T 6th Corps, under Canrobert, was on the right flank of the ar with its right wing at Roncourt, and centre on the heights St. Privat, consisting of the 3rd Division (Lafont de Villiers), a the 2nd Division (Bisson).[1] The left wing, extending to t pond north-west of Amanvillers, was formed by the 4th Divisi (Levassor-Sorval), while the 1st Division (Tixier) was probat posted at the beginning of the battle in reserve to the east St. Privat on both sides of the high road. During the course the battle we find that a brigade was brought up to support t 3rd Division, and posted on the extreme right flank, oblique to the main line of battle, with its front facing northwards, as to watch the outlets from the woods lying in that directi while the other brigade (Péchot) was employed on the left fla with the 4th Division. Bruchard's cavalry brigade of t 3rd Corps was joined on the 17th by the 2nd regiment the Chasseurs d'Afrique, which was the only regiment left und du Barrail's command after the departure of the Empero escort, the Division thus formed being placed under the orde of the 6th Corps.[2]

[1] This Division consisted of the 9th regiment of the Line only.

[2] The distribution of the 6th Corps is mainly taken from Frossard, who particular on this point.

Lieut.-Col. de Montluisant gives exact details of the number, description, a

The 4th Corps, under Ladmirault, extended from the left of the 6th Corps to Montigny la Grange. On the right wing of the first line stood the 1st Division (de Cissey) as far as Amanvillers; on the left wing, between that village and Montigny la Grange, the 2nd Division (Grenier), the 3rd Division (de Lorencez) forming the second line. The cavalry Division was in rear of Amanvillers. Both places were occupied and outposts thrown forward to Champenois.

The line was continued towards the left by the 2nd Corps, under Lebœuf, who had succeeded Decaen, as far as the bend of the high road south of Moscou. The Divisions were in the following order from right to left:—The 1st under Montaudon, the 2nd under Nayral, who had replaced Castagny, the 3rd under Metman, and the 4th under Aymard. The Division of cavalry was under cover behind the ridge. La Folie, Leipsic, Moscou, and St. Hubert were occupied as advanced posts.[1] The 1st brigade of Montaudon's Division, consisting of the 87th and 95th regiments (4 battalions), defended the wood south-west of la Folie; while the Bois de Genivaux was held by the 90th regiment, with one battalion of the 69th regiment belonging to Nayral's Division, and by two battalions of Metman's Division, five battalions in all.

Frossard's 2nd Corps formed the left wing from the bend of the high road as far as St. Ruffine. The 1st Division, under Vergé, was on the right at the bend of the high road opposite the ravine of Gravelotte, occupying also Point du Jour. On its left the 2nd Division, commanded by Fauvart-Bastoul in place of Bataille, stretched along the old Roman road fronting the Bois de Vaux. The extreme left wing consisted of Lapasset's brigade, posted on the slopes of the ridge inclining towards Rozérieulles, with a strong detachment at Ruffine watching the

position of the artillery on the field of battle of the 6th Corps:—76 guns, comprising 12 12-prs. and 64 4-prs. (Vide *Order of Battle* in Appendix). Thus there were no batteries of mitrailleurs, while according to Fay's account that under Flottes' command must have consisted of mitrailleurs. On the left of St. Privat, Lieut.-Colonel de Montluisant had 16 guns under his orders:—Lippmann's battery of six 12-prs., Blondel's of six 4-prs., and Abord's of four 4-prs. On the right of that village were 60 guns:—Lequeux's battery of six 12-prs. and the 4-pr. batteries under Bedaride, Jaubert, Charpeaux, Boyer, Grimard, Labrosse, Heintz, Oster, and Flottes.

[1] St. Hubert was garrisoned by the 60th regiment of Aymard's Division.

approaches to that village and Jussy to protect the communic tion with Metz. Between this brigade and the 2nd Division t batteries of the latter and the 12th reserve battery were plac so as to command the roads and ground in front of the positi and the remaining four batteries of the reserve were posted first in rear of the two Divisions. Advanced piquets and c tachments of infantry held the stone-quarry west of the high ro Valabrègue's Division of Cavalry was encamped in the valley Châtet, and de Forton's Reserve Cavalry Division took up position at the Mill of Longeau.

The reserves were posted on the Col de Lessy between t forts, Plappeville and St. Quentin, and comprised the Guards a the general artillery reserve of the army.[1] Marshal Bazaine h taken up his head-quarters at Plappeville, and they were co nected by telegraph with the observatory on the tower of t cathedral.

2. *Dispositions and orders of the Royal Head-quarters—Pla and movements of the First and Second Armies before t battle.*

Soon after noon on the 17th of August it became evide that the enemy had no longer any intention of offering battle that day, and that it was possible to concentrate the First a Second German Armies on the plan subsequently carried o After the concentration the numerical superiority of the Germa was such that they were warranted in attempting to interce the French line of retreat by the northern road. Consequent General von Moltke, by command of His Majesty, issued t following orders from the hill south of Flavigny at 1.45 P.M. :-

'The Second Army will march at 5 A.M. to-morrow, a advance in echelons between the Yron and Gorze strea (general direction between Ville sur Yron and Rezonvill The VIIIth Army Corps on the right flank will conform to t movement. The VIIth Army Corps will at first protect the mar

[1] 'During the battle,' says Bazaine, 'I was obliged to hold the plateau of Plap ville with the Guard and artillery reserve, in order to repulse the attacks wh might have been made by the enemy either from Vaux and St. Ruffine or fr Woippy against our rear, as it was certain that he would endeavour to cut us off fr Metz.'

of the Second Army against any hostile attempts from the direction of Metz. Further communications from H.M. the King will depend on the movements of the enemy. Reports are to be sent to H.M. on the hill south of Flavigny.

'VON MOLTKE.'

Consequent on these dispositions of the Royal head-quarters the First Army issued an order at Ars sur Moselle at 6.30 P.M. on the 17th of August to the following effect :—The VIIth Corps, on which the First and Second German Armies were to pivot on the 18th, was directed to maintain its present positions under all circumstances, and to get under arms at 5 A.M. The VIIIth Corps, on the other hand, was considered as temporarily withdrawn from the Commander in Chief of the First Army. 'The 1st and 3rd Cavalry Divisions were to await further orders in their present positions on the right bank of the Moselle.'[1]

Towards evening the VIIIth Army Corps reported the localities of its bivouacs to the First Army, and also that its connection with the VIIth Army Corps was secured by outposts and patrols.

At 4 A.M. on the 18th the Royal head-quarters at Pont à Mousson issued the following orders to the First Army, which, however, did not extend to the troops left on the right bank of the Moselle under the command of General Manteuffel :—

'The VIIth Army Corps will in the first place preserve a defensive attitude in observation. Connection with the VIIIth Corps can only be sought in front.

'Should the hostile army throw itself into Metz, our armies will wheel to the right.

'Direct support is to be given to the First Army, if necessary, by the second line of that army.'

The above order arrived at Ars sur Moselle at 6.30 A.M.

H.M. the King left Pont à Mousson in sufficient time to reach the hill south of Flavigny at 6 A.M. With regard to the exposed position of the VIIth Army Corps, which would in all probability have to bear the burnt of the first blow struck by the enemy, General von Steinmetz thought that co-operation

[1] Major von Schell's *Operations of the First Army.*

from the right bank of the Moselle was desirable, and consequently sent orders at 7 A.M. to General von Manteuffel 'to push forward a brigade of infantry, with a few batteries, in the direction of Vaux, keeping beyond the range of the fortress, with the object of taking in flank any offensive movement that might be made by the enemy in the valley of the Moselle against Ars from the right bank. This brigade was not likely to be endangered, as the 3rd Cavalry Division was still in the line Augny—Marly. General von Hartmann was directed personally to obtain information, during the course of the day, of any fighting that might occur, and to march with the 1st Cavalry Division by the road Corny—Gorze to the plateau of Rezonville, and there to act according to circumstances.

'With the view of obtaining more exact intelligence about the enemy, General von Steinmetz rode to the plateau on the south of Gravelotte.'[1]

The VIIth Army Corps had already reported at 6 A.M. :—

'That the enemy occupies generally his position of yesterday. Strong batteries and masses of infantry are at Point du Jour and St. Hubert. The French camp is still standing between Moscou Farm and Leipsic; much movement is going on there; drums, trumpets, bands are heard.'

'A post of observation established by the VIIth Army Corps had remarked, at seven o'clock, strong columns of the enemy and wagons moving along the road from Metz to Thionville, as well as columns standing with their heads pointing in the same direction. This was reported to the Commander in Chief at 10.15 A.M.'

General von Woyna had sent half a company of infantry to Gravelotte to prevent the enemy from getting water there. In rear of the outposts on the slope of the plateau, and screened from the enemy by the corners of the wood jutting out towards Gravelotte, the 14th Division, under Kamecke, had been under arms since 5 A.M., supported by the 25th brigade of infantry in the valley in rear. The Chief of the Staff, General von Sperling, who had been sent at ten o'clock to His Majesty to receive further orders, returned at 11.15 A.M. with an order

[1] Major von Schell's *Operations of the First Army.*

to General von Steinmetz 'that the First Army was not to attack before the Second had come up into line on its left.'

Let us now turn to the Second Army. 'At 5 A.M on the 18th H.R.H. the Commander in Chief gave the dispositions for the day verbally to the generals commanding the Guard, Xth and XIIth Corps, in bivouac to the south of Mars la Tour, and at 5.15 A.M to the generals commanding the IIIrd and IXth Corps to the west of Vionville.' According to the official report of the Second Army they were to the following effect:—

'The Second Army will continue its march to-day with the object of forcing the enemy from the line of retreat Metz—Verdun and of attacking him wherever it may find him. The army will advance in echelons, with the XIIth Corps on the left, which will move off at 5 A.M., taking the direction of Jarny; on its right the Guard Corps will march in the direction of Doncourt.

'The IXth Corps on the right rear of the Guard Corps will start at 6 A.M., and march between Rezonville and Vionville, leaving St. Marcel on the left. The VIIIth Corps will be in echelon on the right rear of the IXth.

'In the second line the Xth Corps and Rheinhaben's cavalry Division will follow the XIIth Army Corps.

'The IIIrd Army Corps and the cavalry Division under Duke William of Mecklenburg will be between the IXth and Guard Corps.

'The advance is not to be made in columns of march, but the Divisions will be massed by themselves.

'The Commander in Chief will be found at the head of the IIIrd Army Corps.'

After issuing this order, Prince Frederick Charles reported himself at the Royal head-quarters, which had arrived at Flavigny, and then rode with his staff to join the IIIrd Corps on the march towards Vernéville; he remained for some time at the head of the 6th Infantry Division, under von Buddenbrock, to the west of Vionville.

The XIIth Army Corps had meanwhile sent its 23rd Division forwards across the high road from its bivouac south of Mars la Tour, followed by the 24th Division. There the deep ravines, hedges, and walls impeded the movements of the troops to such

an extent that the greater part of the corps was obliged to march through the village itself. It was 8.45 A.M. before the 24th was clear of the place. 'The head of the corps reached Jarny at 8.15 A.M. without coming on the enemy. The IXth Corps, and on its right the VIIIth Corps, had been on the march since 6 A.M. But the Guard Corps, whose van reached Mars la Tour at 6 o'clock, came upon the Saxons marching through and near that place, and was obliged to halt till 8.45. P.M.'[1]

The reports which reached the Second Army during the early morning stated :—'That Gravelotte was evacuated by the enemy, that there was a camp to the east of that place, that there was a good deal of movement in the camps at Moscou and Leipsic, and moreover that those at Bruville and St. Marcel were abandoned.'[2] 'At 8.15 P.M., however, Lieut.-Colonel von Verdy was sent by the Royal head-quarters to the Commander in Chief at Vionville to inform him that the enemy was supposed to be in position in front of Metz with his right flank somewhere about Amanvillers, which indeed had already been observed from Vionville. It therefore appeared desirable that the Second Army should not advance further in its present direction, towards the north. If the surmises of the Royal head-quarters were confirmed, the IXth Army Corps would attack the right wing, supported by the Guard Corps, while the First Army advanced against the enemy's front.'

'About this time, towards 9 A.M., the Guard Corps reached Mars la Tour; the XIIth Army Corps was assembling at Jarny and the IXth Corps was on the march. The latter, which was the nearest to the enemy, was ordered by the Commander in Chief to halt at Caulre Farm and cook. Cavalry scouts only were to be pushed forward towards St. Privat and Leipsic as well as to keep up the communication with the Guard Corps. This corps was ordered to halt at Doncourt, the XIIth at Jarny, and the Xth at Bruville. The IIIrd Corps had not yet started. The VIIIth Corps received direct orders from the Royal head-quarters to advance no further, and it formed up between Rezonville and Villers aux Bois, covered by the forests in its front.

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[1] From the Lecture delivered by Captain Helmuth to the Military Society.
[2] From the official report of the Second Army.

'But about 9.45 A.M. the Commander in Chief of the Second Army was made acquainted with the fact that the road by Étain was reached at all points without touching the enemy.[1] The XIIth Corps reported at 9 A.M. that it had arrived at Jarny and found no enemy; adding however, that hostile troops had been seen to the north-west of that place at Valleroy (a mile north-west of Moineville), as well as to the north of Doncourt. A quarter of an hour later, however, all this was contradicted.'

It was reported by the Guard Corps that Doncourt was evacuated by the enemy on the previous day, and at 8.15 A.M. the IXth Corps reported that it was assembling at Caulre Farm; while its patrols sent out towards the north and north-east had seen nothing of the enemy. There was therefore no longer any doubt that at least the main mass of the enemy would be found in front of Metz.

In pursuance of the orders brought by Lieut.-Colonel von Verdy from the Royal head-quarters the Commander in Chief of the Second Army decided to wheel the IXth and Guard Corps only to the right, and for the present to hold back the IIIrd, Xth, and XIIth Corps.

The following orders were therefore issued:—'(10 A.M.) The IXth Corps will advance in the direction of Vernéville and la Folie, and if the right wing of the enemy is found there, it will engage it, commencing the attack by the deployment of a large force of artillery.'

'(10.15 A.M.) The Guard Corps will march by Doncourt to Vernéville and support the IXth Corps, which is advancing against the enemy's right wing at la Folie. It is desirable to reconnoitre on the left towards Amanvillers and St. Privat la Montagne and to report without delay.'

This order reached the Guard Corps just as its 1st Division was assembling at Doncourt and its 2nd arriving at Bruville. The XIIth Corps, which was to remain temporarily at Jarny, was informed of both these orders. The report dated 10.15 A.M. now received from the Guard Corps of its arrival at Doncourt and of its patrols having seen nothing of the enemy

[1] From Captain Helmuth's Lecture.

in the direction of St. Marie only confirmed the Commande in Chief of the army in the views he had adopted.

Soon afterwards Lieut.-Colonel von Verdy arrived at Verne ville with fresh orders which had been issued by the Royal heac quarters at 10.15 A.M. to the following effect:—'From report that have been received, there is every probability that th enemy will hold his ground on the plateau between Point d Jour and Montigny la Grange; four hostile battalions hav advanced into the Bois de Genivaux. His Majesty is of opinio that it will be advisable for the XIIth and Guard Corps to marc on Batilly, in order to fall upon the enemy should he march o Briey, and to attack him from Amanvillers should he retain hi position on the hill.'

'An attack will be made at the same time by the Firs Army from the Bois de Vaux and Gravelotte, by the IXt Corps against the Bois de Genivaux and Vernéville and by th left wing of the Second Army from the north in the same direc tion.'

In pursuance of this order Prince Frederick Charles mad the following arrangements at 11.30 A.M.:—The IXth Corp was directed, in the event of the 'enemy in its front extend ing his line towards the north, to avoid becoming seriously engaged until the Guard Corps commenced its attack from Amanvillers.' The Guard Corps was 'to hasten its march by Vernéville, extending as far as Amanvillers and thence to make a vigorous attack to turn the enemy's right wing.' It was more over added that the Guard Corps might also take the road by Habonville.

The order despatched to the Crown Prince of Saxony at 11.45 A.M. stated:—'The XIIth Corps is ordered to march to St. Marie aux Chênes, to reconnoitre with cavalry towards Briey and Conflans, and if possible to push cavalry into the valley of the Moselle, in order to interrupt the railway and telegraphic com munication with Thionville.' It was also added that the corps which were marching in the first line would attack the enemy on the heights of Leipsic within two hours. In the second line the Xth Corps was directed on St. Ail, the IIIrd on Vernéville, and the IInd on Rezonville as the reserve for the right wing.

While the Commander in Chief was issuing the above orders,

which were to form the basis of further operations, guns were heard from Vernéville, indicating that General Manstein had reached and attacked the enemy.

It was to be feared, therefore, that the corps, instead of attacking simultaneously, as intended, would do so in succession, as those on the outer flank required more time to traverse the longer distance which separated them from the enemy. The Royal head-quarters, which knew that the IXth Corps was engaged by the rapid increase of the firing up to 1 P.M., was anxious to localise the contest, and despatched orders to that effect to both armies: but the military situation had meanwhile become so serious that the nearest corps to the IXth (Guard and VIIIth) found themselves compelled to fight, and the battle became general.

Thus the original plan was modified. It was no longer possible for the chiefs to restrain the course of events: they could only take the necessary steps as occasion required to restore the balance of the contest or to give renewed impulse to a desired movement by pushing forward fresh troops. Prince Frederick Charles hurried forward at 12 o'clock with his staff from Vionville, and passing the 2nd Division of the Guards, now arrived at St. Marcel, rode to the battle field of the IXth Corps, afterwards taking up his position on the hill at Habonville.

3. *Attack of the* IX*th Army Corps—The battle is commenced by the artillery of the* 18*th Division and the corps artillery—Capture of L'Envie—Movements of the Guard Corps and* 25*th Hessian Division—Advance of the corps—Artillery of the* III*rd Army Corps—Champenois is occupied by the Hessians.*

We must again turn to the IXth Corps, which had halted as ordered at Caulre farm, the 18th Division, under General von Wrangel, north of the road, and the 25th Division, commanded by Prince Louis of Hesse, to the south of it. Their cavalry kept up the connection with the Guard Corps and reconnoitred as far as Batilly. General von Blumenthal was ordered to push forward his outposts towards Vernéville
of the 18th Division, and his pat
some small detachments of the

but only a few stragglers were found in the place itself. His outposts touched those of the VIIIth Corps, which had reached Villers.

The IXth Corps was cooking when it received the above-mentioned order, and at 10.30 A.M. commenced its march in two parallel columns towards Vernéville through the openings in the forest. The right column consisted of the 18th Division, Lieut.-General Freiherr von Wrangel, followed by the corps artillery, under Colonel von Yagemann. The 1st Heavy battery (Captain Werner II.) was attached to the advanced guard of the column (36th regiment, 9th battalion of Rifles, 6th Dragoons), under General von Blumenthal, the remainder of the 1st field division of the 9th field artillery regiment, under Major von Gayl, following with the main body.

The 25th Division, under Prince Louis of Hesse, formed the left column. The horse artillery battery, commanded by Captain Freiherr von Schäffer-Bernstein, was attached to the 25th Cavalry Brigade. Having at first reconnoitred at the head of the Division, this brigade, during the further advance, marched by the west of the Bois Doseuillons and Anoux la Grange to Habonville, so as to cover the left flank. The advanced guard, under Colonel von Lyncker (2nd battalion of Rifles, 4th regiment, 1st Heavy and 1st Light batteries, commanded by Captains Reh and Frank), immediately in rear of the cavalry brigade, advanced to the east of the Bois Doseuillons, taking at first the direction of Vernéville. The main body (General von Wittich) came next, and the remainder of the Hessian artillery (2nd Heavy, 2nd and 3rd Light batteries) followed immediately in rear of the batteries of the advanced guard. The whole of the artillery divisions of the IXth Army Corps marched in columns of batteries.

'General von Blumenthal was ordered to move forward at once with the advanced guard and occupy la Folie and the wood in front. It was 11 A.M. when he passed through Vernéville to Chantrenne with the 2nd battalion of the 35th regiment and three companies of the 9th battalion of Rifles; the remainder of the advanced guard (1st battalion of the 36th, a company of Rifles, 1st Heavy battery, and the 6th Dragoons) was retained at Vernéville by General Manstein, who had ridden forward to

that village. From the hill near Vernéville a large French camp was clearly visible on the flat heights opposite at Amanvillers and Montigny la Grange. The troops appeared to be busy cooking, and some battalions were moving in front of the camp apparently in the direction of Vernéville, now occupied by our advanced guard. In other respects the hostile camp seemed to be in a state of careless repose, and the general considered it advisable to attack vigorously, so as to gain the advantage of a surprise, although the French flank extended far beyond la Folie; owing to the configuration of the ground it was impossible to see the whole length of the enemy's front, which extended beyond St. Privat.

Major-General Freiherr von Puttkammer, commanding the artillery, was therefore ordered at 11.30 A.M. to advance immediately at a trot with the artillery of the 18th Division and corps artillery, escorted by two squadrons of the 6th Dragoons, to the hill beyond the valley north-east of Vernéville within effective range of the hostile camp and to open as heavy a fire as possible on it.[1] It was also intended to protect the artillery more completely by placing infantry on its left flank.

Major von Gayl deemed it advisable, pending the arrival of his other batteries, to place the battery of the advanced guard (1. s. IX.), Werner II., on the west of the valley to increase the confusion in the evidently surprised camp by firing on the hostile columns of infantry marching on our side of it. The battery, after firing a few rounds with doubtful effect, received orders simultaneously from Generals von Manstein and Puttkammer to advance. Before, however, this could be done, the other batteries of the divisional artillery came up at a trot, and crossing a somewhat difficult ditch at a gallop, came into action 1,000 paces further forward, and fired at hostile batteries to the west and south of Montigny la Grange.

They crowned the flat ridge extending from Vernéville to Amanvillers, which seemed to offer an opportunity of deploying and taking up positions, sheltered from the enemy's fire. The 2nd Light battery, Captain Freiherr von Eynatten (2. l. IX.),

[1] From the hill north of Vernéville the Bois de la Cusse appeared to extend to the high ground south-west of Amanvillers. It was known to be occupied by the enemy, and our own infantry soon afterwards attacked it.

was the first in action, the 1st Light and 2nd Heavy batteries, Captains Koch and Kindler (1. l. and 2. s. IX.), aligning themselves with it on the left, while the 1st Heavy battery, Captain Werner II. (1. s. IX.), came into action on the right obliquely to the front of the line. The left wing was afterwards prolonged by the batteries of the corps artillery, which came up in succession at a sharp trot, a considerable interval, however being left on the left of the divisional artillery. The order of the batteries from right to left was:—3rd Heavy, 3rd Light, 4th Light, 2nd Horse Artillery, 4th Heavy,[1] commanded respectively by Captains Roerdansz, von Bastineller, Mente, König, and Werner I. But they were not allowed to come into action without opposition. The first shell of the 1st Heavy battery (Werner II.) was fired at 11.45 A.M., and was the signal for the French army to take up its previously prepared position. To protect their camp the French battalions above referred to had deployed and instantly opened a rapid fire at 1,000 paces on our artillery and the Bois de la Cusse. The hostile batteries at Montigny la Grange were speedily reinforced by a strong line of mitrailleurs and guns, which extended, partially covered by intrenchments, in a large arc from la Folie by Montigny la Grange to the heights between Amanvillers and St. Privat. To the storm of shell, shrapnel, and mitraille, which overwhelmed our batteries, was soon added the fire of great numbers of skirmishers who advanced covered by intrenchments as well as by the form of the ground.

Exposed to a concentrated fire in front, on the left flank, and to some extent in rear, the artillery sustained enormous losses from the very first. Colonel von Yagemann was so severely wounded during the advance of the corps artillery, that Lieut.-Colonel Darapsky took over the command. Major von Gayl fell early, and was succeeded by Captain Koch, who, as well as Captain Kindler, was shortly afterwards wounded, the command of the 1st field division then falling into the hands of

[1] When the batteries of the corps artillery arrived at the place of assembly, nearly all of them began watering their horses, and sent men to procure wood, water, and other things; so that when the order arrived to advance, they were obliged to borrow gunners from the reserves, and there was more or less delay in 'hooking in.' This prevented the corps artillery from coming into action simultaneously.

Captain Freiherr von Eynatten. The batteries which suffered least were the two on the right flank, owing to their being defiladed by the ridge on the left.

The artillery kept up the contest in spite of the enemy's superiority of numbers and position, and nobly held its ground, encouraged by General von Puttkammer and the other commanders. The hostile infantry in front of the camp was soon driven back, our guns then directing their fire on artillery and mitrailleurs, as well as at a later period on infantry in the main French position. The enemy's guns, however, were so well concealed that most of the batteries could only aim at the flash, the range being from 2,000 to 2,400 paces. König's battery of horse artillery alone confronted a battery which was distinctly visible in front of the camp. Bringing forward its right shoulder, and supported by the 4th Heavy battery, which came up soon afterwards, so tremendous a fire was directed on the French battery at 1,200 or 1,300 paces that it was obliged to retire. The effect of the fire of the other batteries, notwithstanding the unfavourable circumstances, was also good, as proved by its silencing the enemy's guns and mitrailleurs, and forcing them frequently to change their positions.

The two squadrons of the 6th Dragoons brought up by General von Puttkammer to cover the corps artillery were also soon exposed to the enemy's shells, which fell here in great numbers; and as they could find no opportunity of acting and were losing many men, they withdrew to Vernéville, where they were ordered by General von Wrangel to await further orders with the other two squadrons in rear of the wood west of Chantrenne.[2]

Werner's battery had only taken up its position a short time on the left of König's when it was overwhelmed by the fire from the enemy's guns and mitrailleurs on the left and in rear, and obliged to change its position. To limber up and retire, to wheel to the right and,—advancing resolutely 200 paces,—reply to this tremendous fire, was the work of a moment. But in less than half an hour two officers, three-fourths of the men, and all the horses except eight were either killed or wounded. The hostile mitrailleurs, which had fired with such deadly effect from

[2] Captain Helmuth's Lecture.

a covered position 900 paces distant, were now silenced. soldiers, who had for some time been lying on the field nea hand, and had been taken till that moment for Prussians had pressed forward, gave signs of life: they were Fre officers. A battalion, hitherto hidden by a hollow,[1] sudde appeared close to the battery, like figures on a stage. Non our infantry was at hand, and case shot was out of the quest The hostile infantry, keeping up a heavy fire, continued to p forward, and completed the destruction of Werner's batt The captain of the battery, already wounded and his h killed, mounted a fresh horse and endeavoured to save wha could.

One of the guns had three horses left; Lieutenant Grasz assisted by the gunners, cut the traces of one of the lea which had fallen, and was about to do the same with wheelers, lying wounded on the ground, when they recove Leaping on the remaining leader, he urged the horses to e their remaining strength in dragging the gun up the hill to Bois de la Cusse. Thus with the loss of the team the gun saved, for the infantry was there close at hand. Cap Werner I. led another gun with a team of four horses to edge of the wood, where the horses also fell under the ener fire.

König's battery, next on the left, engrossed in the blo struggle, had not observed the disaster of Werner's batt Suddenly overwhelmed by a storm of Chassepôt bullets f the hostile battalion, it sustained enormous losses in a sl time, but disengaged itself for a moment by a brisk fire shell. Deprived of support owing to the absence of infantry maintain the position was only to court speedy and use annihilation; and the battery decided on retiring, which executed with great difficulty and unexampled loss. A lin was abandoned, the whole of its team of six horses being kil while the gun to which it belonged was hooked on to ano by First Lieutenant Rudolph and Second Lieutenants Lade and Zeeden, and brought off in safety.

König's battery had just commenced to retire when the

[1] Reference is probably made to the railway cutting.

infantry support came up and covered the retreat of the remaining batteries of the corps artillery. This step seemed all the more necessary owing to the great danger threatening the artillery not only from Amanvillers, but also from Champenois. That farm, which lay close to the front of the German artillery, had been seized in a bold rush from Montigny la Grange by some French infantry supported by a destructive and concentrated fire, although the guns of the IXth Army Corps played on the advancing troops with great effect. It was moreover necessary for the batteries to withdraw and make good their loss of men and also of ammunition, the expenditure of which had been very great in this critical state of affairs, while in many instances the lines of wagons had been unable to follow the batteries.

Lieut.-Colonel Darapsky, who, although severely wounded, had not as yet been prevented from directing the corps artillery, received direct permission from General von Manstein, commanding the corps, to withdraw his batteries one by one only to the Bois de la Cusse to obtain supplies, and infantry was ordered to the front to cover the movement. The 84th, 36th, and 3rd Hessian regiments advanced, and thus the safety of both of Werner's guns near the Bois de la Cusse was assured. 'Two of the abandoned guns without limbers fell into the hands of the French infantry and were only recovered at the capitulation of Metz, while the other two, objects of the enemy's repeated attacks, remained till evening on the small plateau over which the tide of battle continued to ebb and flow for a long period.'[1]

The remaining batteries were now withdrawn from the left in succession, covered by the advancing infantry, but the orders were only executed with reluctance. Mente's and Bastineller's batteries were first of all directed to the Bois de la Cusse. The 3rd Heavy battery, under Roerdansz, calmly continued in action for some time longer, but at last hostile infantry made its appearance close in front. Captain Roerdansz had just given the order to load with case when he fell, struck by the enemy's bullets. A few rounds at 400 paces checked the enemy, and the

[1] Captain Helmuth's Lecture.

battery under the command of Lieutenant Schattauer followed the remainder of the corps artillery. At Vernéville infantry assisted in getting a gun, whose team was reduced to three horses, across a difficult ditch. The 84th regiment retired slowly through the neighbouring battery (2nd Heavy, commanded by Kindler), followed closely by hostile skirmishers, who fired on the flanks and rear of the battery. Under these circumstances the commander, who was lying on the ground severely wounded, ordered his battery, which had suffered great losses, to follow the corps artillery. To remove all the guns it was necessary to obtain horses from those lines of wagons which had succeeded in following the batteries, and five ammunition wagons had to be abandoned. Two of the guns sustained such heavy losses in limbering up that they could not retire at the same time with the others. Lieutenant Kelbling, however, who was ordered to remain with them, succeeded in bringing them off after some further loss.

The corps artillery having been withdrawn from the position, General von Puttkammer could turn his attention to the capture of the homestead of Champenois, which was occupied by hostile infantry.

The greater part of the extraordinary loss of the corps artillery of the IXth Corps and the artillery of the 18th Division in this battle was incurred at this time, and was mainly caused by the Chassepôt and mitrailleur. Major von Gayl, Captain Roerdansz, First Lieutenant Goetze, Second Lieutenant and Adjutant Korschefsky, and Second Lieutenant Ladewig were killed. The following officers were severely wounded:—Colonel von Yagemann; Lieutenant-Colonel Darapsky (who, however, retained the command of the corps artillery for several hours, until it had made good its losses); Captain Werner II., (who was succeeded in the command of the 1st Heavy battery by Lieutenant Puttkammer); Captain Kindler (who gave over the command of the 2nd Heavy battery, after it had retired, to Second Lieutenant Kelbling); Captain von Bastineller, who was replaced in the 3rd Light battery by First Lieutenant Heseler; First Lieutenant Horrmann, who afterwards succumbed to his wounds; First Lieutenant and Adjutant Seiffert; Second Lieutenant and Adjutant Krahe; Second Lieutenants Schmidt II.,

Treutler, Fischer, Walther I., and Surgeon Scherk. The following officers were slightly wounded :—Captain Werner I. ; Second Lieutenant Schmidt I. ; Second Lieutenants Kelbling (grazed by a splinter) and Jourdan ; Staff Surgeon Steinhausen (all of whom remained with their batteries) ; Second Lieutenants Giese, Meyer, and Schackschneider. Several officers had horses killed or wounded under them, among which were the following :—Captain König, of the 2nd Horse Artillery battery, two horses ; Second Lieutenant Zeeden, three horses in three-quarters of an hour ; Captain von Bastineller and Lieutenants Heseler and Holsten, one each. A limber of the 1st Light battery exploded.

Soon after the commencement of the battle by the artillery of the 18th Division and corps artillery of the IXth Army Corps, the Hessian Horse Artillery battery, Captain Freiherr von Schäffer-Bernstein, having crossed the Bois de la Cusse by General von Schlotheim's orders, came into action near the south edge of that wood and north of Vernéville. While the second row of wagons remained throughout the battle at Anoux la Grange, the first followed the battery, halting 130 paces in its right rear. Ninety-three shells were fired at 1,700 paces at the hostile artillery, which was under cover. The loss of men and horses was considerable at the wagons as well as at the guns, a wagon horse and a limber horse being killed. It was impossible for the battery to hold its ground opposed to the accurate and greatly superior fire of the enemy ; it decided therefore on retiring and getting supplies from the second line of wagons.

As soon as this was completed the battery returned to the field of battle between 1 and 2 P.M. A gun left on the ground owing to the loss of horses afterwards missed the battery and came into action with the Hessian battery under Reh, to which it was attached by Major von Herget.[1] It was intended that the battery with its five guns should take up a position to the north-east of Vernéville near the Bois de la Cusse, but this was prevented by the heavy fire of the infantry. It consequently moved up and came into action on the right flank of the three batteries of the 18th Division, which bravely held their ground under General von Puttkammer against a superior hostile force. During this move-

[1] *Vide* p. 285.

ment Captain Freiherr von Schäffer-Bernstein received so severe a wound (of which he afterwards died) that he was obliged to give over the command of the battery to First Lieutenant von Grolmann. The losses sustained by the battery in the new position were considerable. After a short time a gun was rendered unserviceable by the bursting of a shell in the bore, in which a splinter remained fixed. First Lieutenant von Grolmann was killed, and Lieutenant Brandt took over the command of the battery.

Having thus sketched this memorable artillery contest of the IXth Army Corps south of the Bois de la Cusse to its close, let us return to its commencement, and investigate the circumstances which were the cause of the artillery being left at first wholly unsupported. Even before the attack against Werner's battery General von Puttkammer, who had accompanied the left flank of his artillery, had been anxious to give it more effective protection by infantry than was afforded by the two squadrons of Dragoons. The general was at first unsuccessful, but presently met a battalion of Hessian Rifles 1,500 paces in rear of the artillery, which promised to advance in the desired direction. Ignorant of the disaster which had befallen Werner's (I.) battery in the interval, the general then rode to the centre and right wing to give directions and to provide for their proper support by infantry.

That the infantry of the IXth Army Corps was eager to advance to the support of its hard-pressed sister arm is proved by the following:—Two companies of the 1st battalion of the 36th regiment, which had been left at Vernéville, were ordered to the front to carry the homestead of l'Envie, situated immediately in front of the artillery. Having driven out the enemy, the companies prepared the farm for defence, and held it in spite of a heavy fire of common shell and repeated attacks made by the French infantry in the course of the afternoon. The other two companies of the battalion were led at the same time into the Bois de la Cusse, to support the artillery indirectly; but deviating from the intended direction in the wood, which was full of thick underwood and bushes, they reached the northern part, where it is traversed by the railroad. There they soon became engaged in a sharp contest with skirmishers of

Cissey's Division. Part only of the infantry succeeded in reaching the south-eastern angle of the wood, but it also was immediately attacked by French infantry.[1]

When the van of the main body of the 18th Division reached Vernéville at 12.30 P.M., Colonel von Winckler was ordered to occupy the Bois de la Cusse with the 1st and 2nd Fusilier battalions of the 84th regiment for the protection of the artillery. Exposed to a heavy fire in front and on the left flank from the enemy's guns as it crossed the gully between the wood and the artillery position, the Fusilier battalion at once wheeled into the wood against the enemy supposed to be there; but taking the direction of St. Privat instead of that to the east, it reached the railroad after a heavy loss simultaneously with the 2nd battalion of Hessian Rifles. The 1st battalion at first followed the Fusiliers, but about 1.15 P.M. found itself at the south angle of the wood opposite Amanvillers, where it was immediately involved with the companies of the 36th regiment in the hot and bloody combat against Cissey's Division, and consequently was no longer available for employment in the other direction.

Such was the state of affairs in rear of the artillery when the disaster occurred on its left flank. The further advance of the enemy's infantry was checked by the arrival of the 1st battalion of the 84th regiment, the 1st and 2nd and part of the 3rd companies of which, at the request of General von Puttkammer and Lieut.-Colonel von Darapsky, debouched in succession from the Bois de la Cusse in a south-easterly direction, and established themselves in a small gully on the left of the artillery, where by a bloody musketry contest they repulsed several attacks made by the enemy.

The Fusilier battalion of the 85th regiment received orders at 1 P.M. at Vernéville to advance and disengage the artillery.[2] It took the direction through the gully, running along the south edge of the Bois de la Cusse; and being informed 'that the artillery was again threatened with an immediate attack by hostile infantry,' crossed the intervening space, which was swept by shell, at a double. It had nearly reached the wreck of

[1] This and the subsequent account are from Captain Helmuth's Lecture.
[2] The battalion was commanded by Major von Goddenthow.

Werner's (I.) battery at 1.45 P.M.; but was brought to a halt by the fire of the enemy's infantry, supported by mitrailleurs. Within twenty minutes more than half the battalion was disabled, while the remainder was obliged to retire to the edge of the wood, where it assembled and reformed under Colonel von Falkenhausen. The enemy, however, did not push his advantage, and the left wing of the artillery was extricated.

We left the Guard Corps at Doncourt and Bruville. At 11.30 A.M. it received a report that a French advanced guard, consisting of all arms, was on the march from Amanvillers. The above-mentioned order was received immediately afterwards.[1] Prince August von Wurtemberg learned from the Saxon corps that in prosecuting its march beyond Jarny it intended to keep somewhat to the west or left. From reports made by cavalry patroling in the neighbourhood of Batilly it was surmised that hostile troops were at St. Privat, and consequently Prince August thought he ought not to execute the order literally, but determined on his own responsibility to march the 2nd Division only to Vernéville, and to advance with the 1st and corps artillery to Amanvillers. Orders to this effect were just issued when further reports came in that hostile troops were marching from St. Privat to St. Marie. General von Pape was therefore ordered in the advance to Amanvillers, to take the road by Habonville.

At the head of the advanced guard of the 1st Division of the Guards, under Colonel von Erkert, were the Hussars of the Guard, which had already trotted forward to St. Ail by order of General von Pape. They were followed by the Fusiliers and the 4th Light battery. The main body consisted of the battalion of Rifles in front; then the remainder of the 1st field division, under Lieut.-Colonel Bychelberg; the two brigades of infantry, and lastly the corps artillery, under Colonel von Scherbening. The artillery marched in columns of batteries, and the infantry in masses with a front of three battalions.

'The 2nd Division of the Guards turned off the road to Bruville, crossing the front of the Xth Corps, which had also

[1] The purport of this order was that the Guard Corps was to advance rapidly by Vernéville, and to attack and turn the enemy's right flank beyond Amanvillers; it also suggested that the corps might make use of the road through Habonville.

arrived to the south of that place, and took the direction of Vernéville, General von Budritzky sending the 2nd Lancers to the front as an advanced guard.'[1] The 3rd field Division of the artillery of the Guard, attached to the Division, under Lieut.-Colonel von Rheinhaben, followed the infantry in column of route. The Division of cavalry of the Guard, having re-assembled at Mars la Tour at 8 A.M., brought up the rear with the 1st and 3rd Horse Artillery batteries. The brigade of Lancers alone was still at St. Mihiel on the Meuse.

The Commander in Chief met the Division at St. Marcel, on his way from Vionville to join the IXth Corps, having already sent orders to the corps commander to march on Amanvillers with all his available troops. He was already aware, from the reports forwarded by the corps, that the greater part of the Guard Corps was moving in the desired direction; and now General von Stiehle gave verbal orders to General von Budritzky to march on Habonville. But meanwhile General von Pape had arrived towards 12.30 P.M. to the west of Habonville with the van of his infantry, and became aware that the battle in which the IXth Corps was engaged was rapidly reaching its height. Its cavalry brigade, exposed to the fire of the French artillery, which covered the ground in every direction, was in the act of taking up a position of readiness near a copse on the right.

General von Pape immediately reported his arrival to the IXth Corps, and observing that the long line of French artillery was gradually extending towards St. Privat, far outflanking the left of the IXth Corps, became impressed with the necessity of attacking it at once in front. With this object in view, the 1st Light battery and then the remainder of the 1st field division, under Lieut.-Colonel Bychelberg, was brought forward at 12.30 P.M. into a position between Habonville and the Bois de la Cusse to reply to the heavy shell fire which the enemy was pouring on the advancing 1st Division of the Guards. The batteries stood in the following order from right to left:—2nd Heavy, 1st Light, 1st Heavy, 2nd Light (2. s., 1. l., 1. s., 2. l. G.), commanded respectively by Captains von Prittwitz, von Dewitz, von Sametzky and von Niederstetter. The batteries opened fire

[1] From Helmuth's Lecture.

at 12.45 P.M. on the enemy's artillery at ranges between 2,600 and 2,700 paces.

General von Pape remained with the batteries until his infantry came up. Convinced of the impossibility of continuing the march on Amanvillers under existing circumstances, he proposed to diverge to St. Marie and thence attack the French position, since this did not appear practicable in front. Having directed his advanced guard to move into the valley leading to St. Marie, he was informed by Colonel von Dannenberg that the general commanding the corps fully approved of the steps he had taken. Prince August von Wurtemberg, who also watched the progress of the battle from the west of Habonville, decided at once on marching with the whole of his troops to support the IXth Corps, and sent orders to the 2nd Division to advance in that direction. Von Manstein, commanding the IXth Corps, had meanwhile stated his opinion that 'direct support' was 'not demanded,' but rather 'indirect support' by an attack in the direction of St. Privat.

He moreover wished that a brigade should be held in reserve. This was afterwards reported to the general commanding the army, who ordered that a brigade of the 2nd Division of the Guard Corps, which arrived to the south-west of Habonville at 2.45 P.M., should be held in readiness to support the IXth Corps. Consequently the general commanding the Guard Corps selected the 3rd brigade under General von Knappe with von Unruhe's battery for this service, and at 4 P.M. it was formed up south of the railway in rear of the artillery position of the 25th Division ready to support General Manstein.[1]

Meanwhile Prince Hohenlohe with Colonel von Scherbening reconnoitred the strong position taken up by the enemy, and saw the necessity of concentrating a strong force of artillery against it. The corps artillery was therefore immediately brought to the front to prolong the left flank of the 1st field division, but a battalion of infantry was ordered to cross the railroad to cover the left flank before the corps artillery passed over it. While the 3rd and 4th Light batteries (3. and 4. l. G.), under Captains von Frederici-Steinmann and von Mutius, took up a temporary

[1] From Helmuth's Lecture.

position by order of Major von Krieger at the crossing of the railroad with the road from Jouaville to Habonville to reply to the enemy's artillery, the other batteries of the corps artillery trotted to a position south-west of St. Ail, where they were soon joined by both the light batteries. The artillery was exposed to a heavy fire of common shell and shrapnel as they advanced to the position, especially when crossing the two steep and difficult ravines, notwithstanding which the operation was executed with great intrepidity and without accident. Considerable losses both of men and horses were incurred when actually in position from common shell, but the shrapnel were harmless. Second Lieut. Bockroth was wounded.

'The 1st Division had meanwhile been ordered to march in the direction of St. Marie aux Chênes and assault that village, while to co-operate in the attack, as well as to gain a more favourable position, the 1st field division was to move further to the north. Even before the corps artillery had completed its movement Colonel von Bychelberg had taken the necessary steps to enable his division to cross the deep and wire-fenced railway cutting in columns of route, and then to advance round Habonville towards the east. In passing the defile east of that hamlet the batteries sustained considerable losses, especially of horses, two guns of the 1st Light, and two of the 2nd Light batteries being left behind in consequence; but notwithstanding this the advance was continued.

The intention of participating in the attack on St. Marie aux Chênes had, however, to be abandoned, because the corps artillery was already marching up into position on the only eligible ground. Consequently the first field division remained on the right of the corps artillery.

The 25th Hessian Division followed on the left of the 18th; while its cavalry brigade had advanced towards Habonville north of the woods, thus keeping up the connection with the Guards. The Hessian cavalry came under the enemy's fire which after 12 o'clock swept the Bois de la Cusse and the ground in its vicinity, and as General von Schlotheim could discover no work for his brigade, he took up a covered position in readiness behind one of the copses at the moment that the van of the 1st Divisic

of the Guards arrived at the same spot, about 1 P.M.[1] The Horse Artillery battery, Captain von Schäffer-Bernstein, had been sent to Vernéville when the fighting in that direction was heard, and was there engaged, as above related. On the arrival of the advanced guard of the 25th Division, commanded by Colonel Lyncker, about this time—nearly 1 P.M.—it was ordered temporarily to take up a position under cover to the north of the Bois de la Cusse. It therefore wheeled to the left towards Anoux la Grange, and was closely followed by the main body of the Division, Prince Louis of Hesse having received orders from General von Manstein to keep the whole Division ready in a covered position to advance with the Guards to the attack at a later hour. It was now past 1 o'clock. While the advanced guard and main body were in the act of taking up the position under cover near the Bois de la Cusse, the necessity became evident of engaging the enemy's artillery which had opened fire from the heights of Privat, and was already causing many casualties. Acting in concert with Colonel von Lyncker, Lieut.-Colonel Stumpf, commanding the Hessian field artillery, ordered Major von Herget to trot forward with the two batteries of the advanced guard and one of the main body—1st Light, 1st and 2nd Heavy—and come into action between Habonville and the Bois de la Cusse.[2] He intended in the next place to bring up the two remaining batteries on the left flank and then to advance in echelon against the strong position of the enemy. In this position the 1st Light battery already had a gun dismounted.[3]

At this moment General von Manstein rode up from Vernéville, where he had become aware of the great line of hostile artillery south of St. Privat, which till then, almost unchecked, had cannonaded so effectively the flank and rear of the artillery of the IXth Corps in position south of the Bois de la Cusse. He ordered the five Hessian batteries instantly to advance nearer to the enemy. They therefore moved forward at a trot, led by Lieut.-Colonel Stumpf, to the

[1] Compare the account given above of the advance of the Guard.

[2] The first position, occupied by three of the Hessian batteries, was almost identical with that relinquished by the 1st field division of the artillery of the Guards.

[3] This gun had a wheel broken. A wheel driver and two horses were killed.

north-west angle of the Bois de la Cusse, and came into action in the following order from right to left:—1st Heavy, 1st Light, 2nd Heavy, 2nd Light, and 3rd Light, commanded respectively by Captains Reh, Frank, Hoffmann, Weygand, and Ronstadt. They opened fire on the enemy's artillery at and to the south of St. Privat, at ranges varying between 2,000 and 3,000 paces. The effect was excellent, although the smoke partially obscured the object. This position of the Hessian batteries was in echelon to that of the artillery of the Guard Corps, which was deploying to the north of Habonville, but to the right and in advance of it. As the latter came up into line with the Hessian at a later period, further mention of the contest in this quarter will be postponed till then.

The Hessian infantry had also advanced with the artillery. Colonel von Lyncker, by General von Manstein's order, had already sent the 2nd battalion of Rifles into the wood, 'posting after 1 o'clock two companies also on the railway embankment touching the 84th and 36th regiments, which had then for some time been warmly engaged.'[1] A portion of the battalion succeeded in crossing the embankment under a storm of bullets, and ensconced itself in a gully. 'The battalion itself was soon joined by a company of the 4th regiment, which by order of Colonel von Lyncker had advanced close to the artillery behind a point of the wood projecting northwards, and found there the main body of the Hessian Division, so that after 1.30 P.M. six battalions were united at that point. The 3rd regiment, and afterwards the 1st battalion of Rifles (Hessian Guard), had on the advance of the main body been detached into the wood, in which there were now, in addition to the above, four Hessian battalions in line with the two and a half Prussian.

The 3rd regiment had at first waited for orders in an open space near the western edge of the Bois de la Cusse, but being requested by an adjutant of the corps from head-quarters to support the hard-pressed corps artillery, 'it sent forward at once the 1st battalion, which was soon followed by the 2nd. . . . The 1st battalion reached the eastern copse some time after the discomfiture of Werner's battery. Some of the men worked at placing the shattered guns in the safe position on the edge of

[1] Captain Helmuth's Lecture.

the wood, while detached parties joined the groups fighting in the northern parts. The remainder of the battalion was formed up in close column behind the eastern copse, exposed to the enemy's fire, and sustaining severe losses. The 2nd battalion however, led by the colonel commanding the regiment, reached the edge of the wood facing Amanvillers and soon became involved in the bloody struggle between the Prussian and Hessian infantry and Cissey's Division.

The 1st battalion of Rifles of the Hessian Guard now came up, having sustained heavy losses in the openings in the wood, and placed itself under the orders of the 3rd regiment, which directed it to form up in rear of its skirmishers on the eastern edge of the forest. 'Such was the situation of the infantry in the Bois de la Cusse towards 3 P.M., and it was clear that neither it nor any of the detachments made with the same object could afford any permanent relief to the artillery.'

Towards 4 o'clock the battalion of Rifles of the Hessian Guard was informed by an adjutant of the corps staff that its advance to the now well-known ridge in support of the artillery was urgently called for. It therefore advanced with great valour from the edge of the wood in a south-easterly direction and drove back the enemy's skirmishers; but its further progress was checked by swarms of tirailleurs rushing out of Amanvillers, whose attacks, often repeated, were repulsed by the deliberate fire of this battalion, which was to a certain extent covered by a gentle incline. The Body Guard company of the 3rd Hessian regiment advanced to support the battalion in its perilous position, but was thrown back into the wood with great losses. The Rifles, however, succeeded in securing the two abandoned guns of Werner's battery. This battalion now formed the only advanced post on the south-east of the wood, the portions of the 1st battalion of the 84th regiment having been driven back after holding their ground for a considerable period.[1]

As the edges of the wood were occupied by a sufficient force of Hessian troops, orders were given that the two weakened and fatigued battalions of the 84th regiment should be assembled, so as to form an available support; this was done in one of the

[1] Captain Helmuth's Lecture.

open spaces in the wood, and two companies of the 36th dispersed by the forest-fight joined the regiment. The General commanding the corps ordered the 84th regiment to reserve these troops for further employment. All had sustained heavy losses.

The remainder of the 25th Division had remained in reserve at the railroad to the north of the wood till 3.30 P.M. In one of the open spaces exposed to the cross fire of the enemy 'Prince Louis himself, in pursuance of the orders he had received, was waiting till the Guard Corps should advance to the attack on his left. He knew that its 1st Division had marched towards St. Marie aux Chênes, and when about 3.30 P.M. it appeared that an advance was being made from that direction, he ordered General von Wittich to cross the railroad, and wheeling to the right, to move against the hill.'[1] The General still had the 1st regiment and the 2nd battalion of the 2nd regiment at his disposal, while the reserve was formed by the seven companies of the 4th regiment under Colonel von Lyncker.

General von Wittich led the attack in person. The railroad, swept by mitraille, was crossed at a double, in spite of the delay occasioned by the wire-fencing and the steep slopes of the embankment and cutting. The 2nd battalion of the 2nd regiment, led by the colonel of the regiment, and a half-battalion of the 1st regiment, were already safely over and formed up according to orders behind the patches of copsewood on the north of the railroad, when General von Wittich received orders from the 25th Division to halt. 'Prince Louis of Hesse had come to the conclusion that the advance of the Guards and Saxons observed by him at St. Marie had not been continued beyond that village and that consequently the intended attack ought to be postponed.'[2] The infantry that had got beyond the railroad took advantage of the favourable ground there to engage the French skirmishers north-west of Amanvillers, and the 2nd battalion of the Hessian Rifles succeeded, as we know, in gaining ground for a few hundred paces, thus giving more effective support to the Hessian batteries as well as to the Guard Corps.

Let us now again revert to the beginning of the battle and

[1] Ibid. [2] From General von Wittich's report.

follow the events on the right flank of the IXth Army Corps. There the detachment under General von Blumenthal sent against Chantrenne at 11 A.M. was received by a hot fire from the homestead and the plantation near it, but resolutely charging the enemy, carried the place at the first rush. Meanwhile part of the infantry slowly penetrated the Bois de Genivaux without coming on the enemy, but on reaching the valley found him established in force in the eastern part of the wood with five battalions of Nayral's and Metman's Divisions; it was therefore impossible to advance in that direction. An attempt made from Chantrenne across the ridge on its right to seize the copses lying in the direction of la Folie, defended by four battalions of Montaudon's Division, failed in spite of the greatest gallantry, and an endeavour to gain a firm footing in the angle of the wood to the south-east of Chantrenne was equally unsuccessful. The northern edge of the wood was flanked by a battery of mitrailleurs posted at la Folie, while other batteries swept the ground between the woods. It is therefore not surprising that under such circumstances Blumenthal's weak detachment was obliged to relinquish all idea of offensive action and limit itself to the defence of Chantrenne and the ridge lying to the east of it.

At 2.30 P.M. the 1st battalion of the 85th regiment reinforced the garrison of Chantrenne by order of General von Wrangel, who had repeatedly made himself acquainted with the state of affairs at that point. The battalion carried the angle of the wood south-east of the homestead at 2.45 P.M. by a rush, but an attempt to penetrate the copses at la Folie made from the eastern skirts of the wood was foiled by the enemy's superior force. At 3 o'clock further reinforcements, consisting of the 2nd battalion of the 85th regiment, reached Chantrenne by order of General von Wrangel, and the officer commanding the regiment made frequent efforts to gain ground in the wood, but the enemy occupied it too strongly. Thus, although the north-western corner of the Bois de Genivaux was now in our possession, the enemy still occupied the greater part of it to the south. At 4 P.M. the struggle in this quarter was flagging, but the infantry on the ridge at Chantrenne was still exposed to the enemy's bullets. General von Blumenthal, whose horse was wounded, remained with the troops.

A short time only had elapsed after the repulse of the corps artillery of the IXth Corps, before the batteries of the corps artillery of the IIIrd Army Corps came into action at Vernéville. The movements of that corps must now be related. It received orders at Vionville at 11.30 A.M. to follow the IXth Army Corps in the direction of Vernéville with both Divisions near each other. The corps artillery was engaged at the moment in distributing the horses allotted to it, and at the suggestion of General von Bülow the Commander in Chief permitted it to follow in rear of the 5th Division. The greatest efforts had been made since the 16th of August to complete the batteries of the IIIrd Corps, but the losses on that day had been so serious that it was only with great difficulty that the whole of the artillery had been rendered fit for service. The ammunition wagons and even the greater part of the guns could only be furnished with four horses; the complement of gunners was incomplete; the want of horses was so great that the horse artillery detachments had to be mounted on the axletree-boxes, and there was not sufficient harness for all the horses received to complete the teams.

During the advance General von Alvensleben had preceded his corps and received reports of the state of affairs at Vernéville from General von Wrangel. He expressed himself ready to afford support in every way, but von Wrangel considered that artillery would suffice. Consequently General von Alvensleben issued orders, which however had been anticipated by those sent by the Commander in Chief to General von Bülow, that the four field batteries of the corps artillery should move forward and take up a position at Vernéville to reinforce the artillery of the IXth Corps. Prince Frederick Charles had indeed for the day retained the disposal of this corps artillery in his own hands. The order reached General von Bülow at St. Marcel at 2.45 P.M., and he immediately led the corps artillery forward, reaching Vernéville at 3 o'clock.[1] Its arrival was all the more opportune as the ammunition of the artillery of the IXth Army Corps had been nearly exhausted by the hot and desperate contest.

At the command of General von Bülow, Colonel von Dresky placed the 2nd field division, Captain Stumpf, in a sheltered

[1] According to Helmuth.

position on the ridge between Vernéville and the Bois de G
vaux ;[1] but as the space there was limited, the horse artil
division was directed to take up a position under cover sout
Vernéville and wait for further orders. Even while moving up
field batteries were exposed to a brisk fire from the French g
and mitrailleurs on the opposite heights, as well as from ho
infantry occupying the woods between la Folie and Chantren
little loss, however, was sustained, as the mitraille generally str
the ground far from the batteries, and the common shell wh
fell in the batteries produced no effect.

Colonel von Dresky received peremptory orders to eng
the enemy's attention, but on no account to advance. Bef
the horse artillery division under Major Lentz had taken
its covered position, an officer of the general staff brought
order from General von Alvensleben to come into action
the south of the Bois de la Cusse in support of the 2
Division. It consequently advanced at a trot in column
divisions round the west and north sides of Vernéville to
left flank of the 1st field division of the 9th artillery regime
which still occupied its original position. Several ditches had
be crossed, and one of them, full of bushes, caused some del
The division was exposed to a storm of shell, mitraille, a
Chassepôt bullets; while two guns of the 1st Horse Artille
battery under First Lieut. Franck were left behind, one havi
its pole broken, and the other having lost a great number
men and horses. But the division continued resolutely to advan
and coming into action, opened fire on the enemy's artillery
Montigny la Grange. The leading battery, 3rd Horse Artiller
under First Lieut. von Gizycki, was the first to arrive, and t
1st Horse Artillery battery came into position on its right. Th
two guns in the rear soon came up, but, owing to want of spa
were placed on the extreme left flank of the division, th
remainder of Franck's battery being afterwards alligned wi
them.[2] In a short time considerable losses were sustained, Fir
Lieut. Franck having a horse killed under him. Later on, whe

[1] The batteries came into action in the following order from right to left:—4
and 3rd Light, 4th and 3rd Heavy, and were commanded respectively by Capt
Muller II., First Lieut. Becker, Captain Fromme, and Captain Vosz.

[2] *Vide* flap of plan of battle of the 18th, 1. r. and 3. r. III.

the battle had been going on for some time, Major Lentz, commanding the division, was struck from his horse severely wounded.[1] At first many casualties were occasioned by some mitrailleurs placed in a covered position to the south-west of Amanvillers, but after a hot contest of 10 or 15 minutes they were silenced by the shell of the two batteries, the range being 1,600 paces.

With this single exception all the batteries between the Bois de la Cusse and Genivaux, although under two distinct commands, fired generally at the same objects, and thus the advantage of a combined artillery mass was gained. The hostile artillery and mitrailleurs crowning the ridges from la Folie to Amanvillers, and protected (as we have seen) by breastworks with embrasures, were effectively cannonaded by the field batteries of the corps artillery of the IIIrd Army Corps at ranges of from 3,000 to 3,800 paces, and by its horse artillery batteries, as well as by the three field batteries of the 18th Division, which had retained their position, and by the Hessian horse artillery at ranges varying from 2,000 to 2,700 paces.

Soon after the division of artillery commanded by Captain Stumpf had opened fire to the south-east of Vernéville, General von Puttkammer desired it to move up and support his right wing, and as the request was urgent and repeated, and finally made in writing, Stumpf, in the momentary absence of Colonel von Dresky, considered it his duty to accede to it. Vosz's and Fromme's batteries (3. and 4. s. III.) were therefore ordered to the front, and the former came into action on the right of the Hessian Horse Artillery battery, but Fromme was unable to find an eligible position, as the homestead of l'Envie lay exactly in the line of fire. An order now given to the battery by General von Puttkammer to advance until it could see the enemy brought it within 400 and 500 paces of French skirmishers, who were lying concealed. This was owing to the peculiar formation of the ground, which prevented any extensive view. The battery was now obliged to retire with the sanction of higher authorities, and expected to find room to come into action between two

[1] The number of casualties that occurred here is all the more remarkable as these batteries of horse artillery, like most of those that had taken part in the battle of the 16th, had already sustained enormous losses. The horse artillery division went into this action with three officers only.

batteries which were under fire in rear. To create a moral impression on the troops the movement was deliberately executed at a walk, the battery only breaking into a trot for a few minutes when crossing the front of another battery in action. A second order from Puttkammer to Fromme's battery to advance and take up a position to the south of l'Envie was not executed, because Colonel von Dresky directed the battery to return to its original position at Vernéville in obedience to the orders of the general commanding.

The duel of artillery was speedily decided in favour of the Germans. Battery after battery was silenced, and towards 4 o'clock the whole of the hostile artillery had ceased firing. The aim of our guns on this part of the field of battle was so accurate that all the efforts made by the enemy to bring fresh batteries into action were frustrated by our concentrated fire.

The contest of guns had to be broken off from time to time to fire on the hostile infantry. Everywhere French skirmishers lay concealed in the hollows of the ground, behind hedges or intrenchments, near the western edges of the copses between Chantrenne and la Folie, and harassed our artillery. In addition to this, the French infantry gallantly made repeated charges down the slopes, but all such attempts were nipped in the bud by the German shell-fire, and often so at long ranges. As soon as the hostile artillery had been reduced to silence, it became the especial duty of the artillery north-east of Vernéville, under the command of General von Puttkammer, to drive the enemy out of Champenois and open fire on the infantry to the east of it. The corps artillery was soon able again to co-operate, having under Lieut.-Colonel Darapsky, who was severely wounded, as far as possible made good their losses from the lines of wagons in and near the Bois de la Cusse. Mente's battery availed itself of ten cart-horses which it found in the farm of Anoux la Grange and of several stragglers. About 4 o'clock König's and Mente's batteries had completed their refitment, and on this being reported to the general in command, he ordered them again to come into action. König's battery took up a position between Jourdan's battery (originally Koch's) and Gizycki's Horse Artillery battery;[1]

[1] At first there was room for four guns only, and the other two came into action near Eynatten's battery, until the horse artillery division of the 3rd regiment made room to the left.

Mente's battery,[1] in which Second Lieut. Müller had a horse killed under him, being placed on the right of Puttkammer's battery, previously commanded by Werner II. The 3rd Light battery, under First Lieut. Heseler (*for* Bastineller), came later into action on the right flank of the Hessian batteries near the Bois de la Cusse, having mistaken the purport of an order given by Colonel Darapsky. The 3rd Heavy battery, Second Lieut. Schattauer (*for* Roerdansz), was, however, exposed in its advance to a heavy fire of musketry, having lost its way in the twilight, and did not come into action, while the remainder of the 4th Heavy battery (Werner II.) had suffered so severely that it was only able partially to take part in the contest. Captain Kindler having been severely wounded, the command of the 2nd Heavy battery had now devolved on Lieutenant Kelbling, who was unable to get all the guns together until after dark; this battery also took no further part in the battle.

At the request of General von Puttkammer the 1st battalion of the 2nd regiment of Hessian infantry was ordered to the front towards 4 P.M. to recapture the homestead of Champenois.[2] The first attack was attended by great losses, but the farm was soon set on fire by the batteries under the direction of that officer at a range of 600 paces. The garrison fled without waiting for the assault of the Hessian infantry, and was nearly annihilated by the combined fire of the Prussian guns and Hessian infantry, and Champenois was permanently occupied.

The Hessian Horse Artillery battery was now able to get closer to the hostile infantry, and under the command of Second Lieutenant Drandt resolutely advanced to a position between Champenois and l'Envie about 4.30 P.M., rapidly driving back some French infantry which had approached to within 900 paces. The battery then fired on both artillery and infantry, but after a short time two more guns became unserviceable, so that the battery was now reduced to two guns.[3]

We left the 5th Light battery, Captain von Unruhe, attached

[1] Mente's battery could bring only five guns into action, as a French shell had torn out the woodwork of both brackets of one of his guns.

[2] Compare the account given above.

[3] The wedge of one of these guns was rendered immovable by 'fouling,' and in the other gun the screw of the wedge was bent in such a way that it could not be withdrawn.

to the 3rd brigade of the Guard Corps, in rear of the position, near the railroad occupied by the Hessian field artillery. An order to advance to the assistance of the batteries of the IXth Army Corps very soon brought it to the left flank, near Franck's battery of horse artillery, where it opened fire on hostile infantry behind a garden wall at 1,800 paces. Wishing, however, to obtain a more extended range, it soon left its position and moved up the hill towards Amanvillers; but before it had advanced more than a few hundred paces it was exposed to so tremendous a storm of bullets, that to avoid a useless and immediate disaster the plan was given up.[1] Second Lieutenant Roth was killed and Captain Freiherr von Hadeln, adjutant to the general commanding the artillery of the Second Army, who had brought orders to the battery, was mortally wounded. Second Lieutenant Freiherr von Tauchnitz was grazed, but remained with the battery. Even in its original position, to which it then returned, the battery was exposed to a smart flanking fire from French infantry. As it appeared, however, that there was a more favourable position further to the south, the battery made a long flank march along the rear of the artillery position of the IXth Army Corps, and again came into action at l'Envie on the right of the Hessian Horse Artillery battery.

About this time the fire of the German artillery between the Bois de Genivaux and de la Cusse was directed on infantry only, which it prevented from assuming the offensive either from the heights or from the copses to the south-east of la Folie. The guns also played on the copses, but the enemy by his superior force and position was able to hold his ground in spite of attacks made by detachments of the 18th Division. The ranges varied between 1,500 and 3,000 paces, but occasionally the enemy was repulsed when within 900 paces.

In addition the concentrated artillery fire now compelled the enemy to keep to his covered position, and rendered abortive his attempts towards evening to place fresh batteries on the hill.[2]

[1] Heavy losses were incurred by this battery on this occasion within a few minutes.

[2] It was very difficult to observe the effect of our fire on the enemy's artillery on this part of the field of battle, owing to the cover afforded to it by the ground, the want of light, and the great distances of some of the batteries.

Although at the early critical stages of the battle the artillery of the IXth Army Corps, the Hessian Horse Artillery battery, and the horse artillery division of the 3rd regiment had found it necessary to fire with great rapidity, they afterwards confined themselves to keeping the enemy in check, the firing being therefore more deliberate, while this became still more imperative about 4.30 P.M., when the artillery of the IXth Army Corps was beginning to run short of ammunition. This was occasioned by the great expenditure at the commencement of the battle, the non-arrival of the lines of wagons of some of the batteries, and by the great loss in the gun teams, which had to be made good by the wagon teams, thus preventing the wagons from bringing up supplies from the columns.

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Let us now examine the French accounts of the period of the battle described above. The 2nd and 3rd French Corps observed movements on the part of the Germans at an early hour. This was reported to Marshal Bazaine at 10 o'clock, and the orders to the 3rd and 4th Corps as to the defensive measures they were to take were repeated.

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fear on the part of the Marshal that it was threatened by the

of necessity, with a view to taking up a position in rear, wh it was then in the act of reconnoitring. On the other hand 4th French Corps was evidently surprised, and according Montluisant's account the 6th Corps also, by the attack of IXth Army Corps. That writer says:—'On the 18th also 6th Corps possessed no information as to the position of enemy, and the staff was so far from suspecting the appro of the Prussians that it looked on the first information sent fr St. Marie aux Chênes, suggesting the probability of an ea attack from Batilly and St. Ail, as unworthy of credence.'

According to Frossard the fire of the Prussian batteries Vernéville was at first directed against Montaudon's Division the 3rd Corps, and afterwards against Grenier's Division of the Corps. Both these divisions formed up in order of battle, th artillery replying to the German guns.[1] At the first shot the Division, de Cissey, of the 4th Corps took up its position betw Amanvillers and the left flank of the 6th Corps. 'Its batte at once opened fire at 1,300 yards on the Prussian colum which were making a flank march against our (French) ri flank.[2] During this time the reserve of the 4th Corps, Lorenc Division, formed up near Amanvillers.'

Frossard also states:—'The battle became very hot on sides at 2 P.M., without the enemy's gaining any import advantages or making any progress, but the artillery of M taudon's, Grenier's and de Cissey's Divisions, fired on by numer batteries, suffered severely.'[3] The energy of the Prussian atta against the 4th Corps is mentioned in another place, and Fross says:—'The 2nd Division, under Grenier, which advanced agai the Prussians in two lines, having directed its right wing agai the Bois de la Cusse, held that position firmly, and even s ceeded in making some progress to the front. In one of attacks detachments of the 5th Chasseurs and 13th regim

[1] V. D. speaks thus of the German artillery:—'Où elle s'avançait jusqu'à mètres de nos fantassins.'

[2] These Prussian columns must be those which tried to advance along the s edge of the Bois de la Cusse.

[3] The batteries included the Hessian field batteries north of the Bois de la C the corps artillery of the IXth and, later on, that of the IIIrd Army Corps, as we the Hessian Horse Artillery battery between the Bois de la Cusse and Genivaux.

captured a Prussian battery of seven (?) guns near the angle of the wood, but only retained possession of two of them.'[1]

As it appeared important to command the ground over which the Germans would advance from Vernéville, the commander of the 4th Corps brought his 3rd Division, Lorencez's, to the front; it advanced in two lines to support Grenier's Division and complete the communication between the 3rd and 4th Corps. The 1st Division, under de Cissey, continued the struggle and gained ground at the same time that it supported the left wing of the 6th Corps.[2]

The situation of the IXth Army Corps at the close of this period of the battle was briefly this:—With a total of 23 battalions and 90 guns, which could only be brought into action in succession, it had succeeded in pushing forward as a wedge towards the enemy's main position, and there establishing itself, although the enemy had from the first deployed in rear of his main position stretching far to the right and left, the whole of the 4th Corps, half of the 3rd Corps, and part (that is, the artillery) of the 6th Corps: a total of 49 battalions and 140 guns. Chantrenne, with the contiguous part of the Bois de Genivaux to the south, l'Envie, Champenois, the Bois de la Cusse and the ground between those points, was in the possession of the IXth Army Corps, which was supported by the corps artillery of the IIIrd Army Corps and the 5th Light battery of the Guard Corps. The IXth Corps remained on the defensive, awaiting the attack of the left wing of the Second German Army, which had not yet come up into line.

[1] This refers to the disaster of Werner's battery.

[2] This statement that the '1st Division gained ground' is based on the repeated and vigorous attacks made against that part of the Bois de la Cusse which lies in front of the railway.

4. *Rendezvous of the First German Army* (VII*th and* VIII*th Co*
previous to the battle—The artillery of the 15*th Division ta*
up a position north of Gravelotte—Orders issued to the F
Army—The VIII*th Corps advances to the attack and*
corps artillery comes into action north of Gravelott
Movements of the artillery of the VII*th Corps—The de*
sive attitude of that corps—Advance of the whole of
artillery of the First Army—Assault and capture of
Hubert—Repulse of attacks on Moscou and Point du J
—French accounts of this period of the battle.

The van of the VIIIth Army Corps reached Villers aux Boi
8 A.M. The 15th Division, commanded by General von Weltz
was advancing on the west of that place, the corps artillery
astride the high road at Rezonville, and the 16th Division, un
General von Barnekow, to the south of that village, while the
brigade, under General Count Gneisenau, detached from
16th Division with a battery, was marching up from Corny.
King's Hussars (7th regiment) had ridden forward to keep o
the communication between the VIIth and IXth Corps, the sa
of the march being secured by advanced parties pushed
towards the woods east of Malmaison.

'The front of the VIIIth Corps faced towards the no
east, for General von Goeben wished to be equally prep
to advance against the enemy if he found him in position
the east or retiring towards the north. The 14th Divisio
the VIIth Corps was led forward to the point where the
from Ars sur Moselle to Gravelotte debouches on the
south of the latter village; while the 25th brigade was ord
to the west, the 26th to the north, and the corps artillery to
south of Ars.[1]

'The outposts of the VIIth Army Corps had remained o
northern edge of the Bois de Vaux, and the reports from t
as well as from the VIIIth Corps stated that Gravelotte wa
occupied by the enemy, but that, on the other hand, the w
of the western border of the Bois de Genivaux as well a

[1] According to Helmuth.

north angle of the Bois de Vaux were so. The real French position was, however, perceptible on the ridge further eastwards.' Meanwhile von Zglinitzki's brigade of the 1st Army Corps with the 6th Light battery marched along the right bank of the Moselle till opposite Ars.

'The VIIIth Army Corps was ordered to advance to the attack astride the high road to Gravelotte against the position east of that village as soon as the IXth Army Corps, directed on Vernéville, had commenced its attack.'[1] Soon after 11.45 A.M., hearing musketry at Chantrenne and guns at Vernéville, General von Goeben ordered the 15th Division to move to the front, occupying Gravelotte with infantry, and to take up a sheltered position in the gully north-west of the village, there to await further orders. The Division commanded by von Weltzien therefore marched along the south-western edge of the Bois de la Jurée and crossed the old Roman road, the leading regiment, the 33rd, being ordered to occupy Gravelotte. The 1st field division, under Major Mertens, was the first to reach the gully, where it took up a position with full intervals ready to act as required. But our leading infantry had hardly approached the gully when the French artillery opened a brisk fire on it. General von Weltzien was therefore obliged to bring his guns to the front to divert the enemy's fire from his own infantry, which was now forming in order of battle from its rendezvous position. He at the same time ordered the 33rd Fusiliers to occupy Gravelotte and the 2nd battalion of the 67th regiment to cover the left flank of the artillery. Before, however, the infantry could reach those points Major Mertens placed the 1st Light battery (1. l. VIII.), Captain Geiszler, to the west of the high road Gravelotte—Malmaison, which was followed soon after by the 1st Heavy battery (1. s. VIII.), Captain Busse; while the 2nd Light and 2nd Heavy (2. l. and 2. s. VIII.), Captains Leo and von Uthmann, came up into line between them. As the individual batteries selected the positions which offered the greatest advantages, they had wide intervals between them. The 7th Hussars covered their left flank as a temporary measure.

It was very difficult to hit the enemy, because the broad and

[1] Fro[illegible]ary.

deep valley which separated the opponents could not be s into, and consequently the range could not be estimated corre so that the batteries fired at distances varying from 1,80 3,800 paces. 'The 15th Division formed up in the gully in f of the batteries, and the 31st brigade moved towards a sele covered position on the south of the high road. Thus the wing of the VIIIth Corps confronted the 3rd French Co commanded by Lebœuf, and the right wing Frossard's Corps, the right flank being immediately covered by the V Corps.'[1]

From the position which the 1st field division had taken as a temporary measure pending the arrival of its own infar very little of the ground in the vicinity could be seen, and it fully commanded by the French artillery. A more favoura position nearer the enemy, however, was found to the east the high road Gravelotte—Malmaison, to which the batteries w ordered by Major Mertens to advance in succession;—the m readily as cavalry patrols had reported that the western skirts the Bois de Genivaux were already occupied by Prussian fantry.[2] Busse's battery (1. s. VIII.) was the first to move to commanding hill north-east of Malmaison; but before we reco the changes of position made by the remainder of this divisi it is necessary to refer to the general movements of the Fi Army.

At 1. P.M. the Commander in Chief of the First Ar received an order from H.M. the King, dated at 12 o'clock fro the south of Flavigny:—[3]

'The fighting now heard is merely a partial affair in fro of Vernéville, and does not call for a general attack. Stron masses of troops must not be shown, but artillery will be pushe forward to prepare the attack to be made later on.'

The steps already taken by the First Army corresponde fully with this order, and the VIIth Army Corps was still in position to act in accordance with it or to attack vigorously But this was not the case with respect to the VIIIth Arm

[1] According to Helmuth.

[2] This somewhat inaccurate report arose from the fact that infantry of th 18th Division had marched from Vernéville by Chantrenne to the Bois de Genivaux.

[3] According to Major von Schell.

Corps, which, unless the IXth Corps was to be left to be overwhelmed in its isolated position, would have to disengage its right flank by an attack. This was clearly seen by General von Goeben, who had received more exact information about the affair at Vernéville than the Royal head-quarters. Such an attack, though in accordance with the earlier instructions, was in opposition to the last order, which was based on conclusions no longer corresponding to the actual state of affairs. General von Goeben therefore, with the approval of General von Steinmetz, ordered General von Weltzien at 1 P.M. to advance to the attack with both his brigades, one on the right of the high road, the other on the left; and the corps artillery, under Colonel von Bröcker, received directions at the same time to reinforce the artillery line in action.

Busse's battery (1. s. VIII.) had just left its position when the corps artillery was already advancing at a trot. Marching north of the high road from Rezonville to Gravelotte, this division, under Major Zwirnemann, in column of batteries on the left, and the horse artillery, under Lieut.-Colonel Borkenhagen, in open column of divisions on the right flank, advanced to the steep ravine of la Jurée. Covered by the hills in front, the corps artillery deployed and came into action on the flanks of three of Merten's batteries, which were still in position, as well as in the intervals between them. On the left of von Uthmann's battery (2. s. VIII.) were von Wissel's, Sommer's, von Teichmann-Logischen's and Gehtmann's batteries (3. s., 4. s., 3. l., 4. l. VIII.); and on the right of Geiszler's (1. l. VIII.) the Horse Artillery batteries commanded by von Fuchsius, Protze, and Schlieben (1. r., 2. r., 3. r. VIII.) They aimed at the French artillery on the heights of Moscou and Point du Jour at ranges of from 3,500 to 3,800 paces, and here as on other occasions succeeded in drawing the fire of the enemy's artillery on themselves without experiencing any great loss.

Almost simultaneously with the batteries of the 15th Division to the north of Gravelotte those of the 14th Division came into action south of that village, by Steinmetz's orders, with the object of diverting the hostile fire from the 15th Division during its advance. Having previously obtained [illegible] of the intended attack on the 18th, I had

to the 3rd brigade of the Guard Corps, in rear of the position, near the railroad occupied by the Hessian field artillery. An order to advance to the assistance of the batteries of the IXth Army Corps very soon brought it to the left flank, near Franck's battery of horse artillery, where it opened fire on hostile infantry behind a garden wall at 1,800 paces. Wishing, however, to obtain a more extended range, it soon left its position and moved up the hill towards Amanvillers; but before it had advanced more than a few hundred paces it was exposed to so tremendous a storm of bullets, that to avoid a useless and immediate disaster the plan was given up.[1] Second Lieutenant Roth was killed and Captain Freiherr von Hadeln, adjutant to the general commanding the artillery of the Second Army, who had brought orders to the battery, was mortally wounded. Second Lieutenant Freiherr von Tauchnitz was grazed, but remained with the battery. Even in its original position, to which it then returned, the battery was exposed to a smart flanking fire from French infantry. As it appeared, however, that there was a more favourable position further to the south, the battery made a long flank march along the rear of the artillery position of the IXth Army Corps, and again came into action at l'Envie on the right of the Hessian Horse Artillery battery.

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slope as far as the meadow ground. In the defile, which was between 60 and 80 paces broad, and happened to be dry, the troops of Strubberg's brigade, scattered by the fight in the forest, reformed, and forced the enemy up the thickly wooded and somewhat steep acclivity beyond. The eastern border of the Bois de Genivaux, which is about 300 paces broad at the high road, was first gained by parties of the 67th regiment and 8th battalion of Rifles, while the troops fighting on the left were unable to reach the eastern margin of the wood, which widens to 2,000 paces in the northern part, till a later hour.

'After the eastern skirts of the Bois de Genivaux had fallen into the hands of Strubberg's brigade, repeated attempts to advance over the open ground, which sloped upwards like a glacis, terminated in a musketry contest of unusual severity, in which neither of the combatants made any progress. The enemy was posted in a continuous line of shelter trenches running from Point du Jour by Moscou to Leipsic, from which, as well as from the strongly garrisoned farm of St. Hubert, he kept up a biting fire of musketry and mitraille.

'On the left wing of von Strubberg's brigade the 2nd battalion of the 28th regiment, having advanced to the forking of the meadow ground in the Bois de Genivaux already mentioned, and commanded by the general in person, "drove back parties of the enemy, posted behind two walls which traversed the meadow land, in the direction of la Folie, and then strove to press forward towards Moscou Farm in an easterly direction. But here a devastating fire from the enemy in front and flank forbade any advance; while further to the left the 2nd battalion of the 67th regiment, which with the 7th King's Hussars had undertaken to cover the left flank of the artillery, had rushed into the Bois de Genivaux, connected itself with the IXth Corps, and now formed up on the left flank of its own brigade."'[1]

The 60th regiment of von Wedell's brigade had meanwhile become available by the arrival of the 32nd brigade, under von Rex, at Gravelotte. It was led with no slight loss across the ravine and formed up on the south of the high road in rear of the right wing of the troops in the line of battle. Thus the whole of the

[1] Von Schell's *Operations of the First Army.*

15th Division (von Weltzien) was now engaged with the enemy, while the 16th Division (von Barnekow) formed the reserve.

'On the right of the 15th Division the VIIth Army Corps had held the skirts of the Bois de Vaux facing the road between the inn of St. Hubert and Rozérieulles against Frossard's Corps, and had till now chiefly maintained a defensive attitude, according to orders. The two battalions of the 53rd regiment already there under Colonel von Gerstein-Hohenstein (28th brigade, von Woyna) had been reinforced by the 7th battalion of Rifles and 2nd battalion of the 13th regiment, commanded by Colonel von Frankenberg (25th brigade, von Osten-Sacken). The remainder of the 25th brigade, as well as the 27th brigade (Colonel von Conrady), had been brought up to the south-west of Gravelotte, while the remainder of the 28th brigade was pushed forward into the defile south-east of that village behind the Bois de Vaux.'[1]

In the meantime changes had also been made in the positions of the artillery of the VIIIth Corps. Von Strubberg's brigade had scarcely forced its way into the Bois de Genivaux when the corps artillery and the three batteries of the 2nd field division, on the west of the high road, advanced in echelons to more commanding positions nearer the enemy. The 4th Light battery, Captain Gehtmann, moved up at a trot to the left of Busse's battery north-east of Malmaison, and soon afterwards the 1st Horse Artillery battery of the 1st field artillery regiment, under Captain Preinitzer, made its appearance on the right of the latter.

This battery had arrived with the 1st Cavalry Division, commanded by General von Hartmann, towards 1 o'clock in rear of the artillery of the VIIIth Army Corps, and had received orders to come into action at Malmaison. Desirous of getting closer to the enemy, it determined to leave its commanding position at that place and advance 1,000 paces to another near the edge of the ravine. There the batteries sustained heavy losses, which were occasioned more by the enemy's mitrailleurs than his guns, although these were superior in numbers and more advantageously posted. Captain Preinitzer and his horse were both slightly wounded; this was also the case with First Lieut. Schmidt.

[1] *Ibid.*

Second Lieut. von Leibitz was severely wounded, but continued to command his division until he was relieved. The two first-named officers remained with their batteries. A gun was rendered unserviceable by a shell striking the breech-piece and breaking it, while the gunner who was working it lost both his hands.

Soon afterwards the 3rd Light battery (von Teichmann-Logischen) came into line on the left of Gehtmann's battery. Geiszler's battery (1. l. VIII.) had meanwhile crossed the high road to take up a position immediately to the north of Mogador farm, which had been set on fire by the enemy's shells.[1] Further to the north von Wissel's battery (3. s. VIII.) advanced beyond the road and Sommer's battery (4. s. VIII.) up to it. Later on Leo's and von Uthmann's batteries (2. l. and 2. s. VIII.), dissatisfied with their position, moved forward and came into action to the right and rear of Preinitzer's battery. With these Geiszler's battery and --by order of Colonel von Broecker—von Wissel's and Sommer's batteries also soon afterwards alligned themselves. Lieut.-Colonel Borckenhagen carried out Colonel von Broecker's order that the horse artillery division should take up a position to the south of Mogador by advancing from the right in column of batteries.

The movements of the batteries of the VIIth and VIIIth Army Corps as well as of the 1st Cavalry Division were so closely connected, and directed as far as practicable by the superior officers of artillery Generals Schwartz, von Kamecke, and von Zimmermann with such unity of purpose, that the artillery combat of the First Army can be embraced in one account. The objects of their fire were the enemy's batteries, which, under cover both natural and artificial, crowned the ridge from the south of Point du Jour to the north of Moscou, at ranges generally between 1,900 and 3,500 paces. Preinitzer's battery of horse artillery, according to its own account, alone cannonaded successfully some mitrailleurs at 1,200 paces, which were placed beyond the eastern

[1] In contradiction to French accounts the German artillery assert positively that this homestead, distinguished by a large flag as a hospital, was set on fire by French shells. Neither of the combatants had any interest in perpetrating a wanton act of cruelty. It must therefore be accepted as a fact that the enemy's shells, intended for the German artillery, caused this accident. The Germans found it impossible to rescue the wounded from the flames.

margin of the Bois de Genivaux before it was captured. The effect of the German artillery was apparently excellent, while the fire of the French guns and mitrailleurs slackened after a comparatively short time.

Desirous of placing the division of horse artillery commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Borckenhagen in a better position, Colonel von Broecker ordered it to make a flank march along the high road and through Gravelotte to a position immediately to the east of the village and south of the high road to Metz, where it would be some hundred paces nearer the enemy.

At the suggestion of the commandant of artillery of the VIIth Corps, General von Zimmermann, the corps artillery, under Colonel von Helden-Sarnowski, had broken up its bivouac south of Ars sur Moselle at the commencement of the contest and marched for the field of battle. The heavy batteries of the 2nd field division were the first to be brought forward by Major Matthiasz; the 3rd Heavy battery, Captain Bleckert, coming into action, by order of Colonel von Helden-Sarnowski, in the interval between Lilienstern's and Goetz's batteries near the south entrance of Gravelotte; and the 4th Heavy battery, Captain Lemmer, on the right flank of the horse artillery division of the VIIIth Army Corps. Soon afterwards the 2nd Horse Artillery battery, Captain von Hahn, was placed by its divisional commander to the south-east of the latter battery near the wood to augment the effect of the fire; but owing to want of space the remaining batteries of the corps artillery (3. l., 4. l., 3. r. VII.), Captains Gnügge, Trautmann, and Hasse, were placed at hand under cover west of Gravelotte.

To obtain a shorter and more effective range the batteries south of Gravelotte under the command of Majors Baron von Eynatten and Wilhelmi advanced in echelons as far as the thickly wooded defile in front allowed. Wolff's battery (2. s. VII.), losing its proper position by this movement, moved to the left flank, where there was more space. Thus there were now 132 guns in line to the north and south of Gravelotte, which maintained a steady fire, directed as a rule by the commanding officers themselves.

The fire was powerful although not very rapid; its excellent effect was proved by the explosion of several of the enemy's

limbers and ammunition wagons, and the gradual disappearance of his batteries. Frequent attempts were made by the French to bring up fresh batteries or to supply men and ammunition to guns which remained silenced under cover, but this was entirely prevented by the accuracy of the German practice. Columns of hostile infantry were also successfully cannonaded, both when retiring and also when advancing. The losses sustained by the artillery at this time were generally slight, except in the case of Goetz's battery, which had been obliged to leave two guns behind while advancing to the last position. One of the guns had a driver killed, two wounded, all its horses killed, its pole broken, and its limber damaged; while the other gun had a wheel disabled. Lieutenant Prüssen, having repaired damages and made good the losses from the 1st line of wagons, brought up the guns again into line without delay. As soon as it became evident that the enemy's fire had slackened, some of the German batteries were able to turn their guns on St. Hubert and prepare the attack against that homestead.

'Towards 3 o'clock detachments of both brigades of the 15th Division (von Weltzien) had been pushed forward against St Hubert with heavy loss. The troops, however, in a broad semicircle on both sides of the high road, slowly gained ground towards the homestead and drove the enemy from the neighbouring quarries. Unable longer to endure the annihilating fire and animated by a common impulse, the Germans soon after 3 P.M. began to storm the massive buildings. Having already been effectively cannonaded,[1] the homestead, though strongly garrisoned and prepared for defence with its garden walls loopholed for musketry, was carried by the 8th battalion of Rifles and detachments of the 67th regiment, the enemy being driven back with great loss to Moscou Farm.

'In this struggle portions of the 33rd Fusiliers of von Wedell's brigade, as well as the Fusilier battalion of the 60th regiment, had played a glorious part, and remained there to strengthen the seriously thinned ranks of von Strubberg's brigade; other detachments of the 33rd at the same time endeavouring to press forward on the south side of the high road on Point du Jour.

[1] According to Captain Helmuth some of the shells aimed at St. Hubert struck our own infantry.

The convexity of the ground permitted no view to be obtained of either our own position or of that of the enemy; and an advance, made in face of the shattering fire of the enemy intrenched on the high road at Point du Jour, miscarried owing to the difficulty of leading the troops. For similar reasons, von Strubberg's left wing could make no further progress either from the Bois de Genivaux or from St. Hubert towards Moscou Farm, notwithstanding the accurate fire which the German artillery directed on that point. At 3.30 P.M. the bloody fight had slackened along the whole front of the VIIIth Army Corps, while the VIIth remained on the defensive.'[1]

The French accounts of this period are very brief. Frossard acknowledges the superior power (*ascendant*) of the German artillery and mentions particularly the tremendous effect of its fire on Aymard's Division of the 3rd Corps. He passes over the capture of St. Hubert and of the southern part of the Bois de Genivaux, stating merely that Aymard's Division was seriously engaged.

5. *The combat of the corps artillery of the Guard south-west of St. Ail—Changes in its position after the capture of St. Ail—The advanced guard of the* 1*st Division of the Guards detains the enemy at St. Marie aux Chênes during the advance of the main body and* XII*th Corps—Advance of the* XII*th Corps—Two batteries of the Guard Corps, the greater part of the* 1*st and* 2*nd field divisions, as well as the corps artillery of the* XII*th Army Corps prepare the attack against St. Marie—Capture of that village.*

Let us now revert to the left flank of the Germans, and in the first place to the Guard Corps. We have already followed the movements of the corps artillery to its position south-west of St. Ail and have seen that the 1st field division was obliged to halt on its right flank. The corps artillery opened fire at ranges of between 2,400 and 3,000 paces against French artillery south and south-west of St. Privat with evident success, inasmuch as some of the hostile batteries were withdrawn. Columns of infantry which showed themselves on the high road between

[1] Major von Schell's *Operations of the First Army.*

St. Marie aux Chênes and St. Privat were cannonade
equally good results, and French infantry endeavouri
advance from the latter village were in every instance com
to retire.

It was necessary for the present to hold back the left w
the artillery of the Guard, for Hussars of that corps had re
the presence of large bodies of the enemy at St. Mari
St. Privat, and moreover hostile infantry was advancing fr
former place against St. Ail. Our own infantry had no
able to move rapidly enough to guard the artillery agai
threatening danger. Major-General Prince of Hohe
Ingelfingen now received permission from the Comman
Chief to take command of the whole artillery line of the
the latter remarking that the protection of the left flank
be at once provided for by occupying St. Ail with infantry.
Hohenlohe however could not think of advancing until th
been effected.

The 1st field division, commanded by Lieut.-C
Bychelberg, then came into action in line with the H
artillery, which, as we have already observed, was near th
de la Cusse in echelon on the right of the artillery of the
Corps. Meanwhile the infantry of the advanced guard of
Division of the Guard had approached. The first shell
greeted by Colonel von Erkert's troops with a shout of j
defiance. General von Pape detached a battalion to
Habonville and support the artillery, while the other
battalions advanced under cover through the valley t
St. Ail. The Hussars of the Guard guarded the left
and kept up the communication with the XIIth Cor
taking up a position in observation north-east of Batill
pushing out patrols towards St. Marie.

As soon as the infantry of the advanced guard in the
had got abreast of St. Ail, a strong detachment of hostile i
rushed forward from St. Marie, which, however, did not p
our seizing St. Ail, and after a smart interchange of mu
the enemy was driven back into St. Marie, which appe
be occupied in force.

As soon as the infantry was in possession of St. A
corps artillery also moved up into line with the Hessian ba

between which and the village the following batteries of the Guard came into action :—The 2nd Light, 1st Light, 2nd Heavy, 1st Heavy, 3rd Heavy, 4th Heavy, 3rd Light, 2nd Horse Artillery, and 4th Light (2. l., 1. l., 2. s., 1. s., 3. s., 4. s., 3. l., 2. r., and 4. l. G.);—nine batteries in all, commanded respectively by Captains von Niederstetter, von Dewitz, von Prittwitz, von Sametzki, von Ehlern, Seeger, von Friederici-Steinmann, von Grävenitz, and von Mutius. The front of this great line of artillery faced St. Privat and the ridge running thence to Amanvillers. We shall see that the batteries on the extreme left flank also cannonaded St. Marie, and a connected account will be given below of the artillery combat in this position, which lasted for several hours.

'General von Pape was already convinced that before anything of importance could be effected it would be necessary to seize St. Marie, which was in front of the enemy's main position. Although he had at once decided to attack the place, the general wished however to wait for the arrival of his main body. He therefore ordered Colonel von Erkert to deploy opposite St. Marie ; who was however not to advance to the assault, but rather to form a screen behind which the main body of the division might form up undisturbed by the enemy. Colonel von Dannenberg, who had ridden up during the movement, approved of the measures adopted in the name of the corps commandant, and at the same time gave positive orders to postpone the attack on St. Marie until the XIIth Corps, which was marching up on the left flank, could co-operate. Prince August von Wurtemberg, who appeared directly afterwards, repeated the above orders.'[1]

To carry out these arrangements Colonel von Erkert occupied St. Ail with a battalion of Fusiliers, while to the west of it another battalion of that regiment and the battalion of Rifles of the Guard surrounded St. Marie on the south and south-west, the left flank being extended to the little wood situated in the valley.

With regard to the occupation of St. Marie aux Chênes by the French, Frossard states :—'The Division of Lafont de Villiers

[1] From Captain Helmuth's Lecture.

got under arms and deployed on hearing the sound of the g
which reached it from the left. It threw the 94th regiment i
the village of St. Marie aux Chênes, which lay a kilometr
the front, supporting it by a battery.' German accounts, m
over, assert distinctly that men of the 4th regiment had b
made prisoners at that village, as had also been the case at
Ail.[1] The French battery directly flanked the southern outsk
of the village from its position on the high road a
hundred paces east of St. Marie aux Chênes.

According to Fay, Marshal Canrobert occupied the vill
to prevent his right flank being turned, the danger of wh
was soon observed by the French. Frossard further states t
'Tixier's Division advanced to reinforce the left wing of the
Corps on the ridge which connects St. Privat with Amanvill
The numerous batteries of the Guard cannonaded our posit
and were briskly answered by the guns of the 6th Corps.'

Skilfully availing themselves of the cover afforded by
ground, the infantry and Rifles of the advanced guard of
1st Division of the Guard approached to within a few hund
paces of St. Marie, driving in the hostile skirmishers, who
become very troublesome and had occasioned considerable l
Meanwhile, with the approval of General von Pape, the
battalion of the Fusiliers of the Guard was brought up fi
Habonville by Colonel von Erkert, the artillery in that qua
being sufficiently protected by the infantry of the IXth Corps

The two brigades forming the main body of the 1st Divis
of the Guard had just formed on the south side of the railr
when they received the order of General von Pape to follow
advanced guard to St. Ail. The railway was crossed in orde
battle, the 2nd brigade under General von Medem in fr
followed by the 1st brigade, commanded by General von Ke
On the first shells bursting between the battalions, the band str
up the national hymn and the troops advanced with a l
hurrah, preserving strictly their proper formation. The briga
were then ordered by their divisional commander to take u
position of readiness under cover behind the wood lying so

[1] Captain Helmuth is of opinion that either outposts from this regiment
pushed forward beyond the actual position of the French, or that some of the
had joined the 94th of their own accord.

west of St. Marie. Before they reached it a communication was received from the Hussars of the Guard that the infantry of the advanced guard was threatened on its left flank by the enemy. The Fusilier battalion of the 4th regiment, which was at the head of the column and first received the information, marched at once in the direction indicated, placing itself on the left of the Rifles of the Guard, and gained connection with the Saxon troops.

General von Pape had meanwhile turned his attention to preparing the attack against St. Marie. He recognised the necessity of creating a sufficient impression by artillery in the first instance, and we have noted the circumstances under which his own batteries had been withdrawn from his immediate disposal. By his orders, however, the batteries of von Mutius and von Grävenitz[1] of the corps artillery of the Guard, which were nearest to St. Marie aux Chênes, turned their guns against that place. The general, moreover, to increase the artillery fire, obtained the co-operation of the Saxon batteries of the 24th Division, which had also opened fire to the west of St. Marie.

It is now necessary to recount the proceedings of the XIIth Corps, whose arrival at Jarny has already been mentioned The following dispositions had been made by H.R.H. the Crown Prince of Saxony for the march from Mars la Tour:—The 23rd Division, commanded by H.R.H. Lieut.-General Prince George of Saxony, furnished an advanced guard under Major-General von Crausshaar, consisting of:—

The 108th Fusiliers,
The 1st Reiter regiment,
The 2nd Light battery,
The 2nd company of Pioneers,
The sanitary detachment.

The right of the advanced guard was in connection with the Hussars of the Guard.

It was followed by the main body of the Division in two parallel columns; the right column, commanded by Colonel Garten, consisted of:—

The 45th brigade of infantry,
The 2nd Heavy battery,
The 1st Light battery.

[1] Two divisionsof this battery cannonaded St. Marie.

The left column, under Colonel von Montbé, was formed by

The 46th brigade of infantry,
The 1st Heavy battery,
The 4th company of Pioneers.
A field hospital.

The brigades were in rendezvous formation, and the corps artillery, commanded by Colonel Funcke, followed the 46th brigade of infantry.

A mile in rear of the corps artillery marched the 24th Division, under Major-General Nehrhoff von Holderberg. The 2nd Reiter regiment was at the head of the Division, and was followed by the division of artillery under Major Richter, which marched in close column of batteries on both sides of the road towards Jarny, with the 47th brigade on the right flank and the 48th on the left. The 1st line of ammunition columns followed the 24th Division, while the trains of the corps assembled at Mars la Tour, where they parked.

The Crown Prince of Saxony marched with the 23rd Division.

The main body of the Cavalry Division, commanded by General Count Lippe, received orders to take the road to Puxe four and a half miles west of Conflans, detaching a regiment to a distance of four and a half miles to reconnoitre towards the west and north, and carefully watch the roads running in that direction as well as the railroad.[1]

The advanced guard reconnoitred from Jarny towards Briey, Auboué, and St. Marie aux Chênes. An early report that hostile troops were visible to the north of Doncourt and at Valleroy, 1,000 paces N.W. of Moineville, was soon afterwards found to be erroneous.

As the original intention of the Commander in Chief was that all the corps should attain the Étain road in first line, and as, moreover, the advance of the XIIth Corps by itself was impracticable, the operation of seizing the last of the three roads leading from Metz towards the west still remained unexecuted. Consequently the Crown Prince of Saxony contented himself with assembling his corps at Jarny and sending a report at 9 A.M. to the Commander in Chief.

[1] From the official account of the XIIth Army Corps.

At 11 A.M. the reconnoitring patrols of the 1st Reiter regiment fell in with a party of French cavalry and infantry at Batilly, which retired ; and with hostile patrols at Coinville. The report of this was received by the Crown Prince towards 11.45 A.M. almost simultaneously with a communication from the Guard Corps that it was on the point of again advancing from Doncourt.

No further orders having been received, the Crown Prince acted on his own judgment and ordered the advanced guard to march along both banks of the Orne on Moineville, and Valleroy 1,000 paces to the north-west. The 23rd Division received orders that the 45th brigade was to proceed to Tichémont and occupy the wood of Ponty, while the 46th brigade was retained at Jarny at the immediate disposal of the general in command. The 24th Division, which was to be followed by the corps artillery, was directed to advance by Jouaville and Batilly against St. Marie. It thus formed a special advanced guard, under the command of Colonel Leonhardi, and, when on arriving at Jouaville guns were heard on the right, was reinforced to the strength of seven battalions (the 47th brigade and 12th Rifles), the 2nd Reiter regiment, and four batteries of the divisional artillery under Major Richter.

These dispositions were reported by the XIIth Corps to the Commander in Chief at 11.45 A.M., and towards 12 o'clock the Crown Prince received the order from that officer already mentioned, which had been despatched at 11.45 A.M. This directed the XIIth Corps to advance on St. Marie aux Chênes, to protect the flanks by cavalry in the direction of Briey and beyond Conflans, and to push cavalry forward wherever possible into the valley of the Moselle to destroy the railway and telegraph to Thionville. It also stated that the VIIth, VIIIth, IXth, and Guard Corps would within two hours attack the enemy, who was in position on the heights from Leipsic to the Bois de Vaux, with his rear towards Metz.

The dispositions already made were, as a rule, in accordance with this order, and were now only so far modified that the 46th brigade, held in reserve, was directed to follow the 45th, while the 48th brigade formed th
corps. An order was also sent at
Division at Puxe, commanded by

up with the army corps and to march on the Bois de Ponty, detaching a regiment in the direction of Valleroy. Count Lippe, on hearing the sound of guns at Habonville, had however already ordered the two regiments of heavy cavalry, under General von Senft-Pilsach, with a battery of horse artillery, to advance, but had left the 17th Lancers at Puxe. These arrangements were also in accordance with the order afterwards received.[1]

The Crown Prince of Saxony with his staff had meanwhile ridden in advance of the troops to the ridge between Jouaville and Batilly. 'The thunder of the guns, constantly increasing in intensity, and the rattle of musketry proclaimed the importance of the struggle at the Bois de la Cusse, and at the same time the line of French artillery was seen through the rising clouds of smoke as it extended towards the right in the direction of St. Privat.'[2]

Reports from the 1st and 2nd Saxon Reiter regiments as well as communications from the Hussars of the Guard proved that the enemy's right wing extended beyond St. Privat, and that Roncourt was occupied. A camp for a Division had been seen at each of those places. Captain von der Planitz of the Saxon general staff, having reconnoitred St. Marie about 12 o'clock, before its occupation, confirmed this information, and reported to the corps commandant that he considered it would be all the more difficult to force the formidable and strongly occupied ridge between St. Privat and Roncourt in front, as the ground afforded scarcely any cover to the assailants. At the same time it was reported by the left wing through General von Craushaar that it had not yet come upon the enemy and that Briey had been found unoccupied by reconnoitring cavalry.

Having weighed all these circumstances, which were partially confirmed by his own observation, the Crown Prince of Saxony decided on 'employing only a small force for the front attack, and all the remaining troops in turning the enemy's right flank by Coinville, Montois la Montagne, and Roncourt.'[3] With this object the following dispositions were made :—The 23rd Division, Prince George, was to march by Coinville to the wood east of Auboué and to Roncourt. General Nehrhoff von Holderberg was

[1] Official report of the XIIth Corps. [2] From Captain Helmuth's Lecture.
[3] Official account of the XIIth Corps.

directed to send the 47th brigade, commanded by Major-General von Leonhardi, and the 12th Rifles round to the west of Batilly and to move towards the north so as to advance from the defile running west of St. Marie directly against that place. The 48th brigade was, however, left at Batilly at the immediate disposal of the corps commandant.

A report of the movements ordered was made to the Commander in Chief at 2.30 P.M. and information given to the Guard Corps.[1]

But meanwhile the state of affairs had altered as regarded the 23rd Division. In consequence of the continued increase of the firing, together with information brought by an orderly officer from the Guard Corps that the enemy was at St. Privat and that it was decided to attack him, Prince George had marched with the main body of the 23rd Division on the sound of the guns towards St. Marie aux Chênes.

All available troops had been at once set in motion and the leading batteries and battalions had arrived close to the scene of fighting at St. Marie at 2.45 P.M., when they were met by the order of the Crown Prince already mentioned. Prince George now named Auboué as the nearest point of assembly not under the direct fire of the enemy. Owing to the necessity of marching generally across somewhat unfavourable ground, a considerable space of time would elapse before the troops could assemble at that place and consequently before the turning movements could be executed.[2]

The advanced guard also, under General von Craushaar, had without waiting for orders marched towards the sound of the guns, which brought it by Hatrize and Beaumont to St. Marie aux Chênes. Part of it had actually reached the field of battle

[1] The report was: 'The Saxon Corps is advancing on St. Marie with the 24th Division, while the 23rd Division is marching by Coinville and the wood between that place and Roncourt to turn the French right wing.'

[2] The road selected by the corps commandant for the turning movement was between 14,000 and 15,000 paces in length, and three hours would therefore be required for the march, so that it would be 6 P.M. before the movement could be executed. The further circuit by Montois would cause a delay of another hour. But under the pressure of circumstances no calculations of this kind were made. The Guard Corps received the impression, partly by verbal communications, that the troops would reach Roncourt at 5 P.M. and attack the enemy in that direction.

at St. Marie and was becoming engaged in the fight, when General von Craushaar likewise received orders to march to Auboué, in order to take part in the turning movement.

The leaders of the 24th Division and 1st Division of the Guard Corps, Generals Nehrhoff von Holderberg and von Pape, agreed on the plan of attack to be adopted. It will be remembered that while the greater number of the batteries of the Guard strove to keep the French artillery at St. Privat in check, von Mutius's battery and two divisions of von Grävenitz's Horse Artillery battery (4. l. and 2. r. G.) had come into action east of St. Ail, and had opened fire at a range of from 1,200 to 1,700 paces to prepare the attack against St. Marie aux Chênes.

With the same object in view Saxon artillery was now ordered to the front, and at the expressed desire of the 1st Division of the Guard the 2nd Saxon field division was ordered by General Nehrhoff von Holderberg to take up a position south-west of St. Marie aux Chênes. Major Richter found space for three batteries only, the remainder of the ground being occupied by infantry forming for the attack. Consequently the 4th Light, the 3rd and 4th Heavy batteries, commanded respectively by Major von der Pforte and Captains Keysselitz and Groh, came into action and cannonaded the south side of the village with shell at ranges of between 800 and 1,000 paces. To the north-west the 1st and 2nd Light batteries, under Captains Lengnik and Westmann, had at the same time, or somewhat earlier, opened fire with common shell and shrapnel at a range of from 1,600 to 2,000 paces against the outskirts and prominent points of the village. Lengnik had previously come into action west of the great defile, but after firing two rounds had changed his position, as the range was found to be too great.

The corps artillery, under Colonel Funcke, was brought up on the west of the defile astride the road from Hatrize to St. Marie aux Chênes. On the right flank was the 3rd field division, under Major Hoch, with the 5th and 6th Heavy and the 5th Light batteries, commanded respectively by Captains Hammer, Verworrner, and von Zeschau (5. s., 6. s., 5. l. XII.): on the left flank the 4th field division, under Lieut.-Colonel Oertel, consisting of the 6th Light, 7th and 8th Heavy, com-

manded respectively by Captains Fellmer, Bucher I., and Portius, and the 2nd Horse Artillery battery, under Captain Müller (6. l., 7. s., 8. s., 2. r. XII.) In front of the interval between these divisions was placed the 2nd Heavy battery, Captain Leonhardi (2. s. XII.)

These batteries to the west of St. Marie fired on the western edge of the village, at a distance of from 2,000 to 2,400 paces, as well as on the troops in the triangle formed by St. Marie, St. Privat, and Roncourt. The cross-fire of the Saxon and Guard batteries south and west of St. Marie was apparently very effective, Richter's batteries, which were the nearest to the village, breaching the enclosing walls in several places, destroying the hedges, and setting fire to many of the houses. Our batteries here were exposed to the enemy's musketry as well as artillery, which, however, did not cause any great loss.[1] But Captain Keysselitz was so severely wounded at the moment of coming into action that he was obliged to give over the command of the 3rd Heavy battery to Second Lieut. Exner.

The Saxon batteries kept up their fire until they were masked by the advance of the storming columns, and the batteries of the Guard at St. Ail were then informed by Colonel von Erkert that the desired effect had been produced. For the present however they all retained their positions, awaiting the result of the assault and ready to act in support if so required.

Accompanied by the Divisional Commander, General Nehrhoff von Holderberg, the 47th brigade, Colonel von Leonhardi, had deployed close to the road from Hatrize to St. Marie aux Chênes under cover in the meadow ground, facing the western side of the latter village, with the 1st battalion of Rifles in the first line and the 104th and 105th regiments by wings in rear. The 3rd battalion of the Fusiliers, belonging to the advanced guard of the 23rd Division, was also advancing along the high road from Auboué against the north side of the village. Meanwhile the infantry of the advanced guard of the 1st Division of the Guard, reinforced by the Fusilier battalion of the 4th regiment, had made some progress against the enemy, and more particularly

[1] Lengnik states that the slight loss sustained by his battery, in spite of the heavy musketry fire from St. Marie aux Chênes, was owing to cover afforded by a thin hedge, behind which it had taken up its position.

the Rifles of the Guard, who were on very favourable ground. Both grenadier battalions of the 4th regiment were placed by General von Pape in rear of the left wing as a reserve to the attack, the 1st brigade of the Guard and the 2nd regiment being in rear of the wood south-west of St. Marie. The 1st battalion was marching up from Habonville.

As soon as the artillery had prepared the way, the infantry advanced to the assault from all sides simultaneously, as concerted by Generals von Pape and Nehrhoff von Holderberg. No cover whatever being afforded by the ground, it sustained considerable loss from the hostile artillery, from the rapid fire of the garrison, and from that of swarms of French tirailleurs, who had advanced from St. Privat till within 700 paces of the place. But Saxon and Prussian pressed resolutely forward. The garrison, already shaken by the German artillery, fell back rapidly on the hostile masses in the direction of St. Privat and Roncourt, leaving some hundreds of prisoners behind it, the enemy however making an obstinate resistance in many of the houses. There was not, as might be expected, space enough for all the storming columns to enter the village, so that some of them passed it on the right and left. The troops in front forced their way through to the eastern side, and to some extent beyond it, in pursuit of the garrison, while other detachments came up and alligned themselves on these. The attention of Generals Nehrhoff von Holderberg and von Pape, as well as of the other leaders, was directed to securing possession of the village by putting the buildings in a state of defence and occupying the eastern outskirts of the village in a regular manner. Shortly afterwards the advanced parties of infantry on the east side became engaged in a stationary but brisk and bloody musketry fight with the hostile masses at St. Privat and Roncourt. Here Colonel von Erkert was killed. The 4th regiment of the Guard was moved up by General von Pape to the western edge of the village in reserve.

The French accounts of Fay, Frossard, and others state briefly that after the 94th regiment had been shattered, and St. Marie set on fire by the German shells, it was obliged by strong hostile columns to evacuate the village.

6. *Changes in the positions of the Saxon artillery consequent on the capture of St. Marie aux Chênes, and continuation of the artillery contest—Advance of the 2nd Division of the Guard against St. Ail—The great artillery mass formed by the batteries of the Guard Corps and Hessian Division—Attack of the French right repulsed—Advance of the 23rd Division at Auboué, reinforced by the 48th brigade—Movements of the 2nd field division of the* XIIth *Corps.*

To silence the heavy fire with which a French battery under cover in the copse to the north-east of St. Marie aux Chênes had harassed the left flank of the 47th brigade during the assault on that place, the 3rd Light battery (3. l. XII.), under Captain Bucher II., which had been held in reserve, was ordered by the 24th Division to take up a position to the left of St. Marie aux Chênes. It cannonaded the French battery at 2,200 paces with such success that the latter retired, Westmann's battery (2. l. XII.), which selected the same target, having time only to fire six common shell and shrapnel at it. These batteries were protected on the left flank by the 2nd Reiter regiment.

After the storming of St. Marie aux Chênes the Saxon corps artillery advanced from the right in echelon of divisions,[1] the leading division, commanded by Major Hoch, taking up a position near the village and to the left of it, fronting the road which leads from St. Marie to Auboué. While the 6th Heavy battery (6. s. XII.), Captain Verworrner, came into action close to the road, the 5th Heavy and 5th Light batteries, Captains Hammer and von Zeschau, were pushed forward beyond the road, where they sustained considerable losses from the enemy's artillery, and especially from swarms of skirmishers which had ensconced themselves in the folds of the ground towards Roncourt. Major Hoch was slightly wounded and Captain Hammer severely. Two guns of the 5th Light battery very soon lost all their horses and nearly all their gunners. To avoid useless losses both batteries were withdrawn behind the high road in line with the 6th Heavy battery.

[1] The corps artillery of this corps comprised two divisions, each of which consisted of one light and two heavy batteries.—*Trans*

Bucher's battery (3. l. XII.) soon came into action in the interval between this battery and the two others; and later on Groh's battery (4. s. XII.) came up into line on the right. Major Richter then brought up his batteries close to the road, where, together with Pforte's battery (4. l. XII.), ordered to this spot from the south-east of St. Marie, they formed an echelon somewhat in advance of the right wing of Hoch's division.

Von der Pforte's battery had previously taken up a position, by order of Major Richter and with the permission of the Divisional Commander, on the south-east of the village, immediately after its capture, to the left and somewhat in advance of the artillery of the 2nd Division of the Guard, which was just then deploying, and had cannonaded a hostile battery at St. Privat at from 2,500 to 3,000 paces.

Richter's and Hoch's divisions in rear of the high road running from St. Marie aux Chênes to Auboué were exposed to a fire, happily less effective than heavy, from the French artillery in its commanding position at Roncourt and St. Privat, which also fired on our infantry as it debouched from St. Marie aux Chênes in pursuit of the retiring garrison. The fire of the Saxon batteries was directed against artillery at ranges of from 3,000 to 3,500 paces with good results, also against infantry retiring towards the east and north-east, as well as against swarms of skirmishers which hovered between St. Privat and Roncourt and afterwards established themselves behind hedges; the precision of the Saxon fire was proved by the frequent changes of position of the hostile artillery and the hasty retreat of the infantry to Roncourt.

While this was taking place Oertel's division of the corps artillery had advanced to a covered position close to the high road, it being impossible at first to bring the batteries into action on the ridge because the copses to the east of Auboué were still held by the enemy. This had been proved to be the case by the 2nd Reiter regiment; offensive movements made by the enemy from Roncourt in the direction of these woods having been invariably repulsed by our guns, the corps commandant concluded that they were unoccupied, and had ordered that regiment to ride along the eastern side of them, which, however, was prevented by a biting fire of infantry occupying the wood.

Lengnik's and Westmann's Light batteries (1. l., 2. l. XII.), as well as the 2nd Heavy battery (Leonhardi) of the 1st field division, which had taken part in the combat at St. Marie aux Chênes, had meanwhile received orders to move into the valley of the Orne, and there, covered by the high ground of Grimonceau, await the advance of the 23rd Division, which was being formed up to turn the enemy's right flank.[1]

Let us now turn to the 2nd Division of the Guard, commanded by General Budritzki. It had reached the line Anoux la Grange—Jouaville at 2 P.M., and in obedience to orders had formed up and halted north of the wood at Jouaville. It has already been mentioned that the 3rd brigade was detached to the IXth Army Corps. From personal observation and a reconnaissance made by General von Dannenberg, the corps commandant was convinced that it was necessary to wait for the attack of the Saxon corps before taking any further measures. He therefore ordered the infantry to postpone its attack while the artillery opened fire to occupy the enemy's attention.

With the object of drawing the available troops together, Budritzki was instructed to march to St. Ail with the remainder of his Division, including the 4th brigade, three batteries of the 3rd field division, and the 2nd Lancers. He was there to await further orders. The Division advanced by the valley, and the van of the infantry reached St. Ail at 5 P.M. The Lancers took up a position south-east of St. Marie.

The 3rd field division was immediately brought into action by Lieut.-Colonel von Rheinhaben by order of General von Budritzki. Scarcely was St. Marie taken, when the division, after a long trot, reached a position between that place and the defile of St. Ail, and took part in the contest, which had already been carried on for a long time by the artillery of the Guard and the Hessian batteries. We have already seen in the previous pages that the Hessian batteries under Lieut.-Colonel Stumpf, as well as the corps artillery (Colonel von Scherbening) and the 1st field division (Lieut.-Colonel Bychelberg), under Prince Hohenlohe, formed a long line between St. Ail and the Bois de la

[1] This is on the authority of the Saxon Colonel Schubert.

Cusse, unbroken except by the defile of Habonville. After the capture of St. Marie aux Chênes those batteries of the artillery of the Guard which had formed an angle with the front of the main position wheeled up into line to the right. We have observed also that at a later hour the 3rd Light battery of the 9th regiment came into action on the right of the Hessian batteries.[1]

Although these three groups of batteries, which had arrived in succession, were separated by the form of the ground and were under different commanders, yet, as they all fired at the same objects, they formed to some extent a single artillery mass during the greater part of the battle.

It will be remembered that at the moment when the Hessian batteries moved to their second position, St. Marie aux Chênes was still in the enemy's possession, and that hostile troops had also shown themselves at St. Ail. After both these places were occupied by the Germans, French troops of all arms appeared in the space between them and the main position. Three strong lines of skirmishers, one in rear of the other, were pushed forward immediately in front of the greater part of the artillery position, almost wholly concealed by the furrows of the ground. It was therefore impossible for the artillery to get to closer quarters with the enemy before our infantry advanced to the attack and dislodged the skirmishers. General Prince Hohenlohe had some difficulty in restraining the impetuosity of his troops, although these circumstances were pointed out to them. It was all the more imperative for the Prince to keep back his artillery as the orders of the general commanding the Guard Corps required that the enemy should only be kept in play in front until his right flank was turned.

To guard the long line of artillery more effectually against the lines of skirmishers which might endeavour to creep up to it under the cover afforded by the undulating ground, the Prince

[1] The eighteen batteries now formed three groups in a flat arc, its concave side facing the enemy, and were in the following order from right to left :—3. l. IX. First Lieut. Heseler *for* Bastineller (wounded); 1. s., 1. l., 2. s., 2. l., 3. l. H., Captains Reh, Frank, Hoffmann, Weygand, Ronstadt; 2. l., 1. l., 2. s., 1. s., 3. s., 4. s., 3. l., 2. r., 4. l., 6. l., 5. s., 6. s. G., Captains von Niederstetter, von Dewitz, von Prittwitz, von Sametzki, von Ehlern, Seeger, von Friederici-Steinmann, von Grävenitz, von *Mutius*, Ising, von Roon, and von Oppell.

asked for assistance from the 2nd Division of the Guard. The 1st battalion of the regiment Augusta, commanded by von Rosenberg, being detailed for this duty, formed company columns in the intervals between the batteries and lay down. Once the commander of the battalion wished to advance against the lines of skirmishers, but was prevented by the Prince in consideration of the general state of affairs.

At the beginning of the battle the French artillery was the principal object at which the Hessian and Guard batteries aimed, the ranges varying between 1,800 and 3,200 paces. The immediate result of their concentrated fire was the withdrawal of the enemy's advanced batteries to his main position, where his artillery was so strongly posted as to necessitate a lengthened cannonade, so that it was 4 P.M. before the French fire perceptibly slackened, and at 5 P.M. it died away almost entirely. After this only a few fresh batteries came into action. The success against the hostile infantry and cavalry was equally great. Columns of both arms, which showed themselves on the high road between St. Marie aux Chênes and St. Privat as well as to the north of it, were cut to pieces by German shells.

When, after the capture of St. Marie, hostile masses advanced from the main position in a westerly and north-westerly direction against the Saxon Army Corps, the good effect of the flanking fire was perceptible, notwithstanding the long range. The enemy was finally compelled by the Saxon artillery to desist from all further aggressive movements in that quarter, and from attempts which he repeatedly made to advance against the front of the German artillery from his main position, especially from St. Privat. As a rule the ranges varied from 1,800 and 3,200 paces; but they were often much shorter, as, for example, when the enemy's skirmishers, advancing against our front to within 800 paces, were completely stopped by the German shells.

In the course of the afternoon the commander of the 2nd battalion of Hessian Rifles informed Major Herget that a hostile column was endeavouring to debouch by a hollow road from Amanvillers. To prevent this a gun of Reh's battery, under the command of Lieutenant Goes, was pushed forward close to the deep railway cutting. The officer, the non-commissioned officer of the gun, and the whole of the detachment with the exception

of one man were wounded, but the firing was maintained with the greatest gallantry, and all attempts of the hostile columns to debouch were frustrated.

In addition to all these important results it must be observed that the right wing, i.e. the Hessian batteries, succeeded in drawing on itself the fire of the enemy's guns and mitrailleurs in its front, and thereby diverting it from the German batteries on the other side of the Bois de la Cusse, which had been so effectively enfiladed. On the other hand the left wing, i.e. the artillery of the Guard, kept the hostile artillery opposed to it in check from the very first, and diverted its fire from the right flank of the infantry advancing from the south against St. Marie aux Chênes.

The firing was generally deliberate, as the military situation here required that the enemy should be merely kept in play; but at first the Hessian batteries fired rapidly, when it was desired to extricate the batteries south of the Bois de la Cusse, and the whole of the artillery did so whenever it was necessary to repulse the hostile attacks. A rapid fire was also directed against the swarms of skirmishers which closely threatened the artillery.

During this artillery contest the commander of the artillery of the Second Army, Lieut.-General von Colomier, rode up to the artillery of the Guard and signified his approval of the steps that had been taken. Finding himself in the vicinity of Verneville while reconnoitring the enemy's position, he had missed the Commander in Chief of the Second Army, and was now riding through the positions of the artillery to give any directions that might be necessary.

Up to this time the battle had been fought with obstinacy, the artillery of the Guard and Hessian Division in spite of their losses displaying great coolness and determination. The enemy's common shells were more effective than his shrapnel, which generally burst too high; but the principal loss was caused by the Chassepôts of his skirmishers, who lay under cover in the furrows, as well as in the ditches of the high road between St. Marie and St. Privat.

During the afternoon the fire of artillery, musketry, and mitrailleurs from the other side of the Bois de la Cusse, to which

the Hessian batteries were exposed both in flank and rear, occasioned the heaviest casualties. Captain Ronstadt was killed; Captain Weygandt, Lieutenant and Adjutant Beck, Lieutenants Goes, Kehrer, and Deisz, Portepeefähnrichs Wagner I. and Wagner II. were wounded. Lieutenant Kehrer succeeded Captain Ronstadt in the command of the 3rd Light battery, and retained it to the end of the battle, in spite of a severe wound. Lieutenant Leydhecker took the place of Captain Weygandt in the command of the 2nd Light battery. Considerable damage also was done to the material of the batteries, and a gun of the 3rd Light battery being dismounted by a shell bursting under it, was disabled for the remainder of the battle.

Let us now return to the infantry of the Guard Corps and XIIth (Saxon) Corps at St. Marie aux Chênes.[1] The former reports that during this period of the battle it observed only one large column of hostile infantry, which was advancing from St. Privat against the east side of St. Marie, but was brought to a halt at a considerable range and obliged to retire by the fire of the infantry, combined with that of the artillery of the Guard in action south of St. Marie. Such, however, was not the case with the Saxons. As soon as St. Marie was taken, strong bodies of hostile troops began to move against that village from Roncourt and St. Privat. Colonel von Leonhardi saw that their object was the recapture of St. Marie, and to prevent this by a counter movement he urged his troops, which had already advanced, to continue their attack, and also sent forward against Roncourt the 3rd battalions of the 104th and 105th regiments, till then held back in reserve.

The French troops which had assumed the offensive were according to Fay's account, the Division commanded by Lafont de Villiers and the 1st brigade of Tixier's Division, supported by du Barail's Division of cavalry.

The fighting around the village was very soon surpassed in violence and daring by that to the north-east. The brigadier, Colonel von Leonhardi, was wounded and replaced by Colonel Elterlein. The Saxons, advancing with the greatest gallantry,

[1] Here the account of Captain Helmuth is generally followed.

were checked by the vastly superior force of the enemy, whose repeated attacks, however, especially directed against our left wing, were finally baffled by the steadiness of the infantry and the effective fire of the artillery, which at the same time kept the French batteries completely in check.

General Nehrhoff von Holderberg had watched the contest from St. Marie, and at first did not interfere, as it appeared that its object was only to drive the enemy from the immediate vicinity of the village. But perceiving that, contrary to the intention of the corps commandant, it was gradually growing more serious, and moreover that the enemy's superiority rendered it useless, he ordered Colonel Elterlein to break off the fight and assemble his brigade at St. Marie. At the same time he received an order from the general commanding the corps to the same effect.

As the whole of the infantry of the 47th brigade had been hotly engaged and widely scattered, it was some time before it could be reassembled. This was not completed until 5 P.M., when the brigade formed up to the north-west of St. Marie, which had only just then been occupied by Prussian troops. After its capture General von Pape had brought up the 2nd regiment of the Guard close to the west of the village, and at 3.45 P.M. the 1st brigade also, which had taken up its position 600 paces to the south-west, so that the whole of the 1st Division was united at that point. A lengthened pause in the battle in front of the Guard Corps and Saxons now intervened, broken only by a measured fire of artillery.

From his position on the west of St. Marie the Crown Prince completely overlooked the contest of his troops and the ground as far as Roncourt; and he soon became aware that the enemy was present there in much greater force than had been previously suspected, so that the importance and difficulty of the turning movement were proportionately enhanced. The Crown Prince therefore at once (3.30 P.M.) ordered the 48th brigade, which had been held in reserve at Batilly, to advance to Auboué to reinforce the turning column. Prince George was informed of this and directed to make the turning movement more towards the north, as it was obvious that an advance in the direction

previously indicated would lead directly against the enemy's post at Roncourt.

General von Pilsach had reached the Bois de Ponty about 3 P.M. with the two Reiter regiments of the Saxon cavalry and the 1st Horse Artillery battery. It was useless to think of employing this force against the enemy's front, but an opportunity might occur during the turning movement. The general was therefore ordered to join the turning columns, and moreover to send two squadrons into the valley of the Moselle to break up the railroad and telegraph between Metz and Thionville. We have already seen that the Commander in Chief of the army had given similar instructions to the XIIth Corps at 11.30 A.M. and when it was known that we were opposed to the bulk of the enemy's force, it became all the more important to destroy his last communication with the country in his rear. In an order by Prince Frederick Charles despatched at 3.45 P.M. from Habonville he again urged the importance of this step. Meanwhile the 23rd Division had continued its march on Auboué during the contest at St. Marie aux Chênes, and the 1st and 2nd battalions of Rifles belonging to the advanced guard, which were the first to arrive, were at once directed by H.R.H. Prince George against the hostile skirmishers occupying the copses east of Auboué.

Convinced of the necessity of employing a strong force of artillery against the masses opposed to him, the Crown Prince at 4.30 P.M. ordered the corps artillery to move further forward, which could now be done without risk, as the progress of the Saxon skirmishers in the copses was clearly visible. Leonhardi's battery (2. s. XII.) was ordered by Prince George of Saxony to take up a position on the extreme left flank, Oertel's division of artillery afterwards coming up on its right, and the whole of the batteries maintaining their position against a brisk hostile fire. Before long Hoch's division also came up into line on the right, followed by Richter's division, whose batteries were now all present.[1]

[1] The twelve batteries were in the following order from right to left :—Von der Pforte, Groh, Bucher II., Exner *for* Keysselitz, Verworrner, Hammer, von Zeschau, Müller, Fellmer, Bucher I., Portius, and Leonhardi (4. l., 4. s., 3. l., 3. s., 6. s., 5. s., 5. l., 2. r., 6. l., 7. s., 8. s., 2. s. XII.)

During the movement Captain Müller observed some hostile cavalry in front of Roncourt. Galloping to the front with the 2nd Horse Artillery battery, he crossed the defile, and opening fire with shell compelled the French horse to retire. Our artillery between St. Marie and the wood to the north of it was principally occupied in subduing the fire of the enemy's guns between St. Privat and Roncourt, and in preventing him from advancing to impede our turning movement. Consequently the enemy's artillery was generally the object of our fire; but the instant that any hostile columns or swarms of skirmishers advanced from Roncourt and St. Privat, as was frequently the case, the Saxon artillery concentrated their fire on them. The ranges were generally between 2,500 and 3,800 paces, being reduced to 1,500 paces during the offensive movements of the enemy. Common shells were mostly employed, but shrapnel were also used by some of the batteries.[1] The practice made by these twelve batteries was excellent and obliged the hostile artillery to withdraw, while every attempt made by the French infantry to advance from its position was successfully repelled.

'Meanwhile Prince George had received orders from the corps commandant at 5.30 P.M. to take a wider sweep towards the north with his turning column; while at the same time the 48th brigade arrived, which had also been placed at his disposal, and the 46th was marching up. The Prince therefore ordered Colonel Schulz with the 48th brigade—reinforced by the 1st Reiter regiment and three batteries, and followed by the two regiments and the battery of his cavalry division—to prosecute his march till in a line with Joeuf and Montois, and march thence by the latter village against Roncourt. General von Craushaar was at the same time to occupy in force the wood to the east, and to advance to the attack of Roncourt as soon as the 48th brigade had commenced its attack from the north,

[1] Nothing certain is stated as to the effect of the shrapnel. The 4th Light battery observed that its shrapnel fire at 2,800 paces was *apparently* effective against strong swarms of skirmishers north of St. Privat. The 5th Heavy and 5th Light batteries fired three and seven rounds respectively at ranges of about 2,000 and 1,800 paces against hostile artillery and infantry. They considered that the bursts were well timed.

but not before. As the 46th brigade was still on the march, orders could not at present be given for its employment.'[1]

It was about 4.45 P.M. when these arrangements were made. The 108th regiment of Rifles was already forcing its way slowly through the bushy copse, intersected by a deep ravine, and driving the French tirailleurs before it under a smart interchange of musketry, a fire of artillery being at the same time kept up on the wood.

. . . . . .

General von Craushaar had ordered the 100th Body Guard Grenadiers to follow the Rifles, near which it soon became engaged. The 101st regiment came after in reserve. At 5.15 P.M. the first line reached the edge of the wood on the side of Roncourt and occupied it. Some of the troops rushed out of the wood in pursuit of the flying skirmishers, but the general, in obedience to his orders, halted the two regiments on the edge of the wood and in front of it, where the most advanced of the troops maintained a brisk musketry combat with some hostile skirmishers.[2] As soon as the French were observed at Montois, a battalion of the 101st was ordered to move in that direction and watch the village until the arrival of the 48th regiment, which led to a stationary musketry fight with the enemy at 800 paces from the outskirts of the place. While these movements were taking place, the 48th brigade, accompanied by Prince George, was marching along the valley of the Orne.

7. *Situation of the First German Army at* 3 P.M.—*General von Steinmetz decides to assume the offensive—Advance of the corps artillery of the* VIIIth *Corps—Changes in position of the artillery of the First Army—Corps artillery of the* VIIth *Corps at St. Hubert—Success of the French left wing—Contest of the 8th Division at St. Hubert and in the Bois de Genivaux—French accounts of these events.*

Let us now briefly examine the situation of the First German Army after 3 P.M.

The artillery—or at least that part of it which had become

[1] According to Helmuth.

[2] The 47th brigade also arrived at this point at a later hour from St. Marie to form the reserve.

engaged—had from its position north and south of Gravelotte almost silenced the French batteries, and now, owing to the paucity of objects, maintained a measured fire. The 15th Division, under General von Weltzien, held its ground with difficulty and loss beyond the defile of Gravelotte in the northern part of the Bois de Vaux, in the western portions of the quarries on the east, in St. Hubert, and in the southern part of the Bois de Genivaux as far as the forking of the ravine. To the north the battle swayed to and fro. The extreme left flank was in connection with the IXth Corps at Chantrenne. The troops of the Division were greatly exhausted and no longer retained their tactical formations.

The 32nd brigade, under von Rex, and the artillery of the 16th Division (von Barnekow) were under cover to the west of Gravelotte in reserve; while the 31st brigade, General Count Neidhardt von Gneisenau, had rejoined the Division at 2 P.M., having completed its expedition in the direction of Thionville. The 7th King's Hussars guarded the left flank of the artillery, the 9th Hussars being posted to the west of Gravelotte. The latter village was put in a state of defence and garrisoned to meet the possibility of a repulse.

The VIIth Army Corps had by the King's orders been held back from all offensive action up to this time. At Gravelotte were assembled the 27th brigade, Colonel von Conrady, and the 77th regiment of the 28th brigade, General von Woyna, whose Fusilier battalion supported the corps artillery. The Fusiliers of the 53rd regiment were in rear of the right of the artillery, while the other two battalions occupied the eastern skirts of the Bois de Vaux. Here were also the 7th battalion of Rifles,[1] and since 1.30 P.M. two battalions of the 13th regiment, belonging to the 13th Division, commanded by General von Glümer, while a battalion of the 13th was detached to defend the mill in the defile and the places of assembly established there. General von Osten-Sacken was in the rear of the right flank of the artillery with the 73rd regiment of the 25th brigade, and General von der Goltz with the 26th brigade at Ars in the valley of the Moselle

[1] Riflemen as well as infantry had also collected by degrees in the gravel-pits near the forest-track east of the wood. Some partial attacks only had been made, with great loss against the retiring troops, which had been repulsed by von Weltzien's Division.

The 15th Hussars were posted to the west of Gravelotte, while the 1st Cavalry Division, under General von Hartmann, had been formed up since 1 P.M. behind the left flank of the artillery.

'General von Steinmetz had attentively watched the progress of the conflict, and had ridden with his staff so far to the east of Gravelotte as to expose himself to the enemy's fire. Officers of his staff were killed and wounded. Among others Captain Köhler of the 1st East Prussian field artillery regiment, adjutant to the general commanding the artillery of the First Army, was wounded.'[1]

'Towards 3 o'clock the expected advance of the Second Army could not yet be discerned, but the infantry of the VIIIth Army Corps had gained ground towards St. Hubert along both sides of the high road. The determined resistance of the enemy appeared therefore to be overcome, and the right moment seemed to have arrived to bring up cavalry and artillery to support the infantry fighting beyond the defile on the east of Gravelotte. The enemy showed only a small force of infantry on the heights from Point du Jour to beyond Moscou Farm, which led to the conclusion that part of the force posted there had been withdrawn to support the right wing of the French army.

'General von Steinmetz now sent a verbal order by General von Sperling to von Hartmann's Cavalry Division, which had come up in rear of the left wing of the artillery, "to advance across the defile in front of Gravelotte, so as to be ready at hand." The whole of the corps artillery of the VIIth Army Corps was to cross the defile in succession, and the moment appeared favourable for an attack against the enemy's left wing. The VIIth Army Corps was therefore to advance in force against the strong position of Point du Jour, while it was intended to direct the reserve, consisting of the 26th brigade, under von der Goltz, on Vaux.'[2]

Before, however, this order could be executed the situation of the VIIIth Army Corps had changed. General von Goeben had anxiously watched the 15th Division, and observed the difficulty with which it maintained its ground. To support it he

[1] According to Helmuth.

[2] Major von Schell's *Operations of the First Army.*

sent orders at 3 P.M. to the 31st brigade, General Count Gneisenau, to advance across the ravine to the plateau in the direction of Moscou. The 69th regiment was therefore directed to march on the north side of the high road, while the 29th moved along the defile itself, its van reaching the middle of it at 4 P.M.

At the same time the 3rd field division was ordered by General von Goeben to move to the front. Led by Lieut.-Colonel Hildebrandt, it quitted its position under cover 2,200 yards west of Gravelotte and trotted along the high road through that village to the right of the batteries of the 8th artillery regiment already in position to the north of it,—about the time that the horse artillery division of the same corps completed its change of position in the same direction.

The artillery of the First Army now formed a mass of 26 batteries—156 guns in all.[1] The commanding officers were careful to concentrate the fire on the most important points, wherever this was necessary or had not already been done. The German guns had previously established their great superiority over the enemy's artillery, although the latter was excellently placed behind artificial cover, and now an organised cannonade of an hour's duration at a range of from 2,200 to 3,000 paces sufficed to silence it completely. Repeated attempts made by the French to bring fresh batteries into action were invariably baffled by the accuracy of our concentrated fire; many of the guns could not even unlimber, and others which succeeded in doing so, were obliged to retire after firing a few rounds. Explosions of ammunition wagons and limbers were frequently observed; while the German shells also told with great effect on infantry as it retired along the high road. After silencing the enemy's guns our artillery concentrated its fire on the farms of Moscou and Point du Jour, as well as on the crowded shelter trenches. The losses now sustained by the artillery were trifling.

[1] The batteries were in the following order from right to left:—Gasch (6. l.), Hübner (1. s.), von Gostkowski (6. s.), Gaul *for* Schweder (1. l.), Götz (2. l.), Wolff (2. s.), Bleckert (3. s.), Rühle von Lilienstern (5. s.), von Hahn (2. r.), Hasse (3. r.) did not fire in the position, Lemmer (4. s.), of the 7th regiment; Protze (3. r.), von Fuchsius (1. r.), Schlieben (2. r.), von Helden-Sarnowski (6. l.), Mende (6. s.), Jacobi (5. s.), Gillmeister (5. l), Sommer (4. s.), Geiszler (1. l.), von Wissel (3. s.), von Uthmann (2. s.), Leo (2. l.), of the 8th regiment; Preinitzer (1. r.), of the 1st regiment; Busse (1. s.), Gehtmann (4. l.), von Teichmann-Logischen (3. l.), of the 8th regiment.

During the artillery contest General von Hindersinn, inspector of artillery, arrived at Gravelotte with his adjutants, Major Fassong and Captain von Rheinhaben. After passing some time with the batteries of the VIIth and VIIIth Army Corps near that village, he rode to the batteries at Malmaison, where he remained till the end of the battle.

Let us now see how the order given by the First Army was carried out: The batteries of the VIIth Army Corps from the south, the horse artillery division of the VIIIth from the west, and twenty squadrons of von Hartmann's Division advanced towards the mouth of the defile, which the 29th regiment had just entered; the 9th and 15th Hussars also moved up from behind Gravelotte. From every quarter troops were hurrying towards the defile, or rather towards the plateau beyond, on which it was expected to reap the fruits of victory.

To provide an escort for his batteries ordered to the front from his own troops, General von Zastrow had directed the 27th brigade, von Conrady, to take up a position of readiness on the slope on this side of the ravine. Two battalions of the 39th regiment were, in pursuance of this order, in the act of passing through the defile when the batteries of their corps reached it.

Those batteries of the corps artillery that had not yet been engaged had long been impatient to take part in the contest, so that the order to cross the defile and come into action beyond it was received with joy. The 4th Light battery, Captain Trautmann, immediately moved off on receiving orders direct from General von Zastrow, and was joined by the 3rd Light battery, Captain Gnügge, the 3rd Horse Artillery, Captain Hasse, and the 4th Heavy, Captain Lemmer. They were accompanied by Colonel Helden-Sarnowski, commanding the corps artillery, and General Zimmermann, commandant of the artillery of the VIIth Corps.

But now the van of the 1st Cavalry Division had come up, and its twenty squadrons with Preinitzer's battery completely filled the defile for a considerable period. The other batteries of the corps artillery of the VIIth Corps, Borckenhagen's horse artillery division of the VIIIth Corps, and von Eynatten's division on the left, found themselves cut off from the defile, while Wilhelmi's division, which had also approached from the extreme right flank

of the artillery of the First Army, was again obliged to form front to the right. But the space at Gravelotte was too limited for all the batteries on our side of the defile again to come into action; the horse artillery division of the VIIIth Corps, the 2nd Horse Artillery battery and the 3rd Heavy of the corps artillery of the VIIth Corps, as well as the 2nd Heavy battery of von Eynatten's division, alone succeeded in doing so, and as they appeared sufficient, the other three batteries of the latter division were withdrawn to the west of Gravelotte in reserve.

Von Hartmann's Cavalry Division had reached the defile before the 9th and 15th Hussars, who were also pressing towards it, just when the ammunition wagons of the 3rd Light battery, having got ahead of the other batteries, were striving to enter it. General von Sperling communicated to General von Hartmann his views as to the supposed state of affairs with the enemy, which however was in reality far otherwise. For although the most advanced of the French troops had been routed and driven back, large masses, wholly intact, were drawn up behind excellent cover, where it was absolutely impossible for cavalry to get at them.

Captain Trautmann was soon severely wounded, but directed his battery, as he lay on the ground at St. Hubert, to the position it was to take up. Meanwhile artillery and cavalry were crowded together with infantry in the defile. Till then the enemy had kept comparatively quiet, but now there suddenly poured from every part of his position a storm of shells, mitraille, and musketry, which swept the bare plateau and the defile reaching even to Gravelotte. The German batteries nevertheless continued resolutely to advance. The leaders of one of Trautmann's guns (4th Light) falling, it was left in the defile. The remaining guns passed it, led by First Lieut. Humann, and came into action, by General Zimmermann's orders, to the south-east of St. Hubert just in front of the 1st battalion of the 60th regiment, which was on the outer flank of the infantry then on the plateau.

Captain Hasse had followed close in rear with the 3rd Horse Artillery battery in column of route. Wheeling to the right and forming line to the front, he came into action on Trautmann's left. Captain Gnügge saw that there was no eligible position for the 3rd Light battery on the plateau, which was

swept by a close and biting fire of musketry, but found a comparatively good position on the high road to the south-east of St. Hubert, where some cover was afforded by a garden wall as high as the knee. After coming smartly into action to the left flank, the battery incurred considerable losses and Captain Gnügge's horse was wounded. Some minutes were spent in making good the losses before the battery could open fire. The 4th Heavy battery, whose commander, Captain Lemmer, was mortally wounded, was unable to gain a firm footing on the plateau.

The movements of the cavalry Division in rear, which was rapidly losing men and horses from the enemy's musketry and mitrailleurs, must now be traced. In a few minutes the narrow defile, already obstructed by the disabled gun, was blocked up with bodies of men and horses, while to augment the confusion a limber now dashed through the defile. In spite of all this the determination of the 4th Lancers at the head of the cavalry carried them to the outlet of the defile, and the regiment formed up at a gallop on the south of the high road and in the right rear of the 4th Light battery. But no object for attack presented itself; men and horses fell in heaps under the murderous fire; and the cavalry, unable to hold its ground, retired in echelons. General von Hartmann finding the actual circumstances entirely different from those under which the order to attack had been given, was compelled to retreat. In spite, however, of the heavy fire to which the rear of the division was exposed in the crowded defile, the officers succeeded generally in preserving order. Some of the troopers, however, could not be prevented from galloping wildly along the high road through Gravelotte, where they spread dismay, and caused disorder among the throng of ammunition wagons and trains, including the carts of the market-tenders, which had now reached that place. Order, however, was soon restored and the Division drew up to the north-west of Gravelotte, where it was quickly reformed. Preinitzer's battery of horse artillery (1. r. 1.) was ordered by General von Hartmann again to come into action; it therefore took up its former position among the batteries of the 8th regiment, and afterwards advanced on two different occasions.

While these events were taking place the enemy's mitrailleurs and swarms of skirmishers at Point du Jour, in the quarries, as

well as at Moscou and in the hollow road between that farm and St. Hubert, poured an incessant fire on the front and flanks of the batteries to the east of the defile, rendering their position desperate. Colonel von Helden-Sarnowski, and soon afterwards Major Matthiasz had horses killed under them, the former being also struck by a bullet. Lieutenant Ruhnke of Humann's battery (originally Trautmann's) was killed and Portepeefähnrich Brauns was hit by a ricochet. The battery had only just opened fire with evidently good effect against Moscou, distant 900 or 1,000 paces, when the teams of four limbers bolted towards the defile, most of the horses being wounded; the officers tried in vain to stop them; a single limber was with difficulty brought back to the guns, where the only men fit for duty were a non-commissioned officer, a driver, and two gunners besides the officers. Two of the guns were brought off in succession by means of the two limbers, Lieutenants Humann and Basch assisting to limber up. The three remaining guns, which were still exposed to several hostile attacks, were not withdrawn across the defile till after dark by means of wagon limbers.

Hasse's horse artillery battery from the very first sustained enormous losses; First Lieutenant von Hochwächter and Second Lieutenant Humann II. were severely wounded. Captain Hasse himself received a slight wound, which however obliged him to give over the command to Second Lieutenant Hoeckner for a short time only; all the officers of the battery had horses killed under them. But in spite of the losses both of men and horses, which increased from moment to moment, the battery not only bravely held its ground, but also maintained its fire with great effect. Shells were thrown at from 700 to 900 paces against hostile skirmishers in the hollow road, and at 1,100 paces against Moscou, as well as at shelter trenches and mitrailleurs east and west of that farm.

Perceiving the desperate situation of the battery, Lieut.-General von Schwartz sent his adjutant, Captain von Blecken-Schmeling, through the storm of bullets with an order for it to withdraw across the defile. But so many horses had already been disabled that the battery could not be moved, and Captain Hasse affirmed that death was preferable to leaving the position unnecessarily. The firing was therefore continued, till at length

but one gun could be served, and that by four men only; for all the gunners of the other detachments were either killed or wounded. The ammunition of its own gun limbers as well as that of a limber of the 4th Light battery was exhausted, and there was no more at hand, the lines of wagons not having been able to pass the defile. At this moment Major Coester, the divisional commander, reached the battery and repeated the order to retire. The major was with the 2nd Horse Artillery battery (von Hahn), which, as we have seen, had come under fire at Gravelotte before Hasse's battery, and had not observed the advance of the latter until it was beyond the defile. He then shared the fate of Hahn's battery in being prevented from crossing. Having, however, received orders from General von Schwartz to take steps for bringing off Hasse's disabled battery, he now arrived with three wagon teams, which the adjutant, Lieutenant Selhausen, had procured.

Having refitted under fire as far as was absolutely necessary, the battery then retired through the defile, its limbers riddled by bullets, the drivers on foot, the guns drawn by two or four horses, and closely packed with the severely wounded. The movement was made at a walk and further losses were sustained. Major Coester had a horse killed under him; the last gun was suddenly reduced to one horse, and, heavily laden with wounded men, was obliged to halt for assistance. The battery was received at Gravelotte with a loud hurrah, and General von Schwartz embraced the commander with emotion in the presence of the troops. The retreat of this heroic battery was a triumphal march in the real sense of the word.

We have seen that the 3rd Light battery (Gnügge) also experienced heavy losses from the very first. In a few minutes a great number of men and horses were wounded or lying dead on the ground. After it came into action the battery was fortunately covered from the tremendous fire from Moscou by the low garden wall; but suffered severely on its right flank, which was still exposed. Captain Gnügge, however, efficiently assisted by Lieutenant Wintgens, maintained a steady fire against Moscou, as well as against the shelter trenches and gun-pits near it and in its front, at ranges of from 800 to 1,000 paces. Moscou itself was set on fire by this battery and Hasse's. They

also prevented the enemy placing fresh batteries in position, the effect of their fire being observed and reported by a wounded officer of Lancers in the upper story of the inn of St. Hubert.

The only troops available in the first instance for the support of the right flank were some weak detachments of the 29th and 69th regiments, and all the efforts of Colonel von Helden-Sarnowski, Major Matthiasz, and Captain Gnügge were directed to obtaining further reinforcements. Whenever any infantry reached that dangerous point, it was invariably cut to pieces by the tremendous fire to which it became exposed.

As might be expected, the failure of the 1st Cavalry Division, joined to the heavy fire, which now again burst forth after a long pause, operated disadvantageously on the 15th Division.

Let the reader picture to himself the situation of the greater part of its troops after the long and bloody struggle against the enemy's superior force. Both brigades of the Division were terribly cut up and the troops were falling back into the ravine. But here the few commanders, who still remained unhurt, and among them General von Wedell, were ready to halt and reform the men. The infantry had at first lost ground north of the quarries and then the quarries themselves, which had been so gallantly held.

On the other hand the failure of the cavalry had not affected the garrison of St. Hubert, which place was in addition filled with stragglers and wounded; and Gnügge's battery was also able to maintain its position. The special reserves of St. Hubert were partially brought forward. The enemy did not at present venture to make a direct attack against St. Hubert, but swarms of skirmishers attempted to surround it from Moscou; they were, however, brought to a halt by the infantry at St. Hubert, by von Strubberg's brigade, occupying the outskirts of the wood, and by the effective fire from the German artillery at Gravelotte.

The troops under the personal orders of General von Strubberg in the ravine of the Bois de Genivaux had not received direct intelligence of these events on the plateau, but suddenly the firing was again heard breaking out in full force. In the belief that the enemy was about to make an attempt to recapture St. Hubert, the 28th regiment dashed out of the wood in

order to take part in the conflict; but, after heavy losses, a portion only succeeded in reaching the homestead.

The two battalions of the 39th regiment, which General von Zastrow sent forward through the valley south of the defile of Gravelotte, advanced resolutely about 4.30 P.M. up the steep slope towards Point du Jour with some detachments of the 33rd regiment, which it met on the way. Too weak to storm the enemy's strong position, they stood firm at 600 paces from the enemy, and prevented him from advancing from the quarries, which would have been disastrous to the batteries at St. Hubert.[1]

The 29th regiment had been prevented from immediately deploying by the advancing batteries and by the 1st Cavalry Division; but as soon as the latter retired, the regiment, which was met by fugitives from the Lancers, again moved forward, as from the heavy firing it was believed that a serious combat was taking place. On reaching the quarries and St. Hubert, a rush was made under a hot fire towards Moscou, but failed to carry the farm, in spite of the greatest valour. After sustaining heavy losses it was thrown on the defensive, while a portion of the regiment fell back into the Bois de Genivaux; and supports, detached from time to time to the batteries at St. Hubert, were invariably cut to pieces by the enemy's concentrated fire.

The 1st battalion of the 69th regiment, which reached Malmaison at a later hour, made a resolute attack against Moscou, but was repulsed after a heavy loss by the enemy's superior force. The two other battalions attacked the enemy in the Bois de Genivaux in succession and partially reached St. Hubert. Their arrival was all the more welcome as the detachments of the 28th regiment fighting at the forking of the meadow ground had expended all their ammunition. Towards 5 P.M. the 69th, the 28th, and the 67th cleared the southern part of the Bois de Genivaux of the enemy, but the 69th, which advanced resolutely over the open ground against Moscou, was soon obliged to retire.

In spite of its devotion and daring the 31st brigade had been unable to force its way beyond the points contested by the 15th

[1] Major von Schell's *Operations of the First Army.*

Division, but the fighting there had the effect of raising the depressed spirits of the troops, and the Division had been reinforced at nearly every point. In St. Hubert alone eleven companies had come to the assistance of von Weltzien's troops.

After 4.30 P.M. it appeared to the superior officers, who were watching the progress of events from Gravelotte, that affairs on the left flank at the Bois de Genivaux were taking an unfavourable turn. At 5 P.M. General von Steinmetz had directed General von Goeben to support the attack, and the latter had consequently ordered his last brigade, the 32nd, under von Rex, to advance. The 72nd regiment received orders to march along the road and take up a position in the ravine, in immediate support of the troops engaged. The 1st battalion of the 40th regiment was placed at Malmaison to cover the artillery, while the 2nd and 3rd battalions were directed to advance on the north side of the high road to the forking of the ravine in the Bois de Genivaux. On arriving there they found all going on well with von Strubberg's brigade. An attempt now made by the 3rd battalion against Moscou was nipped in the bud by the enemy's heavy fire; the 2nd battalion fell back again to the high road and moved on to the plateau, whence it afterwards advanced in the direction of St. Hubert and took part with the 29th and portions of the IInd Corps in the fighting, which occurred during the evening.

H.M. the King had arrived at Gravelotte at 5 o'clock with his head-quarters at the moment the cavalry was retiring from the defile and the contest beyond it had broken out with redoubled violence. The head-quarters were now within reach of the enemy's bullets, and several shells also fell close to the large group of horsemen, although this was purely accidental on the part of the enemy's batteries. General von Steinmetz hastened to report the state of affairs to His Majesty. The Quartermaster-General, Colonel Count Wartensleben, had already been sent to ask for the support of the IIIrd Corps, which originally had been told off as the reserve of the First Army, but at noon, as we have already seen, was with the approval of the Royal head-quarters directed on Vernéville. Consequently the IInd Corps, General von Fransecky, which was formed up at Rezonville, now received orders to march to Gravelotte.

The great artillery mass of the First Army had meanwhile continued the contest wherever it was not masked by the advance of its own troops.[1] Its fire was directed, as already mentioned, on Moscou, Point du Jour, shelter trenches, and various other points. To its co-operation must it be mainly attributed that the objects aimed at by Hasse's and Gnügge's batteries were so successfully cannonaded. The result was that Moscou was set on fire, the mitrailleurs near that farm driven away, and the enemy prevented from bringing up fresh batteries of guns and mitrailleurs. Point du Jour was also set on fire. Columns of hostile infantry which showed themselves on the crest of the hill, or even on the slopes, were invariably cut to pieces by the accurate shell-fire; and especially those bodies of troops which were moving between Moscou, the Bois de Genivaux, and St. Hubert, as well as those which showed themselves at Point du Jour. The fire of this artillery mass moreover was so effective that the French were prevented from assuming the offensive in sufficient force to drive back across the ravine the German troops which still maintained their ground beyond it.

The batteries of horse artillery under Lieut.-Colonel Borckenhagen (8th regiment) in their new position east of Gravelotte were exposed to a heavy fire from French infantry in the Bois de Vaux (probably stragglers), and were consequently obliged to fall back to the eastern outskirts of the village. Major Wilhelmi's horse was wounded.

The French accounts of this period of the battle, although brief, agree generally with the German. 'As the German artillery,' writes Frossard, 'had attained a marked superiority (*quelque ascendant*) over ours, the enemy hastened to take advantage of it. Strong columns of infantry preceded by skirmishers debouched from the woods and ravines of Gravelotte and marched on Point du Jour to seize that important position. General Vergé reinforced the right flank of his threatened first line by two battalions of the 32nd regiment; while General Frossard ordered the 23rd regiment of Bastoul's (2nd) Division

[1] Major Wilhelmi kept No. 6 gun of the 5th Heavy battery of the 7th regiment, i.e. the left gun of his division, under his personal orders, and employed it very successfully to obtain the range of different objects by trial shots, the result being communicated to the neighbouring batteries.

to support the left flank. The fire of our infantry and mitrailleurs checked the enemy's columns and drove them back into the ravine, notwithstanding the heavy cannonade with which this attack was supported.[1] Captain Dupré's mitrailleur battery (2nd Division), having been pushed forward somewhat too far on the road, lost a great number of men and horses in a few minutes.' The battery was extricated and the guns finally withdrawn, covered by the 1st battalion of the 23rd regiment and the 12th battalion of Rifles.[2]

'On the right of Vergé the 4th Division (3rd Corps), under Aymard, was exposed to a terrible fire of artillery, and had also been engaged in opposing the attack directed against Point du Jour, but the force of the assailants was spent against the firm and vigorous resistance which they encountered.' If Frossard means by this that the Germans, in spite of three attacks prepared by a heavy shell-fire, failed to carry the Bois de Genivaux, he must refer to that portion of it south of the forking of the ravine.

8. *The 26th brigade, with the co-operation of the 5th Light battery of the 7th regiment, seizes Vaux and Jussy—The 4th brigade and the 6th Light battery come into action at St. Ruffine—French accounts of this period of the battle.*

In obedience to its orders the 26th brigade, commanded by General von der Goltz, advanced between 2 and 4 P.M. in two columns from Ars sur Moselle against Vaux, one of which marched along the valley and the other through the vineyards on its slopes. Previous to the receipt of the order the 5th Heavy battery, Captain Schreiber, had taken up a position on the high vine-covered hills at Ars, which commanded the valley of the Moselle. It now moved off with the brigade; but unable to advance through the vineyards, it was obliged to march by the road in the valley.

[1] The German infantry held its ground on the eastern edge of the valley. This is confirmed by V. D., who says, '*mais où elle se maintint, malgré les pertes que lui faisait éprouver la convergence de notre tir.*'

[2] This must have occurred at the commencement of the attack made by the 15th Division.

The enemy had placed batteries at Vaux, Jussy, and St. Ruffine, as well as on the heights of Rozérieulles, and had also barricaded the entrances to the villages. Our infantry forced its way under a heavy fire through and beyond Vaux, into the vineyards in front of Jussy, of which village it gained possession after a sharp fight in the streets. Strong bodies of troops were now visible at Rozérieulles and St. Ruffine. General von der Goltz, judging that a serious engagement would have no useful result, ordered his troops to hold their ground without attempting to advance.

As soon as the French skirmishers were even partially driven away, Captain Schreiber, by von der Goltz's orders, led his battery (5. l. VII.) up the steep slope beyond Vaux, and taking up a position in the vineyards between that place and Jussy, threw shells with good effect into the villages of St. Ruffine and Moulins, as well as at hostile columns which showed themselves in their vicinity, at ranges varying between 1,400 and 2,500 paces. To the fire of the French infantry and field guns was added that of the heavy guns of Fort St. Quentin, but to the latter the battery paid no attention, as their shells struck the ground far in rear and more important objects for its fire presented themselves. Among the casualties, which were due almost entirely to the Chassepôt, was Second Lieut. Müller, slightly wounded; who however remained with the battery.

About 5 P.M., after the capture of Jussy, the 6th Light battery, Captain Dolmann (6. l. I.), opened fire from the right bank of the Moselle. In obedience to an army order that a brigade was to operate against the flank of a hostile column advancing in the valley of the Moselle, the 1st Army Corps had directed the 4th brigade, General von Zglinitzki, consisting of the 5th and 45th regiments, reinforced by the 3rd squadron of the 10th Dragoons, the 6th Light battery, and half a company of pioneers, to manœuvre in the direction of Vaux. Reaching Augny at 4.30 P.M., the brigade ascertained the state of affairs at Jussy by reconnaisance, and Dolmann's battery advanced to Orly, escorted by two companies, which were directed on Frescaty. Its shells appeared to strike the village of St. Ruffine, at which they were aimed, although the range was 5,000 paces, and the firing was continued till dark.

An officer, sent from the brigade to communicate with the troops of the VIIth Corps engaged on the left bank, returned at 7 P.M. with the news that they were seriously engaged, and expected the brigade to make a diversion in their favour. As hostile columns were now seen retiring from the field of battle towards the valley of the Moselle in the direction of Metz, the Fusilier battalion of the 5th regiment was pushed forward towards Vaux as far as the railway embankment, with its 9th company towards St. Ruffine. The latter alone succeeded in engaging the enemy, whose columns were apparently thrown into confusion by the heavy fire with which they were plied.

The fire of the guns of Fort St. Quentin directed on the marching columns occasioned no loss.

The contest of infantry at Jussy and St. Ruffine lasted till 11 P.M., when the line of outposts extended along the edges of the Bois de Vaux on the side of Rozérieulles and then across the high road to Jussy.

The French accounts of this period of the battle state that von der Goltz's brigade was opposed by Lapasset's, the village of St. Ruffine being held by the 97th regiment. Marshal Bazaine first learnt during the afternoon that his whole line was attacked, and then rode from Plappeville to Fort St. Quentin. Fay remarks—and nearly all the French writers concur in the opinion—that 'it was apparent to everyone that our antagonist could attempt nothing of importance in this direction.' But Marshal Bazaine—to judge from his own work—thought it possible that the enemy would try to turn the French left flank by means of the army corps on the right bank of the Moselle, especially as the forts, unfinished and scarcely armed, were in no condition to afford any material support. ('Les forts de Metz, inachevés et à peine armés, étaient hors d'état de rendre quelque service sérieux.') Therefore to avert the danger of being cut off from Metz, which he greatly dreaded in consequence of the troops not having yet received their supplies of provisions, Marshal Bazaine was induced to place batteries from the reserve so as to command the valley of the Moselle, and these now replied to the fire of the German artillery.

9. *The First Army is ordered to assume the offensive—Attacks by the 2nd and 3rd French Corps—The 4th Light battery at St. Hubert—Advance of the 32nd brigade—Co-operation of the artillery of the* IInd *Corps with that of the First Army—Arrival of the* IInd *Corps at Gravelotte—Attack of the 3rd Division against Point du Jour and Moscou—Advance against the French left flank—Close of the contest on the German right flank—The 4th Division on the morning of the 19th—The 5th Heavy battery under the guns of Fort St. Quentin.*

At six o'clock the contest at Gravelotte had gradually died away along the whole line, but towards 6.45 P.M. unusually heavy firing was heard in the direction of St. Privat. The Royal head-quarters presumed that this was a fresh and possibly decisive attack by the Second Army, and, to afford direct support, ordered the First Army to advance at once to the attack with all available troops, it being also known that the whole of the IInd Corps was already on the march and therefore might be reckoned on for support.

General von Steinmetz immediately issued the necessary orders to Generals von Zastrow and Goeben, but the number of available troops was small. The position of the VIIth Army Corps was such that its movements necessarily conformed in every way to those of the IInd Army Corps, and will be described below. After the advance of the 40th regiment General von Goeben had no troops at hand except the 72nd regiment, which was in reserve in the ravine; but before the order for its advance reached it, the heavy firing from Moscou and St. Hubert announced a sudden change in the situation.

Some uneasiness was caused to the 2nd and 3rd French Corps by the abrupt renewal of heavy firing on the right flank and along the whole line. General Frossard therefore ordered all the troops in reserve to move up into the first line, a similar movement having already taken place on the left flank of the 3rd Corps, where the Voltigeurs of the Guard had been sent to the front; and at the same time the whole of the artillery reopened fire.

No information is given by French writers as to whether this movement was made with the intention of assuming the offensive or merely to guard against the expected attack of the Germans. This much however is certain, that, in addition to the advance of small bodies of troops from every part of the line, strong masses of troops also rushed forwards with shouts from the hill between Leipsic and Moscou in the direction of St. Hubert and the copses to the north-west.

'Shortly before the outbreak of the hostile fire General von Goeben had become aware that though St. Hubert was sufficiently garrisoned by companies of the 15th and 16th Divisions, there were in and about that place hundreds of stragglers from different battalions, who, without coherence, object, or leaders, and wearied by the long contest, were likely to give way to any sudden pressure. When, therefore, the stillness was broken by the renewed firing, and swarms of tirailleurs advanced from Point du Jour and Moscou, the foremost men fell back, carrying with them those in rear; while the panic increased in proportion to the distance from the supposed danger. The garrison of St. Hubert, although now engaged in the contest, was not affected by this retrograde movement.'

The position of Gnügge's battery (3. l. VII.) was at this time more than ever perilous, great losses being caused by the hostile fire from Point du Jour, which took it in flank and rear. But a sense of the importance of the position induced the commander to maintain it, and he was moreover encouraged to do so by General von Goeben, who had arrived in the vicinity of the battery with General von Kamecke, commanding the artillery of the VIIIth Army Corps.

Even when the mass of stragglers rushed towards the battery Captain Gnügge preserved an unshaken calmness, and endeavoured to 'restore order out of chaos.' Vain attempt! The mighty stream could not be checked, but poured through the battery, where it was overwhelmed by the enemy's fire, and men and horses were crushed together. Everything was obscured by clouds of dust. Captain Gnügge, utterly powerless, saw part of his battery swept away in the general confusion;

[1] From Helmuth's Lecture.

and when the turmoil was over, three guns without limbers and another unhorsed limber were all that remained of the battery in its original position. Collecting however a few gunners and infantry men, about 30 in number, he opened fire with case at a distance of from 300 to 500 paces on the pursuing skirmishers, and repulsed them.[1] The German infantry then again advanced in good order against the enemy's position, so that the battery was unable to fire more than a few rounds in the direction of Point du Jour for fear of hitting some of the troops. Second Lieut. Wintgens had meanwhile removed his division of the battery to a position 200 paces to the rear, near the high road, to support the infantry; there he had time to fire a few rounds of shell and case in the direction of Point du Jour before the guns were masked by the advancing infantry.

The battery did not quit the position where it had behaved so nobly until darkness made it impossible to lay the guns, and the IInd Corps advanced to the assault. Everything that could be removed was carried on the guns; the wounded were conveyed to the rear, and the road as much as possible cleared of the corpses of men and horses. The battery bivouacked with the corps artillery at Gravelotte.

'The mob of stragglers had meanwhile crossed the ravine, spreading confusion on the right and left as far as the detachments which still maintained their ground; so that, notwithstanding the steadiness of the troops in front, the state of affairs appeared to those far in rear to be critical.[2] The 72nd regiment of the 32nd brigade (von Rex) now advanced from the ravine as far as St. Hubert, passing the mob of stragglers with unshaken steadiness and order, and was followed by the 2nd battalion of the 40th regiment. The 2nd battalion of the 72nd attacked Moscou, incurring heavy casualties, but failed to gain possession of the place.

At this moment the IInd Corps reached Gravelotte with

[1] The battery had previously (before 6 P.M.) fired four case-shot, being for the moment without other projectiles, against an ammunition wagon escorted by cavalry, which came forward from behind some cover. The troopers immediately fled, abandoning the wagon. After 6 P.M. Acting Sergeant-Major Haase brought up the long-desired supply of ammunition from Gravelotte.

[2] According to Helmuth.

bugles sounding and drums beating amidst the shouts of thousands. With the permission of the Royal head-quarters General Fransecky had started from Pont à Mousson at 2 A.M. instead of at 4 A.M. At 1 P.M. on the previous day the corps had received orders to march from Mézières to Rezonville, where it formed up in the presence of the King, and then advanced by order of the Royal head-quarters to Gravelotte. The corps artillery, Colonel Petzel, escorted by the 11th Dragoons, was immediately sent forward at a trot with orders to come into action on the west of the ravine.

The 3rd Division, General von Hartmann, followed at 5.45 P.M., and in rear of it the 4th Division, commanded by General Hann von Weihern; the advanced guard of the 3rd Division arrived to the south of Gravelotte at 6.30 P.M. Having asked for orders from General von Steinmetz, the IInd Corps was directed 'to advance against the hills of Point du Jour and Moscou, and to make itself master of the plateau and homesteads.' The struggle there was evidently a hot one, for the Chassepôt and mitrailleur bullets actually reached as far as Gravelotte. Information was received from General von Zastrow that it was possible to march along the high road and on either side of it, but not through the Bois de Vaux. In order to bring up the fresh troops with rapidity it was necessary to advance as far as possible in line; General von Fransecky placed himself at the entrance of the defile to direct the operation.

Before we follow the IInd Corps into action we must return to the contest of the great artillery mass of the First Army at Gravelotte. The guns had ceased firing for some time,[1] when large masses again showed themselves on the opposite heights. Favoured by the form of the ground and approaching twilight the French batteries were not discovered until they opened fire. Although a heavy fire of shell, shrapnel, and mitraille was directed on the German artillery from the hostile position, the loss was trifling. It, in return, shelled with the best effect masses of infantry which showed themselves at Point du Jour, Moscou, and other points; while advancing

[1] Some of the batteries fed their horses and served out rations to the men.

columns were compelled to retreat at ranges of from 1,800 to 2,000 paces. Batteries on the left flank directed their fire apparently with good results against bodies of hostile troops (possibly reserves) not far from the Bois de Vaux at ranges varying from 3,500 to 4,000 paces. In a short time the position of the hostile artillery was discernible only by the flash of the guns, at which our batteries aimed. The enemy soon ceased firing entirely.

The corps artillery of the IInd Corps reached Gravelotte in open column of batteries, but there was no room for it to come into action. Single guns were, however, eagerly pushed forward into the intervals between the Westphalian artillery, and after some trouble space was found on the extreme right flank of the great line of artillery by a division of the 2nd Horse Artillery battery, Captain Rodenwaldt, the 3rd Heavy battery, Captain Zöllner, and the 3rd Horse Artillery battery, Captain Roehl. The two latter fired only one round each against the hostile masses at Point du Jour, and were then ordered to cease firing, as there was danger of hitting our troops as they advanced beyond the defile. The remaining batteries of the corps artillery were obliged to remain to the south-east of Gravelotte. Several casualties were occasioned by musketry and mitrailleurs.

Meanwhile orders to advance were brought by Colonel Count von Wartensleben to the advanced guard of the IInd Corps under Colonel von Decken at 6.45 P.M. The 2nd battalion of Rifles, followed by the 54th regiment, marched along the wooded slope of the ravine. The 1st Light battery, Captain von Eckensteen, belonging to the advanced guard, was, in obedience to orders, on the point of following the infantry into the defile, which was swept by the enemy's musketry and mitrailleurs; but was prevented by the divisional commander, Major Freiherr von Eynatten, because the infantry on reaching the opposite side of the defile became at once engaged in a hot musketry fight. The battery was obliged to move into the great artillery line of the First Army to the east of Gravelotte, and fired a few rounds at 2,000 paces against hostile artillery at St. Hubert, when orders were given to cease firing, to avoid injuring our own advancing troops.

Owing to the limited space the other batteries of the 1st field division experienced great difficulty in aligning themselves with Eckensteen's, as ordered; this, however, they at last accomplished one after the other, but only just as darkness was coming on. Consequently the 2nd Heavy battery, Captain Hildebrandt, and the 2nd Light battery, Captain Linker, were unable to fire more than one round each in this position. The latter had already cannonaded Point du Jour at a range of 2,500 paces from a position near the 5th Heavy battery of the 7th regiment. The 1st Heavy battery, Captain Goetsch, which finally arrived on the left flank of the division, did not come into action.[1] All the batteries incurred casualties from the enemy's musketry fire.

The 3rd field division, Lieut.-Colonel Bauer, in columns of batteries, had followed the leading brigade of the 4th Division on the right flank, and was obliged to remain near at hand in rear of the 1st field division. The 5th Light battery alone was able to come into action on the right flank of the 1st field division, where it fired two rounds of common shell. This division also suffered from the enemy's musketry.

The Pomeranian artillery also was prevented from carrying out its intention of coming into action beyond the defile, for Colonel Petzel found that the defile was almost completely blocked up. When at length it became more free, darkness had intervened, and it was impracticable to take the artillery over. The 1st and 3rd field divisions after moving off were obliged to halt, and several casualties were occasioned by the Chassepôt.

Having traced the movements of the Pomeranian artillery to

[1] The reports of the 1st field division state that the batteries, and especially the ammunition wagons heavily laden with forage, experienced great difficulty in crossing the ravine of la Jurée at the side of the high road. In that of the 1st Heavy battery it is related that 'the battery selected a bye-road leading along the edge of the wood, by which four guns only succeeded in reaching the plateau without accident. On the other hand, two guns were delayed by the halting of an ammunition wagon of the 1st Light battery (of the advanced guard), one of the guns being precipitated down a steep bank with the wheelers. No damage, however, was done, and Lieutenant Klopsch, commanding the division of the battery, succeeded in bringing up both guns half an hour later.'

The assistance of the detachments was also necessary in getting the ammunition wagons up the slope.

the end of the battle, we must return to the other arms. Let it be remembered that the IInd Army Corps after completing the long journey by rail had continuously made forced marches. It had on this day started before midnight and been eighteen hours on the march, but the consciousness that it was destined to decide the day, animated the corps to such an extent that fatigue was forgotten, while the announcement by General Fransecky that it was in the immediate presence of the King was received with loud hurrahs. Resolutely, with colours flying and drums beating, the troops pressed forward towards the ravine.

Thus, long before the news of the decisive success of the Second Army against the French right wing could be received, the head-quarters were convinced that the state of affairs on the right, where the First Army was posted, was secure against all changes of fortune. By order of General von Fransecky the 2nd battalion of Rifles advanced on the south of the high road to cover the right flank and alligned itself with the 39th regiment. Skilfully led, the battalion succeeded, notwithstanding the hostile fire, in approaching in the twilight to within a few hundred paces of Point du Jour, and maintained its position there.

The 54th, which was following, advanced right and left of St. Hubert against Moscou and Point du Jour, sustaining heavy casualties, and established itself at the bend of the road near the latter place. At a few hundred paces from Moscou it suffered severely, not only from the enemy but also from our own infantry in rear, which, losing some men as it advanced, aimed at the spot where the enemy was supposed to be. To avoid this the leading troops at last ceased firing, but maintained the ground already won.

The advanced guard of the Division was soon followed by the main body, seven battalions strong, from the 42nd, 2nd, and 14th regiments, which pressed forward eagerly along the high road and to the south of it. Generals von Hartmann and von Koblinsky endeavoured to keep the troops in hand as much as possible, and General von Barnekow crossed the ravine for the same purpose; but this was rendered almost impossible by the darkness, the want of space in front of the defile, and the general state of affairs. Beyond St. Hubert the leaders were

unable to make the troops act together, and each commander acted on his own responsibility.

Of the main body of the 3rd Division the 2nd and 14th regiments attacked resolutely in the direction of Point du Jour, General Hartmann retaining half a battalion of the 2nd in hand at St. Hubert. In the advance it was impossible to avoid their becoming mixed up with the 54th regiment and portions of the VIIth as well as of the VIIIth Army Corps, but pressing on and passing them, they partially reached the first line. It was 8.30 P.M. when the last regiment (the 42nd) of the Division reached the other side of the ravine, and seeing no opportunity of engaging, formed up with its left flank resting on the high road.

The 4th Division, General Hann von Weihern, which had followed the 3rd, began to arrive to the east of Gravelotte exactly at sunset, consequently after 8 P.M., with the 7th brigade, du Trossel, in front. The 8th brigade, having been met by His Majesty on the march, received him with loyal acclamations and was directed on Gravelotte. Eager to reach the front at all costs, the battalions made their way through the hedges and fences enclosing the wood. As soon as the brigade came up on the left of the 7th, being thus nearest to the defile, it received orders to march towards the plateau. The leading regiment, the 21st, made its way with great difficulty through the crowded defile and halted near St. Hubert to await further orders. A few of its leading companies, however, pressed forward into the front line of the troops engaged against Moscou and Point du Jour, and with a heavy loss took part in the contest.

The 21st regiment was followed by the 61st, which on reaching the defile was ordered by General von Moltke to halt on this side of it. That officer, having watched the progress of events for some time from a position close to the defile, had come to the conclusion that the troops of the IInd Corps beyond the ravine were in sufficient force to secure the victory, while it would be impossible in the darkness to manœuvre with success the vast body of troops now pressing onwards. But the impatience of the men and their officers was not to be repressed, and the 21st also was directed by General von Kettler to march towards the heights occupied by the enemy.

Let us now briefly notice the movements of the VIIth Corps.

At 7 o'clock General von Zastrow had issued orders to von Kamecke's and von Glümer's Divisions to advance to the attack. But in order not to be left entirely without a reserve, three battalions of the 27th brigade of von Kamecke's Division (74th regiment) were left to the east of Gravelotte. General von Glümer, knowing that his only brigade on the spot (the 25th) was much scattered, assembled the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 73rd regiment, and led them along the forest road towards Rozérieulles and the plateau.

'It was now past 8 P.M. and already dark; from the left was heard the din of war, as well as the shouts and bugle calls of the IInd Corps, while General von Glümer advanced against Point du Jour, though there was but little prospect of success against the hostile masses, which soon became visible.'[1] On the right of General von Glümer the 53rd, the 13th, and the 7th Rifles, under Colonels von Frankenberg and von Gerstheim-Hohenstein, were advancing at the same time. By a decisive attack the extreme right flank succeeded in making its way to within 80 paces of the main road, where it held its ground until nearly 10 P.M., when the fighting ceased. The troops then withdrew in good order to the eastern edge of the wood, where the 7th Rifles and the 73rd had placed their outposts.

General von Osten-Sacken had directed the 1st battalion of the 73rd regiment to march towards the north end of the Bois de Vaux, whence it reached the plateau south of the high road and was soon lost among the advancing troops of the IInd Army Corps. General von Woyna was also marching on the same point with part of the 77th regiment of von Kamecke's Division, which, as well as the 39th, advanced mixed up with the 14th regiment against Point du Jour.

At 9.15 P.M. the 'Halt' and 'Assembly' were sounded for the troops beyond the ravine, and at 9.30 P.M. the enemy's fire gradually died away, although every now and then a volley of musketry or an occasional round from a mitrailleur was fired haphazard into the darkness.

[1] From Captain Helmuth's Lecture.

The arrangements for assembling the troops were conducted with the utmost energy under the immediate supervision of the generals in command; a task of considerable difficulty, owing to the darkness, the position of the ravine in rear, and the fact that the troops of three army corps were mixed together! At St. Hubert half of the 2nd battalion of the 2nd regiment and the the 21st and 42nd regiments were formed up, with the 61st just arrived in second line. These battalions were directed by Generals von Hartmann and Hann von Weihern to take up a position to the west of St. Hubert (which was still occupied), extending across the high road from the edge of the wood on the north to that on the south of it, with orders to remain under arms, but not to fire unless they saw the enemy close and distinctly. All other troops were ordered to assemble in the ravine.

It was 2 A.M. before the plateau was clear of the disordered and retiring masses of troops. At St. Hubert the half-battalion of the 2nd regiment had throughout preserved its formation unshaken. Meanwhile the last brigade of the IInd Corps (the 7th, under General du Trossel) was ordered to the front to furnish the outposts; and when this had been done, twelve battalions in addition (the 4th Division, the 42nd regiment, and half of the 2nd) were formed up in line with St. Hubert ready to resume the contest if necessary on the following morning. The Fusilier battalion of the 9th regiment was pushed forward by order of General Hann von Weihern to the bend in the high road, and the 1st company of the 2nd regiment established itself a hundred paces from Point du Jour.

On the left flank von Strubberg's men, reinforced by some companies of the 2nd battalion of the 69th, had finally made themselves masters of the copses extending from the south of the neighbouring defile to the enemy's shelter trench. This line therefore indicated the boundary of the ground won from the enemy. An examination of the map shows that the infantry had forced its way like a wedge into the line Moscou—Point du Jour.

Even after 10 P.M., by which hour the enemy's fire had generally ceased, it broke out again at three distinct periods during the night, disturbing the troops and occasioning casualties. This was possibly intended to cover the enemy's retreat, which

had already commenced at this part of the line. Not a man was left on the following morning except a detachment of 200 men at Point du Jour; being summoned by the colonel of the 9th regiment to lay down their arms, only a few men obeyed, but the party retired firing, when two fusilier companies were ordered to the front. The 2nd battalion of the 9th regiment now occupied Moscou and Point du Jour, which were merely smoking heaps of ruins.

Hann von Weihern's Division was posted astride the high road ready to oppose any offensive movement by the enemy from Metz, and was supported by Lieut.-Colonel Bauer with two batteries (5th Heavy and 5th Light, commanded by Captain Meisner and Rhades), which had been ordered to cross the ravine early in the morning and take up a position at Point du Jour. The pioneers commenced digging gun-pits for the batteries, whose appearance on the plateau was the signal for Fort St. Quentin to open fire from its heavy guns, the shell falling close in front of the batteries and in the intervals between them. The batteries were therefore withdrawn 200 paces and placed under cover until the completion of the pits.

10. *The attack of the Guard Corps on St. Privat, supported by the Hessian field artillery—The French position is pierced at a point S.W. of St. Privat.*

Let us now return to the Guard Corps. It has already been shown that the 1st Division was assembled in and about St. Marie aux Chênes; that the 2nd Division was on the march from the wood east of Jouaville to St. Ail, its van having already reached the latter village, and was forming up; and that the whole of the artillery (exclusive of the batteries attached to the cavalry), together with the Hessian batteries, formed a line extending from St. Marie aux Chênes by St. Ail to the Bois de la Cusse, having already reduced the French guns to silence.

Prince August von Wurtemberg had watched the enemy's position incessantly, and the right moment for decisive operations seemed to have arrived. Movements were observed on the part of the enemy which might be interpreted as indicating an inten-

tion to attack one of the neighbouring corps or as the commencement of a change of position to avoid a decisive engagement at that point. The sun was sinking and the thick smoke made it seem later than it really was; the time available for a battle was evidently short.

The Prince, observing also the increasing activity of the Saxon artillery north of St. Marie and the uneasiness of the enemy at Roncourt, considered that the Saxon troops engaged in the turning movement could not be far from Roncourt. Moreover the difficulty experienced by the IXth Army Corps in maintaining its position in the Bois de la Cusse urgently demanded an attack by the Guard Corps to disengage its left flank. Consequently Prince August decided to attack St. Privat, with the conviction that the co-operation of the Saxon Corps would not long be delayed. This was reported to Prince Frederick Charles, who had ridden up to the hill of Habonville, and could not withhold his consent.

General von Dannenberg conveyed the orders for the attack to both Divisions. The 4th brigade was to advance against St. Privat from St. Ail on the south of the high road, the 1st from St. Marie on the north of it, followed by the 2nd regiment of the 2nd brigade in support. The advanced guard of the 1st Division was to remain for the present at St. Marie, which village was to serve as the *point d'appui* for the attack, as well as a rallying point in the event of a repulse.

Prince August von Wurtemberg rode along the front of the 4th brigade, just then deploying, to St. Marie to confer with General von Pape about the proposed attack. That officer immediately issued orders to the 1st brigade to advance: as it had however to march up from its position in reserve south-west of St. Marie, it could not commence the attack until twenty minutes later than the 4th brigade, which having deployed, advanced soon after 5.30 P.M.

The description of the field of battle has conveyed some idea of the great natural strength of St. Privat, which its garrison had turned to the best possible advantage. At nearly every point the assailants were exposed to the fire of four or five ranks of men, one in rear of the other, supported by shell and shrapnel from several batteries recently brought forward. Neither

St. Privat nor its garrison had as yet suffered from the German artillery.

The 4th brigade of the Guard, General von Berger, had deployed at St. Ail with the precision of the parade. The advance to the attack was simultaneous, the regiment Franz being on the left flank and the reigment Augusta on the right. A battalion of the latter regiment, ordered to escort the artillery, could no longer be kept back from advancing with the other troops, one half joining the right wing of its own regiment, and the other half passing the right of the artillery with part of the 1st battalion of the regiment Alexander, which till now had been posted at Habonville, where the remainder of this battalion was retained for the present as a support.

The bands played the national anthem, but their music was soon drowned by the din of battle, which broke forth on the collision of the combatants. Our infantry incurred heavy casualties from the very commencement of the advance, but pressed onward with gallant impetuosity. It was past 5.30 P.M. and the battle at its height when the 1st brigade of the Guard moved from its position in reserve on the south-east of St. Marie. It marched round the south of St. Marie to the north of the high road to avoid the troops of the 4th brigade in that direction, and already during this flank march was exposed to a heavy fire. On arriving there, the brigade, although losing severely, wheeled to the right so as to bring its flank 600 paces from the road, when it advanced direct against St. Privat. Up to this time the regiments had been formed in contiguous columns of half-battalions, but now by continually reinforcing the foremost troops the line of battle was so ordered that two battalions of the 3rd regiment were on the right flank ; on the left of which were two and a half battalions of the 1st regiment and still further to the left the remaining battalion and a half (1st battalion of the 3rd regiment and a half-battalion of the 1st). In spite of the murderous fire, which mowed down whole ranks of men even at this great distance, the troops pressed forward with admirable bearing.

When the infantry of the Guard advanced to the assault, Prince Hohenlohe ordered the artillery to prepare for the attack by concentrating its fire on St. Privat and the enemy's batteries,

which had reopened fire. But as soon as the infantry had driven in the French tirailleurs, which till then had prevented our batteries advancing, the Prince ordered them to move up in order to support the attack more effectively. Lieut.-Colonel Bychelberg with the 1st field division advanced from the centre, and Colonel von Scherbening with the corps artillery in echelons from the left flank; while still further to the left Lieut.-Colonel Rheinhaben at the same time led the 3rd field division to the front. This division with the two batteries on the left of the corps artillery, under von Mutius and von Grävenitz, which trotted forward at first, opened fire at 1,700 paces on columns of infantry and at 2,000 paces on St. Privat from intermediate positions, which however they were soon obliged to leave, being masked by their own infantry. Here considerable loss was incurred, principally from hostile infantry, Captain von Mutius and Second Lieut. von Vangerow receiving severe wounds, of which the latter eventually died. Captain von Oppell and Second Lieut. von Vangerow had horses killed under them.

A storm of Chassepôt bullets, common and shrapnel shells, was poured on the artillery of the Guard, but in spite of great losses it moved steadily onwards. A fresh position was taken up as close to the enemy as the form of the slope permitted.[1] Owing to the circumstance that the corps artillery inclined somewhat to the right, to give the advancing infantry more room and also to avoid being masked, the relative position of the 1st Heavy battery of the Guard, von Sametzki, with regard to the other batteries was changed. With the assent of Lieut.-Colonel Bychelberg it wheeled to the right by divisions and made a flank march along the rear of the other batteries, afterwards coming into action on this right of this division. During the movement it incurred but few casualties, notwithstanding the enemy's heavy fire.

The advance of the artillery as well as of the infantry of the Guard was supported by the Hessian batteries, which confronted the heights of Amanvillers and were drawn up in echelon on the right rear. It will be seen that some of them afterwards came up into line on the right of the artillery of the Guard

[1] The slope is irregular. Had the artillery advanced further at that time, it would have found itself in a hollow and been unable to see anything.

The infantry meanwhile continued eagerly to press forwards, without waiting until the artillery could take up its second position nearer the enemy. The batteries could only come into action between the advancing columns by degrees. The new line was not completed, and only a few of the batteries had just reopened fire when the attack of the infantry was brought to a standstill. At a distance of 800 paces from St. Privat the left wing of the 4th brigade was exposed to a biting fire of artillery and infantry, which compelled it to halt. It now received orders from the corps commandant to abandon the attack and maintain its hold of the ground it had won. A stationary musketry contest ensued. Very great loss was occasioned by hostile infantry behind the hedge, enclosing the road which runs to the south-west corner of St. Privat. It was, however, dislodged by a combined attack made in front and rear by parties from both regiments.

A detachment from the right wing of this brigade had already succeeded in seizing that part of the hill of St. Privat which juts out towards the south-west. This was from 1,000 to 1,300 paces from the village, and was in fact part of the French main position. The detachment was presently attacked by strong columns from Amanvillers, probably of Cissey's Division. The few companies at hand held their ground resolutely, but with great difficulty, against the enemy's superior force.[1] The important point was in danger of being lost. Generals von Berger and von Budritzky, who were actively engaged in the struggle, looked anxiously for the advancing artillery. But the cry from the hill for support had already reached the 2nd Heavy battery of the Guard, commanded by Captain von Prittwitz. Without waiting for orders it advanced up the slope, and coming into action near the hard-pressed infantry, maintained the important point against all attacks. But heavy losses were caused by the hostile musketry fire, and Lieutenant von Winterfeld was severely wounded. In its advance three guns were temporarily left behind, one of them having lost all its drivers. In this position the battery fired on the hostile columns

[1] Consisting of Falkenstein's and Arnim's companies of the regiment Augusta, and two sections of the regiment Alexander.

and skirmishers at a range of 800 paces with such effect that they were compelled to halt.

The battery, however, was not alone. With equal daring Captain von Friederici-Steinmann was advancing with the 3rd Light battery of the Guard to come into action somewhat further to the north. Forming the last echelon of the corps artillery, it was only just on the point of taking up a position in the great line of artillery confronting St. Privat, when General von Berger made his request for support to the divisional commander, Major von Krieger. By order of that officer the battery, passing along the rear of the other batteries of the division, advanced to the hill. It also was exposed to a deadly fire, but came into action, notwithstanding the heavy casualties incurred. The captain of the battery fell severely wounded, and died soon afterwards. The command devolved on Lieutenant Schmalz. The enemy was shelled at ranges of from 1,000 to 1,100 paces. By the fire of the batteries, in conjunction with the obstinate resistance of the weak body of infantry, the foremost troops of the enemy were repulsed and possession of the important point maintained.

The 4th Heavy battery of the Guard, Captain Seeger, next came into action between these two batteries, and all three directed a deliberate and most effective fire at 1,500 paces against the hostile masses which continued to advance from Amanvillers.

Almost in a line with the 4th brigade and within 400 or 500 paces of the enemy, the attack of the 1st brigade was also checked. After losing nearly all its officers and half its men, it nevertheless held its ground under a heavy fire with four and a half battalions in a thin line fronting St. Privat, while by order of General von Kessel a half-battalion and a company of pioneers, forming an angle with the remainder of the brigade, faced Roncourt. The 6th battalion (1st of the 3rd regiment) had diverged further to the north and joined the Saxon troops.

General von Pape had remained with the 1st brigade in the foremost line, encouraging the troops by his presence. Its critical position, and the gap now formed between it and the 4th brigade, did not escape his notice. He therefore at 6 P.M. ordered up the 2nd regiment of the Guard to connect the brigades. Accompanied by Brigadier-General von Medem, it pressed reso-

lutely forwards under the renewed fire of the enemy. Its battalions with great gallantry reached the foremost line, and after losing many officers and men filled up the gap between the brigades, General von Medem being among the wounded. General von Pape had his horse killed under him, and several of his staff were either killed or wounded.

A regiment of Chasseurs of du Barail's Division charged the left flank, but was repulsed with great loss by a well-directed volley from the 2nd battalion of the 1st regiment. The 2nd Lancers of the Guard saw the hostile cavalry and dashed forward from its position west of St. Marie, but was unable to get to close quarters.

The position of the left wing was still critical. In consequence of a report to this effect made by General von Kessel, General von Pape ordered the 4th regiment of the Guard to march to its support. Towards 6.30 P.M. it advanced from the west of St. Marie and was ordered by Prince August von Wurtemberg to keep as much as possible under cover in the hollow ground as far as the meadow close to the south edge of the wood, which it was then to follow to the left flank of the 1st brigade. By skilfully taking advantage of the ground as it advanced, the regiment succeeded in prolonging the left of the line without any very serious loss and in getting within 800 paces of the north-west corner of St. Privat. It was 7 P.M. and the co-operation of the Saxons had for some time made itself felt.

According to the statements of Lieut.-Colonel de Montluisant the great losses of the Guard Corps must be attributed to the biting fire of the 9th battalion of Rifles no less than to the French shell and shrapnel, which were very effective against its columns of infanty even at a range of 3,000 yards. We conclude from the French reports that the seventeen battalions of the Guard, exclusive of the four battalions left behind to garrison St. Marie, were opposed by nearly 40,000 men, consisting of by far the greater part of the 6th Corps, as yet nearly intact, and Cissey's Division of the 4th Corps, most of whose battalions wheeled to the right to attack the Guard Corps.

In spite of this numerical disproportion and the great advantage of position enjoyed by the French, the troops of th

Guard Corps, unaided, had now succeeded in enveloping St. Privat on the south-west, west, and north-west at a distance of 800 paces. Part of the 4th brigade had moreover already forced its way like a wedge into the enemy's main position, had broken the connection between the 4th and 6th French Corps,[1] and now held its ground materially supported by three batteries of the Guard. To continue the contest, however, was impossible; it was now necessary to await the effect of the artillery on St. Privat and the development of the attack of the Saxon Army Corps. Orders to halt were therefore issued to the foremost troops of the infantry of the Guard, and had to be repeated owing to the eagerness of the troops to push forward.

11. *Continuation of the artillery contest between the Bois de la Cusse and de Genivaux—Attack of Amanvillers—The* 18*th Division at Chantrenne, supported by artillery of the* III*rd Army Corps.*

Meanwhile the IXth Army Corps had continued the contest. On the more open high ground in the centre, artillery was mainly employed, while on the two flanks resting on the Bois de Genivaux and de la Cusse infantry maintained the struggle.

We have seen that the hostile artillery here had already been silenced. Thick swarms of skirmishers now showed themselves between Montigny la Grange and Amanvillers in the vicinity of the French camp; on them the nine batteries[2] under General von Puttkammer concentrated their fire at ranges of from 1,800 to 2,500 paces. To obtain a more direct fire Captain Freiherr von Eynatten, with the permission of General von Puttkammer, wheeled his three batteries of the 1st field division an eighth of a circle to the left, which was executed by the 2nd Light battery advancing 300 paces and at the same time bringing its right shoulder forward, the other batteries being aligned with it. This advantage was of course gained with loss of cover, the effect

[1] It was probably Péchot's brigade which had been driven back.

[2] (1. r.) First Lieut. Franck, (3. r. III.) First Lieut. von Gizycki, of the 3rd field artillery regiment; (2. r.) Captain König, (1. l.) Second Lieut. Jourdan *for* Koch, (2. l.) Captain Freiherr von Eynatten, (1. s.) Second Lieut. Puttkammer *for* Werner II., (4. l.) Captain Mente, of the 9th regiment, (r. H.) Lieut. Brandt *for* Captain Schäffer-Bernstein, and (5. l. G.) Captain von Unruhe.

of which was soon felt, the Chassepôt adding fresh casualties to the heavy losses previously incurred. But, encouraged by the words of General von Puttkammer and the example of their officers, the men continued to work their guns with great gallantry.

The 1st Light battery (Second Lieut. Jourdan *for* Captain Koch) experienced exceptional difficulty in moving into the new position. The detachments had been so thinned that the guns could only be unlimbered with the greatest difficulty. One of them sustained such heavy losses that it had to be left in its old position, and afterwards joined the 2nd line of wagons. No riding-horse was left in the battery, so that the captain himself was obliged to walk. Second Lieut. Jourdan and some men were severely wounded by the explosion of a cartridge while loading. But the French infantry was soon forced to retire by the accurate and concentrated fire of the batteries under the orders of Generals von Puttkammer and von Bülow at ranges varying from 1,600 to 3,500 paces.

There was now a considerable pause in the battle, which however was frequently broken by successive attacks of bodies of infantry, while the attempts made by the enemy to bring forward fresh batteries of guns and mitrailleurs were always frustrated by the concentrated fire of the German artillery. But some losses were experienced by the latter from the hostile artillery, as well as from small parties of infantry, which, covered by hollow roads and inequalities of ground, it was impossible wholly to drive away. A limber of Jourdan's battery was completely destroyed by a French shell.

Let us now turn to the offensive movements made by the IXth Army Corps. The attack was simultaneous with that of the Guard Corps and in support of it. When General von Manstein observed that the 4th brigade was advancing, he sent orders about 5.30 P.M. to General von Knappe to lead the 3rd brigade of the Guard to the attack of Amanvillers; at the same time General von Wittich was to advance along both sides of the railway, the 4th regiment forming his reserve under Colonel von Lyncker.

The Commander in Chief had indeed held out the prospect of aiding General von Manstein with a brigade of the IIIrd Corps in case of an attack, but it failed to appear. General von Alven-

sleben, on being informed of this, had decided to advance wi whole of the IIIrd Corps to the point where his presence w quired. Both Divisions had already started from Vernéville the enemy was reported to be advancing against the right fl the IXth Corps. At the same time, 4.30 P.M., the din of wa again heard at its height in the direction of St. Hubert; it se indeed that the battle was extending towards the west, the reported movement of the enemy made highly pro This was of such moment that General von Alvensleben sidered he had no choice but to meet the movement, and fore led his infantry to the west of the Bois de Genivaux, le General von Manstein to his own resources.

Meanwhile General Knappe von Knappstädt had a P.M. put his brigade in motion. In the first line the bat of Rifles was to march through the Bois de la Cusse again hill north-west of Amanvillers, with the remaining two batt of the Emperor Alexander's regiment on its right, whil Elizabeth Grenadiers with the 2nd and 3rd Pioneer com were for the present held in reserve.[1]

The description of the battle field shows that even i direction the French position was naturally strong, althou approach to it was concealed to within 1,000 paces by the de la Cusse.

The 3rd brigade of the Guard, six battalions strong, adv against Lorencez's entire Division of thirteen battalions. consequence of this formidable attack it was, according to necessary to reinforce the Division. The left wing was s east of Amanvillers and the right extended towards the ra where it touched Cissey's left flank.

But to appreciate fully the difficulty of the task impos this brigade of the Guard, it must be understood that the G artillery had been able to sweep the left flank of this part French position only, the right flank having remained en unmolested. On the advance of the infantry to the attac batteries of the IIIrd and IXth Corps fired with increased ra against the hostile troops on the hill between Amanviller

[1] It has been mentioned above that the 5th Light battery of the Guard, von Unruhe, attached to this brigade, came into action about 5 P.M.

[2] This is the probable number of battalions.

Montigny la Grange, and continued to do so until masked by the advance of its own infantry on the left. After this the enemy was held in check on the heights further to the south, and by this means prevented from advancing against the right flank of the assailants.

According to the order of attack the battalion of Rifles of the Guard now led the way from the east side of the Bois de la Cusse, which was occupied in force by the 3rd Hessian regiment, and advanced against the hill north-west of Amanvillers. The battalion was immediately exposed to a heavy fire, but continued resolutely to advance, notwithstanding the heavy losses incurred, to within a few hundred paces from the hollow road leading from St. Ail to Amanvillers, which was lined by French infantry in great force. Having lost all its officers and half its men, with both flanks and rear exposed to the enemy's fire, the battalion formed a thin and irregular line, maintaining its position without attempting to advance.

The two battalions of the regiment Alexander advanced up the gully on the south edge of the wood against Amanvillers. On General Knappe von Knappstädt being severely wounded Colonel von Zeuner took the command of the brigade. Both battalions pressed forward under a heavy fire with equal determination; the Fusilier battalion getting the touch of the Rifles on its left, while the 2nd battalion, inclining to the right, worked its way towards Amanvillers, passing the left flank of the batteries, and on the flat hill south-west of that village, relieved the Hessian Rifles, exhausted by a contest of three hours, in which they had spent their last cartridge. The farm of Champenois was also occupied by a party of the regiment Alexander, its previous garrison having evacuated it. But the heroism of these battalions of the Guard was not rewarded by the capture of the enemy's position. After incurring terrible losses, especially of officers, they were obliged to halt a few hundred paces from the enemy's position, where they kept up a hot fire of musketry. During this time energetic and frequent attacks of hostile infantry were repulsed by the deliberate fire of the infantry and artillery of the Guard on the hill south-west of St. Privat; and cavalry, which repeatedly showed itself between Amanvillers and Montigny la Grange, was obliged to retire.

With difficulty did these three battalions hold the
they had won, against the superior numbers of the
especially as a gap had formed between the 2nd and
battalions of the regiment Alexander. To fill this the Eli
Grenadiers received orders to move up at 6.15 P.M. Wh
2nd battalion of that regiment remained for the pres
reserve, the other two battalions advanced resolutely u
murderous fire, but were unable to push beyond the
the foremost deployed line. But as the situation of t
brigade was critical, the last battalion of the regiment Eli
was ordered up at 7.30 P.M. It must be mentioned th
skirmishers of the 2nd company of pioneers of the Guar
also engaged.

The result of the contest was that Knappe's brigac
gained a position, the centre and most advanced port
which was the flat hill south-west of Amanvillers; its lef
being a few hundred paces from the hollow road occupied
enemy and about the same distance from the guard's hc
the railway, which the Hessians had meanwhile occupiec
its right flank extending as far as the artillery immediately
south of the Bois de la Cusse, a detachment having oc
Champenois.

Soon after the 4th brigade of the Guard on the l
advanced to storm the hill and about the same time w
charge of the Rifles on the right, Prince Louis of He
obedience to orders, gave the signal for attack.[1] Gener
Wittich accordingly made the following dispositions :—T
battalions of the 1st and 2nd Hessian regiments, after join
detachments of Rifles already on the north of the railwa
to advance on that side of it, and the 2nd battalion of
regiment immediately south of it. Portions of the 2nd
which had been ordered by Colonel von Lyncker to hc
railway embankment, could not resist the prevailing enth
and voluntarily joined the advancing troops.

By this time the 4th brigade of the Guard had eff
breach in the enemy's main position south of St. Privat, t
exposed in front and on its right flank to a heavy fire from

[1] Captain Helmuth's Lecture.

and Lorencez's Divisions. Against these the Hessians now directed their attack, unchecked by the bloody loss occasioned by the enemy's overwhelming fire. The Hessians connected themselves with the 4th brigade of the Guard on the left, and with the 3rd brigade on the right, and succeeded in forcing their way until in line with the guard's house on the railroad and the gully which runs north-east to St. Privat, thereby supporting the great line of artillery which, as we have seen, was gradually forming between St. Privat and the Bois de la Cusse. The gallant Hessians could however advance no further. General von Wittich indeed led a detachment of infantry on the right flank against the hollow road to disengage the battalion of Rifles, but found that it was impossible to drive back the superior forces of the enemy strongly posted under cover.

Detachments of the 3rd Hessian regiment also advanced from the eastern edge of the Bois de la Cusse to disengage the hard-pressed 3rd brigade of the Guard on the left flank, and was joined by the 84th and 36th regiments, with all the strength that the bloody struggle had left them. Heavy losses were again incurred, but the troops were unable to dislodge the enemy.

On the right flank of the IXth Corps at Chantrenne the state of affairs had remained unchanged. The infantry, in spite of repeated attacks, executed with the greatest energy and heavy casualties, had been unable to obtain possession of the strongly occupied copses at la Folie.[1] Artillery now advanced to its support. By General von Bülow's order Colonel von Dresky directed the 2nd field division of the 3rd regiment of artillery, Captain Stumpf, to wheel half-right, so as to bring a more effective fire to bear on the copses. The enemy's guns at a distance of from 1,700 to 1,800 paces were indeed frequently silenced, but reopened fire as often as our own infantry advanced to renew the attack.

General von Alvensleben now ordered, 6 P.M., a heavy fire to be concentrated on the copses by the divisional batteries, which had been held in reserve; and the four heavy batteries of the

[1] From Captain Helmuth's Lecture.

Divisions advanced by order of General von Bülow. C
Stöphasius at once moved to the front with the 1st an
Heavy batteries, Captain Nöldecke and Second Lieut. Châ
Beaulieu, from the reserve position at Anoux la Grange.
reduction of the teams, by the bloody battle of the 16th, t
horses each, and the thick clay forbad a rapid movement;
6.45 P.M. before these batteries could come into action
west of L'Envie. After this, when darkness was comi
Lieut.-Colonel Beck came up on the left with the 5th a
Heavy batteries, Captains Eunicke and Meinecke, those
having in obedience to orders reconnoitred during the aft
a position near the 1st field division of the 9th regiment
view to support it after the withdrawal of the corps artil
the IXth Corps; but on the arrival of the horse artillery ba
of the corps artillery, by directions from another quart
lieut.-colonel had received counter-orders. During the
naissance, which was conducted under a heavy fire, Lieu
and Adjutant Cordemann was wounded. As soon as the
batteries made their appearance at L'Envie, Captain von U
with the 5th Light battery of the Guard, placed himself c
left flank.

Having obtained a fresh supply of ammunition fr
Prussian batteries in the vicinity, the two guns of the H
horse artillery battery still serviceable came into action
the hostile infantry south of Amanvillers. But their
pieces became so jammed by fouling that they also we
abled and were removed by Lieutenant Brandt to the l
north of Vernéville.

The mass of artillery at Chantrenne and L'Envie, wh
gradually increased to nine batteries, was ordered by
von Bülow to enfilade the south edge of the copses of-l
at a range of from 1,700 to 2,000 paces.[1] The 2nd
battery, commanded by Châles de Beaulieu, advanced
what beyond the line, bringing forward its right shoulde
clear of the infantry. That the effect was excellent was

[1] In order from left to right the batteries stood as follows:—(5. l. G.) C
Unruhe, (5. s.) Captain Eunicke, (6. s.) Captain Meinecke, (1. s.) Captain
(2. s.) Second Lieut. Châles de Beaulieu, (3. s.) Captain Vosz, (4. s.) Captain
(3. l.) First Lieut. Beck, and (4. l. III.) Captain Müller II.

by the cessation of the hostile musketry fire and by the number of corpses afterwards found shattered by shell. Some mitrailleurs also, which had taken up a position in the twilight at the south-west corner of the wood, ceased firing after a few rounds. In this stage of the battle the batteries sustained considerable loss from the enemy's musketry fire, to which the right flank in particular was exposed.[1]

Although General von Wrangel had ordered the 3rd company of Rifles to Chantrenne to support the assault of the two battalions of the 85th regiment, these five weakened Prussian battalions, pitted against ten French battalions in a strong position, were unable to wrest from them a decisive victory. The two battalions of the 85th and a detachment of the 36th had however occupied the angle of the wood south of Chantrenne, and the farm itself was garrisoned by the weakened 3rd battalion of the latter regiment, which had moreover expended all its ammunition. Portions of the 2nd battalion of the 36th and of the Rifles then advanced from the east, but were repulsed with great carnage. Perceiving this, the 2nd battalion of the 84th, forming with two battalions of the 11th the reserve at Vernéville, sent forward two companies in support at 6.15 P.M., which however in spite of their resolute attack, attended by heavy losses, were unable to give a favourable turn to the fight.

General von Blumenthal now determined to make a last attempt with the 1st battalion of the 85th. Advancing resolutely, it reached the road running parallel with the wood at a distance of a few hundred paces; where, exhausted and weakened by its great losses, it was reduced to maintaining a brisk musketry fire. An attack made by the enemy against the left flank was effectually repulsed.

As darkness was gradually falling on the blood-stained battle field, General von Blumenthal concentrated the troops in the captured position, the 36th Rifles repulsing several hostile attacks by musketry and finally making an advance of a hundred paces to the right. In the last moments of the contest General Lebœuf had considered it necessary to reinforce his menaced right flank by fresh troops, as described below.

[1] Some of the batteries state that this fire came from Champenois, which, at any rate, was not occupied by our infantry at that moment.

12. *Advance of the corps artillery of the Saxon Army C prepare the assault of Roncourt—Evacuation of R by the French—Attack of St. Privat.*

We left the Saxon Army Corps disposed in the fol manner. Prince George of Saxony was marching wi 48th infantry, and the light cavalry brigades, with the ba attached to them, along the valley of the Orne to tu enemy's right flank. The 45th brigade had occupied the of the wood east of Auboué facing Roncourt and, with operation of the twelve batteries posted on its right rear hill north of St. Marie, was engaged in keeping the en play until the turning movement was completed. One ba of this brigade watched Montois la Montagne. The 4 gade, having reformed at St. Marie, was in the act of takir position in reserve near the above wood. No precise had as yet been issued to the 46th brigade, which howe marching in the same direction.[1]

Meanwhile the 45th brigade now advanced on the Roncourt, slowly driving in the swarms of hostile skir across the ground between that village and the wood. right of this brigade at 6 P.M. the troops covering the le of the 1st brigade of the Guard—the 1st battalion of regiment of the Guard and half a battalion of the 1st re —advanced to the attack, not without considerable lo opened a brisk fire.

From previous reconnaissances Roncourt was consid be strongly held, although the ground beyond it co be seen into, owing to the ridge which extends from St. to that place; the enemy was however supposed to force at that point also. To prepare the assault Funcke was ordered by the Crown Prince of Saxony to a to close quarters with the corps artillery in echelon of b

[1] The 23rd Division, moreover, was prevented from seeing the atta Guard Corps against St. Privat by the thick smoke which hung between t batteries and the enemy's right flank.

from the left. Two positions were taken up in succession, the second being in line with the 54th brigade, and its left flank resting on the wood. The 2nd Heavy battery, Leonhardi, was brought up to Montois to join the outflanking column, but the 2nd field division was, in consequence of a mistaken order, withdrawn to the 47th brigade further westwards.[1] This division was then ordered by the corps commandant to come into action in the last position on the left of the corps artillery, to increase the weight of its fire, but Major Richter only found room enough there for two batteries, the 4th Heavy and the 4th Light, Captain Groh and Major von der Pforte.[2] The losses sustained by the Saxon batteries were occasioned principally by musketry. Lieut.-Colonel Schörmer, commanding the column division, who had directed the operation of supplying ammunition, was here severely wounded.

The left wing of the Saxon artillery overwhelmed Roncourt with shell at ranges of from 2,600 to 2,900 paces from its first position, and of from 2,200 to 2,300 paces from its second. The right wing also fired with equally good effect against St. Privat and the batteries placed north-east of that village, until at length only a few of the latter still held their ground. Müller's battery of horse artillery opened fire with shrapnel on advancing columns of infantry at 2,000 paces, apparently with good effect.

While General von Craushaar with the 45th brigade and the artillery thus carried out the wishes of the corps commandant by preparing the attack against Roncourt and keeping the enemy in play, the 48th and troops attached to it had deployed at Montois at 6 P.M., and the Crown Prince of Saxony, who was watching them, saw that the movement had made such progress that the assault of Roncourt was near at hand. He therefore rode from St. Marie and joined General von Craushaar. This was at 6.30 P.M.—about the time that the left flank of the 1st brigade of the Guard was being prolonged by the 4th regiment. The

[1] From Captain Helmuth's Lecture. According to the report of the Saxon artillery, the 2nd field division remained a quarter of an hour at most with this brigade.

[2] Pforte's battery also, to judge from its own account, did not open fire, being masked by the batteries in its vicinity.

struggle at St. Privat, carried on with unwonted vehemence, ha for some time been perceptible. Of the 48th brigade Colon Schulz ordered the 107th regiment on the right to advance fro the west and two battalions of the 106th from the north again Montois, which was reported to be occupied; they were followe by the 2nd battalion of Rifles. The 107th found, however, th the place was already abandoned. Schulz's brigade therefo wheeled immediately to the right against Roncourt, on its bei discovered that the wood south of Montois had also been ev cuated. Detaching three companies to cover the flank towar Malancourt, whence shots had been fired, the 106th regime (5 companies) moved against the north-east of Roncourt. was about 6.30 P.M. when this combined assault, which had be concerted by the Crown Prince and Prince George of Saxony, w commenced by the 45th brigade from the woods against t west side of Roncourt and by the 48th from Montois against t north side.

Both princes expected to find Roncourt as well as the grou immediately in rear of it strongly occupied. But in fact Marsh Canrobert had already withdrawn nearly the whole of his troo which originally occupied this part of the position in force, order to concentrate them opposite the Guard, at that mome checked in its attack, and to meet the turning movement of t Saxons, which had then been discovered. Consequently t XIIth Corps made more rapid progress than the Crown Prince h ventured to hope.

In the first line of the 48th brigade were the five availab companies of the 106th regiment on the left flank and the 107 on the right; followed by the 2nd Rifles in support. In the fi line of the 45th brigade the 1st battalion of the 101st Grenadie was on the left; on the right of which came the 108th regimer a battalion and a half of the 100th Body Guard Grenadiers, ar on the right flank half a battalion of the 1st and a battalion the 3rd regiment of the Guard, as well as the 1st company pioneers. The remainder of the 100th Body Guard Grenadie formed the 2nd line, and the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 101 Grenadiers the 3rd line. Prince George was with the 108 regiment, and General von Craushaar on the right flank of h brigade.

Although the cavalry found no object of attack, the artillery attached to the turning column came into action immediately after the capture of Montois, in order to prepare the way against the French right flank, and—which was of most importance—to indicate to the 23rd Division, according to agreement, that the outflanking column had reached Montois and was ready to advance. Its first shots were in fact the signal for the commencement of the combined assault to which reference has been made above.

From a position south-west of Montois the 1st Light battery, Captain Lengnik (1. l. XII.), opened fire on Roncourt at a range of 2,500 paces with common shell and shrapnel, and on the advance of the infantry moved forward to a range of 1,700 paces, coming into action and again firing at the village. The effect of this fire, to which was added that of the 2nd Light battery (2. l. XII.), Captain Westmann, which also came into action at this spot, was apparently good.

The hostile skirmishers, which till then had held their ground, retired before our infantry to Roncourt, the village itself falling almost at the same time into the hands of detachments of the two Saxon brigades as well as of the Guard. It was garrisoned by the 108th regiment and held against all counter movements of the enemy. The 1st battalion of the 101st regiment, the 3rd battalion of the 107th, as well as two battalions of the 106th regiment, became engaged in a brisk musketry fight with the hostile troops occupying the wood of Jaumont and could not advance.

The 2nd Heavy battery, Leonhardi, which had soon followed the light batteries of the 1st field division, came into action further to the east, but did not fire, as Roncourt was already evacuated. The 1st Horse Artillery battery (1. r. XII.), Captain Zenker, having with the brigade of cavalry under General von Senfft-Pilsach brought up the rear of the turning column, could not consequently come into action on the east of Montois until a quarter of an hour after the field batteries. A few rounds then sufficed to drive away two bodies of infantry, which were seen at the edge of the wood south of that place.

Meanwhile Lieutenant von Esebeck, orderly officer to General von Pape, had been sent to the Saxons for information. He

met General von Craushaar and then the commander of the 107th regiment, Colonel von Schweinitz, and impressed on both those officers the desperate situation of the Guard as well as the importance of attacking St. Privat without delay. Eager to support their comrades the Prussians in this emergency, they with some of the Saxon infantry diverged even before the capture of Roncourt from the direction in which they were moving, without waiting for further orders.

Under the pressure of circumstances it was impossible to avoid a temporary confusion among the tactical units of the infantry. General von Craushaar directed the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 101st regiment from the 3rd line against St. Privat, detachments of the 1st and 3rd regiments of the Guard[1] and the 100th Body Guard regiment also making a similar change of direction. The latter had not yet completed the wheel, when Colonel von Schweinitz with the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 107th regiment came up and passed through it. The report sent by the colonel to the brigadier of his having decided to advance against St. Privat was not received, as the officer carrying it was struck down.

Of the Saxons the two battalions of the 107th regiment came first into collision with the French troops lining the walls, which ran parallel to the north side of St. Privat, and encountered an obstinate resistance. Exposed to a rapid musketry fire in front and taken in flank by the hostile batteries east of St. Privat, these battalions incurred heavy casualties, and Colonel von Schweinitz was killed. But the troops pressed resolutely forwards. The enemy did not wait to receive the attack behind the walls but retired, the 107th immediately establishing itself among them.

General von Craushaar also led forward the above-named troops of his own brigade and of the Guard on either side of the 107th, which then again advanced. Loud hurrahs from the right announced that they had got into connection with the 4th regiment of the Guard, with which they now moved to the assault. These troops lost heavily, but their progress was not checked. The left flank suffered less, thanks to the use made

[1] Other portions of both these battalions continued to march in the original direction.

of the cover afforded by heaps of stones and inequalities of the ground. The enemy was soon driven from the walls, and in fact a square enclosure, immediately connected with the north-west corner of St. Privat, was already in the hands of the assailants.[1]

During this attack a brisk rattle of musketry was heard in rear at Roncourt. Half a battalion of the 3rd regiment of the Guard, which had advanced with the other troops against St. Privat, inferring that the state of affairs at Roncourt was very critical, considered it necessary to return to that place. The enemy had indeed made an attempt to advance from the wood against that village, but had been repulsed by the 1st battalion of the 101st regiment.

The exertions of the Crown Prince and Prince George of Saxony had been directed meanwhile to preventing the troops engaged in this improvised attack from being thrown into disorder. Prince George pushed forward the 108th regiment towards St. Privat in support to within 600 paces of the foremost fire-line; while a battalion from the 46th brigade, which had reached Roncourt towards 7.30 P.M., was ordered to support the 106th regiment in the ravine east of that village.

13. *The artillery of the Guard Corps prepares the final assault on St. Privat—That of the* XII*th* (*Saxon*) *Corps opens fire on the village—Roncourt is occupied and St. Privat stormed—French accounts of the 6th Corps—The artillery of the Guard,* X*th*, XII*th Corps, and of the Hessian Division form a line from the Forêt de Jaumont to the Bois de la Cusse—The final assault on Amanvillers—The Germans do not pursue—Saxon cavalry in the valley of the Moselle—Losses of the combatants.*

It was past 7.15 P.M.; the advance was checked along the whole line of the Saxon and Guard Corps; time was required to recover breath and reform previous to a final assault on the village of St. Privat. But the pause was filled up by a brisk fire-fight, principally of artillery, to which we must now again turn our attention. We left the artillery of the Guard in the act of taking up a position, from which to prepare the final

[1] Portions of the 101st Grenadiers and of the 4th regiment of the Guard.

assault. A few only of the batteries were able at first to ope fire for this purpose, while three batteries of the Guard wei engaged on the hill south-west of St. Privat in keeping up a h fire on Amanvillers.

In compliance with the suggestion of General von Budritzk Colonel von Scherbening ordered the 2nd field division, Maj von Krieger, to bring forward its right shoulder, so as to obtain more effective fire against the hill on which St. Privat is situate The formation of the slope[1] did not allow of the whole of th artillery approaching nearer to the village than from 1,500 t 2,000 paces. Being masked by advancing infantry, von Roehl and von Oppell's batteries (4. l., 6. s. G.) came into action nor of the high road.

As soon as the fire had been kept up for some time from th new position, General von der Goltz gave permission to Maj von Buddenbrock to advance with the 1st and 3rd Hor Artillery batteries of the Guard, Captains von der Planitz ar von Anker, from the rendezvous position of the Cavalry Divisi of the Guard west of St. Ail, and come into action in the ga which had been formed between von Rheinhaben's division an the corps artillery by the movement above-mentioned. Th major now assumed command of the three horse artiller batteries of the Guard which had thus been accidentally brougl together at this point.

Shortly after this the first batteries of the Xth Corps can into action. General von Voigts-Rhetz with his staff had ridde forward to St. Ail about 6 P.M. in advance of his corps, whi was on the march from Batilly to that place. Considering advisable to bring a more powerful fire of artillery to bear o St. Privat, he ordered Colonel von der Becke to move th corps artillery (Colonel von der Goltz) to the front. The 20t Division was directed to form up in rear of St. Ail. Colon von der Becke led the six batteries of the corps artillery throug the difficult defile between Batilly and St. Ail, and in obedien to direct orders from General von Voigts-Rhetz the 1st and 3 Horse Artillery batteries (Captain Frisch and Lieutenant Ma card), under Captain Saalmüller, came at once into acti between von Buddenbrock's and von Rheinhaben's divisions.

[1] *Vide* page 266.

The artillery of the Guard was further reinforced on the right flank also. After the successful advance of the Hessian infantry, Hoffmann's and Leydhecker's batteries (2. s. and 2. l. H.), under the command of Major Herget, were ordered to come up into line by Lieut.-Colonel Stumpf, who was present with this part of his artillery, which he had intended should be the first to advance, being still intact and having a sufficient supply of ammunition. The other three Hessian batteries, with the horse artillery gun [1] and the 3rd Heavy battery of the 9th regiment, were continuing their fire with good effect against hostile artillery, mitrailleurs, and advancing columns.

Exposed to a terrible fire of musketry, the whole of the artillery, notwithstanding the great range, sustained very considerable loss while coming into action and subsequently. Captain von Ehlern, of the artillery of the Guard, was severely wounded. First Lieut. and Adjutant Sluytermann van Langeweyde had a horse killed under him; First Lieut. Crantz, Lieutenants von Oppen, von Hoyer, von Voigts-Rhetz, and others had their horses wounded. In the horse artillery batteries of the 10th regiment Captain Frisch was severely, Lieut. and Adjutant Rehkopf slightly wounded. In spite of his severe wound, of which he afterwards died, Captain Frisch retained the command of his battery till the end of the action. In the Hessian artillery Captain Hoffmann as well as Lieut. and Adjutant Bekker had horses killed under them. Nevertheless the heavy fire of the enemy was unable to shake the steadiness of this long artillery line.

The batteries under the supreme command of General Prince von Hohenlohe concentrated their fire at first wholly on St. Privat and on the batteries or other troops in its immediate vicinity the ranges varying from 1,500 to 2,000 paces. Although Bychelberg's division on the right flank sustained heavy losses, its fire was not diverted from the main object until masked by the advancing infantry, when it turned its guns on the troops on the hill in the vicinity of the pond. Both the Hessian batteries fired in the same direction.

But the German artillery was able presently to cannonade

[1] This gun, belonging to the Hessian Horse Artillery battery, having been left behind, was attached to Reh's battery. *Vide* page 183.

struggle at St. Privat, carried on with unwonted vehemence, had for some time been perceptible. Of the 48th brigade Colonel Schulz ordered the 107th regiment on the right to advance from the west and two battalions of the 106th from the north against Montois, which was reported to be occupied; they were followed by the 2nd battalion of Rifles. The 107th found, however, that the place was already abandoned. Schulz's brigade therefore wheeled immediately to the right against Roncourt, on its being discovered that the wood south of Montois had also been evacuated. Detaching three companies to cover the flank towards Malancourt, whence shots had been fired, the 106th regiment (5 companies) moved against the north-east of Roncourt. It was about 6.30 P.M. when this combined assault, which had been concerted by the Crown Prince and Prince George of Saxony, was commenced by the 45th brigade from the woods against the west side of Roncourt and by the 48th from Montois against the north side.

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From a position south-west of Montois the 1st Light battery, Captain Lengnik (1. l. XII.), opened fire on Roncourt at a range of 2,500 paces with common shell and shrapnel, and on the advance of the infantry moved forward to a range of 1,700 paces, coming into action and again firing at the village. The effect of this fire, to which was added that of the 2nd Light battery (2. l. XII.), Captain Westmann, which also came into action at this spot, was apparently good.

The hostile skirmishers, which till then had held their ground, retired before our infantry to Roncourt, the village itself falling almost at the same time into the hands of detachments of the two Saxon brigades as well as of the Guard. It was garrisoned by the 108th regiment and held against all counter movements of the enemy. The 1st battalion of the 101st regiment, the 3rd battalion of the 107th, as well as two battalions of the 106th regiment, became engaged in a brisk musketry fight with the hostile troops occupying the wood of Jaumont and could not advance.

The 2nd Heavy battery, Leonhardi, which had soon followed the light batteries of the 1st field division, came into action further to the east, but did not fire, as Roncourt was already evacuated. The 1st Horse Artillery battery (1. r. XII.), Captain Zenker, having with the brigade of cavalry under General von Senfft-Pilsach brought up the rear of the turning column, could not consequently come into action on the east of Montois until a quarter of an hour after the field batteries. A few rounds then sufficed to drive away two bodies of infantry, which were seen at the edge of the wood south of that place.

Meanwhile Lieutenant von Esebeck, orderly officer to General von Pape, had been sent to the Saxons for information. He first

struggle at St. Privat, carried on with unwonted vehemence, had for some time been perceptible. Of the 48th brigade Colonel Schulz ordered the 107th regiment on the right to advance from the west and two battalions of the 106th from the north against Montois, which was reported to be occupied; they were followed by the 2nd battalion of Rifles. The 107th found, however, that the place was already abandoned. Schulz's brigade therefore wheeled immediately to the right against Roncourt, on its being discovered that the wood south of Montois had also been evacuated. Detaching three companies to cover the flank towards Malancourt, whence shots had been fired, the 106th regiment (5 companies) moved against the north-east of Roncourt. It was about 6.30 P.M. when this combined assault, which had been concerted by the Crown Prince and Prince George of Saxony, was commenced by the 45th brigade from the woods against the west side of Roncourt and by the 48th from Montois against the north side.

Both princes expected to find Roncourt as well as the ground immediately in rear of it strongly occupied. But in fact Marshal Canrobert had already withdrawn nearly the whole of his troops which originally occupied this part of the position in force, in order to concentrate them opposite the Guard, at that moment checked in its attack, and to meet the turning movement of the Saxons, which had then been discovered. Consequently the XIIth Corps made more rapid progress than the Crown Prince had ventured to hope.

In the first line of the 48th brigade were the five available companies of the 106th regiment on the left flank and the 107th on the right; followed by the 2nd Rifles in support. In the first line of the 45th brigade the 1st battalion of the 101st Grenadiers was on the left; on the right of which came the 108th regiment, a battalion and a half of the 100th Body Guard Grenadiers, and on the right flank half a battalion of the 1st and a battalion of the 3rd regiment of the Guard, as well as the 1st company of pioneers. The remainder of the 100th Body Guard Grenadiers formed the 2nd line, and the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 101st Grenadiers the 3rd line. Prince George was with the 108th regiment, and General von Craushaar on the right flank of his brigade.

Although the cavalry found no object of attack, the artillery attached to the turning column came into action immediately after the capture of Montois, in order to prepare the way against the French right flank, and—which was of most importance—to indicate to the 23rd Division, according to agreement, that the outflanking column had reached Montois and was ready to advance. Its first shots were in fact the signal for the commencement of the combined assault to which reference has been made above.

From a position south-west of Montois the 1st Light battery, Captain Lengnik (1. l. XII.), opened fire on Roncourt at a range of 2,500 paces with common shell and shrapnel, and on the advance of the infantry moved forward to a range of 1,700 paces, coming into action and again firing at the village. The effect of this fire, to which was added that of the 2nd Light battery (2. l. XII.), Captain Westmann, which also came into action at this spot, was apparently good.

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met General von Craushaar and then the commander of the 107th regiment, Colonel von Schweinitz, and impressed on both those officers the desperate situation of the Guard as well as the importance of attacking St. Privat without delay. Eager to support their comrades the Prussians in this emergency, they with some of the Saxon infantry diverged even before the capture of Roncourt from the direction in which they were moving, without waiting for further orders.

Under the pressure of circumstances it was impossible to avoid a temporary confusion among the tactical units of the infantry. General von Craushaar directed the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 101st regiment from the 3rd line against St. Privat, detachments of the 1st and 3rd regiments of the Guard[1] and the 100th Body Guard regiment also making a similar change of direction. The latter had not yet completed the wheel, when Colonel von Schweinitz with the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 107th regiment came up and passed through it. The report sent by the colonel to the brigadier of his having decided to advance against St. Privat was not received, as the officer carrying it was struck down.

Of the Saxons the two battalions of the 107th regiment came first into collision with the French troops lining the walls, which ran parallel to the north side of St. Privat, and encountered an obstinate resistance. Exposed to a rapid musketry fire in front and taken in flank by the hostile batteries east of St. Privat, these battalions incurred heavy casualties, and Colonel von Schweinitz was killed. But the troops pressed resolutely forwards. The enemy did not wait to receive the attack behind the walls but retired, the 107th immediately establishing itself among them.

General von Craushaar also led forward the above-named troops of his own brigade and of the Guard on either side of the 107th, which then again advanced. Loud hurrahs from the right announced that they had got into connection with the 4th regiment of the Guard, with which they now moved to the assault. These troops lost heavily, but their progress was not checked. The left flank suffered less, thanks to the use made

[1] Other portions of both these battalions continued to march in the original direction.

of the cover afforded by heaps of stones and inequalities of the ground. The enemy was soon driven from the walls, and in fact a square enclosure, immediately connected with the north-west corner of St. Privat, was already in the hands of the assailants.[1]

During this attack a brisk rattle of musketry was heard in rear at Roncourt. Half a battalion of the 3rd regiment of the Guard, which had advanced with the other troops against St. Privat, inferring that the state of affairs at Roncourt was very critical, considered it necessary to return to that place. The enemy had indeed made an attempt to advance from the wood against that village, but had been repulsed by the 1st battalion of the 101st regiment.

The exertions of the Crown Prince and Prince George of Saxony had been directed meanwhile to preventing the troops engaged in this improvised attack from being thrown into disorder. Prince George pushed forward the 108th regiment towards St. Privat in support to within 600 paces of the foremost fire-line; while a battalion from the 46th brigade, which had reached Roncourt towards 7.30 P.M., was ordered to support the 106th regiment in the ravine east of that village.

13. *The artillery of the Guard Corps prepares the final assault on St. Privat—That of the* XIIth *(Saxon) Corps opens fire on the village—Roncourt is occupied and St. Privat stormed—French accounts of the 6th Corps—The artillery of the Guard,* Xth, XIIth *Corps, and of the Hessian Division form a line from the Forêt de Jaumont to the Bois de la Cusse—The final assault on Amanvillers—The Germans do not pursue—Saxon cavalry in the valley of the Moselle—Losses of the combatants.*

It was past 7.15 P.M.; the advance was checked along the whole line of the Saxon and Guard Corps; time was required to recover breath and reform previous to a final assault on the village of St. Privat. But the pause was filled up by a brisk fire-fight, principally of artillery, to which we must now again turn our attention. We left the artillery of the Guard in the act of taking up a position, from which to prepare the final

[1] Portions of the 101st Grenadiers and of the 4th regiment of the Guard.

troops, a great number of batteries passed on to support those of the Guard, which had been in action for some time on the spur 1,000 paces south-west of St. Privat. On the fall of that stronghold the whole of the German artillery in that part of the field of battle moved forward, the batteries vying with each other in eagerness to reach the heights of St. Privat, and coming into action wherever it was possible to do so, while those which had been long under fire were forced out of the line by the new arrivals.

Lieut.-Colonel Bychelberg trotted to the front with the three remaining batteries of his division and took up a position at a considerable interval to the right of Prittwitz's battery, under a heavy fire of artillery and musketry. Captain von Sametzki with the 1st Heavy battery had previously been able to support the assault on St. Privat at a short range from an intermediate position. In the next place Captain Reinsdorff, by Colonel von der Goltz's orders, brought up Richard's and Berendt's light batteries of the corps artillery of the Xth Army Corps on the left of Seeger's battery of the Guard,[1] while on their left again Schede's and von Scheven's batteries came up afterwards into line.

Major von Buddenbrock brought the horse artillery batteries of the Guard (von der Planitz, von Grävenitz, and von Anker) at a smart trot to the hill south of St. Privat, soon after the village was captured, where they maintained their position under a very heavy fire from the French guns at the quarries at Amanvillers. Of Rheinhaben's division Ising's and von Roon's batteries of the Guard as well as a division of von Oppell's battery, under Lieutenant Poncet, were alone able to find room on the hill; the remainder of this battery as well as von Roehl's battery (originally von Mutius's) finding themselves excluded from this position. Advancing from an intermediate position south-west of St. Privat the horse artillery battery of the 10th regiment, commanded by Captain Saalmüller, who had again taken over the command from Lieutenant Marcard, came up into line by order of Colonel von der Becke;

[1] Colonel von der Goltz calls attention to the fact that these two batteries came into action previous to the capture of St. Privat, and that there were then but few of the batteries of the Guard immediately on their right.

while Frisch's Horse Artillery battery, finding no room here, joined the batteries of the 20th Division.

The batteries of the corps artillery of the Guard found themselves excluded from the line by the field batteries of the corps artillery of the Xth Army Corps. Colonel von Scherbening therefore took the necessary steps to reassemble his batteries and make good his losses; Seeger's and von Grävenitz's batteries alone remaining in their selected positions, while Schmalz's battery (previously Friederici-Steinmann's) withdrew from its post of honour, having expended the whole of its ammunition.

From the 5th Cavalry Division, held by General von Voigts-Rhetz in readiness for pursuit if required, Major Körber received permission to bring both his batteries into action. After advancing from St. Marie aux Chênes and making a flank march along the rear of the hills crowned by artillery, Bode's battery of the 4th regiment and Schirmer's battery of the 10th, came into action between Prittwitz's battery and the three other batteries of Bychelberg's division of the artillery of the Guard. But the great artillery line now forming was destined to be still more crowded and its length increased. The day was already at an end and twilight commencing when, desirous of taking part in the closing act, Lieut.-Colonel Stumpf brought up the Hessian artillery, and Lieut.-Colonel Schaumann the 1st field division of the 10th regiment of artillery.

While Schaumann's division, breaking into column to the left, moved to St. Privat and thence made a flank march covered by the form of the ground to the extreme right flank of the whole line, seeking for intervals large enough to admit even single batteries, Colonel Stumpf and Major Herget sought for space on the right flank for the Hessian batteries. It became at last impossible to distinguish the troops and necessary to enquire what they were. It was therefore here also unavoidable that these batteries of the Xth Corps and of the Hessian Division thrust themselves between those of the Guard and partially masked them.

The Hanoverian batteries, which at last came into action, were only able to fire a few rounds, as shown by the return of ammunition. The 1st Heavy and 3rd Light Hessian batteries as well as the 3rd Heavy battery of the 9th regiment with the

Hessian horse artillery gun were unable to come into position here. The fire of the other Hessian batteries also was limited by want of men, and because four breech-pieces in the 1st Heavy battery and one in the 2nd were split.

A long interval elapsed between the commencement and completion of this great line of artillery, but during that period the duel of guns never ceased for a moment. Another mass of eleven batteries had meanwhile been formed north-east of St. Privat. As soon as it was observed that the attacking columns had established themselves firmly in St. Privat, the Saxon and Prussian artillery north of the high road vied with each other in their haste to reach the hills north-east of that place at a trot. Colonel Funcke with Groh's battery of the Saxon artillery was the first to reach the highest ground between St. Privat and Roncourt. He was soon followed by four batteries of the Saxon corps artillery, Hammer's heavy battery (now commanded by von Götz) of Hoch's division, Bucher's and Portius's heavy batteries of Oertel's division, as well as Müller's horse artillery; also by the 2nd field division of the 10th regiment, under Major Krause, consisting of Heyn's, Ribbentrop's, Burbach's, and Mittelstädt's batteries. Leonhardi's and Zenker's batteries had to come into action on the left rear, owing to the form of the ground.[1]

As soon as Colonel Bychelberg reached the hill his batteries concentrated their fire at ranges between 1,200 and 1,500 yards on the swarms of skirmishers and masses of infantry which showed themselves at Amanvillers, while Major von Buddenbrock shelled the French retiring columns at ranges of more than 1,000 paces with equal success.

[1] The following was the order of the batteries from the forest of Jaumont by St. Privat to the railway, as shown on the flap of the plan of the field of battle:—2. s. Leonhardi, 1. r. Zenker, 4. s. Groh, 8. s. Portius, 7. s. XII. Bucher I.; 4. s. X. Ribbentrop; 5. s. von Götz *for* Hammer, 2. r. XII. Müller; 3. l. Burbach, 4. l. Mittelstädt, 3. s. X. Heyn; 6. s. G. von Oppell (under Poncet); 3. r. X. Saalmüller; 5. s. von Roon, 6. l. Ising, 1. r. von der Planitz, 3. r. G. von Anker; 2 l. X. Baumbach; 2. r. G. Grävenitz; 6. s. Schede, 5. s. von Scheven, 6. l. Richard, 5. l. X. Berendt; (also at an earlier hour 3. l. von Friederici-Steinmann), 4. s. Seeger, 2. s. G. Prittwitz; 1. r. IV. Bode; 2. r. X. Schirmer; 1. s. von Sametzki, 1. l. von Voigts-Rhetz *for* von Dewitz, 2. l. G. Karbe *for* von Niederstetter; 2. s. Hoffmann, 2. l. H. Leydhecker *for* Weygand. Then came probably in the following order:—3. l. 1. l. 1. s. H. (Kehrer *for* Ronstadt, Frank, Reh); 3. l. IX. Heseler *for* Bastineller; 1. l. 2. s. 1. s. X. (Knauer, Lancelle, Kleine).

The most advanced Saxon and Prussian batteries, north-east of St. Privat, under the command of Colonel Funcke and Major Krause, harassed the flying French troops at from 1,500 to 2,000 paces; while Ribbentrop's battery states that it fired at only 800 paces into a hostile column, which had withdrawn into the wood. The Saxon batteries under Bucher I. and Portius also fired shrapnel at ranges of from 1,600 to 2,000 paces against dense swarms of tirailleurs and bodies of infantry in close order. Apparently the effect was good, but here also it was difficult to distinguish it from that of common shell.

The batteries while coming into line were at times masked by our own infantry. On the arrival of the two light batteries of the corps artillery of the Xth Army Corps, which occurred very early, Colonel von der Goltz ordered Richard's battery to open fire on the formidable mass of French artillery at the quarries of Amanvillers, while Berendt's battery laid its guns on the village itself. Shortly afterwards the whole of the twenty-one batteries and the two guns to the north of Berendt's battery concentrated their fire with good effect on the enemy's artillery, ten batteries and the two guns being between Berendt's battery and St. Privat, and eleven between that place and the forest of Jaumont.

On the other hand the right wing of this great artillery line cannonaded the masses of infantry and swarms of skirmishers at Amanvillers with such success that they speedily disappeared.

But when fresh hostile batteries appeared soon afterwards to the north-east of Amanvillers and opened a brisk fire, the right wing, in default of other objects, was directed to reply, the range being from 1,800 to 2,200 paces. Colonel von der Goltz therefore ordered Berendt and Richard (5. l. and 6. l. X.) to advance to a shorter range; but they had only fired a few rounds at 1,900 paces when a brisk musketry fire was directed against their right flank. Berendt's battery and a division of Richard's wheeled at once to the right, and after driving away the hostile infantry by a few well-aimed shells again resumed their practice at the French artillery. Amanvillers, repeatedly struck, was in flames.

This battle of artillery had been as a rule directed by the

superior officers, among whom were Prince Hohenlohe, Colonel von der Becke, and Colonel Funcke.

It must have been about this time that the 3rd brigade of the Guard, Colonel von Zeuner (*for* General Knappe von Knappstädt), made a final and successful offensive movement. We left it engaged in a stationary musketry action; its last available battalion, the 2nd of the Elizabeth Grenadiers, having been ordered to the front. This battalion advanced with a heavy loss direct on Amanvillers on the left flank of the Fusilier battalion of the same regiment. The 'Advance' was now sounded for the whole brigade. Owing to the darkness and want of ammunition-charges with the bayonet were frequent. The brigade gradually gained ground towards Amanvillers, but, fortunately for the enemy, the darkness concealed his hasty retreat, and, as the troops were exhausted, General von Manstein at 8 P.M. ordered the brigade to content itself with holding the position it had won. The enemy now renewed his fire with increased fury against the right flank of the artillery from Amanvillers and the skirts of the wood. Masses of French infantry preceded by swarms of skirmishers made a fresh attack at 7.30 P.M., but were checked at a distance of from 1,200 to 1,500 paces by the calm and concentrated fire of the German guns combined with a rapid fire of infantry. According to Prince Hohenlohe's report three such assaults were attempted, and were severally repulsed, the French columns seeking shelter in the defiles of Amanvillers.

The centre and left wing of the German artillery had meanwhile continued their fire with success against the artillery mass at the quarries of Amanvillers, and had also forced a large column of cavalry, which showed itself to the east of St. Privat, to retire.

The losses of the German artillery in the last position were not inconsiderable, the right flank being exposed to musketry fire from Amanvillers, and the left to that from the forest of Jaumont. Most of the French common shell passed over it, while the shrapnel, which were almost exclusively used towards the close of the day, generally burst too high. But notwithstanding this, the batteries immediately to the south of St. Privat incurred heavy casualties. Brilliantly illuminated by the flames of the village,

they were the only objects which the enemy could distinguish in the increasing darkness, and he consequently concentrated his artillery on them.

In this position Captain Ising, of the artillery of the Guard lost his left arm, the command of the 6th Light battery devolving on First Lieut. von Saldern-Ahlimb. Captain von Roon was slightly wounded, and one of his limbers exploded, the entire gun detachment being wounded, although First Lieut. Villaume, who was close to it, escaped unhurt. A shell passed between Captain von Grävenitz's legs, the rush of air rolling him over and over, and so severely bruised was he, that he had to be lifted on his horse. Another shell passed between Lieutenant Dudy's legs while in the act of dismounting, destroying the saddle but without seriously injuring the horse. That officer escaped with a bruise only. Lieutenant von Oppen had a horse killed under him. In the artillery of the Xth Army Corps Colonel von der Goltz was grazed by a splinter, but remained with his guns.

The heavy firing was continued even after dark, the guns being laid on the flash of the enemy's guns. It was not until 8.15 P.M. that complete darkness terminated the contest.

The material as well as the personal of the artillery had suffered considerably during this hot and protracted combat. Mention has already been made of the Hessian batteries in this respect. In the artillery of the Guard several damages to the guns were made good under fire by exchanging wheels, elevating screws and other articles with those of the spare carriages. Comparatively few guns were here disabled, but a gun of the 2nd Heavy battery had to be withdrawn from the last position, as its breech-piece was injured and the spare one did not fit.

The 1st field division, Lieut.-Colonel Bychelberg, remained till daybreak in the position, protected by portions of the regiments Augusta and Alexander, and afterwards by the 1st battalion of the 57th regiment, for whose support the colonel had asked General von Voigts-Rhetz. Three Hessian batteries also remained for the present near the division, but were finally ordered to withdraw to the Bois de la Cusse and bivouac with the 25th brigade of cavalry, which during the last part of the

contest had been in reserve in the right rear, covering that flank of the great line of artillery.[1]

Firing was resumed at frequent intervals until after 10 P.M., when all became still. Amanvillers was evacuated by the enemy, but was not occupied by the Germans until early on the 19th. Montigny remained in the enemy's possession throughout the night. Isolated encounters with detachments of the retreating enemy occurred while placing the outposts. A detachment of the 2nd battalion of the Elizabeth Grenadiers being summoned by a body of French troops to lay down its arms, replied by a volley.

We must now examine the French accounts of this period of the battle. Marshal Canrobert succeeded in covering the flight of the 6th Corps by posting a rear guard at the entrance of the wood near the quarries of Amanvillers. The available troops consisted of the 94th and 100th regiments and du Barail's Division of Cavalry. The most important services were rendered by the artillery of the 6th Corps, under Lieut.-Colonel de Montluisant, in a formidable position opposite St. Privat, where it was afterwards joined by the batteries of the Guard and of the 4th Corps in succession.[2]

The effect of the retreat of the 6th Corps was soon felt by

[1] The Hessian guns were brought horizontal, to be ready to meet a night attack.

[2] According to Montluisant's account, which repeats the report of General of Division Tixier, 'he placed sixty guns (six batteries of Tixier's Division and four of the 9th regiment) 2,300 yards to the east of St. Privat in support soon after the capture of St. Marie aux Chênes near the quarries of Amanvillers, on the high road to Woippy. ('. . . Je vis de loin la prise de St. Marie aux Chênes, les masses écrasantes de l'adversaire, et je pris immédiatement mes précautions de retraite. . . . Je disposai de suite les trois batteries Lippman, Blondel, Abord, etc. . . .') The somewhat thickly planted slope afforded a position with three terraces one above the other. That this position was carried so early was principally owing to the failure of ammunition in the 6th Corps, which, being unprovided with an ammunition park, had only a little over 100 rounds per gun at the beginning of the battle. As the ammunition soon ran short, the firing in the first position necessarily became slow, the guns only firing one round every quarter of an hour until they ceased fire entirely, so as to retain a reserve of ten or fifteen rounds for eventualities. 'The firing from these guns,' says Montluisant, 'commenced at 6 P.M., when the Prussians surrounded St. Privat and crowned the heights right and left with more than sixty guns, which deluged us with shell.' The cannonade lasted into the night. The army corps meanwhile retired, leaving the roads to the guns. At last, when the enemy was checked and the battle terminated, Montluisant withdrew after firing his last round.

the 4th Corps, for as soon as the enemy had made himself master of the heights of St. Privat, he directed a hot fire against the right flank of the latter, which was exposed by the retreat of the former and menaced through the gap which had been made between the villages of St. Privat and Amanvillers. At the same time a fresh attack was made against Ladmirault's front. His 1st Division at once changed front to the right; but the fire of the enemy's artillery,[1] taking the French in flank and rear, was so destructive that, in spite of the almost superhuman endeavours of General Ladmirault to prevent it, a portion of his corps also was obliged to retire,[2] the exhausted troops, who had no cartridges left, following the movement of the 6th Corps. The remainder of the 4th Corps made a firm stand for a time in rear of Amanvillers against the German frontal attack,[3] but then also followed the retrograde movement to the plateau of Plappeville, with the exception of the 1st and 6th regiments of the line (1st brigade of Cissey's Division), which still occupied the skirts of the wood in rear of Amanvillers, and an infantry battalion whose name has been forgotten and which remained in the farm of Montigny la Grange throughout the night without the enemy attempting to dislodge it.

When also the right wing of the 4th Corps retired, the Imperial Guard had reached the defile of the Bois de Saulny, and there the disordered masses of that corps were rallied, while its artillery, which had preceded it, came earlier into action. 'At length,' says V. D., 'Picard's Division of Grenadiers reached the field of battle after dark, and deploying to the right and left of the artillery, supported it.'[4]

In consequence of the right flank of the 3rd Corps becoming exposed by the retreat of the 4th Corps Marshal Lebœuf ordered up two reserve-batteries and the 41st regiment of the line, till

[1] This fire was evidently from the right flank of the German artillery position, which had been formed at the close of the battle between St. Privat and the Bois de la Cusse.

[2] Mais le tir de l'artillerie ennemie devient tellement écrasant, qu'une partie de ce corps d'armée est obligée aussi de céder (Frossard). Montluisant also describes the effect as terrible.

[3] This was the attack of the IXth Army Corps, reinforced by the 3rd brigade of the Guard.

[4] From Frossard and the anonymous account of an 'officier supérieur.'

then held in reserve, to support it. 'These troops used their utmost exertions to check all advance in that direction by the enemy.'

The French are unanimous in admitting that the retreat of the 4th and 6th Corps,—the former to the plateau of Plappeville and the latter by Woippy into the valley of the Moselle,—was attended by the greatest confusion,[1] and that the advance of a few German troops as far as Woippy would have resulted in the annihilation of the 6th French Corps and the capture of a great part of its material. As a fact Prince Frederick Charles had despatched orders to the Crown Prince of Saxony, urging him to follow up the advantages that might be gained, and to push infantry as well as cavalry into the valley of the Moselle on that day. But at that time affairs at St. Privat had not yet taken a decisive turn, and when they did so, pursuit was prevented by the darkness, which concealed and favoured the flight of the enemy; by large bodies of fresh troops covering the retreat, and strongly posted as rear guards at the Bois de Jaumont; and by the complete exhaustion of all the German troops in the immediate presence of the enemy, who had been on their legs since 5 A.M. (15 hours), and some of whom had been engaged in a furious struggle during nine hours.

The 46th brigade was indeed still intact, having however made forced marches, and was now actually on the march under fire to the north-east of St. Privat; but in consequence of the contest on the left flank, which was maintained with great vivacity in the Bois de Jaumont till after dark, the Crown Prince hesitated to risk his last available fresh troops. The 1st squadron of the Reiter regiment of the Guard, and the 2nd squadron of the 3rd Reiter regiment had been sent at 4 P.M. into the valley of the Moselle to break up the railway at Richemont and Daspich, which was effected in spite of great difficulties experienced on the march, from abattis and barricades.

This line was still more completely broken up near Mézières on the 19th of August by the 46th brigade, reinforced by a squadron and a company of pioneers. The road through Mar-

[1] Il n'y avait plus ni bataillons, ni régiments, ni divisions, mais des amas d'hommes, de chevaux et de voitures, qui représentaient dans la vallée de la Moselle le 6e Corps, sur les hauteurs de Plappeville le 4e.

hange taken by the brigade was barricaded for a distance of more than a mile and a quarter.

The line indicating the position of the most advanced French troops after the cessation of the battle followed the margins of the Bois de Saulny and de Châtel to Montigny la Grange, passing round the copses south-west of la Folie and thence by Leipsic, Moscou, Point du Jour, and Rozérieulles to St. Ruffine.

Those French corps, which still held their positions on the field of battle, bivouacked on the ground they occupied with the exception of Montaudon's Division of the 3rd Corps, which, being most exposed to danger, remained under arms. It was not until 4.30 A.M. on the 19th that these troops began by Bazaine's orders to move off the battle field in order to encamp with the other troops of the Army of the Rhine behind Forts St. Quentin and Plappeville.

The outposts of the Second Army for the night after the battle were furnished by the IXth and Xth Corps. The XIIth (Saxon) Corps encamped at Roncourt, and most of the Guard between St. Privat and St. Marie; the IIIrd Corps in and near Vernéville. The line of outposts of both German armies is shown on the plan of the battle.

It was not until the morning of the 19th that the whole importance of the brilliant victory of the previous day was realized at St. Privat. The enemy had everywhere disappeared.

The losses were as follows:—

German.

	Officers	Men
Guard Corps	288	7,700
IInd Army Corps	44	1,300
IIIrd ,,	6	80
VIIth ,,	29	750
VIIIth ,,	168	3,200
IXth ,,	181	4,100
Xth ,,	8	100
XIIth ,,	87	2,200
Total	811	19,430

French.

	Officers	Men
2nd Corps	27	594
3rd ,, ...	110	2,050
4th ,, ...	246	4,561
6th ,, ...	212	4,473
Total . . .	595	11,678

The effective strength of the French on the 17th of August was, according to V. D. :—

Corps	Men
2nd Corps, including Lapasset's, but excluding Laveaucoupet's Division .	16,000
3rd ,, ...	44,700
4th ,, ...	31,800
6th ,, ...	32,400
Guard Corps	18,800
Reserve Cavalry, exclusive of Marguerite's brigade, and allowing for the losses on the 16th	4,400
Artillery and Engineer Reserve	2,500
Total	150,600

The effective strength of the Germans, including Cavalry Divisions, after the enormous losses of the previous battles and the forced marches made by some of the troops, was in round numbers from

210,000 to 225,000 men.

But it must be remarked that on both sides a large force was held in reserve, that on the German side being much the largest ; also that the Germans could only be brought up by degrees and after considerable losses, while the French were from the very first deployed with a wide front and had no marches to make ; and lastly that the latter possessed great advantages from their excellent position, the greater part of which was intrenched, as well as from the co-operation of Fort St. Quentin. They however lay great stress on the fact that the 6th Corps was very deficient of artillery ammunition.

SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION AND REFITMENT OF THE BATTERIES, BOTH AS REGARDS MEN AND MATERIAL.[1]

1. *Supply of ammunition to the limbers from the ammunition wagons.*

The lines of wagons as a rule followed their batteries at the regulated distances, but there were many instances when this was not the case. Thus with some of the batteries of the Guard (horse artillery and 3rd field division) the wagons of the 1st line were close up to the guns, and ammunition was served direct from them, so as to keep the complement in the gun limbers intact for an emergency. In the case of the batteries of the 7th regiment, which crossed the ravine of Gravelotte, the 1st line did not follow them. The wagons of the 3rd Light battery tried indeed to cross, but were kept back by superior orders; consequently these batteries very soon ran short of ammunition. In many instances the lines of wagons were unable to follow the batteries of the IXth Army Corps, Hessian as well as Prussian. Thus the 1st line of wagons of the Hessian field batteries, which was at first 100 paces from the latter, very soon increased the distance to 300 or 500 paces and halted south of the railway covered by the Bois de la Cusse. That owing to the lines of wagons frequently remaining in rear in this way, as well as to the severity of the contest, the batteries south of that wood experienced a want of ammunition, has been mentioned in the preceding pages.

[1] In addition to its 15 batteries every regiment of field artillery had 9 ammunition-columns, 5 of artillery and 4 of infantry. A column was formed into two divisions of three sections (*Zug*) each. A section consisted of four wagons. The column comprised 4 spare gun-carriages, a field forge, a store wagon, and a baggage wagon, the remainder being ammunition-wagons, 8 for 6-pr. and 9 for 4-pr. ammunition.—*Trans.*

2. *Refitment of the batteries from the ammunition-columns.*

a. The 1st echelon of the column-division (1st artillery, 1st and 2nd infantry ammunition-columns) of the Guard Corps, under Major von Heineccius, was at Hagéville, 2¼ miles south-west of Chambley, on the 17th; the 2nd echelon (2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th artillery, 3rd and 4th infantry ammunition-columns) at Thionville on the Moselle.

Early on the 18th the 1st echelon was ordered in the first place to Mars la Tour. The 2nd echelon also received orders to make a forced march to the same point, and arrived there in the course of the day.

From Mars la Tour the 1st echelon followed the corps to Doncourt, and afterwards halted near Habonville, where it was to issue ammunition. By great exertions the 2nd and 3rd artillery ammunition-columns of the 2nd echelon, Captains von der Planitz and von Keudell, also succeeded in reaching that place during the battle. Consequently Major von Heineccius, who always remained close to the batteries in action, was able to conduct the supply of ammunition so regularly that at the close of the battle only one battery had exhausted its ammunition. On the 19th, and during the subsequent night and day, the ammunition was made up to the full complement from the columns which were also obliged to furnish material and 200 horses, these being replaced by requisition during the march to and from the field of battle.

All the artillery ammunition-columns returned to Saarbrück for fresh supplies, with the exception of the 1st, which completed its supply from the 4th. One only of the infantry ammunition-columns was emptied to the extent of one-third of its contents.

b. The supply of ammunition which the IInd Army Corps received from its column-division cannot be precisely stated, but on the 25th and 26th of August a large amount of its artillery ammunition was issued to the IIIrd and IXth Army Corps. The 4th and 5th artillery ammunition-columns were replenished at Herny, whence they returned to Auboué on the 31st of August and 2nd of September.

c. It has been stated in the 2nd part of this work that the

whole of the artillery ammunition-columns of the IIIrd Army Corps were emptied during the battle of Mars la Tour, and on the 18th were on the march to Herny to be replenished. By order of the Commander in Chief of the army an artillery ammunition-column of the IInd Army Corps and one of the IXth were made over to Captain Burchard; but the former did not reach the bivouac at the Baraques de St. Marie till the 19th of August.

The 1st division of the artillery ammunition-column of the IXth Army Corps gave up its ammunition to the 10th regiment of artillery before the beginning of the battle. Captain Burchard with the 2nd division, in pursuance of orders, left the Baraques at 5 P.M. on the 18th, and made a forced march to Vernéville, but could not reach that place till after dark. Ammunition was issued to the batteries of the 3rd regiment on the 19th, and then the whole column started at once for Herny to obtain a fresh supply. Captain Burchard bivouacked on the 19th at Vernéville with the 1st infantry ammunition-column and the artillery ammunition-column of the IInd Corps which had arrived there.

d. The orders for the 18th issued to the 1st echelon of the ammunition-columns of the VIIth Army Corps were to halt for the present at Ancy between Ars sur Moselle and Corny, where several batteries of the corps replenished their supplies during the following night. At the suggestion of the commandant of artillery this echelon was advanced to the plateau of Gravelotte on the 19th and bivouacked about 3,000 paces to the west of that village. There the remainder of the batteries and other troops of the army corps received their supply of ammunition.

e. The 1st echelon of the ammunition-column of the VIIIth Army Corps, under Captain Eggers, bivouacked during the battle and after it in the defile of Rezonville to the south of the road from Mars la Tour to Metz. The supply to the batteries was partially carried out during the night and completed on the 19th and 20th. The columns had also on the 19th to make good the losses in men and horses.

During the battle the commander of the column-division received an order, probably in consequence of a misunderstanding, to send an infantry ammunition-column in the direction of

Gravelotte. Captain Hermann was therefore directed at 5 P.M. to march with the 3rd infantry ammunition-column along the high road to the farm north-west of that village. As several casualties were caused by the enemy's shells, the column was halted in a hollow road, and two wagons only were sent forward as rapidly as possible to the farm under the Sergeant Major, who was to leave the ammunition there. To avoid the chance of explosion as much as possible this was to be repeated if necessary; but it turned out that the infantry in that quarter were in no want of ammunition.

By the advice of General Count von Gneisenau, Captain Hermann kept the 1st division of the column in the covered position during the battle, the 2nd division returning to its bivouac.

f. The column-division of the IXth Army Corps, commanded by Captain von Lüttwitz, originally consisted of two infantry and of three artillery ammunition-columns, but the latter were reduced by the great expenditure in the battle of Mars la Tour to one-fourth of the 1st and the entire 2nd artillery ammunition-columns only.

At the commencement of the battle of the 18th hostile shells fell into the bivouac at Rezonville; at noon information was received from Colonel von Jagemann that the corps artillery was advancing on Vernéville. Without waiting for orders Captain von Lüttwitz at 3.30 P.M. determined to place his division at Villers aux Bois. He was induced to take this step by the desire of being nearer to his own army corps in the event of its requiring ammunition, and to avoid the risk of being cut off from the IIIrd Army Corps by the advance of the IInd. On the march Lieutenant Forsbach brought an order from General Puttkammer that the whole of the column-division was to move at once to the field of battle, stating moreover that the batteries were in want of ammunition, which they were unable to obtain from their own lines of wagons on account of the absence of some and of the great losses incurred by the others. The very interesting report of the commander of the division goes on to state: 'I immediately mounted the men on the wagons and the division moved off in sections at a trot by Villers aux Bois towards Vernéville, where I reported myself to General von Wrangel, commanding the 18th Division. I halted the infantry columns at

Vernéville, passed through that village at a trot with the artillery ammunition-column and a quarter, and advancing towards the 2nd Horse Artillery battery (König's), brought up the wagons at a gallop to about ten paces in rear of the batteries in action. The column was immediately beset on all sides, every battery requiring ammunition; but unfortunately Sergeant Gräger, who had taken two wagons to a heavy battery, had the key with him, and it was necessary to break open all the locks. The issue of ammunition was conducted as follows:--On the arrival of the column a mounted man from each battery reported himself, and a wagon was told off to him; a place of assembly was appointed for empty wagons about 500 paces in rear of the front line. As soon as the first supply was issued I withdrew the remaining wagons to the place of assembly behind the hill, all the batteries being informed of its position. Orderlies were sent when necessary from the batteries, which brought up the wagons to them at a gallop; when empty they returned. Presently a team came back without its wagon, and the drivers on being questioned stated that they had been ordered to unhook and return with their horses to the place of assembly, and that they were to go back for the empty wagon after half an hour; had they remained at the battery they would certainly have been killed to no purpose. This plan was so good that it was adopted by all the other batteries. Lieutenant Klinger the divisional adjutant, Lieutenant Roehrig commanding the column, Lieutenant Schlenther and I, rode up and down in rear of the guns, looking after the wagons which were dispersed in all directions, while I also directed Lieutenant Roehrig to take every care by means of his non-commissioned officers and trumpeters that no wagon was absent when the assembly was sounded. The column reached the position at 4 P.M. and it was 9 P.M. before it formed up in the place of assembly in complete order. During these five hours it was exposed to an incessant fire of musketry, for even the place of assembly, though not seen into by the enemy, was by no means defiladed from his fire. The whole of the column was present with the exception of a limber which had been given to a battery to replace an exploded one. In addition to this a pole was broken, two non-commissioned officers, one man, and some horses wounded, and one man missing.'

g. The Xth Army Corps was followed on the 18th of August by the 1st echelon of its ammunition-columns as far as Doncourt, where it was to await further orders; but as during the afternoon the battle appeared to be getting more distant, it marched to Jouaville and drew up near the high road without unhooking. In the evening the 1st column issued four wagon loads of 4-pr. ammunition on requisition to batteries of the Guard artillery.

On the morning of the 19th of August the echelon moved to a bivouac in rear of the corps artillery at St. Ail, where a supply of men, horses, and ammunition was for the first time made to the batteries of the 10th regiment.

h. Early on the 18th the Hessian Division ordered all its columns and trains to march on Vionville, where they were to be parked. The column-division consisted of two artillery and two infantry ammunition-columns, under Major von Giersberg. During the course of the day the 1st echelon of the ammunition-columns (1st artillery and 1st infantry) was ordered to the field of battle by the commanding officers of the Division and of the artillery; but although they trotted most of the way, it was evening before they reached the telegraph at Vernéville, where the issue of ammunition at once commenced. On the 20th of August the two artillery ammunition-columns marched to Falkenberg to replenish, but were obliged to go on to Forbach before they could obtain a supply.

i. The 1st echelon of the ammunition-columns of the Saxon Corps followed the 24th Division in its advance on the 18th and took up a position during the battle to the west of the defile of Habonville—Auboué, not far from the crossing of the roads from Auboué to Batilly, and from Hatrize to St. Marie aux Chênes. It afterwards marched to the latter village. The 3rd echelon was parked with the trains at Mars la Tour. The supply of ammunition to the batteries took place during the night of the 18th and on the following day. It has already been mentioned that Lieut.-Colonel Schörmer, commanding the column-division, was wounded, having come under fire in his eagerness to supply the batteries.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. *The French.*

THE intention of the French was to allow the Germans to waste their strength against the formidable position St. Privat —Amanvillers—Rozérieulles, and having completed their supplies, to assume the offensive from the right flank in the direction of St. Marie. By these means they hoped to overthrow the weakened enemy and then reach Briey.

To carry out this plan it was necessary to hold the position everywhere, especially on the right flank. This was possible by intrenching the ground and distributing the troops judiciously; for the selected position was so strong by nature as to compensate fully for the numerical superiority of the Germans. It is clear from the description of the battle field that an offensive movement from the right flank of the position was greatly favoured by the ground.

Under these circumstances Marshal Bazaine had impressed on all his corps the duty of carefully strengthening their positions; but it is very remarkable that this was carried out fully by the 2nd and 3rd Corps only, to a less extent by the 4th Corps, and scarcely at all by the 6th Corps. The reasons of this omission on the part of the 4th Corps cannot be gathered from French sources; but the 6th Corps seems to have had no engineer park, and arrived late in its position, which it then occupied only on the urgent representation of Marshal Canrobert. It thus happened that the left flank, already strong by nature and supported by Fort St. Quentin, was thoroughly intrenched, whereas the right flank, the decisive point and weakest by nature, was left in its normal condition.

The distribution of the French forces is equally surprising. If it was intended finally to assume the offensive on the right flank, the army reserves should have been placed in rear of it,

to compensate for its relative weakness, whereas they were actually placed between Forts Plappeville and St. Quentin, four and a half miles from St. Privat. Marshal Bazaine admits that he thus disposed his reserves, fearing to be cut off from Metz, and he considered that an aggressive movement against his rear from Woippy on the one flank, or from St. Ruffine and Vaux on the other, could be most effectively repulsed from the plateau of Plappeville. The fortress of Metz was, we admit, necessary to the Marshal after the battle of Mars la Tour as a source of supplies. If the Germans succeeded in forcing back the French left flank, no favourable conditions for retreat were presented by the valley of Châtel St. Germain and the roads in the Moselle valley running to Metz ; but then to force that part of the position was a task of peculiar difficulty, and moreover all pursuit was forbidden by Fort St. Quentin.[1] Consequently the majority of the Marshal's staff did not participate in his anxiety ; but singularly enough this was also the case with regard to the possibility of an aggressive movement against the French rear from Woippy after effecting the passage of the Moselle below Metz. If such a manœuvre were attempted within reach of the fortress, it would doubtless have been possible in case of necessity to detach a sufficient force from the right flank along the road to Saulny. The placing the reserves of the French army in rear of the left wing appears therefore indefensible. Nor was the position of the French outposts before the battle thoroughly judicious, for had the Bois de la Cusse been occupied, the German artillery could not have surprised the 4th French Corps in its camp.

It is remarkable that the French did not attempt in the first stage of the battle, when their deployed front considerably overlapped the left of the Germans, to make a general attack, and falling on the IXth Army Corps, annihilate or drive it back.

The offensive movements of the French in this quarter were partial and made by the advanced troops without orders. It almost seems as if the corps leaders took too strict a view of the extent to which they were bound by the Marshal's dispositions for a defensive attitude and feared the responsibility of depart-

[1] The French state that the armament of Fort St. Quentin was incomplete ; but that, at any rate, heavy guns were mounted in it, has been mentioned in the account of the battle.

ing from them, although the conditions on which they were based had changed. The occupation of St. Marie at the last moment on the approach of the Germans was extraordinary and certainly not in accordance with the Marshal's plan of battle. It had, however, the effect of postponing the decision of the contest.

Of great moment was the fact that Marshal Bazaine took up his position at Fort Plappeville, and even spent some time in Fort St. Quentin; for all impressions made on the left wing in his immediate presence appeared to him more important than those reported on the right. Consequently a brigade of Voltigeurs of the Guard was sent as early as 12 o'clock to St. Châtel to support the 3rd Corps; batteries of the general reserve of the army were employed to secure the left flank against the attack of the Germans on Jussy and St. Ruffine; and the reserves were moved to the right flank so late that they only served to cover the retreat, whereas their early arrival might have warded off the decisive issue of the battle.

2. *The Germans.*

It was necessary that the Royal head-quarters should make its dispositions for the 18th of August to meet two alternatives;—either the enemy would endeavour to retire by the northern roads, or, recognising the difficulty of such an operation, would offer battle immediately in front of Metz with his rear towards Germany.

In both cases a march towards the north at once became necessary, with the armies concentrated as much as possible. In the first case the Germans would come into collision with the flank of the enemy, obliging him to halt and fight. In the second case the last link which connected Metz with the interior of France would be cut and the troops enabled to deploy and outflank the enemy's right.

If however the French army took up a position on the heights with its rear towards Metz, it would be necessary during the flank march to cover the right flank against any aggressive enterprise on the part of the enemy, and also to provide for blocking the roads by which the communications with Germany might be threatened from the fortress.

It was moreover desirable that the troops marching towards

the north should come into collision with the enemy's columns on the road Gravelotte—Conflans as much as possible at the same moment. As the German army had encamped with its front immediately to the south of the road from Metz to Gravelotte and Mars la Tour, the marches to be made by the right flank were shorter than those to be made by the left.

We shall now see that both eventualities were met in the simplest way by the dispositions of the Royal head-quarters and of the Commanders in Chief of the Armies.

The Second Army was to advance on the 18th, massed as much as possible, in echelon from the left, with three army corps in first line and two in second line between the Yron and Gorze. The XIIth Corps on the left flank, having to make the longest march, had to move off at 5 A.M.; the IXth Corps on the right, an hour later.

It fell of course to the lot of the VIIth Army Corps—the nearest to Metz—to protect the right flank of the armies during the manœuvre, while it was prepared also to meet any advance of the enemy in the valley of the Moselle towards Ars. On the other hand the 1st Army Corps and the 3rd Cavalry Division provided for the safety of the communications on the right bank of the Moselle.

The VIIIth Army Corps connected to a certain extent the fixed pivot of the movement represented by the VIIth Corps with the Second German Army; it was to conform to the echelon movement. In accordance with the time-honoured maxim that, previous to fighting a decisive battle, all troops should be ordered to the battle field that can by any possibility reach it, the IInd Army Corps was ordered from Pont à Mousson to Buxières as a last reserve. Owing to the difficulties experienced in marching up into position already alluded to, which were augmented by the configuration of the ground at Mars la Tour and the great distance of the camps of the Saxon and Guard Corps, the battle could not be expected to commence till comparatively late in the day. Not until the troops were actually on the march was the true position of affairs discovered. When the leading army corps of the Second Army reached the centre road of the three which lead from Metz to the west, at Doncourt and Caulre farm, the only communications still open to the enemy were the roads to Briey, and to Thionville by the Moselle valley.

At the Royal head-quarters and at those of the Second Army it was now a matter of certainty that large hostile masses intended to hold the plateau running north from Point du Jour. But although therefore it was highly probable that the Germans would have to fight facing the east, it was still expedient to bear in mind the possibility of the enemy's marching to Briey.

Both these cases were evidently met by the dispositions of the Germans. The Commander in Chief of the Second Army, who was near the right flank, received information which enabled him at 10 A.M. to order the Guard Corps to march against the plateau occupied by the enemy, the XIIth Corps being left for the present at Jarny; while at 10.30 A.M. the Royal head-quarters considered it advisable that the Guard and XIIth Corps on the left of the first line of the Second Army should continue their march as far as Batilly and stop the enemy, if they found him on the march at St. Marie aux Chênes, or attack him if in position. As regarded the extent of the enemy's right flank nothing was as yet known by the Germans; the orders of the Second Army indicating that it was at la Folie, while the Royal head-quarters were of opinion that it extended to Montigny la Grange.

It is clear that the orders for the attack were based on the following ideas:—'Our numerical superiority will be taken advantage of to turn the enemy's flank from the north; the First and Second Armies will advance simultaneously against the French front and right flank, but not before the whole of the troops have marched up into position; during the interval the attention of the enemy in front will be engaged principally by artillery.'

The line of battle of the whole army was to be formed by the army corps wheeling to the right in succession. We have seen that the XIIth Corps had anticipated the orders of the Second Army as well as those of the Royal head-quarters; and that erroneous information about the enemy, which however was immediately corrected, had caused it to take a more westerly direction, which however only slightly delayed the whole operation.

It is clear from our remarks that the Royal head-quarters as well as the armies made every preparation with the greatest care

and forethought for a pitched battle, in which, nevertheless, much had after all to be improvised. Under the conviction that the camp at Montigny la Grange represented the enemy's right flank, and animated with the desire of taking the enemy by surprise, a chance of which was afforded by the enemy's carelessness, the IXth Army Corps resolved from the first to make a vigorous attack with its artillery at a short range. As seen from Vernéville, an opportunity of protecting the artillery seemed to be offered by taking possession of the Bois de la Cusse, which was reported to be unoccupied by the enemy, and towards which infantry was at once directed.

The narrative has shown that this was to a great extent erroneous. Had the IXth Corps been fully aware of the state of affairs, it would have contented itself with occupying and holding the Bois de la Cusse, so important as a point of support and as affording a comparatively covered approach for the assailants; and at any rate it would not have at once advanced far beyond the defile of la Mance. Being only able to come up into position gradually, its situation was now very critical, the front of the French line overlapping it and threatening to outflank it both on the right and left. The left wing of the advanced artillery line, partially annihilated, was obliged to retire. The corps, however, obstinately held the ground it had won against all hostile attempts, and especially the Bois de la Cusse, the importance of which was so rightly appreciated.

It was natural for the Royal head-quarters to conclude from the dispositions they had made and the orders they had issued, that the fighting heard at Vernéville was only a partial affair, not requiring the general attack of the First Army; and that consequently they should order it to employ its artillery only in preparation for a future attack.

This order was not fully carried out by the First Army, as the conclusions which led to its issue were no longer admissible at the time of its receipt. For the VIIIth Army Corps had then full information as to the severity of the contest waged at Vernéville by the IXth Army Corps, whose right wing needed immediate support to prevent its being turned and annihilated by superior hostile forces. Consequently, with the sanction of the Commander in Chief of the First Army, and (in this emer-

gency) certainly not in opposition to the intention of the Royal head-quarters, the 15th Division of the VIIIth Army Corps assumed the offensive astride the high road running through Gravelotte. Its success justified the great loss incurred in the bloody struggle with a superior force, for not only did it save the right wing of the IXth Army Corps from being outflanked, but it also succeeded in capturing the southern portion of the Bois de Genivaux, St. Hubert, and the western portion of the quarries. Thus a lodgment of the character of a bridge head was formed in front of the defile of Gravelotte, and the assumption of the offensive at the decisive moment by the whole of the First Army was facilitated. That the opponent regarded this position as a constant and effective menace is proved by the fact that he did not dare to draw off any of the troops confronting it to other parts of the field of battle, and that Marshal Bazaine considered it necessary to reinforce the 3rd Corps at that point by the brigade of Voltigeurs of the Guard from the reserve.

The IXth Army Corps was at first left to a great extent to its own resources in protecting its left wing from being outflanked. For this purpose the greater part of the 25th Division, with portions of the 18th, took up a position under cover at the north-western angle of the Bois de la Cusse, while the Hessian field batteries came into action to the north of it. The Guard was at first unable to co-operate except by means of the artillery of its 1st Division, and the corps artillery from a position further to the rear. But eventually it was prepared to support the IXth Corps with all its available troops; we know, however, that the 3rd brigade alone was asked for by that corps to act as its reserve.

We have seen that the critical position of the 15th Division made it necessary for the VIIIth Army Corps to send forward the 31st brigade against Moscou, and for the batteries of the 16th Division to come into action in the great artillery line formed by the First Army.

The narrative of the battle also mentions the circumstances from which the Commander in Chief of the First Army concluded that the obstinate resistance made by the enemy had been overcome even before the advance of the 31st brigade to the assault. We know moreover that in consequence of this assumption the

1st Cavalry Division and some batteries (corps artillery of the VIIth Corps and others) were ordered to cross the ravine of Gravelotte to complete the success; but that under the actual circumstances the attack of the cavalry although resolutely attempted was completely foiled, and only a part of the artillery was able to come into action beyond the defile.

The attack of the 26th brigade and the battery attached, which was ordered at the same time by the corps commandant, with the co-operation of some infantry and a battery of the 1st Army Corps, had in addition to the capture of Jussy the very important result of increasing Bazaine's anxiety about his left flank and diverting his attention from St. Privat. This was the cause of his keeping the reserves so long on the plateau of Plappeville when their presence was so urgently required on the right flank; and also of his employing part of the reserve artillery of the army to oppose this attack, which was merely of secondary importance.

We know that the XIIth Army Corps after reconnoitring the hostile position decided against a direct assault on Privat as presenting too many difficulties, but resolved to turn the right flank, while detaining and amusing the enemy in front principally by artillery. This accorded with the spirit of the dispositions made by the Royal head-quarters, and was at the same time the plan best suited to the form of the ground.

Then followed the capture of St. Marie aux Chênes, which had been hastily occupied by the enemy. The assault, having been prepared by the greater part of the Saxon batteries and by those on the extreme left of the corps artillery of the Guard, was made from the south, west, and north-east by portions of those corps; while the greater part of the corps artillery and the field division of the Guard kept the enemy on the heights of St. Privat in check. It is not surprising that some of the Saxon troops, on hearing the rapid fire, diverged towards St. Marie from their proper line of march until ordered back; although this also tended to delay the execution of the turning movement.

As soon as the Guard had formed up and its artillery had partially silenced the enemy's batteries, it advanced resolutely to the assault of St. Privat. The narrative gives as motives for this:—The necessity of obtaining a decisive result before the

end of the day, as it was now late and the smoke made it appear even later; and the belief that the turning movement of the XIIth Corps was more advanced than was really the case. The circumstances have been mentioned which led to the attack being made in echelons from the right; and to its being checked for a time in spite of the brilliant gallantry of the troops. This is not to be wondered at, considering the strength of the enemy's position, not as yet sufficiently shaken by our artillery, and that the assailants were attacked on both flanks by overwhelming hostile masses. But nevertheless two important results towards a decisive success had already been achieved; a portion of the 4th brigade of the Guard, supported by artillery, had succeeded in seizing and maintaining possession of the spur south-west of St. Privat, forming part of the main French position; and moreover the whole of the hostile troops were here so engaged in their front as materially to facilitate the decisive movement against the enemy's flank.

We have seen that the Saxons had not made such progress in the turning movement as was supposed by the Guard Corps, and that the attack of this corps was checked before the Saxons could come into collision with the enemy.

As required by its own dispositions and the general military situation, the IXth Army Corps collected all its disposable forces to renew the frontal attack with energy; the IIIrd Army Corps did not join in the attack as had been intended, because the enemy had just made a fresh and decisive advance against the First Army, which it was considered necessary to paralyse by holding back that corps. Although in the resolute advance of the 3rd brigade of the Guard, the Hessian Division, and part of the 18th Division from the Bois de la Cusse against Amanvillers the main French position was not reached, nevertheless ground was won, and, what was of most importance, by it the attention of the hostile troops opposite was diverted from the right flank of the Guard Corps, while the right of the great artillery line north-east of the Bois de la Cusse was also enabled to advance nearer the enemy. The batteries on the spur south-west of St. Privat as well as those not so far advanced co-operated most effectively in producing this result. But notwithstanding that the corps artillery, the heavy divisional batteries of the IIIrd

Corps, and a battery of the Guard maintained a heavy fire on the southern skirts of the copses of la Folie, the determined attacks made against them by detachments of the 18th Division from the Bois de Genivaux failed to place them in our possession.

The din of battle, which reached the Royal head-quarters at Malmaison from St. Privat and Amanvillers, indicated unmistakeably that the Second German Army had commenced its attack in front and flank of the enemy's right wing. It was therefore time for the whole line of the First Army to make a resolute attack against his left wing, so as to prevent him withdrawing troops from that flank to support his right. Consequently this army also received orders to attack with all its strength, the IInd Army Corps also being moved forward.

We know that owing to its great strength, the great losses here sustained by the Germans, and the approaching darkness, the Germans in spite of their gallantry were unsuccessful in forcing this part of the enemy's main position; although they succeeded in thrusting themselves like a wedge between Point du Jour and Moscou. Nor could a final and decisive movement be successful until the XIIth Corps, having completed its flank march, advanced to turn the French right, and after the last assault had been prepared by the artillery of the Guard, Xth and Saxon Corps—St. Privat and Roncourt having also been cannonaded by the Hessian division.

The narrative has shown that the execution of the turning movement on the part of the Saxons was delayed and modified by accidental circumstances, which caused several officers of the Saxon Corps, excited by a noble spirit of enthusiasm, to march without orders to the support of their hard-pressed comrades of the Guard. The assault on St. Privat was finally delivered from three directions by Guards and Saxons who, stimulated by emulation, rushed forward shoulder to shoulder.

The 6th French Corps was everywhere decisively driven back; and the right wing of the 4th Corps, in spite of the most strenuous exertions, was unable to sustain the concentrated fire of the German artillery crowning the heights south of St. Privat.

The 3rd brigade of the Guard also continued to gain ground in a second decisive advance against Amanvillers until further success was prevented by the approaching darkness.

This victory, in common with the others near Metz, was attended by no great capture of trophies or of prisoners. The enemy was protected from immediate pursuit on the battle field not only by his employing fresh troops to cover the retreat and by the exhaustion of the Germans, but above all by the approaching darkness; while any further pursuit was prevented by the vicinity of the fortress. Nevertheless a decisive result in a military sense was attained by the victory; the battle was the close of the strategic operations round Metz; the result was that the communications of the hostile army with Paris were severed.

3. *The German artillery.*

As the battle of the 18th of August was conducted more systematically than those of the 14th and 16th, so also did the movements of the artillery partake of the same character; there were however here also several instances of improvised action.

1. The battle commenced with a surprise of the enemy's camp by artillery, as was also the case on the 16th. Owing to the faulty arrangements of the French for the security of their position, the ridge between Vernéville and Amanvillers enabled the artillery to approach under cover, deploy, and open a flanking fire on the French right wing, for which the camp at Montigny la Grange was mistaken. The measures for supporting the artillery as narrated seem to have been sufficient.

It might appear that the chances in favour of the decisive success of this surprise by artillery were greater than on the 16th; but in fact the conditions were much less favourable. On the 18th the artillery confronted a strong hostile position, occupied in force and far more commanding. Although it is true that the surprise at Vionville placed the artillery in a critical position, here on the other hand success was out of the question, for it was impossible to remain long under the tremendous fire from troops of all arms at close quarters and mostly under cover until the arrival of the last batteries of the corps artillery of the IXth Army Corps. After heavy losses the squadrons, which formed the only escort of the guns, were compelled to retreat, although the artillery still strove against the inevitable. Not until a battery had been worsted in a gallant and isolated conflict with hostile

skirmishers, and the others were threatened with useless annihilation, was there any thought of withdrawing the left wing of the artillery, which had held its ground with astonishing bravery in spite of its heavy casualties. Even then the batteries obeyed the orders to retire, issued with the sanction of the corps commandant, with reluctance and very gradually The first detachment of infantry which came up only succeeded by heroic devotion in covering the withdrawal of part of the artillery and was at last compelled to give way to the enemy's superior force.

The three batteries of the 18th Division on the right alone were able to maintain their position longer, being somewhat more sheltered in a break in the southern slope of the ridge.

That at a later hour the horse artillery batteries of the corps artillery of the IIIrd Army Corps and one of the batteries of the corps artillery of the IXth Army Corps, which had been taken to the rear, were able again to come into action on the left flank of this artillery line, must be attributed not alone to the gallantry of the troops, but also to the circumstance that the destructive fire from the heights towards the north, which had played on their flanks and rear, had in the interval slackened considerably; for the enemy in that quarter was now held in check by German troops prolonging the left flank. That also towards evening the left of the artillery was unable again to recover its former position, is proved by the resolute but futile attempt made by the 5th Light battery of the Guard to come into action on that flank.

2. Let us now consider in what way the artillery of the IXth Corps would have been disposed if the actual state of affairs with respect to the enemy had been known to the authorities from the commencement of the action. The views of the Royal head-quarters and the general military situation demanded that the entire First Army as well as the IXth Corps should at first detain the enemy, for the object was to prevent him from advancing from his position and to engage his artillery, so as to divert its fire from the other troops and prepare the attack which was to follow. The best position for the execution of this essentially defensive project was on the heights to the right of the defile of la Mance and their continuation towards the north. This ground was in fact occupied by the artillery of the First Army.

The desire of retaining possession of the Bois de la Cusse, which was held by German infantry, necessarily led to the batteries of the IXth Corps becoming scattered; so that while the Hessian artillery took up a position to the north of the Bois de la Cusse at Habonville, the corps artillery and the batteries of the 18th Division were enabled to crown the heights on either side of Vernéville, a good position from which to prepare attacks of infantry against L'Envie and Champenois. We have seen that consequently the field batteries of the corps artillery of the IIIrd Corps afterwards came into action here; and that it did not advance further, as it would have been very much exposed to the hostile infantry occupying the copses south-west of la Folie.

3. In this battle also it was impossible to avoid the separation of the artillery from the bodies of troops to which it belonged. This was generally brought about by the circumstances of the battle and by the form of the ground, although seldom executed but by the express orders or with the sanction of the superior officers. Thus it was impossible to place artillery at the northern edge of the Bois de Vaux because the only road leading to it from the ravine of la Mance was impassable for guns. Consequently the whole of the artillery of the VIIth Corps was employed on its left flank, the 5th Light battery alone being able, after over coming considerable difficulties, to support the 26th brigade at Jussy and St. Ruffine.

The corps artillery of the Guard and afterwards the heavy divisional batteries of the IIIrd Corps were detached and sent to the front to reinforce the hard-pressed artillery of the IXth Corps and to support the attack of the 18th Division. Similarly the horse artillery batteries of the Guard and 5th Cavalry Division as well as the artillery of the Xth Corps were detached to assist the artillery of the Guard and Hessian Division in preparing the assault on St. Privat and afterwards in the last position in the pursuing of the retiring enemy by shelling the 4th French Corps and the formidable artillery position east of St. Privat.

Although the 1st field division of the Guard Corps was separated from the 1st Infantry Division by the corps artillery rushing in between them, yet this did not materially affect the

amount of support given to that Division in its attack of St. Marie. After attaining the principal object of keeping the enemy and notably his artillery in check on the hills south of St. Privat, and thus diverting its fire from the right flank of the attack against St. Marie aux Chênes, it appears to be a matter of indifference whether the battery and a half, which remained available for the direct support, belonged to the corps artillery or 1st field division. The voluntary support given by batteries of both the Saxon Divisions to the 1st Guard Division fully compensated for the absence of its own artillery. This also necessitated a temporary separation of the batteries from the troops to which they belonged, but it is evident that they endeavoured to rejoin them shortly afterwards.

The 5th Light battery of the Guard, which had been assigned to the 3rd brigade of the Guard, was detached owing to the necessity of supporting the artillery of the IXth Army Corps south of the Bois de la Cusse. When the first attack against Amanvillers was made by that brigade, simultaneously with that by the 25th Hessian Division, the only means of supporting its right flank was by the fire of the left wing of the artillery south of the Bois de la Cusse. There was no direct support whatever. That the artillery to the south of the wood did not follow the assault of its own accord, appeared to be well explained by the necessity of holding the hostile troops on and behind the opposite hills in check, to prevent their being employed against the flank of the assailants. Direct support would certainly have been afforded by the available light divisional batteries of the IIIrd Army Corps at short ranges, had not that corps been prevented by the situation of the 1st Army Corps from taking part in this attack. When the 3rd brigade of the Guard again advanced it was supported effectively by the batteries on the right of the great artillery line on the heights south of St. Privat.

4. In this battle the principle of employing artillery in masses was carried out from the very commencement, and on every part of the battle field, to the greatest possible extent. This is to be ascribed not only to tactical considerations but also to the formation of the ground.

a. The only position for artillery on the entire battle field of the First Army, especially at the beginning of the battle, was

the ridge on which Gravelotte is situated, extending from about 1,000 paces to the south of the village to 800 paces north-east of Malmaison. Consequently we find that the whole of the artillery of the First Army, 28 batteries or 168 guns, was here united, as far as the space permitted, under one command. The enemy admits that the concentrated fire of this mass was overwhelming; for it efficiently prepared the assault on St. Hubert, set Moscou and Point du Jour on fire, and silenced his artillery.

One thing was naturally impossible for the artillery, namely, to drive the enemy from under cover. This, when at all, had to be done by infantry. The attack here, already difficult on account of the ravine in front, was rendered more so as the artillery could only co-operate to a limited degree. For though at first the artillery mass at Gravelotte could fire over the heads of the infantry without any risk of hitting it, it was afterwards obliged to cease firing. This was the critical moment when the enemy's masses might have attempted to drive back the shaken infantry.

The form of the ravine was such that as a rule artillery beyond it could not open fire on the hostile position until the guns had advanced nearly to the crest, and this would necessitate the occupation of the ground there by infantry. In any case such an advance of artillery would be attended with danger, and would be only justifiable if the decisive attack was to be made at this point. This was indeed the idea when the corps artillery of the VIIth Army Corps was ordered to cross the defile, but at that time the infantry had not made sufficient progress, and consequently three batteries only could be brought into action. That two of these were able to retain their position for some time is to be attributed not only to their praiseworthy valour, but also to the direct and indirect support afforded by St. Hubert, by the gully running thence to Moscou, and by the fire of the great artillery mass in rear at Gravelotte, although this gully only gave them command of Moscou and the ground in its immediate vicinity.

The enemy was prevented from pursuing our retreating infantry in any force by the precision of the fire of the artillery

mass at Gravelotte,[1] and although fresh hostile batteries were repeatedly brought up, they were either prevented from coming into action or obliged to retire after a few rounds.

b. The surprise of the enemy's camp at Montigny la Grange, mentioned above, was executed by ten batteries brought into action in succession on the south-east of the Bois de la Cusse, and united under one command, consisting of the corps artillery of the IXth Army Corps, the batteries of the 18th Division, and the Hessian Horse Artillery battery. When they found that no permanent success was thus attainable the batteries were ordered to prepare the two attacks made by the infantry of that corps through the Bois de la Cusse against Amanvillers, as well as from Chantrenne through the Bois de Genivaux against the copses at la Folie. This was to be effected in the first place by cannonading the troops on the opposite heights, and especially the artillery posted there. The number of German batteries engaged in this particular duty varied during the battle, amounting at most to thirteen, after the 5th Light battery of the Guard came into action. They included six of the IXth Corps (one of these being the Hessian horse artillery battery), six of the IIIrd, and one of the Guard Corps. Although they formed two groups under different commanding officers, their fire was, as a rule, concentrated on the same object, and after a severe contest the hostile artillery here also was driven away.

The artillery claim that Champenois was evacuated owing principally to the concentrated and heavy fire of the batteries to the south of the Bois de la Cusse, and certainly the precision of the guns between that wood and the Bois de Genivaux was such that all the attempts made by the enemy to place fresh batteries on the opposite heights, as well as the offensive movements made by isolated bodies of infantry, were foiled.

Several alterations occurred in this position, the recapitulation of which will be interesting.

1. In consequence of the hostile fire, which took the left of the position in flank and rear, the 4th Heavy battery of the

[1] It must of course be understood, and it has already been shown in the narrative, that parties of infantry, which held their ground on the eastern edge of the ravine, as, for instance, the garrison of St. Hubert, endeavoured to co-operate as much as possible.

9th regiment moved to the front, but after the disaster which it sustained the temporary withdrawal of the whole of the corps artillery and a battery of the 18th Division was imperatively called for.

2. Anxious to support the remaining three batteries of the 18th Division, which, although hard pressed, were unwilling to give up the ground already won, the horse artillery division of the corps artillery of the IIIrd Corps, which was passing by, came into action on their left, and the Hessian Horse Artillery battery, which was retiring, on the right.

3. The 2nd Horse Artillery battery and 4th Light battery of the corps artillery of the IXth Army Corps, having rapidly refitted, again came into action in the artillery line.

4. Owing to the capture of Champenois the Hessian Horse Artillery battery was able to advance into line with that place and L'Envie.

5. Being ordered to advance and support the artillery south of the Bois de la Cusse, the 5th Light battery of the Guard came into action for a short time on the left flank. Desirous, however, of obtaining a better field of view, it advanced in the direction of Amanvillers; but the impossibility of finding an eligible position compelled it to return to its first position. Thence it made a long flank march along the rear of the position, and came into action on the right of the Hessian Horse Artillery battery, where the range was more open.

6. Towards evening the four batteries on the right flank wheeled to the left, so as to bring a more effective fire to bear on fresh hostile artillery and infantry (supposed to be Lorencez's Division) at Montigny la Grange.

7. All its guns having become unserviceable the Hessian Horse Artillery battery was obliged to withdraw during the evening.

8. As soon as the hostile artillery on the heights had been silenced, the southern group of batteries (field division of corps artillery, IIIrd Army Corps) was able to wheel to the right so as to enfilade the southern skirts of the wood of la Folie. This line was moreover now prolonged on the left by five batteries (four heavy divisional batteries of the IIIrd Corps and the 5th Light battery of the Guard) to the north of the defile of Chan-

trenne, so that the fire of these nine batteries under one commander was concentrated with great success on the same object.

c. To the north of the Bois de la Cusse also artillery was employed in masses, for instance, at first:—

1. The five Hessian field batteries, afterwards joined by the 3rd Light field battery of the 9th regiment, immediately to the north of the wood.[1]

2. To the north-west nine batteries of the 1st field division and of the corps artillery of the Guard Corps, which after the occupation of St. Ail by the Germans were aligned on the Hessian batteries.

The general commanding the IXth Corps, who had distinctly seen the critical position of the batteries south of the Bois de la Cusse, was obviously right in ordering the Hessian artillery to advance from its first to its second position,[2] for it was necessary to create a more rapid and decisive effect, which could only be effected at a shorter range. After a hot conflict the well-directed fire of these batteries was successful in so diverting the attention of the troops confronting them that the left wing of the IXth Corps, and more especially the advanced line of artillery to the south of the Bois de la Cusse, were to some extent relieved from the fire which till then had played with such deadly effect on their flanks and rear.[3] The mass of artillery of the Guard alluded to in (2) had at first to play a secondary part, that of detaining the enemy and preventing his artillery on the heights near St. Privat from enfilading the Hessian batteries (1). With their co-operation it carried on a decisive contest from its position south-east of St. Ail against the French artillery on the heights to the south of St. Privat, and though interrupted by frequent attacks of the enemy, always repulsed them by its accurate and overwhelming fire. We know that here also the German artillery gained the advantage, though not without considerable loss.

[1] The narrative has shown that this position had already been occupied by the 1st field division of the artillery of the Guard.

[2] It has been mentioned above that the commander of the Hessian artillery had already intended to make this movement.

[3] It was not possible wholly to silence the flanking fire of the hostile infantry, because the ground immediately to the south-west of Amanvillers, where it found cover, could not be seen into by our artillery.

3. Further to the north-west again, thirteen Saxon batteries (seven of the corps artillery and three from each of the Divisions of the XIIth Corps) were concentrated and most efficiently prepared the assault of St. Marie aux Chênes, while the extreme left flank of the corps artillery of the Guard Corps (4. l. and part of 2. r. G.) fronted St. Marie for the same purpose.

After the capture of that place the bulk of the Saxon artillery was employed in supporting the turning movement of this corps, which wheeled to the right on St. Marie as a pivot; the position of the artillery being immediately to the north of the village, i.e. at the pivot. Intermediate positions were indeed at first taken up with the left flank refused, until the Saxon infantry drove the enemy out of the copses between Auboué and Roncourt. This was scarcely accomplished when we find twelve batteries (72 guns) massed under one command to the north of St. Marie, where it brought the conflict with the hostile artillery between St. Privat and Roncourt to a successful termination, and with the co-operation of part of the artillery of the Guard repulsed repeated offensive movements made by the enemy's right flank. At this time also occurred the resolute and successful advance made by the 2nd Horse Artillery battery against hostile cavalry.

While the 1st Heavy battery accompanied the 46th brigade in its march into position, the main body of the 1st field division and the 1st Horse Artillery battery followed the extreme left flank of the XIIth Corps, opening the way for its advance against Roncourt and the forest between that place and Malancourt.

4. Soon after the capture of St. Marie aux Chênes the 3rd field division of the artillery of the Guard came into action between that village and St. Ail to reinforce the fire of the batteries of this corps already engaged.

When the infantry of the Guard moved to the assault of St. Privat, the artillery of that corps had almost silenced the hostile batteries on the west and south of that place, but had not had time to cannonade the village itself sufficiently. It was not therefore until the infantry had advanced far enough to protect it against the line of hostile skirmishers lying under cover, that it was able to move forward in echelons and prepare the

assault more effectively at a shorter range. But the infantry was now advancing so impetuously that part only of the batteries of the Guard reached this new position, where they were soon again overtaken and masked by the infantry. We know that the assault, commenced with such brilliant gallantry, was for a time interrupted owing to the enemy's numerical superiority and advantage of ground, in order to give time for the artillery of the Guard to prepare the way by cannonading St. Privat, as well as to await the co-operation of the XIIth Corps. We have seen that the 2nd Heavy and 3rd Light batteries of the Guard (afterwards joined by the 4th Heavy) hastened to the front to establish the success which the Guard Corps had just attained by the capture of the spur south-west of St. Privat. In that critical situation they held their ground shoulder to shoulder with the weak parties of infantry, and most effectually repulsed by the accuracy of their fire all endeavours on the part of the enemy to regain possession of the spur.

The Hessian artillery had at first to cover the right of the attack from its position in retired echelon, until the IXth Corps had also gained ground towards the front, when some of its batteries moved up into line with the artillery of the Guard.

With the above exceptions the artillery of the Guard—which was before long reinforced by the two horse artillery batteries of the Cavalry Division, the corps artillery of the Xth Army Corps, and two Hessian field batteries, two batteries of the Guard being pushed forward through the advancing infantry immediately to the north of the high road—now continued its fire with redoubled vigour against St. Privat and the hostile batteries in its vicinity, which again made their appearance.[1]

The Saxon artillery also was now able to lay aside its defensive attitude and, inclining to the left and bringing forward its left shoulder, conform to the turning movement of its infantry. It prepared the attack against Roncourt, and finally against St. Privat, from two different positions near the south edge of the wood between the former village and Auboué. The capture of Roncourt was the signal for the whole of the Saxon

[1] Then the three other batteries of the 1st division of the artillery of the Guard, which had remained on the right flank of the great artillery line, being masked by advancing infantry, directed their fire at the hill where the pond is situated.

artillery to move forward to a position enveloping St. Privat on the north and north-west. Having been detained too long by the forest-fight, the two batteries on the extreme left flank (east of Roncourt) arrived too late to contribute to the very effective fire which was concentrated for some time on St. Privat from this new position. In the last moments of the contest that decisive point was encircled on the north, west, and south-west by a mass of thirty-one batteries (186 guns) from the Guard, Saxon, and xth Army Corps and from the 25th (Hessian) Division, to which four batteries of the 20th Division were added at the commencement of the assault. Overwhelmed by the German shell (including a few shrapnel), the enemy's proud stronghold yielded to the last assault. French accounts, and especially Montluisant's, testify to the decisive part played by the German artillery at this important phase of the contest.

The gallant infantry had hardly captured St. Privat and taken up a position on the heights, when batteries came up from the artillery mass to secure possession of what had been won and to be in readiness for future events.[1] Thus by degrees the last great artillery mass was formed extending from the Forêt de Jaumont by St. Privat to the Bois de la Cusse, in which finally thirty-eight batteries (228 guns) were crowded together. While the left and larger wing (19-20 batteries), after successfully shelling the retiring hostile columns, concentrated its fire on the artillery position at the forest, the right wing poured its fire, according to the enemy's own admission, into the right flank (and rear even?) of the 4th French Corps with such effect that it was compelled first to change front and then to retreat. The accurate fire of this wing always repulsed the offensive movements which were repeatedly directed against it by small as well as by large bodies of infantry from Amanvillers.[2]

5. In this battle also the ranges varied between 800 and 4,000 paces, with the single exception of the 6th Light field battery of the 1st Army Corps, which fired from the right bank of the Moselle at the enemy's flank at a distance of 5,000 paces.

[1] Reinforcements reached the batteries of the Guard on the spur south-west of St. Privat during the contest round that village.

[2] This refers, no doubt, to Ladmirault's endeavours (French accounts say that they were superhuman) to lead his troops back to their original position and cover the retreat of his corps.

On a few occasions case shot had to be resorted to, in repelling hostile attacks. However extraordinary these differences of range may appear, they are accounted by for existing circumstances.

We find the longest ranges in the beginning of the battle, with some few exceptions which have been already mentioned. This was necessary not only because it was required at first to 'detain' the enemy, which as a rule allowed of long ranges, but also because there were no eligible defensive positions at shorter ranges. The following are instances of these long ranges:—(1.) The artillery of the First Army at Gravelotte was forced to concentrate its fire on points of the hostile position which lay opposite one or other of its flanks at ranges of from 2,500 to 4,000 paces;[1]—(2.) The field batteries of the corps artillery of the IIIrd Army Corps south of Vernéville at 3,800 paces;—(3.) The artillery of the Guard Corps in its first position at 4,000 paces;—(4.) The Saxon artillery up to more than 4,000 paces, from its position north and north-west of St. Marie.

We have already seen that in the last three instances the artillery was prevented from advancing to shorter ranges by the enemy either permanently or temporarily occupying the copses of la Folie, the village of St. Ail, and the wood between Auboué and Roncourt.

At these long ranges, nevertheless, not only was the purpose of 'detaining' the enemy fully accomplished, but also, after the range had been obtained by trial shots, the systematic firing succeeded in silencing the enemy's guns, either wholly or partially, as in the case of the artillery of the First Army. In another quarter the decisive contest on the part of the Saxon, Guard, and Hessian artillery was conducted at ranges of from 2,000 to 2,800 paces.

The artillery on the heights of St. Privat afterwards fired at the hostile batteries near the forest to the east of that village at ranges varying from 1,800 to 2,500 paces. Still shorter ranges were employed against hostile artillery, although the fire was directed at other objects also, by the artillery of the IXth Army

[1] The 1st Horse Artillery battery of the 1st regiment alone relinquished the advantage of its commanding and covered position for that of a shorter range.

Corps south of the Bois de la Cusse and the batteries of the VIIth Army Corps on the east of the ravine of Gravelotte.

The shortest ranges for offensive purposes varied from 800 to 1,200 paces, and were resorted to in the following instances:— (1.) By the batteries of the VIIth Army Corps at St. Hubert. (2.) By the left wing of the corps artillery of the IXth Army Corps. (3.) By the batteries of the XIIth (Saxon) Army Corps, which cannonaded St. Marie from the south. (4.) By the batteries of the Guard, which came into action alongside the hard-pressed infantry on the spur south-west of St. Privat. (5.) By some of the Saxon batteries in the last position against St. Privat. We know that the artillery of the Guard was obliged by the form of the south-western slope of the heights of St. Privat to remain somewhat further off in order not to lose sight of the object. (6.) By those batteries which crowned the heights north and south of St. Privat so rapidly that they were in time to fire into the retreating columns.

But all these occurred at decisive moments, or at moments considered so by the commanding officers, when attention had to be paid to the effect of the fire rather than to obtaining cover for the guns. Although this principle was carried out by the batteries mentioned in the first two instances to such an extent as to cause their partial destruction, they were unsuccessful in attaining a decisive result, that being rendered impossible by the general state of affairs; nevertheless the advantage gained was no slight one, as the best possible effect was produced on the morale of the other troops.

In the other instances the effect of the artillery fire was decisive; this has been shown in the narrative by several quotations from the French reports.

We find similar short ranges used for defensive purposes and in some instances case shot resorted to. The narrative shows that this occurred when several of the batteries that were cannonading the hostile position at long ranges had to defend themselves against small bodies of hostile infantry, principally skirmishers, which tried to creep up under cover of the ground Of this character was the successful cannonade of Champenois by batteries of the IXth and IIIrd Corps from the south of the Bois de la Cusse; the repulse of the offensive movement made by the extreme right

flank of the French by the accurate fire of the Saxons, assisted by that of some of the batteries of the Guard (here the shortest ranges were somewhat exceeded), also the repulse by Hessian guns of the parties of infantry which tried to push forward near the Bois de la Cusse along the railroad; and, lastly, the repulse of repeated attacks on the part of the 4th French Corps from Amanvillers by the deliberate and accurate fire of the batteries on the right of the great artillery line south of St. Privat, consisting of the 1st field division, 3rd Light and 4th Heavy batteries of the Guard artillery, some batteries of the Xth Corps, of the 5th Cavalry Division, and of the Hessian artillery.

6. In this battle also we find case shot successfully employed in self-defence. At ranges of 400 paces the 3rd Heavy battery of the 9th regiment repulsed an attack of skirmishers from Champenois, and the 3rd Light battery an attack from Moscou, while the extreme left flank of the corps artillery of the IXth Army Corps had not even time to try the efficacy of case shot, which, however, would hardly have extricated it from its critical position.

7. Shrapnel shells were fired by some of the Saxon batteries, but it was very difficult, as already mentioned, to distinguish their effect as they were fired at the same time as the common shell at the same objects.

8. In this battle also flank marches were not unfrequently made by artillery within effective range of the enemy, more or less protection being afforded by the ground, of which the following are instances:—The artillery of the VIIth Army Corps taking up its position at Gravelotte. The march of the artillery of the IXth Corps into position south of the Bois de la Cusse relatively to the position of the enemy in front. The movement of the corps artillery of the Guard Corps from its first position near the railroad through the defile to its second position. The flank marches of several detachments of Saxon artillery from their first positions towards the north through the defile running from Habonville to Auboué. The movements made by Hanoverian and Guard batteries after the capture of St. Privat to crown the hills which, commencing to rise at that point, covered the operation to some extent.

It was, however, impossible to avoid exposing the flanks

some instances, as for example:—When the 1st field division of the Guard moved from its position close to the Bois de la Cusse on the south of the railway to another north of it; also when the 1st Heavy battery of the Guard (having lost its relative position in its division by the advance in echelon of the artillery of the Guard from its position between St. Ail and the Bois de la Cusse) was forced to move to the right flank of the line; and again when the 4th Light and 6th Heavy batteries of the Guard, being masked by the advance of the infantry of the Guard to the assault, were obliged to move to the north of the road from St. Marie to St. Privat. Then also the Saxon batteries which had lost their relative position as they advanced in echelon into the crowded position at Roncourt were obliged to come into action wherever they could find room. In all these cases considerable losses were sustained by the enemy's fire, but not to such an extent as to prevent the attainment of the object. Nor is it stated in the reports of those batteries of the VIIth Corps which had to deploy at St. Hubert that the manœuvre itself was the cause of the heavy loss incurred. That the horse artillery division of the 8th regiment of artillery sustained no casualties in its flank march from the position at Mogador to that on the south of the high road near the eastern outskirts of Gravelotte, is explained by the circumstance that the enemy, being kept in check by the batteries which had remained in the position, had his attention diverted from the movement.

We can therefore only repeat our statement with regard to the battles of the 14th and 16th of August: 'that as a rule it is not difficult to withdraw artillery in action from the fighting line and employ them in another part of the field of battle; and that flank and diagonal marches, which artillery do not make willingly under the enemy's fire, can always be executed in case of necessity.' These reflections add weight to the principle of employing a greater part of the artillery at the outset, and lead to the conviction that reserves of artillery are less necessary than of infantry and cavalry.

9. As already mentioned in the narrative of the battle, the German artillery occasionally fired into their own troops,[1] but

[1] According to Captain Helmuth's Lecture at the Military Society, there is no doubt that this was the case. It must, moreover, be remarked that accidents of this nature occurred also on the 14th and 16th of August.

in all the instances which have come to the writer's knowledge this arose from mistaking them for the enemy under some such circumstances as the following :—

a. When the artillery was firing over its own troops at long and unknown ranges.

b. In close and intersected ground, when it became difficult to distinguish objects owing to the insufficient light caused by smoke, dust, and approaching darkness, or when the sun was shining in the faces of the troops.

c. During the hasty pursuits made by detachments of the assaulting columns after villages or positions had been taken, especially when it was growing dark.

d. When the batteries, brought forward from the reserves or columns of march, happened to come within range of the hostile guns which were firing at batteries already in action in front. This was more frequently the case when the latter, being placed on high ground, prevented the hostile batteries being seen, as for example, on the heights of St. Privat, which defiladed the hostile artillery position near the wood east of St. Privat from the batteries coming up from the rear.

e. During the assaults on the enemy's flank in which artillery co-operated, and which became somewhat disconnected owing to the approaching darkness. The more extensive the scale on which the attack was conducted, so much the greater was the danger of single detachments pressing forward being enfiladed by those that had remained in their positions.

Such accidents may in future be avoided by the following precautions :—

a. Should the formation of the ground necessitate troops firing over the heads of those in front, as in the case of an assault, the officers who have the arrangement of the assault must make it their business to give exact information to the artillery when it is to take place, so that it may cease firing.[1] But the assaulting columns must also understand that they are not to advance under such circumstances without orders. This is all the more imperative if the formation of the ground requires the employment of long ranges or if want of light makes it diffi-

[1] It is scarcely necessary to mention that artillery is by no means absolved from the duty of attentively observing the movements of its own infantry.

cult to see. At a given signal the artillery will cease firing and the assault will be delivered.

Information of this description was given by the commander of the advanced guard of the 1st Division of the Guard Corps to the two batteries of that corps while cannonading St. Marie aux Chênes. This does not appear to have been the case at all in the attack on St. Privat; nor was it indeed possible, because the last assault was commenced before the superior officers could issue their orders for it.

b. It is as much for the interest of the infantry as of artillery that as a rule successful assaulting columns should not pursue beyond the object they attack, but that this duty should be left to troops coming up in rear or to reserves; besides which the artillery following the movement has more time for co-operation and will be less likely to mistake its own troops in the front for those of the enemy.

c. Artillery which is to be brought forward during the battle into the fighting line must be directed when possible by officers who have been able to follow the course of the battle, and are thoroughly acquainted with the relative positions of their own and the enemy's troops. This is of peculiar importance if events in front call for immediate action, as the commandant of artillery, who has generally no reconnoitring patrols at his disposal, has no time to obtain sufficient information under such unfavourable conditions.

It is as a rule not sufficient merely to point out the general direction in which artillery is to come into action.

d. When it is intended to prosecute assaults against the enemy's flank after dark, it will in most cases be advisable for the artillery to cease firing entirely. Its fire does more harm than good, as the actual effect must be very slight when objects can no longer be distinguished. The gain in morale which the troops acquire from the knowledge that they are supported by artillery is on such occasions more than counterbalanced by the danger of being hit by it.

10. The losses of the artillery in this battle are according to the lists very varied. The heaviest were sustained by the batteries of the IXth Army Corps in the position south of the Bois de la Cusse, and by the batteries of the VIIth Army Corps engaged to the east of the defile of Gravelotte, in some instances

amounting to the loss of all the officers, three-fourths of the men, and more than the complement of horses.[1]

The losses were, as might be expected, least when the artillery was engaged in merely 'detaining' the enemy which could be done at long ranges from under cover, and in some batteries the casualties were in such cases extremely few. On the other hand batteries which fought at short ranges at decisive moments lost more than one-third of their men and three-fourths of their horses.

The loss in material was remarkably trifling, and we consequently consider ourselves justified in repeating the maxim that artillery opposed to artillery should aim less at dismounting guns than at disabling men and horses.

CONCLUSION.

FROM the preceding narrative it is evident that on the 18th of August also the German Artillery vied with its sister arm, the infantry, in heroism, and played a most important part in gaining this decisive victory; its distinguished behaviour has received full recognition in the reports of the German Armies.

[1] The lines of wagons are not included in the purely combatant portion of the batteries. This is as follows:—

	Officers	Men	Horses
Field battery . . .	4	62	48
Horse Artillery battery .	4	74	96

The full strength of mobilised batteries is:—

	Officers	Men	Horses
Horse Artillery battery .	4	150	207
Light field battery . .	4	145	127
Heavy " . .	4	151	126

Order of Battle—continued.

Army Corps	Divisions	Brigades	Regiments	Remarks
VIIIth Army Corps—General of Infantry von Goeben Chief of General Staff—Col. von Witzendorf Commander of Artillery—Maj.-Gen. von Kamecke	15th Infantry Division—Lieut.-Gen. von Weltzien	29th Infantry Brigade—Maj.-Gen. von Wedell	33rd Fusiliers—Lieut.-Col. von Henning 60th Regiment—Lieut. Col. von Dannenberg	*Artillery* 1st Field Division (Maj. Mertens), attached to 15th Infantry Division
		30th Infantry Brigade—Maj.-Gen. von Strubberg	28th Regiment—Col. von Rosenzweig 67th ,, Col. von Zglinicki	
		Attached to Division: 8th Rifle Battalion—Maj. von Oppeln-Bronikowski; 7th King's Hussars—Col. Freiherr von Loë		3rd Field Division (Lieut.-Col. Hildebrandt), attached to 16th Infantry Division
	16th Infantry Division—Lieut.-Gen. Baron von Barnekow	31st Infantry Brigade—Maj.-Gen. Count Neidhardt von Gneisenau	29th Regiment—Lieut.-Col. von Blumröder 69th ,, Col. Beyer von Karger	Remainder belonged to Corps Artillery, under Col. von Broecker;—Horse Artillery Division (Lieut.-Col. von Borkenhagen); 2nd Field Division (Maj. Zwirnemann); Column-Division (Capt. Eggers)
		32nd Infantry Brigade—Col. von Rex	40th Fusiliers—Col. Freiherr von Eberstein 72nd Regiment—Col. Mettler	
		Attached to Division: 9th Hussars—Col. von Wittlich or von Hinzmann-Hallmann		
	Attached to Army Corps: 8th Field Artillery Regiment, 8th Pioneer Battalion, 8th Train Battalion			

Order of Battle—continued.

Army Corps	Divisions	Brigades	Regiments	Remarks
Cavalry Divisions attached to First Army	1st Cavalry Division—Lieut.-Gen. von Hartmann	1st Cavalry Brigade—Maj.-Gen. von Lüderitz	2nd Cuirassiers—Col. von Pfuhl 4th Lancers—Lieut.-Col. von Radecke 9th ,, Lieut.-Col. von Kleist	
		2nd Cavalry Brigade—Maj.-Gen. Baumgarten	3rd Cuirassiers—Col. von Winterfeld 8th Lancers—Col. von Below 12th ,, Lieut.-Col. von Rosenberg	
		1st Horse Artillery Battery of 1st Field Artillery Regiment		
	3rd Cavalry Division—Maj.-Gen. Count von der Groeben	6th Cavalry Brigade—Maj.-Gen. von Mirus	8th Cuirassiers—Col. von Rödern 7th Lancers—Lieut.-Col. von Pestel	
		7th Cavalry Brigade—Maj.-Gen. Count Dohna	5th Lancers—Col. Freiherr von Reitzenstein 14th ,, Col. von Lüderitz	
		1st Horse Artillery Battery of 7th Field Artillery Regiment		

Summary of First Army.

1st Army Corps	25 Battalions,	8 Squadrons,	14 Batteries	(84 guns).
VIIth ,, ,,	25 ,,	8 ,,	14 ,,	(84 ,,).
VIIIth ,, ,,	25 ,,	8 ,,	15 ,,	(90 ,,).
1st Cavalry Division	— ,,	24 ,,	1 ,,	(6 ,,).
3rd ,, ,,	— ,,	16 ,,	1 ,,	(6 ,,).
Total	75 ,,	64 ,,	45 ,,	(270 ,,).

Order of Battle—continued.

Army Corps	Divisions	Brigades	Regiments	Remarks
VIIIth Army Corps—General of Infantry von Goeben	15th Infantry Division—Lieut.-Gen. von Weltzien	29th Infantry Brigade—Maj.-Gen. von Wedell	33rd Fusiliers—Lieut.-Col. von Henning 60th Regiment—Lieut. Col. von Dannenberg	*Artillery* 1st Field Division (Maj. Mertens), attached to 15th Infantry Division
		30th Infantry Brigade—Maj.-Gen. von Strubberg	28th Regiment—Col. von Rosenzweig 67th ,, Col. von Zglinicki	
		Attached to Division: 8th Rifle Battalion—Maj. von Oppeln-Bronikowski; 7th King's Hussars—Col. Freiherr von Loë		3rd Field Division (Lieut.-Col. Hildebrandt), attached to 16th Infantry Division
Chief of General Staff—Col. von Witzendorf	16th Infantry Division—Lieut.-Gen. Baron von Barnekow	31st Infantry Brigade—Maj.-Gen. Count Neidhardt von Gneisenau	29th Regiment—Lieut.-Col. von Blumröder 69th ,, Col. Beyer von Karger	Remainder belonged to Corps Artillery, under Col. von Broecker;—Horse Artillery Division (Lieut.-Col. von Borkenhagen); 2nd Field Division (Maj. Zwirnemann); Column-Division (Capt. Eggers)
Commander of Artillery—Maj.-Gen. von Kamecke		32nd Infantry Brigade—Col. von Rex	40th Fusiliers—Col. Freiherr von Eberstein 72nd Regiment—Col. Mettler	
		Attached to Division: 9th Hussars—Col. von Wittlich or von Hinzmann-Hallmann		
	Attached to Army Corps: 8th Field Artillery Regiment, 8th Pioneer Battalion, 8th Train Battalion			

Order of Battle—continued.

Army Corps	Divisions	Brigades	Regiments	Remarks
Cavalry Divisions attached to First Army	1st Cavalry Division — Lieut.-Gen. von Hartmann	1st Cavalry Brigade — Maj.-Gen. von Lüderitz	2nd Cuirassiers—Col. von Pfuhl 4th Lancers—Lieut.-Col. von Radecke 9th ,, Lieut.-Col. von Kleist	
		2nd Cavalry Brigade — Maj.-Gen. Baumgarten	3rd Cuirassiers—Col. von Winterfeld 8th Lancers—Col. von Below 12th ,, Lieut.-Col. von Rosenberg	
		1st Horse Artillery Battery of 1st Field Artillery Regiment		
	3rd Cavalry Division — Maj.-Gen. Count von der Groeben	6th Cavalry Brigade — Maj.-Gen. von Mirus	8th Cuirassiers—Col. von Rödern 7th Lancers—Lieut.-Col. von Pestel	
		7th Cavalry Brigade — Maj.-Gen. Count Dohna	5th Lancers—Col. Freiherr von Reitzenstein 14th ,, Col. von Lüderitz	
		1st Horse Artillery Battery of 7th Field Artillery Regiment		

Summary of First Army.

1st	Army Corps	.	.	25	Battalions,	8	Squadrons,	14	Batteries	(84 guns).
VIIth	,,	,,	.	25	,,	8	,,	14	,,	(84 ,,).
VIIIth	,,	,,	.	25	,,	8	,,	15	,,	(90 ,,).
1st Cavalry Division		.	.	—	,,	24	,,	1	,,	(6 ,,).
3rd	,,	,,	.	—	,,	16	,,	1	,,	(6 ,,).
	Total	.	.	75	,,	64	,,	45	,,	(270 ,,).

SECOND ARMY.

Commander in Chief . . . GENERAL OF CAVALRY PRINCE FREDERICK CHARLES OF PRUSSIA, K.H.

Chief of the Staff—*Major-General* von Stiehle.
Quartermaster-General—*Colonel* von Hertzberg.
Commander of Artillery—*Lieut.-General* von Colomier.
Commander of Engineers and Pioneers—*Colonel* Leuthaus.

Army Corps	Divisions	Brigades	Regiments	Remarks
Guard Corps—General of Cavalry Aug. von Wurtemberg, K.H. Chief of General Staff — Maj.-Gen. von Dannenberg Commander of Artillery — Maj.-Gen. Kraft Prince von Ho[illegible] Insel-	1st Guard Infantry Division — Maj.-Gen. von Pape	1st Guard Infantry Brigade —Maj.-Gen. von Kessel	1st Foot Guards—Col. von Roeder 3rd ,, ,, Col. von Linsingen	*Artillery* 1st Field Division (Col. von Bischelberg) was attached to 1st Infantry Division 3rd Field Division (Lieut.-Col. von Rheinhaben), to 2nd Infantry Division Remainder belonged to Corps Artillery (Col. von Scherbening) Horse Artillery Division (Maj. Baron von Buddenbrock) 2nd Field Division (Maj. von Krieger) Column-Division (Maj. von Heineccius)
		2nd Guard Infantry Brigade—Maj.-Gen. Baron von Medem	2nd Foot Guards—Col. Count von Kanitz 4th ,, ,, Col. von Neumann Fusilier Guards—Lieut.-Col. von Erkert	
		Attached to Division: Guard Rifle Battalion—Maj. von Arnim		
	2nd Guard Infantry Division — Lieut.-Gen. von Budritzki	3rd Guard Infantry Brigade — Colonel Knappe von Knappstädt	1st Grenadier Guards—Col. von Zeuner 3rd ,, ,, Col. von Zaluskowski	
		4th Guard Infantry Brigade — Maj.-Gen. von Berger	2nd Grenadier Guards—Lieut.-Col. von Boehn 4th ,, ,, Col. Count von Waldersee	
		Attached to Division: Guard Sharpshooters Battalion—Col. von Fabeck		

Order of Battle—continued.

Army Corps	Divisions	Brigades	Regiments	Remarks
Guard Corps — (*continued*)	Guard Cavalry Division Lieut.-Gen. Count von der Goltz	1st Guard Cavalry Brigade — Maj.-Gen. Count von Brandenburg	Gardes du Corps Col. von Krosigk Guard Cuirassiers—Col. Baron von Brandenstein	*Artillery*—cont. The Batteries of Horse Artillery were attached to the Cavalry Division as required
		2nd Guard Cavalry Brigade Lieut.-Gen. Prince Albrecht of Prussia	1st Guard Lancers - Lieut.-Col. von Rochow 3rd ,, Dragoons—Col. F. W. von Hohenlohe Guard Hussars—Lieut.-Col. von Hymmen	
		3rd Guard Cavalry Brigade - Maj. Gen. Count von Brandenburg (2)	1st Guard Dragoons—Col. von Auerswald 2nd ,, ,, Col. Count Finck von Finckenstein 2nd Guard Lancers - Col. Prince Henry of Hesse	
	Attached to Guard Corps: Guard Field Artillery Regiment, Guard Pioneer Battalion, Guard Train Battalion			
11nd Army Corps —General of Infantry von Francecky	3rd Infantry Division — Maj.-Gen. von Hartmann	5th Infantry Brigade — Maj.-Gen. von Koblinski	2nd Grenadiers -Col. von Ziemietzky 42nd Regiment—Col. von der Knesebeck	*Artillery* 1st Field Division (Maj. Baron von Eynatten), attached to 3rd Infantry Division
		6th Infantry Brigade — Col. von der Decken	14th Regiment—Col. von Voss 54th ,, Col. von Busse	3rd Field Division (Lieut.-Col. Bauer), to 4th Infantry Division
	Attached to Division: 2nd Rifle Battalion - Maj. von Netzer; and 3rd Dragoons—Col. Baron von Willisen			

SECOND ARMY.

Commander in Chief . . . GENERAL OF CAVALRY PRINCE FREDERICK CHARLES OF PRUSSIA, K.H.

Chief of the Staff—*Major-General* von Stiehle.
Quartermaster-General—*Colonel* von Hertzberg.
Commander of Artillery—*Lieut.-General* von Colomier.
Commander of Engineers and Pioneers—*Colonel* Leuthaus.

Army Corps	Divisions	Brigades	Regiments	Remarks
Guard Corps—General of Cavalry Aug. von Wurtemberg, K.H. Chief of General Staff — Maj.-Gen. von Dannenberg Commander of Artillery—Maj.-Gen. Kraft Prince von Hohenlohe Ingelfingen	1st Guard Infantry Division — Maj.-Gen. von Pape	1st Guard Infantry Brigade —Maj.-Gen. von Kessel	1st Foot Guards—Col. von Roeder 3rd ,, ,, Col. von Linsingen	*Artillery* 1st Field Division (Col. von Bischelberg) was attached to 1st Infantry Division 3rd Field Division (Lieut.-Col. von Rheinhaben), to 2nd Infantry Division Remainder belonged to Corps Artillery (Col. von Scherbening) Horse Artillery Division (Maj. Baron von Buddenbrock) 2nd Field Division (Maj. von Krieger) Column-Division (Maj. von Heineccius)
		2nd Guard Infantry Brigade—Maj.-Gen. Baron von Medem	2nd Foot Guards—Col. Count von Kanitz 4th ,, ,, Col. von Neumann Fusilier Guards—Lieut.-Col. von Erkert	
		Attached to Division: Guard Rifle Battalion—Maj. von Arnim		
	2nd Guard Infantry Division — Lieut.-Gen. von Budritzki	3rd Guard Infantry Brigade — Colonel Knappe von Knappstädt	1st Grenadier Guards—Col. von Zeuner 3rd ,, ,, Col. von Zaluskowski	
		4th Guard Infantry Brigade — Maj.-Gen. von Berger	2nd Grenadier Guards—Lieut.-Col. von Boehn 4th ,, ,, Col. Count von Waldersee	
		Attached to Division: Guard Sharpshooters Battalion—Col. von Fabeck		

Order of Battle—continued.

Army Corps	Divisions	Brigades	Regiments	Remarks
Guard Corps—(*continued*)	Guard Cavalry Division—Lieut.-Gen. Count von der Goltz	1st Guard Cavalry Brigade—Maj.-Gen. Count von Brandenburg	Gardes du Corps—Col. von Krosigk Guard Cuirassiers—Col. Baron von Brandenstein	*Artillery*—cont. The Batteries of Horse Artillery were attached to the Cavalry Division as required
		2nd Guard Cavalry Brigade—Lieut.-Gen. Prince Albrecht of Prussia	1st Guard Lancers—Lieut.-Col. von Rochow 3rd ,, Dragoons—Col. F. W. von Hohenlohe Guard Hussars—Lieut.-Col. von Hymmen	
		3rd Guard Cavalry Brigade—Maj.-Gen. Count von Brandenburg (2)	1st Guard Dragoons—Col. von Auerswald 2nd ,, ,, Col. Count Finck von Finckenstein 2nd Guard Lancers—Col. Prince Henry of Hesse	
	Attached to Guard Corps: Guard Field Artillery Regiment, Guard Pioneer Battalion, Guard Train Battalion			
IInd Army Corps—General of Infantry von Franecky	3rd Infantry Division — Maj.-Gen. von Hartmann	5th Infantry Brigade — Maj.-Gen. von Koblinski	2nd Grenadiers—Col. von Ziemietzky 42nd Regiment—Col. von der Knesebeck	*Artillery* 1st Field Division (Maj. Baron von Eynatten), attached to 3rd Infantry Division
		6th Infantry Brigade — Col. von der Decken	14th Regiment—Col. von Vosz 54th ,, Col. von Busse	3rd Field Division (Lieut.-Col. Bauer), to 4th Infantry Division
		Attached to Division: 2nd Rifle Battalion—Maj. von Netzer; and 3rd Dragoons—Col. Baron von Willisen		

Order of Battle—continued.

Army Corps	Divisions	Brigades	Regiments	Remarks
Chief of General Staff—Col. von Wichmann Commander of Artillery—Maj.-Gen. von Kleist	4th Infantry Division—Lieut.-Gen. Hann von Weihern	7th Infantry Brigade—Maj.-Gen. du Trossel	9th Grenadiers—Col. von Ferenkeil Gruppenberg 49th Regiment—Col. von Laurin	*Artillery*—cont. 1st Horse Artillery Battery, to 2nd Cavalry Division Remainder belonged to Corps Artillery (Col. Petzel); Horse Artillery Division (Lieut.-Col. Maschke); 2nd Field Division (Maj. Hübner); Column-Division (Maj. Grabe)
		8th Infantry Brigade—Maj.-Gen. von Kettler	21st Regiment—Lieut.-Col. von Lobenthal 61st ,, Col. von Wedell	
		Attached to Division: 11th Dragoons—Lieut.-Col. von Guretzki-Carnitz		
	Attached to Army Corps: 2nd Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Pioneer Battalion, 2nd Train Battalion			
IIIrd Army Corps—Lieut.-Gen. von Alvensleben Chief of General Staff—Col. von Voigts-Rhetz Commander of Artillery—Maj.-Gen. von Bülow	5th Infantry Division—Lieut.-Gen. von Stülpnagel	9th Infantry Brigade—Maj.-Gen. von Döring	8th Body Guard Grenadiers—Lieut.-Col. von L'Estocq 48th Regiment—Lieut.-Col. von Garelts	*Artillery* 1st Field Division (Maj. Gallus), attached to 5th Infantry Division 3rd Field Division (Col. Beck), to 6th Infantry Division 2nd Horse Artillery Battery, to 6th Cavalry Division Remainder belonged to Corps Artillery (Col. von Dresky); Horse Artillery Division (Maj. Lentz); 2nd Field Division (Maj. von Lyncker); Column-Division (Capt. Burchard)
		10th Infantry Brigade—Maj.-Gen. von Schwerin	12th Grenadiers—Col. von Reuter 52nd Regiment—Col. von Wulffen	
		Attached to Division: 3rd Rifle Battalion—Maj. von Jena; 12th Dragoons—Maj. Pfeffer von Salomon		
	6th Infantry Division—Lieut.-Gen. von Buddenbrock	11th Infantry Brigade—Maj.-Gen. von Rothmaler	20th Regiment—Col. von Flatow 35th ,, Col. du Plessis	
		12th Infantry Brigade—Col. von Bismarck	24th Regiment—Col. Count Dohna 64th ,, Col. Freiherr Treusch von Buttlar Brandenfels	
		Attached to Division: 2nd Dragoons—Col. von Drigalski		
	Attached to Army Corps: 3rd Field Artillery Regiment, 3rd Pioneer Battalion, 3rd Train Battalion			

Order of Battle—continued.

Army Corps	Divisions	Brigades	Regiments	Remarks
IVth Army Corps—General of Infantry von Alvensleben Chief of General Staff—Col. von Thile Commander of Artillery—Maj.-Gen. von Scherdening	7th Infantry Division—Lieut.-Gen. von Grosz or von Schwarzhof	13th Infantry Brigade—Maj.-Gen. von Borries	26th Regiment—Col. von Schmeling 66th ,, Lieut.-Col. Count Finck von Finckenstein	*Artillery* 1st Field Division (Lieut.-Col. von Freyhold), attached to 7th Infantry Division 2nd Field Division (Maj. von Gilsa), to 8th Infantry Division 1st Horse Artillery Battery, to 5th Cavalry Division Remainder belonged to Corps Artillery (Colonel Crusius); Horse Artillery Division (Lieut.-Col. Forst); 3rd Field Division (Maj. Steltzer); Column-Division (Capt. Meisner)
		14th Infantry Brigade—Maj.-Gen. von Zychlinski	27th Regiment—Col. von Pressentin 93rd ,, Col. von Krosigk	
		Attached to Division: 4th Rifle Battalion—Maj. Baron von Lettow-Vorbeck; 7th Dragoons—Lieut.-Col. Baron von Schleinitz		
	8th Infantry Division—Lieut.-Gen. von Schöler	15th Infantry Brigade—Maj.-Gen. von Keszler	31st Regiment—Col. von Bonin 71st ,, Lieut.-Col. von Klöden	
		16th Infantry Brigade—Col. von Scheffer	86th Fusiliers—Col. von Horn 96th Regiment—Lieut.-Col. von Redern	
		Attached to Division: 12th Hussars—Lieut.-Col. von Suckow		
	Attached to Army Corps: 4th Field Artillery Regiment, 4th Pioneer Battalion, 4th Train Battalion			
IXth Army Corps—Gen. of Infantry von Manstein	18th Infantry Division—Lieut.-Gen. Freiherr von Wrangel	35th Infantry Brigade—Maj.-Gen. von Blumenthal	36th Fusiliers—Col. von Brandenstein 84th ,, Col. von Winckler	*Artillery* 1st Field Division of 9th Regiment (Maj. von Gayl), attached to 18th Infantry Division
		36th Infantry Brigade—Maj.-Gen. von Below	11th Grenadiers—Col. von Schöning 85th Regiment—Col. von Falkenhausen	
		Attached to Division: 9th Rifle Battalion—Maj. von Minckwitz; 6th Dragoons—Col. Baron von Houwald		

Order of Battle—continued.

Army Corps	Divisions	Brigades	Regiments	Remarks
Chief of General Staff — Maj. Bronsart von Schellendorf Commander of Artillery — Maj.-Gen. Baron von Puttkammer	25th Hessian Division — Lieut.-Gen. Prince Louis of Hesse	49th Infantry Brigade — Maj.-Gen. von Wittich	11th Regiment—Lieut.-Col. Coulmann 2nd ,, Col. Kraus 1st Rifles—Maj. Lautenberger	*Artillery*—cont. 2nd Field Division (Lieut.-Col. von Darapsky), and 2nd Horse Artillery Battery formed the Corps Artillery, under Col. von Jagemann Column-Division (Capt. von Lüttwitz) Hessian Field Artillery (Lieut.-Col. Stumpf) Field Division (Maj. von Herget), attached to Division Horse Artillery Battery, to Cavalry Brigade Column-Division (Maj. Nickel)
		50th Infantry Brigade — Col. von Lyncker	3rd Regiment—Lieut.-Col. Stamm 4th ,, Col. Zwenger 2nd Rifles—Maj. Winter	
		25th Cavalry Brigade — Maj.-Gen. von Schlotheim	1st Hessian Reiter Regiment—Col. Baron von Riedesel zu Eisenbach 2nd Hessian Reiter Regiment—Col. Baron von Bouchenröder	
	Attached to Army Corps : half of the 9th Field Artillery Regiment, Division of the 1st Hessian Field Artillery, a Pioneer Battalion, 9th Train Battalion, and Hessian Train Division			
xth Army Corps—Gen. of Infantry von Voigts-Rhetz	19th Infantry Division — Lieut.-Gen. von Schwartzkoppen	37th Infantry Brigade — Col. Lehmann	78th Regiment—Col. Baron von Lyncker 91st ,, Col. von Kamecke	*Artillery* 1st Field Division (Lieut.-Col. Schaumann), attached to 19th Infantry Division 2nd Field Division (Maj. Krause), to 20th Infantry Division
		38th Infantry Brigade — Maj.-Gen. von Wedell	16th Regiment—Col. von Brixen 57th ,, Col. von Cranach	
	Attached to Division : 9th Dragoons—Lieut.-Col. Count von Hardenberg			

Army Corps	Divisions	Brigades	Regiments	Remarks
Chief of General Staff—Maj. von Caprivi Commander of Artillery— Col. Freiherr von der Becke	20th Infantry Division — Maj.-Gen. von Kraatz-Koschlau	39th Infantry Brigade — Maj.-Gen. von Woyna	56th Regiment—Col. von Block 79th ,, Col. von Valentini	*Artillery*—Cont. 2nd Horse Artillery Battery, to 6th Cavalry Division Remainder belonged to Corps Artillery (Col. Baron von der Goltz);—Horse Artillery Division (Maj. Körber);—3rd Field Division (Lieut.-Col. Cotta);—Column-Division (Maj. Strackerjan)
		40th Infantry Brigade — Maj.-Gen. von Diringshofen	70th Regiment—Col. von Ehrenberg 92nd ,, Lieut.-Col. Haberlandt	
		Attached to Division: 10th Rifle Battalion—Maj. Dunin von Przychowski; 16th Dragoons—Lieut.-Col. von Waldow		
	Attached to Army Corps: 10th Field Artillery Regiment, 10th Pioneer Battalion, 10th Train Battalion			
XIIth Army Corps (Royal Saxon)—Gen. Crown Prince Albert of Saxony, K.H. Chief of General Staff — Lieut.-Col. von Zezschwitz Commander of Artillery — Maj.-Gen. Köhler	23rd Infantry Division — Lieut.-Gen. Prince George of Saxony, K.H.	45th Infantry Brigade — Maj.-Gen. von Crausshaar	100th Body Guard Grenadiers—Col. Garten 101st Grenadiers—Col. von Seidlitz Gerstenberg 108th Skirmishers—Col. Freiherr von Hansen	*Artillery* 1st Field Division (Lieut.-Col. von Watzdorff) attached to 23rd Infantry Division 2nd Field Division (Maj. Richter), to 24th Infantry Division 1st Horse Artillery Battery, to 12th Cavalry Division Corps Artillery (Col. Funke);— 3rd Field Division (Maj. Hoch), 4th Field Division (Lieut.-Col. Oertel), each of 2 heavy and 1 light batteries; 2nd Horse Artillery Battery; Column-Division (Lieut.-Col. Schörmer)
		46th Infantry Brigade — Col. von Montbé	102nd Regiment (Crown Prince)—Col. Rudorff 103rd Regiment—Lieut.-Col. Dietrich	
		1st Reiter Regiment (Crown Prince's)—Lieut.-Col. von Sahr		
	24th Infantry Division — Maj.-Gen. Nehrhoff von Holderberg	47th Infantry Brigade — Maj.-Gen. von Leonhardi	104th Regiment (Prince Frederick Augustus)—Col. von Elterlein 105th Regiment—Col. von Tettau 12th Rifles—Maj. Count von Holtzendorff	
		48th Infantry Brigade — Col. von Schutz	106th Regiment (Prince George's)—Col. von Abendroth 107th Regiment—Lieut.-Col. von Schweinitz 13th Rifles—Maj. von Götz	
		2nd Reiter Regiment—Maj. Genthe		

Order of Battle—continued.

Army Corps	Divisions	Brigades	Regiments	Remarks
XIIth Army Corps (cont.)	12th Cavalry Division — Maj.-Gen. Count zur Lippe	23rd Cavalry Brigade — Maj.-Gen. Prince von Nidda	Guard Reiter Regiment—Col. von Carlowitz 17th Lancers—Col. von Miltitz	
		24th Cavalry Brigade — Maj.-Gen. Senfft von Pilsach	3rd Reiter Regiment—Col. von Standfest 18th Lancers—Lieut.-Col. Trosky	
	Attached to Army Corps : 12th Field Artillery Regiment, 12th Pioneer Battalion, 12th Train Battalion			
Cavalry Divisions attached to the Second Army	5th Cavalry Division — Lieut.-Gen. Baron von Rheinhaben	11th Cavalry Brigade — Maj.-Gen. von Barby	4th Cuirassiers—Col. von Arnim 13th Lancers—Col. von Shack 19th Dragoons—Col. von Trotha	
		12th Cavalry Brigade — Maj.-Gen. von Bredow	7th Cuirassiers—Lieut.-Col. von Larisch 16th Lancers—Maj.-Gen. von der Dollen 13th Dragoons—Col. von Brauchitsch	
		13th Cavalry Brigade — Maj.-Gen. von Redern	10th Hussars—Col. von Weise 11th ,, Col. Frh. von Eller-Eberstein 17th ,, Lieut.-Col. von Rauch	
		1st Horse Artillery Battery, 4th Field Artillery Regiment 2nd ,, ,, ,, 10th ,, ,, ,,		
	6th Cavalry Division — Lieut.-Gen. Duke William of Mecklenburg-Schwerin	14th Cavalry Brigade — Col. Freiherr von Diepenbroick-Grüter	6th Cuirassiers—Lieut.-Col. Count Lynar 3rd Lancers—Col. Count von der Gröben 15th ,, Col. Count von Alvensleben	
		15th Cavalry Brigade— Maj.-Gen. von Rauch	3rd Hussars—Col. von Zieten 16th ,, Col. von Schmidt	
		2nd Horse Artillery Battery, 3rd Field Artillery Regiment		

Summary of Second Army.

Guard Corps	.	.	.	29	Battalions,	32	Squadrons,	15	Batteries	(90	guns).
IInd Army Corps.	.	.		25	,,	8	,,	14	,,	(84	,,).
IIIrd ,, ,,	.	.	.	25	,,	8	,,	14	,,	(84	,,).
IVth ,, ,,	.	.		25	,,	8	,,	14	,,	(84	,,).
IXth ,, ,,	.	.	.	23	,,	12	,,	15	,,	(90	,,).
Xth ,, ,,	.	.	.	25	,,	8	,,	14	,,	(84	,,).
XIIth ,, ,,	.	.	.	29	,,	24	,,	16	,,	(96	,).
5th Cavalry Division	.	.		—	,,	36	,,	2	,,	(12	,,).
6th ,, ,,	.	.		—	,,	20	,,	1	,,	(6	,,).
Total	.	.		181	,,	156	,,	105	,,	(630	,,).

List of Casualties on the 14th of August, 1870.

Corps	Officers Wounded		Non-Commissioned Officers and Men		Horses	
	Severely	Slightly	Killed	Wounded	Killed	Wounded
Artillery of the 1st Army Corps.						
1st Field division, Maj. Munk	Maj. Munk	Second Lieut. and Adj. Hoffmann	—	—	—	—
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. von Horn	Second Lieut. Korsch	—	1	11	9	3
2nd ,, ,, Capt. von Selle	—	—	1	17	6	8
1st Light ,, Capt. Hoffbauer	Capt. Hoffbauer	Second Lieuts. Ottzenn, Ganda	2	24	13	15
2nd ,, ,, Capt. Puppel	Capt. Puppel	—	1	2	6	5
2nd Field division, Lieut.-Col. Gregorovius	—	—	—	—	—	1
3rd Heavy field battery, Capt. Westphal	—	—	—	4	1	5
4th ,, ,, Capt. Iwentz	—	—	—	2	1	—
3rd Light ,, Capt. Roehl	—	—	—	—	—	1
4th ,, ,, Capt. Schmidt	—	—	—	—	—	—
3rd Field division, Maj. Müller	—	—	—	—	—	—
5th Heavy field battery, Capt. Grasz	—	—	—	4	1	2
6th ,, ,, Capt. Hellwig	—	—	—	1	—	2
5th Light ,, Capt. Schweickart	—	—	1	1	1	—
6th ,, ,, Capt. Dolmann	—	—	—	2	—	2
Horse Artillery division, Maj. Gerhards	—	—	—	—	—	—
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Preinitzer	—	—	—	3	—	—
2nd ,, ,, Capt. Cruse	—	—	—	2	5	1
3rd ,, ,, Capt. Schmidtke	—	—	—	3	8	3

List of Casualties—continued.

Corps	Officers Wounded		Non-Commissioned Officers and Men		Horses	
	Severely	Slightly	Killed	Wounded	Killed	Wounded
Artillery of the VIIth Army Corps.						
1st Field division, Maj. Freiherr von Eynatten	—	—	—	—	—	—
1st Light field battery, Capt. Schweder	—	—	—	—	—	—
2nd Field division, Maj. Matthiasz	—	—	—	—	1	—
3rd ,, ,, Maj. Wilhemi	—	—	—	1	—	—
5th Heavy field battery, Capt. Schnackenberg	Capt. Schnackenberg, First Lieut. Baehr	Second Lieut. Borggreve	3	15	9	14
6th ,, ,, Capt. von Gostkowski	—	—	—	—	—	—
5th Light ,, Capt. Schreiber	—	—	3	10	7	11
6th ,, ,, Capt. Gasch	Second Lieut. Dieterici	—	1	2	—	—
Horse Artillery division, Lieut.-Col. von Coester	—	—	—	6	2	5
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Schrader	—	—	—	—	1	—
2nd ,, ,, Capt. von Hahn	—	—	1	—	—	—
3rd ,, ,, Capt. Hasse	—	—	—	2	—	5
			—	1	—	1
Artillery of the IXth Army Corps.						
1st Field division, Maj. von Gayl	—	—	—	—	—	—
2nd Heavy field battery, Capt. Kindler	—	—	—	—	—	—
2nd Light ,, Capt. Freiherr von Eynatten	—	—	—	—	—	3

First Lieut. Baehr and Second Lieut. Borggreve afterwards died of their wounds.

The following damages occurred :—

1st Horse Artillery battery of 1st Artillery Brigade : framework of limber and one wheel broken.
2nd ,, ,, ,, one wheel broken.
5th Heavy battery of 7th Artillery Brigade : gun carriage and limber wheel broken.

Expenditure of Ammunition by the Prussian Artillery on the 14th of August, 1870.

Battery	Number of Rounds	
	Shell	Case
Artillery of 1st Army Corps and 1st Cavalry Division.		
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. von Horn . . .	163	—
2nd ,, ,, Capt. von Selle . .	124	—
1st Light ,, Capt. Hoffbauer . . .	302	6
2nd ,, ,, Capt. Puppel	280	—
3rd Heavy ,, Capt. Westphal . . .	35	—
4th ,, ,, Capt. Iwentz	75	—
3rd Light ,, Capt. Roehl	1	—
4th ,, ,, Capt. Schmidt . . .	1	—
5th Heavy ,, Capt. Grasz	100	—
6th ,, ,, Capt. Hellwig . . .	46	—
5th Light ,, Capt. Schweickart . .	57	—
6th ,, ,, Capt. Dolmann . . .	315	—
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Preinitzer	227	—
2nd ,, ,, Capt. Cruse . . .	168	—
3rd ,, ,, Capt. Schmidtke . .	175	—
Artillery of VIIIth Army Corps and 3rd Cavalry Division.		
1st Light field battery, Capt. Schweder . . .	7	—
4th Heavy ,, Capt. Lemmer . . .	1	—
5th ,, ,, Capt. Schnackenberg . .	28	—
6th ,, ,, Capt. von Gostkowski . .	182	—
5th Light ,, Capt. Schreiber . . .	134	—
6th ,, ,, Capt. Gasch	134	—
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Schrader . . .	66	—
2nd ,, ,, Capt. von Hahn . .	58	—
3rd ,, ,, Capt. Hasse . . .	68	—
Artillery of IXth Army Corps.		
2nd Heavy field battery, Capt. Kindler . . .	26	—
2nd Light ,, Capt. Freiherr von Eynatten .	76	—
Total . . .	2,849	6

List of Casualties on the 16th of August.

Corps	Killed			Wounded			
	Officers	Men	Horses	Officers		Men	Horses
				Severely	Slightly		
1st Horse Artillery battery, Guard Corps, Capt. Edler von der Planitz	— —	—	3	— —	— —	3	4
Artillery of the IIIrd Army Corps.							
Staff of Lieut.-Gen. von Bülow, commanding the artillery	— —	—	—	Lieut. and Adj. Steinlein	— —	—	—
1st Field division, Maj. Gallus	— —	—	3	Maj. Gallus (died later)	— —	—	1
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. Nöldecke	— —	9	40	Second Lieut. Brehmer [1]	— —	31	—
2nd ,, ,, Capt. Knobbe	First Lieut. Heidenreich	8	40	Second Lieut. Krüger	Capt. Knobbe	37	—
1st Light ,, Capt. Stöphasius	— —	3	40	First Lieut. Puscher, Second Lieut. Flöthe	Second Lieut. Haase	30	—
2nd ,, ,, Capt. Vollbrecht	Captain Vollbrecht, Sec. Lieut. Borchert	4	42	Second Lieut. Schröder	Asst. Surgeon Lissa	39	8
3rd Field division, Lieut.-Col. Beck	— —	—	1	— —	— —	—	—
5th Heavy field battery, Capt. Eunicke	— —	1	11	— —	— —	13	3
6th ,, ,, Capt. Meinecke	— —	2	9	Second Lieut. Rohde	— —	15	4
5th Light ,, Capt. Müller I.	— —	2	11	— —	— —	12	14
6th ,, ,, Capt. von Schlicht [2]	— —	3	29	— —	Capt. von Schlicht	17	15
Corps Artillery, Col. von Dresky	— —	—	—	— —	— —	—	—
2nd Field division, Capt. Stumpf	— —	—	—	— —	— —	—	—
3rd Heavy field battery, Capt. Vosz	— —	4	12	— —	— —	16	3
4th ,, ,, Capt. Fromme	— —	1	14	— —	— —	12	19
3rd Light ,, First Lt. von Pressentin	— —	5	25	First Lt. von Pressentin	Second Lieut. Ahrens	15	15
4th ,, ,, Capt. Müller II.	— —	3	8	— —	— —	11	13

[1] This officer remained with his battery.

[2] *Portépéefähnrich* Lessing was among the killed.

List of Casualties—continued.

Corps	Killed			Wounded			
	Officers	Men	Horses	Officers		Men	Horses
				Severely	Slightly		
Artillery of the III*rd Army Corps*—cont.							
Horse Artillery division, Maj. Lenz	— —	—	2	— —	Second Lieut. and Adj. v. Massalsky	1	—
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Scheringer	— —	3	42	Capt. Scheringer, Second Lieuts. Gerber and Wolter	— —	18	17
2nd ,, ,, Capt. Wittstock	— —	5	23	— —	— —	14	18
3rd ,, ,, Capt. Rödenbeck	— —	4	50	Capt. Rödenbeck (died later), Sec. Lieut. Weyer	Second Lieut. Müller or Wiehr, Second Lieut. Ahlers	26	28
3rd Artillery Ammtn. Column, Capt. Bartels	— —	1	9	— —	— —	6	5
1st Infantry ,, ,, Capt. Hundrich	— —	—	—	— —	— —	—	—
Artillery of the VIII*th Army Corps.*							
3rd Field division, Lieut.-Col. Hildebrandt	— —	—	2	— —	— —	—	—
5th Heavy field battery, Capt. Jacobi	— —	—	13	Second Lieut. von Metzen (died later)	— —	12	6
6th ,, ,, ,, Capt. Mende	— —	3	2	— —	— —	4	5
5th Light ,, ,, Capt. Hammer	— —	—	26	Capt. Hammer	— —	30	22
Artillery of the IX*th Army Corps.*							
Hessian Field Artillery, Col. Stumpf	— —	—	—	— —	— —	—	—
2nd Heavy field battery, Capt. Hoffmann	— —	—	1	— —	— —	1	—
1st Light ,, ,, Capt. Frank	— —	—	—	— —	— —	—	—

List of Casualties—continued.

Corps	Killed			Wounded			
	Officers	Men	Horses	Officers		Men	Horses
				Severely	Slightly		
Artillery of the XI*th Army Corps.*							
Staff, Col. Freiherr von der Becke	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
1st Field division, Maj. Schaumann	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. Kleine	—	—	5	—	—	13	10
2nd ,, ,, ,, Capt. Lancelle	—	1	4	—	—	8	1
1st Light ,, ,, Capt. Knauer	—	5	5	—	—	13	9
2nd ,, ,, ,, Capt. von Baumbach	—	—	—	—	—	5	7
2nd Field division, Maj. Krause	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3rd Heavy field battery, Capt. Heyn	—	2	10	Second Lieut. Bulius	First Lieut. Stolterforth[1]	10	5
4th ,, ,, ,, Maj. Ribbentrop	—	1	6	—	—	6	—
3rd Light ,, ,, Capt. Burbach	—	2	11	Sec. Lt. von Grumbkow	Capt. Burbach[1]	14	2
4th ,, ,, ,, Capt. Mittelstädt	—	1	7	—	Second Lieut. Bachmann[1]	4	2
Corps Artillery, Col. Baron von der Goltz	—	—	1	Capt. Lenz	—	2	2
3rd Field division, Lieut.-Col. Cotta	—	—	—	Lieut.-Col. Cotta	—	—	—
5th Heavy field battery, Capt. von Scheven	—	1	14	—	Second Lieut. Varnove	14	—
6th ,, ,, ,, Capt. Reinsdorff	—	1	8	—	—	7	7
5th Light ,, ,, Capt. Berendt	Second Lieut. Schelhaas	3	20	—	—	24	—
6th ,, ,, ,, Capt. Richard	—	6	30	—	—	11	2
Horse Artillery division, Maj. Körber	—	—	1	—	—	1	1
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Frisch	—	4	18	Second Lieut. Bluhm	Second Lieut. Rückheim, Staff Surg. Maritz[1]	38	17
2nd ,, ,, Capt. Schirmer	—	6	47	—	—	15	3
3rd ,, ,, Capt. Saalmüller	—	3	24	—	Capt. Saalmüller	19	25
Artillery of the IV*th Army Corps.*							
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Bode	Lieut. Frh. von Türcke	3	21	Second Lieut. Oemler	—	18	15

[1] These officers remained with their batteries.

The following damages were reported by the batteries :—

The 1st Heavy battery, IIIrd Corps : a gun wheel.

,, 2nd ,, ,, ,, the centre box of a limber.

,, 2nd Light ,, ,, several poles and the lid of a limber-box.

,, 4th ,, ,, ,, two gun wheels and an elevating screw (replaced under fire).

,, 2nd Horse Artillery battery IIIrd Corps : a limber box, by a shell passing through it.

,, 5th Light battery, VIIth Corps : a pole and a limber.

,, 1st ,, ,, Xth ,, a limber and gun wheel.

,, 2nd ,, ,, ,, ,, a gun wheel and gun carriage.

,, 4th ,, ,, ,, ,, a pole, 6 spokes, back rail of limber box.

,, 5th Heavy ,, ,, ,, gun axletree-box seat.

,, 5th Light ,, ,, ,, a gun wheel.

,, 1st Horse Artillery battery, IIIrd Corps : a gun wheel.

In addition to the above, nearly all the batteries sustained minor damages in material.

Expenditure of Ammunition on the 16th of August, 1870.

Battery	Number of Rounds	
	Shell	Case
Artillery of Guard Corps.		
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Edler von der Planitz	82	—
Artillery of IIIrd Corps.		
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. Nöldecke	1,650	—
2nd ,, ,, Capt. Knobbe		
1st Light ,, Capt. Stöphasius	2,083	—
2nd ,, ,, Capt. Vollbrecht		
3rd Heavy ,, Capt. Vosz	925	—
4th ,, ,, Capt. Fromme	735	—
3rd Light ,, First Lieut. von Pressentin	552	—
4th ,, ,, Capt. Müller II.	417	—
5th Heavy ,, Capt. Eunecke	562	—
6th ,, ,, Capt. Meinecke	432	—
5th Light ,, Capt. Müller I.	465	5
6th ,, ,, Capt. von Schlicht	576	8
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Scheringer	1,148	—
2nd ,, ,, Capt. Wittstock	838	6
3rd ,, ,, Capt. Rödenbeck	1,164	—
Artillery of VIIIth Corps.		
5th Heavy field battery, Capt. Jacobi	211	—
6th ,, ,, Capt. Mende	289	—
5th Light ,, Capt. Hammer	400	—
Artillery of IXth (Hessian) Corps.		
2nd Heavy field battery, Capt. Hoffmann	38	—
1st Light ,, Capt. Frank	65	—
Artillery of Xth Corps.		
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. Kleine	597	—
2nd ,, ,, Capt. Lancelle	332	—
1st Light ,, Capt. Knauer	677	—
2nd ,, ,, Capt. von Baumbach	444	—
3rd Heavy ,, Capt. Heyn	255	—
4th ,, ,, Major Ribbentrop	157	—
3rd Light ,, Capt. Burbach	475	—
4th ,, ,, Capt. Mittelstädt	225	—
5th Heavy ,, Capt. von Scheven	259	—
6th ,, ,, Capt. Reinsdorff	175	—
5th Light ,, Capt. Berendt	248	—
6th ,, ,, Capt. Richard	141	—
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Frisch	1,048	—
2nd ,, ,, Capt. Schirmer	785	—
3rd ,, ,, Capt. Saalmüller	603	—
Artillery of IVth Corps.		
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Bode	585	—
	19,638	19

List of Casualties on the 18th of August.

Corps	Killed			Wounded			
	Officers	Men	Horses	Officers		Men	Horses
				Severely	Slightly		
Staff of Lieut.-Gen. von Schwarz, commanding the artillery of the First Army	—	—	—	—	Capt. and Adj. Koehler	—	—
Staff of Lieut.-Gen. von Colomier, commanding the artillery of the Second Army	—	—	—	Capt. and Adj. Freiherr von Hadeln[2]	—	—	—
Artillery of the Guard Corps.							
Staff of Maj.-Gen. Kraft Prince of Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, commanding the artillery	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1st Field division, Lieut.-Col. Bychelberg	—	—	—	—	Sec. Lieut. and Adj. Reinecke[1]	—	1
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. von Sametzki	—	—	9	—	—	8	12
2nd ,, ,, Capt. von Prittwitz	—	—	2	10	Sec. Lieut. von Winterfeld	—	—	13	18
1st Light ,, Capt. von Dewitz	Capt. von Dewitz		1	17	—	—	17	5
2nd ,, ,, Capt. von Neiderstetter	—	—	3	12	Capt. Neiderstetter[2]	Lieut. Dudy[1]	19	23
3rd Field division, Lieut.-Col. von Rheinbaben	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
5th Heavy field battery, Capt. von Roon	—	—	—	9	—	Capt. von Roon[1]	15	5
6th ,, ,, Capt. von Oppell	—	—	—	6	Sec. Lieut. von Vangerow[2]	—	—	10	9
5th Light ,, Capt. von Unruhe	Sec. Lieut. Roth		1	6	—	—	Sec. Lieut. Freiherr von Tauchnitz[1]	17	12
6th ,, ,, Capt. Ising	—	—	3	6	Capt. Ising	—	—	12	7

[1] These officers, though wounded, continued to do duty with their batteries.
[2] These officers afterwards died of their wounds.

List of Casualties—continued.

Corps	Killed				Wounded					
	Officers		Men	Horses	Officers				Men	Horses
					Severely		Slightly			
Artillery of the Guard Corps—cont.										
Corps Artillery, Col. von Scherbening	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2nd Field division, Maj. von Krieger	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3rd Heavy field battery, Capt. von Ehlern	—	—	—	10	Capt. von Ehlern		—	—	5	—
4th ,, ,, Capt. Seeger	—	—	3	10	—	—	—	—	9	16
3rd Light ,, Capt. von Friederici Steinmann	—	—	2	28	Capt. von Friederici Steinmann [2]		Sec. Lieut. Bockroth		18	15
4th Light field battery, Capt. von Mutius	—	—	—	20	Capt. von Mutius		—	—	6	—
Horse Artillery division, Maj. Baron von Buddenbrock	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Edler von Plantz	—	—	—	7	—	—	—	—	7	5
2nd Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Gravenitz	—	—	1	16	Capt. von Grävenitz [1]		—	—	19	30
3rd ,, ,, Capt. Anker	—	—	—	9	—	—	—	—	3	6
Artillery of the 1st Army Corps.										
8th Light field battery, Capt. Dolmann	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Preinitzer	—	—	1	12	Lieut. Leibitz		Capt. Preinitzer		28	20
Artillery of the IInd Army Corps.										
Staff of Maj.-Gen. von Kraatz, commanding the artillery	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1st Field division, Maj. Freiherr von Eynatten	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. Goetsch	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	5

[1] This officer, though wounded, continued to do duty with his battery.

[2] This officer afterwards died of his wounds.

List of Casualties—continued.

Corps	Killed			Wounded				
	Officers	Men	Horses	Officers		Men	Horses
				Severely	Slightly		
Artillery of the II*nd Army Corps*—cont.							
2nd Heavy field battery, Capt. Hildebrandt	— —	—	1	— —	— —	1	1
1st Light ,, Capt. von Eckensteen	— —	—	2	— —	— —	1	1
2nd ,, ,, Capt. Linker	— —	—	1	— —	— —	—	1
Corps Artillery, Col. Petzel	— —	—	—	— —	— —	—	—
2nd Field division, Maj. Hübner	— —	—	—	— —	— —	—	—
3rd Heavy field battery, Capt. Zöllner	— —	—	—	— —	— —	—	—
4th ,, ,, Capt. Steinkeller	— —	—	—	— —	— —	2	—
3rd Field division, Lieut.-Col. Bauer	— —	—	—	— —	— —	—	—
5th Heavy field battery, Capt. Meisner	— —	—	1	— —	— —	—	—
6th ,, ,, Capt. Ostermeyer	— —	—	—	— —	— —	—	3
5th Light ,, Capt. Rhades	— —	—	—	— —	— —	—	2
6th ,, ,, Capt. Preuszendorf	— —	—	—	— —	— —	—	2
Horse Artillery division, Lieut.-Col. Maschke	— —	—	—	— —	— —	—	—
2nd Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Rodenwoldt	— —	—	1	— —	— —	—	—
3rd Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Roehl	— —	—	—	— —	— —	—	—
Artillery of the III*rd Army Corps.*							
Staff of Maj.-Gen. von Bülow, commanding the artillery	— —	—	—	— —	— —	—	—
1st Field division, Capt. Stöphasius	— —	—	—	— —	— —	—	—
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. Nöldecke	— —	—	—	— —	— —	—	—
2nd ,, ,, Lieut. Châles de Beaulieu	— —	—	1	— —	— —	—	2

List of Casualties—continued.

Corps	Killed				Wounded					
	Officers		Men	Horses	Officers				Men	Horses
					Severely		Slightly			
Artillery of the IIIrd *Army Corps*—cont.										
3rd Field division, Lieut.-Col. Beck	—	—	—	—	—	—	Lieut. and Adj. Cordemann		—	—
5th Heavy field battery, Capt. Eunicke	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
6th ,, ,, Capt. Meinecke	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	2
Corps Artillery, Col. von Dresky	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2nd Field division, Capt. Stumpf	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3rd Heavy field battery, Capt. Vosz	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	2	—
4th ,, ,, Capt. Fromme	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	2
3rd Light ,, Lieut. Beckh	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	3	—
4th ,, ,, Capt. Müller II.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	1
Horse Artillery division, Maj. Lentz	—	—	—	—	Maj. Lentz	—	—	—	—	—
1st Horse Artillery battery, Lieut. Franck	—	—	1	32	—	—	—	—	26	21
3rd ,, ,, Lieut. Gizycki	—	—	—	19	—	—	—	—	15	14
Artillery of the VIIth *Army Corps.*										
Staff of Maj.-Gen. von Zimmermann, commanding the artillery	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
1st Field division, Maj. Freiherr von Eynatten	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. Hübner	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	1	2
2nd ,, ,, Capt. Wolff	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3
1st Light ,, Capt. Schweder	—	—	—	7	Capt. Schweder	—	Sec. Lieut. Drees		3	4
2nd ,, ,, Lieut. Götz	—	—	2	13	—	—	Dr. Beermann		13	5

List of Casualties—continued.

Corps	Killed			Wounded			
	Officers	Men	Horses	Officers		Men	Horses
				Severely	Slightly		
Artillery of the VIIIth Army Corps—cont.							
3rd Field division, Maj. Wilhelmi	— —	—	—	— —	— —	—	1
5th Heavy field battery, Sec. Lieut. Rühle von Lilienstern	— —	—	1	— —	— —	1	1
6th Heavy field battery, Capt. Gostkowski	— —	—	—	— —	— —	—	2
5th Light ,, Capt. Schreiber	— —	1	4	— —	Sec. Lieut. Müller I.[1]	6	6
6th ,, ,, Capt. Gasch	— —	—	1	— —	— —	1	1
Corps Artillery, Col. von Helden-Sarnowski	— —	—	1	— —	Col. von Helden-Sarnowski[1]	—	—
2nd Field division, Maj. Matthiasz	— —	—	1	— —	— —	—	—
3rd Heavy field battery, Capt. Bleckert	— —	1	2	— —	— —	4	3
4th ,, ,, Capt. Lemmer	— —	—	10	Capt. Lemmer[2]	— —	6	—
3rd Light ,, Capt. Gnügge	— —	2	26	— —	Lieut. Waldschmidt	12	14
4th ,, ,, Capt. Trautmann	Sec. Lieut. Ruhnke	3	30	Capt. Trautmann	— —	12	7
Horse Artillery division, Lieut.-Col. Coester	— —	—	—	— —	— —	—	—
2nd Horse Artillery battery, Capt. von Hahn	— —	—	—	— —	— —	1	2
3rd ,, ,, Capt. Hasse	— —	5	67	Lieut. von Hochwächter, Sec. Lieut. Humann II.	Capt. Hasse	30	10

[1] These officers, though wounded, continued to do duty with their batteries.
[2] This officer afterwards died of his wounds.

List of Casualties—continued.

Corps	Killed			Wounded					
	Officers		Men	Horses	Officers			Men	Horses
					Severely		Slightly		
Artillery of the VIIIth *Army Corps.*									
Staff of Maj.-Gen. von Kamecke, commanding the artillery	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1st Field division, Maj. Mertens	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. Busse	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2nd ,, ,, Capt. von Uthmann	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4
1st Light ,, Capt. Geiszler	—	—	—	5	—	—	—	6	3
2nd ,, ,, Capt. Leo	—	—	—	—	—	—	Sec. Lieut. Kamp[1]	2	2
3rd Field division, Lieut.-Col. Hildebrandt	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
5th Heavy field battery, Capt. Jacobi	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
6th ,, ,, Capt. Mende	—	—	1	3	—	—	—	1	—
5th Light ,, Lieut. Gillmeister	—	—	—	—	—	—	Lieut. Gillmeister,[1] Sec. Lt. Burg II.[1]	3	—
6th ,, ,, Capt. von Helden-Sarnowski	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	8
Corps Artillery, Col. von Broecker	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2nd Field division, Maj. Zwirnemann	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3rd Heavy field battery, Capt. von Wissel	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	3
4th ,, ,, Capt. Sommer	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2
3rd Light ,, Capt. von Teichmann-Logischen	—	—	1		—	—	—	1	2
4th Light field battery, Capt. Gehtmann	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

[1] These officers, though wounded, continued to do duty with their batteries.

List of Casualties—continued.

Corps	Killed				Wounded					
	Officers		Men	Horses	Officers				Men	Horses
					Severely		Slightly			
Artillery of the VIIIth *Army Corps*—cont.										
Horse Artillery division, Lieut.-Col. Borckenhagen	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. von Fuchsius	—	—	—	5	—	—	—	—	5	3
2nd Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Schlieben	—	—	—	15	—	—	—	—	11	14
3rd ,, ,, Capt. Protze	—	—	1	14	—	—	—	—	4	—
2nd Infantry Ammunition Column, Capt. Hermann	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Artillery of the IXth *Army Corps.*										
Staff of Maj.-Gen. Freiherr von Puttkammer, commanding the artillery	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
a. *Prussian Artillery.*										
1st Field division, Maj. von Gayl	Maj. von Gayl		—	—	Lieut. and Adj. Seiffert		—	—	—	—
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. Werner II.	—	—	3	38	Capt. Werner II.		Sec. Lieut. Schmidt[1]		23	14
2nd ,, ,, Capt. Kindler	—	—	8	60	Capt. Kindler		Sec. Lieut. Kelbling I.[1]		17	10
1st Light ,, Capt. Koch	—	—	5	54	Capt. Koch, Lieut. Horrmann[2]		Sec. Lieut. Jourdan		34	8

[1] These officers, though wounded, continued to do duty with their batteries.
[2] This officer afterwards died of his wounds.

List of Casualties—continued.

Corps	Killed			Wounded			
	Officers	Men	Horses	Officers		Men	Horses
				Severely	Slightly		
Artillery of the IXth Army Corps—cont.							
2nd Light field battery, Capt. Freiherr von Eynatten	— —	3	36	— —	— —	18	9
Corps Artillery, Col. von Jagemann	— —	—	1	Col. von Jagemann, Lieut. and Adj. Krahe	Staff Surg. Steinhausen[1]	1	—
2nd Field division, Lieut.-Col. Darapsky	Lieut. and Adj. Korschefsky	—	1	Lieut.-Col. Darapsky	— —	—	—
3rd Heavy field battery, Capt. Roerdansz	Capt. Roerdansz	4	44	Lts. Treutler and Fischer	— —	32	8
4th ,, ,, Capt. Werner I.	First Lieut. Goetze	11	45	Sec. Lieut. Walther I.	Capt. Werner I.[1]	34	4
3rd Light ,, Capt. von Bastineller	— —	3	41	Capt. von Bastineller	Lieut. Giese	21	6
4th ,, ,, Capt. Mente	— —	3	41	— —	Lieuts. Meyer and Schackschneider	26	8
2nd Horse Artillery battery, Capt. König	Sec. Lieut. Ladewig	7	81	Dr. Scherk	— —	29	20
b. *Hessian Artillery.*							
Staff of Lieut.-Col. Stumpf, commanding	— —	—	2	— —	— —	—	1
Field Division, Maj. von Herget	— —	—	—	— —	Lieut. and Adj. Beck[1]	—	1
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. Reh	— —	2	6	Sec. Lieut. Goes	— —	22	4
2nd ,, ,, Capt. Hoffmann	— —	2	4	— —	— —	7	1
1st Light ,, Capt. Frank	— —	3	9	— —	— —	9	6
2nd ,, ,, Capt. Weygand	— —	3	8	Capt. Weygand	Sec. Lieut. Deisz	10	5
3rd ,, Capt. Ronstad	Capt. Ronstadt	4	9	— —	Sec. Lieut. Kehrer[1]	16	9
Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Freiherr von Schäffer-Bernstein	Lieut. Grolmann	6	22	Capt. Freiherr von Schäffer-Bernstein[2]	— —	24	15

[1] These officers, though wounded, continued to do duty with their batteries.
[2] This officer afterwards died of his wounds.

List of Casualties—continued.

Corps	Killed			Wounded					
	Officers	Men	Horses	Officers				Men	Horses
				Severely		Slightly			
Artillery of the Xth Army Corps.									
Staff of Maj.-Gen. Freiherr von der Becke, commanding the artillery	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1st Field division, Lieut.-Col. Schaumann	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. Kleine	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2nd ,, ,, Capt. Lancelle	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1
1st Light ,, Capt. Knauer	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3
2nd ,, ,, Capt. von Baumbach	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2nd Field division, Maj. Krause	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3rd Heavy field battery, Capt. Heyn	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4th ,, ,, Maj. Ribbentrop	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3rd Light ,, Capt. Burbach	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	4
4th ,, ,, Capt. Mittelstädt	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	1	—
Corps Artillery, Col. Baron von der Goltz	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3rd Field division, Capt. Reinsdorff	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
5th Heavy field battery, Capt. von Scheven	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
6th ,, ,, First Lieut. Schede	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
5th Light ,, Capt. Berendt	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	2	—
6th ,, ,, Capt. Richard	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Horse Artillery division, Maj. Körber	—	—	—	—	—	Sec. Lieut. Rehkopf[1]	—	—	—
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Frisch	—	—	10	Capt. Frisch[1,2]	—	First Lieut. Frels[1]	—	4	10
2nd ,, ,, Capt. Schirmer	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
3rd ,, ,, Capt. Saalmüller	—	—	2	11	—	—	—	5	16
1st ,, ,, 4th regiment, Capt. Bode	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3

[1] These officers, though wounded, continued to do duty with their batteries.
[2] This officer afterwards died of his wounds.

List of Casualties—continued.

Corps	Killed			Wounded			
	Officers	Men	Horses	Officers		Men	Horses
				Severely	Slightly		
Artillery of the XIIth Army Corps.							
Staff of Maj.-Gen. Köhler, commanding the artillery	— —	—	—	— —	— —	—	—
1st Field division, Lieut.-Col. von Watzdorf	— —	—	—	— —	— —	—	—
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. Rothmaler	— —	—	—	— —	— —	—	—
2nd ,, ,, Capt. Leonhardi	— —	—	—	— —	— —	2	1
1st Light ,, Capt. Lengnik	— —	—	—	— —	— —	2	1
2nd ,, ,, Capt. Westmann	— —	—	—	— —	— —	—	2
2nd Field division, Maj. Richter	— —	—	—	Lieut. and Adj. Friedrich	— —	—	—
3rd Heavy field battery, Capt. Keysselitz	— —	—	—	— —	Capt. Keysselitz	—	2
4th ,, ,, Capt. Groh	— —	—	—	— —	— —	—	—
3rd Light ,, Capt. Bucher II.	— —	—	—	— —	— —	5	5
4th ,, ,, Maj. von der Pforte	— —	—	—	— —	— —	1	—
Corps Artillery, Col. Funcke	— —	—	—	— —	— —	—	—
3rd Field division, Maj. Hoch	— —	—	—	— —	Maj. Hoch	—	—
5th Heavy field battery, Capt. Hammer	— —	—	—	Capt. Hammer	— —	—	—
6th ,, ,, Capt. Verworrner	— —	1	2	— —	— —	3	—
5th Light ,, Capt. von Zeschau	— —	1	11	— —	— —	9	8
4th Field division, Lieut.-Col. Oertel	— —	—	—	— —	— —	—	—
7th Heavy field battery, Capt. Bucher I.	— —	—	—	— —	— —	1	2
8th ,, ,, Capt. Portius	— —	1	—	— —	— —	1	1
6th Light ,, Capt. Fellmer	— —	—	1	— —	— —	1	2
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Zenker	— —	—	1	— —	— —	1	9
2nd ,, ,, Capt. Müller	— —	—	2	— —	— —	1	2
Column-division, Lieut.-Col. Schörmer	— —	—	—	Lieut.-Col. Schörmer	— —	—	—

Expenditure of Ammunition on the 18th of August, 1870.

Battery	Number of Rounds		
	Shell		Case
	Common	Shrapnel	
Artillery of the Guard.			
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. von Sametzki . .	603	—	—
2nd ,, ,, Capt. von Prittwitz . .	704	—	—
1st Light ,, Capt. von Dewitz . . .	662	—	—
2nd ,, ,, Capt. von Neiderstetter . .	632	—	—
3rd Heavy ,, Capt. von Ehlern . . .	494	—	—
4th ,, ,, Capt. Seeger . . .	607	—	—
3rd Light ,, Capt. von Friederici-Steinmann	727	—	—
4th ,, ,, Capt. von Mutius . . .	762	—	—
5th Heavy ,, Capt. von Roon . . .	590	—	—
6th ,, ,, Capt. von Oppell . . .	179	—	—
5th Light ,, Capt. von Unruhe . . .	375	—	—
6th ,, ,, Capt. von Ising . . .	632	—	—
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Edler von der Planitz	342	—	—
2nd ,, ,, Capt. von Grävenitz . .	800	—	—
3rd ,, ,, Capt. von Anker . .	320	—	—
Artillery of the 1st Army Corps.			
6th Light field battery, Capt. Dolmann . . .	90	—	—
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Preinitzer . .	693	—	—
Artillery of the IInd Army Corps.			
2nd Heavy field battery, Capt. von Hildebrandt . .	1	—	—
1st Light ,, Capt. von Eckensteen . .	15	—	—
2nd ,, ,, Capt. Linker . . .	6	—	—
3rd Heavy ,, Capt. Zöllner . . .	1	—	—
5th Light ,, Capt. Rhades . . .	2	—	—
3rd Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Roehl . . .	1	—	—
Artillery of the IIIrd Army Corps.			
1st Heavy field battery, Capt, Nöldecke . . .	47	—	—
2nd ,, ,, Lieut. Châles de Beaulieu .	68	—	—
3rd ,, ,, Capt. Vosz	283	—	—
4th ,, ,, Capt. Fromme . . .	461	—	—
3rd ,, ,, Lieut. Beckh . . .	382	—	—
4th ,, ,, Capt. Müller II. . . .	416	—	—
5th ,, ,, Capt. Eunicke . . .	3	—	—
6th ,, ,, Capt. Meinecke . . .	21	—	—
1st Horse Artillery battery, Lieut. Franck . . .	253	—	—
3rd ,, ,, Lieut. Gizycki . . .	852	—	—
Total	12,024	—	—

Expenditure of Ammunition—continued.

Battery	Number of Rounds		
	Shell		Case
	Common	Shrapnel	
Brought forward	12,024	—	—
Artillery of the VIIth *Army Corps.*			
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. Hübner . . .	229	—	—
2nd ,, ,, Capt. Wolff . . .	470	—	—
1st Light ,, Capt. Schweder . . .	168	—	—
2nd ,, ,, Lieut. Götz	306	—	—
3rd Heavy ,, Capt. Bleckert . . .	143	—	—
4th ,, ,, Capt. Lemmer . . .	52	—	—
3rd Light ,, Capt. Gnügge . . .	225	—	16
4th ,, ,, Capt. Trautmann . . .	10	—	—
5th Heavy ,, Lieut. Rühle von Lilienstern .	445	—	—
6th ,, ,, Capt. von Gostkowski . .	173	—	—
5th Light ,, Capt. Schreiber . . .	183	—	—
6th ,, ,, Capt. Gasch	430	—	—
2nd Horse Artillery battery, Capt. von Hahn . .	144	—	—
3rd ,, ,, Capt Hasse . . .	243	—	—
Artillery of the VIIIth *Army Corps.*			
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. Busse	386	—	—
2nd ,, ,, Capt. von Uthmann . .	470	—	—
1st Light ,, Capt. Geiszler . . .	606	—	—
2nd ,, ,, Capt. Leo	572	—	—
3rd Heavy ,, Capt. von Wissel . . .	468	—	—
4th ,, ,, Capt. Sommer . . .	544	—	—
3rd Light ,, Capt. von Teichmann-Logischen	552	—	—
4th Light field battery, Capt. Gehtmann . . .	416	—	—
5th Heavy ,, Capt. Jacobi . . .	261	—	—
6th ,, ,, Capt. Mende . . .	178	—	—
5th Light ,, Lieut. Gillmeister . . .	423	—	—
6th ,, ,, Capt. von Helden-Sarnowski .	345	—	—
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. von Fuchsius . .	260	—	—
2nd ,, ,, Capt. Schlieben . .	212	—	—
3rd ,, ,, Capt. Protze . . .	226	—	—
Artillery of the IXth *Army Corps.*			
a. Prussian Artillery.			
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. Werner II. . .	1,320	—	—
2nd ,, ,, Capt. Kindler . .			
1st Light ,, Capt. Koch . . .	1,930	—	—
2nd ,, ,, Capt. Freiherr von Eynatten			
3rd Heavy ,, Capt. Roerdansz . . .	261	—	4
4th ,, ,, Capt. Werner I. . . .	145	—	—
3rd Light ,, Capt. von Bastineller . .	341	—	—
4th ,, ,, Capt. Mente	533	—	—
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. König . . .	702	—	—
Total	26,396	—	20

***Expenditure of Ammunition*—continued.**

Battery	Number of Rounds		
	Shell		Case
	Common	Shrapnel	
Brought forward	26,396	—	20
b. HESSIAN ARTILLERY.			
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. Reh	651	—	—
2nd ,, ,, Capt. Hoffmann . . .	564	—	—
1st Light ,, Capt. Frank	920	—	—
2nd ,, ,, Capt. Weygand . . .	960	—	—
3rd ,, ,, Capt. Ronstadt . . .	776	—	—
Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Freiherr von Schäffer-Bernstein	576	—	—
Artillery of the Xth Army Corps.			
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. Klein	3	—	—
2nd ,, ,, Capt. Lancelle . . .	15	—	—
1st Light ,, Capt. Knauer . . .	59	—	—
2nd ,, ,, Capt. von Baumbach . .	99	—	—
3rd Heavy ,, Capt Heyn	37	—	—
4th ,, ,, Maj. Ribbentrop . . .	32	—	—
3rd Light ,, Capt. Burbach . . .	31	—	—
4th ,, ,, Capt. Mittelstädt . . .	81	—	—
5th Heavy ,, Capt. von Scheven . .	157	—	—
6th ,, ,, Lieut. Schede . . .	127	—	—
5th Light ,, Capt. Berendt . . .	228	—	—
6th ,, ,, Capt. Richard . . .	181	—	—
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Frisch . . .	99	—	—
2nd ,, ,, Capt. Schirmer . .	77	—	—
3rd ,, ,, Capt. Sallmüller . .	269	—	—
1st H. A. battery, 4th Regiment, Capt. Bode . .	87	—	—
Artillery of the XIIth Army Corps.			
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. Rothmaler . . .	8	3	—
2nd ,, ,, Capt. Leonhardi . . .	102	62	—
1st Light ,, Capt. Lengnik . . .	52	6	—
2nd ,, ,, Capt. Westmann . . .	96	—	—
3rd Heavy ,, Capt. Keisselitz . . .	58	—	—
4th ,, ,, Capt. Groh	157	9	—
3rd Light ,, Capt. Bucher II. . . .	177	—	—
4th ,, ,, Maj. von der Pforte . .	83	19	—
5th Heavy ,, Capt. Hammer . . .	137	3	—
6th ,, ,, Capt. Verworrner . . .	157	15	—
5th Light ,, Capt. von Zeschau . .	138	23	—
7th Heavy ,, Capt. Bucher I. . . .	162	3	—
8th ,, ,, Capt. Portius . . .	173	11	—
6th Light ,, Capt. Fellmer . . .	193	6	—
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Zenker . . .	42	13	—
2nd ,, ,, Capt. Müller . . .	321	6	—
Grand Total	34,481	179	20

List of Casualties and Expenditure of Ammunition of the Artillery of the 1st Army Corps on the 17th of August, 1870.

Battery	Men		Horses		Number of Shell
	Killed	Wounded	Killed	Wounded	
1st Heavy field battery	—	3	—	1	53
2nd ,, ,,	—	—	—	—	66
1st Light ,,	—	—	2	—	139
2nd ,, ,,	—	—	—	—	132
3rd Heavy ,,	1	—	2	3	63
4th ,, ,,	—	—	—	—	137
3rd Light ,,	—	—	—	—	141
4th ,, ,,	—	—	—	—	103
5th Heavy ,,	—	—	—	—	56
6th ,, ,,	—	—	—	—	85
5th Light ,,	—	—	—	—	39
6th ,, ,,	—	—	—	—	54
2nd Horse Artillery battery	—	—	—	—	122
3rd ,, ,,	—	1	—	—	113

The following damages were reported by the batteries on the 18th :—

2nd Heavy field battery, Guard Corps :	a breech piece and a gun carriage.
1st Light ,, ,,	an elevating screw, a wheel, and a limber box.
2nd ,, ,, ,,	a wheel and a limber box.
3rd ,, ,, ,,	a limber.
5th Heavy ,, ,,	a limber (exploded), and a breech piece.
3rd Horse Artillery battery ,,	a wheel.
1st ,, ,, 1st Army Corps :	a breech-piece.
2nd Light field battery, VIIth Army Corps :	a pole and gun-wheel.
4th ,, ,, ,,	two wheels.
6th Heavy ,, ,,	a wheel.
3rd Horse Artillery battery, VIIth Army Corps :	an axletree-box seat.
6th Heavy field battery, VIIIth Army Corps :	a wheel.
1st Light ,, IXth ,,	two limbers.
4th ,, ,, ,, ,,	a limber, gun carriage, and two wheels.
1st Horse Artillery battery, IXth Army Corps :	a pole.
1st Light field battery, Hessian Artillery :	a wheel.
2nd ,, ,, ,,	a limber and a wheel.
Horse Artillery battery ,,	two wheels.
3rd ,, ,, Xth Army Corps :	a limber wheel.
6th Light field battery, XIIth Army Corps :	a gun wheel.

The muzzle of a gun in the 2nd Heavy field battery of the IXth Army Corps was indented by a French shell, but remained serviceable during the whole campaign. During the advance of the battery both store wagons were so injured that they were left behind as unserviceable.

A store wagon of the 4th Heavy field battery of the Xth Army Corps was also so damaged that its place was supplied by a captured French wagon.

ORDER OF BATTLE

OF THAT PORTION OF THE ARMY OF THE RHINE WHICH TOOK PART IN THE BATTLES NEAR METZ.

Commander-in-Chief . . . H.E. MARSHAL BAZAINE.

Chief of the Staff—*General of Division* Jarras.
Commander of Artillery—*General of Division* Soleille.
Commander of Engineers—*General of Division* Coffinières.

2ND CORPS. GENERAL OF DIVISION FROSSARD.
Chief of the Staff—*General* de Saget.

FIRST DIVISION. *General of Division* Vergé.
Chief of the Staff—*Colonel* Andrieu.

1st Brigade—General Letellier-Valazé: 3rd Rifles, 32nd and 55th Regiments.
2nd Brigade—General Jolivet: 76th and 77th Regiments.
Artillery—5th and 12th Batteries, 6th Battery (mitrailleurs), 5th Artillery Regiment.
Engineers—9th Company, 3rd Regiment.

SECOND DIVISION. *General of Division* Bataille.
Chief of the Staff—*Lieut.-Colonel* Loysel.

1st Brigade—General Pouget: 12th Chasseurs, 8th and 23rd Regiments.
2nd Brigade—General Fauvart-Bastoul: 66th and 67th Regiments.
Artillery—7th and 8th Batteries, and 9th Battery (mitrailleurs), 5th Artillery Regiment.
Engineers—12th Company, 3rd Regiment.

THIRD DIVISION. *General of Division* de Laveaucoupet.
Chief of the Staff—*Lieut.-Colonel* Billot.

1st Brigade—General Doens: 10th Chasseurs, 2nd and 63rd Regiments.
2nd Brigade—General Micheler: 24th and 40th Regiments.
Artillery—7th and 8th Batteries, 11th Battery (mitrailleurs), 5th Artillery Regiment.
Engineers—13th Company, 3rd Regiment.

CAVALRY DIVISION. *General of Division* Marmier.
Chief of the Staff—*Lieut.-Colonel* de Cools.

1st Brigade—General de Valabrègue: 4th and 5th Chasseurs.
2nd Brigade—General Bachelier: 7th and 12th Dragoons.

ARTILLERY RESERVE.

10th and 11th Batteries, 5th Regiment.
6th and 10th Batteries, 15th Regiment.
7th and 8th Batteries, 17th Regiment.

2nd Company, Bridging Train.
Detachment of 3rd Company, Artificers.

ENGINEER RESERVE.

2nd Company, 3rd Engineer Regiment.
Detachment of Sappers, 1st Engineer Regiment.

3RD CORPS. GENERAL OF DIVISION DECAEN.

Chief of the Staff—*Brigadier-General* Manèque.

FIRST DIVISION. *General of Division* Montaudon.

Chief of the Staff—*Colonel* Folloppe.

1st Brigade—General Baron Aymard : 18th Chasseurs, 51st and 62nd Regiments.
2nd Brigade—General Clinchant : 81st and 95th Regiments.
Artillery—6th and 8th Batteries, and 5th Battery (mitrailleurs), 4th Artillery Regiment.
Engineers—6th Company, 1st Regiment.

SECOND DIVISION. *General of Division* Castagny.

Chief of the Staff—*Colonel* du Martray.

1st Brigade—General Nayral : 15th Chasseurs, 19th and 41st Regiments.
2nd Brigade—General Duplessis : 69th and 90th Regiments.
Artillery—9th and 11th Batteries, 12th Battery (mitrailleurs), 4th Artillery Regiment.
Engineers—10th Company, 1st Regiment.

THIRD DIVISION. *General of Division* Metman.

Chief of the Staff—*Lieut.-Colonel* d'Orléans.

1st Brigade—General de Potier : 7th Chasseurs, 7th and 29th Regiments.
2nd Brigade—General Arnaudeau : 59th and 71st Regiments.
Artillery—6th and 7th Batteries, 5th Battery (mitrailleurs), 11th Artillery Regiment.
Engineers—11th Company, 1st Regiment.

FOURTH DIVISION. *General of Division* Aymard.

Chief of the Staff—*Lieut.-Colonel* de la Soujeole.

1st Brigade—General de Brauer : 11th Chasseurs, 44th and 60th Regiments.
2nd Brigade—General Sanglé-Ferrière : 80th and 85th Regiments.
Artillery—9th and 10th Batteries, 8th Battery (mitrailleurs), 11th Artillery Regiment.
Engineers—12th Company, 1st Regiment.

CAVALRY DIVISION. *General of Division* Clérembault.

Chief of the Staff—*Lieut.-Colonel* Jouffroy d'Albans.

1st Brigade—General de Bruchard : 2nd, 3rd, and 10th Chasseurs.
2nd Brigade—General de Maubranches : 2nd and 4th Dragoons.
3rd Brigade—General de Juniac ; 5th and 8th Dragoons.

ARTILLERY RESERVE.

7th and 10th Batteries, 4th Regiment.
11th and 12th Batteries, 11th Regiment.
1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Batteries, 17th Regiment.

4th Company, Bridging Train.
Detachment of 7th Company, Artificers.

ENGINEER RESERVE.

1½ company and a detachment of Sappers, 1st Regiment.

4TH CORPS. GENERAL OF DIVISION DE LADMIRAULT.

Chief of the Staff—*Brigadier-General* d'Osmont.

FIRST DIVISION. *General of Division* de Cissey.

Chief of the Staff—*Colonel* de Place.

1st Brigade—General Brayer : 20th Chasseurs, 1st and 6th Regiments.
2nd Brigade—General de Golberg : 57th and 73rd Regiments.
Artillery—5th and 9th Batteries, 12th Battery (mitrailleurs), 15th Artillery Regiment.
Engineers—9th Company, 2nd Regiment.

SECOND DIVISION. *General of Division* Grenier.

Chief of the Staff—*Lieut.-Colonel* de Rambaud.

1st Brigade—General Bellecourt : 5th Chasseurs, 13th and 43rd Regiments.
2nd Brigade—General Pradier : 64th and 98th Regiments.
Artillery—6th and 7th Batteries, 5th Battery (mitrailleurs), 1st Artillery Regiment.
Engineers—10th Company, 2nd Regiment.

THIRD DIVISION. *General of Division* de Lorencez.

Chief of the Staff—*Lieut.-Colonel* Villette.

1 Brigade—General Pajol : 2nd Chasseurs, 15th and 33rd Regiments.
2nd Brigade—General Berger : 54th and 65th Regiments.
Artillery—9th and 10th Batteries, 8th Battery (mitrailleurs), 1st Artillery Regiment.
Engineers—13th Company, 2nd Regiment.

CAVALRY DIVISION. *General of Division* Legrand.

Chief of the Staff—*Colonel* Campenon.

1st Brigade—General de Montaigu : 2nd and 7th Hussars.
2nd Brigade—General de Gondrecourt : 3rd and 11th Dragoons.

ARTILLERY RESERVE.

11th and 12th Batteries, 1st Regiment.
6th and 9th Batteries, 8th Regiment.
5th and 6th Batteries, 17th Regiment.

8th Company, Bridging Train.
Detachment of 5th Company, Artificers.

ENGINEER RESERVE.

1 company and a detachment of Sappers, 2nd Regiment.

A MIXED BRIGADE OF THE 5TH CORPS.[1]

General Lapasset.

14th Chasseurs, 84th and 97th Regiments.
3rd Lancers.
7th Battery, 2nd Regiment.

6TH CORPS. MARSHAL CANROBERT.

Chief of the Staff—*Brigadier-General* Henri.

FIRST DIVISION. *General of Division* Tixier.

Chief of the Staff—*Lieut.-Colonel* Fourchault.

1st Brigade—General Péchot : 9th Chasseurs, 4th and 10th Regiments.
2nd Brigade—General Leroy de Dais : 12th and 100th Regiments.
Artillery—5th and 7th Batteries, 8th Battery (mitrailleurs), 8th Artillery Regiment.
Engineers—3rd Company, 3rd Regiment.

SECOND DIVISION. *General of Division* Bisson.

Chief of the Staff—*Colonel* de Fresnel.

1st Brigade—General Noël : 9th and 14th Regiments.
2nd Brigade—General Maurice : 20th and 31st Regiments.
Artillery—11th and 12th Batteries, 10th Battery (mitrailleurs), 8th Artillery Regiment.
Engineers—4th Company, 3rd Regiment.

[1] Attached to the 2nd Corps during the battles near Metz, according to Frossard.

THIRD DIVISION. *General of Division* Lafont de Villiers.

Chief of the Staff—*Lieut.-Colonel* Piquemal.

1st Brigade—General de Sonney: 75th and 91st Regiments.
2nd Brigade—General Colin: 93rd and 94th Regiments.
Artillery—5th and 6th Batteries, 7th Battery (mitrailleurs), 14th Artillery Regiment.
Engineers—7th Company, 3rd Regiment.

FOURTH DIVISION. *General of Division* Levassor-Sorval.

Chief of the Staff—*Colonel* Mellin.

1st Brigade—General de Marguenat: 25th and 26th Regiments.
2nd Brigade—General de Chanaleilles: 28th and 70th Regiments.
Artillery—7th and 8th Batteries, 9th Battery (mitrailleurs), 10th Artillery Regiment.
Engineers—11th Company, 3rd Regiment.

CAVALRY DIVISION. *General of Division* de Salignac-Fénelon.

Chief of the Staff—*Lieut.-Colonel* Armand.

1st Brigade—General Tilliard: 1st Hussars and 6th Chasseurs.
2nd Brigade—General Savaresse: 1st and 7th Lancers.
3rd Brigade—General de Béville: 6th and 7th Cuirassiers.

ARTILLERY RESERVE.

5th, 6th, 10th, and 12th Batteries, 10th Regiment.
8th and 9th Batteries, 14th Regiment.
1st and 2nd Batteries, 9th Regiment.
Detachment of 6th Company, Artificers.

ENGINEER RESERVE.

1 company and a detachment of Sappers, 3rd Regiment.

IMPERIAL GUARD. GENERAL OF DIVISION BOURBAKI.

Chief of the Staff—*Brigadier-General* d'Auvergne.

FIRST DIVISION (Voltigeurs). *General of Division* Deligny.

Chief of the Staff—*Colonel* Ferret.

1st Brigade—General Brincourt: Chasseurs à Pied, 1st and 2nd Voltigeurs.
2nd Brigade—General Garnier: 3rd and 4th Voltigeurs.

SECOND DIVISION (Grenadiers). *General of Division* Picard.

Chief of the Staff—*Colonel* Balland.

1st Brigade—General Jeanningros: Zouaves, 1st Grenadiers.
2nd Brigade—General Poitevin de Lacroix: 2nd and 3rd Grenadiers.

CAVALRY DIVISION. *General of Division* Desvaux.

Chief of the Staff—*Colonel* Galinier.

1st Brigade—General Halna du Frétay : Guides and Chasseurs.
2nd Brigade—General de France : Lancers and Dragoons.
3rd Brigade—General de Preuil : Cuirassiers and Carbineers.

ARTILLERY OF THE GUARD.

Regiment of Field Artillery, 6 batteries (2 mitrailleurs).
Regiment of Horse Artillery, 6 batteries.
Squadron of Train.

ENGINEERS.

2 companies, 3rd Regiment.

RESERVE CAVALRY.

1ST CAVALRY DIVISION. *General of Division* du Barail.

Chief of the Staff—*Squadron Commander* de Lantivy.

1st Brigade—General Margueritte : 1st and 3rd Chasseurs d'Afrique.
2nd Brigade—General de Lajaille : 2nd and 4th Chasseurs d'Afrique.
Artillery—5th and 6th Batteries, 19th Regiment.

2ND CAVALRY DIVISION. *General of Division* de Bonnemains.

Chief of the Staff—*Lieut.-Colonel* de Tugny.

1st Brigade—General Girard : 1st and 4th Cuirassiers.
2nd Brigade—General de Braüer : 2nd and 3rd Cuirassiers.
Artillery—7th and 8th Batteries, 19th Regiment.

3RD CAVALRY DIVISION. *General of Division* de Forton.

Chief of the Staff—*Colonel* Durand de Villers.

1st Brigade—General Prince Murat : 1st and 9th Dragoons.
2nd Brigade—General de Gramont : 7th and 10th Cuirassiers.
Artillery—7th and 8th Batteries, 20th Regiment.

GENERAL RESERVE OF ARTILLERY. *Brigadier-General* Canu.

13th Regiment, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th Batteries.
18th Regiment, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Batteries.

GENERAL RESERVE OF ENGINEERS.

2nd company of Sappers, 1st Regiment (telegraph).
2 companies and a detachment of Sappers, 3rd Regiment.

REMARKS.

(1) According to Fay's account, the following troops of the 6th Corps—afterwards included in the newly formed 12th Corps—remained behind in the camp at Châlons, in consequence of the destruction of the railway :—

The 2nd Division of Infantry, with the exception of the 9th Regiment of the Line ;
The Reserve Artillery ;
The Engineer Reserve ;
The Cavalry Division.

(2) The deficiency of the 6th Corps in artillery was supplemented by allotting several batteries to it at later periods, as pointed out by Montluisant. The 12th Battery of the 8th Regiment (Blondel) succeeded during the night, between the 14th and 15th August, in reaching Metz by way of Mézières and Thionville, and it was temporarily attached to the 1st Infantry Division of the 6th Corps.

On the 13th August the 9th and 10th Batteries (12-prs.) of the 13th Regiment (General Reserve) were attached to the 2nd Infantry Division, and so remained till the battle of the 16th, after which they joined the 1st Infantry Division, which had thus 6 batteries on the 18th.

For the 18th, moreover, the 7th and 8th Batteries of the 18th Regiment (4-prs. from the General Reserve) were attached to the 6th Corps.

After the battle of the 18th more artillery was allotted to the 6th Corps, and at Noisseville its artillery, under General Baron de Berckheim, consisted of

(*a*) The original batteries of the 1st and 3rd Infantry Division, as given in the foregoing order of battle.

(*b*) The 7th and 8th Batteries of the 19th Regiment, and the 12th of the 8th Regiment of the 4th Infantry Division.

(*c*) Of the Reserve Artillery—

9th and 10th Batteries, 13th Regiment (12-prs.);
11th Battery (mitrailleurs), 15th Regiment (Lauret);
9th Battery (mitrailleurs), 4th Regiment.

Lauret's battery belonged previously to Laveaucoupet's Infantry Division, which joined the garrison of Metz on the 14th August.

(*d*) The 5th and 6th Batteries of the 19th Regiment of the Cavalry Division.

Total, 15 batteries, 11 4-prs., 2 12-prs., 2 mitrailleurs.

A discrepancy is to be found between Fay's and Montluisant's accounts with regard to the batteries of mitrailleurs. According to the former 4 out of the 15 batteries were mitrailleurs.

(3) In the 1st Division of Reserve Cavalry (Du Barrail) the 4th Regiment of Chasseurs d'Afrique was absent from the first.

After the departure of the Emperor Napoleon's escort on the 16th August, Bruchard's cavalry brigade of the 3rd Corps was added to the 2nd Regiment of Chasseurs d'Afrique and the two batteries, which were then the only troops left to General

du Barrail, and the division thus reorganised was placed under the command of the 6th Corps.

(4) The large artillery ammunition park, which left Versailles on the 10th August, was unable to reach the army, and only reached Toul.


(5) Marshal Bazaine gives the strength of the artillery of the Army of the Rhine as

456 guns,
84 mitrailleurs.
Total 540


He estimates the strength of the army on the 13th August, when he took over the command, at 170,000 men :—

Infantry	122,000
Cavalry	13,000
Artillery	10,000
Engineers and Administration	25,000

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FEBRUARY, 1874.

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